Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Banning information as a redistributive device 

      Gottlieb, Daniel; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
      In this paper we analyze the optimality of allowing firms to observe signals of workers’ characteristics in an optimal taxation framework. We show that it is always optimal to prohibit signals that disclose information ...
    • A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED 

      Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde; Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
      We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is ...
    • Should educational policies be regressive? 

      Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
      In this paper, we show that when the government is able to transfer wealth between generations, regressive policies are no longer optimal. The optimal educational policy can be decentralized through appropriate Pigouvian ...