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dc.contributor.authorGuimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos
dc.contributor.authorSalama, Bruno Meyerhof
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-02T16:31:01Z
dc.date.available2017-03-02T16:31:01Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.siciTD 440
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/17985
dc.description.abstractLegislation that seems unreasonable to courts is less likely to be followed. Building on this premise, we propose a model and obtain two main results. First, the enactment of legislation prohibiting something raises the probability that courts will allow related things not expressly forbidden. In particular, the imposition of an interest rate ceiling can make it more likely that courts will validate contracts with interest rates below the legislated cap. Second, legal uncertainty is greater with legislation that commands little deference from courts than with legislation that commands none. We discuss examples of e§ects of legislated prohibitions (and, in particular, usury laws) that are consistent with the model.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEESP - Textos para Discussão;TD 440por
dc.subjectAdjudicationeng
dc.subjectCourtseng
dc.subjectProhibitionseng
dc.subjectInterest rate capeng
dc.titleContingent judicial deference: theory and application to usury lawseng
dc.typeWorking Papereng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.contributor.unidadefgvEscolas::EESPpor
dc.subject.bibliodataAdjudicaçãopor


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