The effect of financiaI repression & enforcernent on entrepreneurship and economic deveIopment

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of financiaI repression and contract enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium mo deI with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financiaI frictions: intermediation costs and financiaI contract enforcement. Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously, and depend on agent type (wealth and ability) and the credit market frictions. The mo deI shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries. We use empirical estimates of each country's financiaI frictions, and United States values for all other parameters. The results allow us to isolate the quantitative effect of these financiaI frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States. The results depend critically on whether à general equilibrium factor price effect is operative, which in turn depends on whether financiaI markets are open or closed. This yields a positive policy prescription: If the goal is to maximize steady-state efficiency, financial reforms should be accompanied by measures to increase financiaI capital mobility.