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dc.contributor.authorWerlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-28T15:46:53Z
dc.date.available2019-02-28T15:46:53Z
dc.date.issued1986-04-01
dc.identifier.issn1980-2447
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/27096
dc.description.abstractThis is part of a larger project to investigate the Bayesian foundations of non-cooperative solution concepts. Elsewhere Bernheim and Pearce prove that common knowledge of Bayesian rationality is not enough to justify the non-cooperative solution concept defined by Nash. Here several alternative behavioural assumptions are considered. In general the coordination required to achieve a Nash equilibrium is very strong. Not only Bayesian rationality, but also the actions taken, have to be common knowledge . For particular kinds of games the coordination required is not as strong.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSociedade Brasileira de Econometria
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBrazilian Review of Econometrics
dc.sourcePeriódicos científicos e revistas FGV
dc.subjectBayesian foundationseng
dc.subjectNash equilibriumeng
dc.titleBayesian foundations of Nash equilibrium behavioureng
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)eng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataTeoria dos jogospor
dc.subject.bibliodataTeoria bayesiana de decisão estatísticapor
dc.identifier.doi10.12660/bre.v6n11986.3119
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccesseng
dc.identifier.file3119


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