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The Private Memory of Aggregate Shocks

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Abstract

We study constrained efficient aggregate risk sharing and its consequence for the behavior of macro-aggregates in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) setting. Privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be independent of i.i.d. publicly observed aggregate shocks. Yet, private allocations display memory with respect to past aggregate shocks, when idiosyncratic shocks are also i.i.d.. Under a mild restriction on the nature of optimal allocations the result extends to more persistent idiosyncratic shocks, for all but the limit at which idiosyncratic risk disappears, and the model collapses to a pure heterogeneity repeated Mirrlees economy identical to Werning [2007]. When preferences are iso-elastic we show that an allocation is memoryless only if it displays a strong form of separability with respect to aggregate shocks. Separability characterizes the pure heterogeneity limit as well as the general case with log preferences. With less than full persistence and risk aversion different from unity both memory and non-separability characterize optimal allocations. Exploiting the fact that non-separability is associated with state-varying labor wedges, we apply a business cycle accounting procedure (e.g. Chari et al. [2007]) to the aggregate data generated by the model. We show that, whenever risk aversion is great than one our model produces efficient counter-cyclical labor wedges.

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1 Introduction

Following Wilson’s (1968) landmark contribution, much has been learnt about optimal risk sharing. Absent asymmetric information the mutualization of private risks and its consequences for the dynamics of private consumption as a function of aggregate consumption are now well understood: conditional on aggregate consumption, an individuals’ current consumption ought to be independent of past information, i.e., first best allocations are memoryless.

If, however, there is private information with regards to idiosyncratic shocks, full insurance is no longer feasible. Contrary to the case with no private information, (constrained) optimal schemes are history dependent. Most of this latter literature focuses on the case in which only private risk exists by making assumptions on the nature of idiosyncratic shocks that ultimately lead to the elimination of aggregate risk – Phelan [1994] being a noteworthy exception.

In this paper we consider the interaction between aggregate shocks and private allocations which arises in a dynamic agency environment. Our prototype economy is a dynamic Mirrlees economy with a finite number of productivity levels and i.i.d. aggregate shocks. We assume that aggregate and private shocks are independent from one another and explore the endogenously generated interconnections displayed by the efficient allocations.

We show a strong form of dependence between aggregate shocks and private allocations: allocations exhibit memory with respect to aggregate shocks. That is, today’s allocation depends not only on current shock—as in Wilson [1968]— and on yesterday’s idiosyncratic shock—as in Golosov et al. [2003]—but also on yesterday’s aggregate shock, despite the fact that the latter is public and independent of idiosyncratic shocks. Our assumptions on the nature of shocks rules out non-trivial interactions between aggregate

\[ 1 \text{Our knowledge of dynamic insurance in the presence of private information stems from a large literature, starting with the early contribution of Rogerson [1985] followed by the methodological advances found in Green [1987], Spear and Srivastava [1987] and Thomas and Worrall [1990] which built our current understanding of fundamental issues of dynamic insurance schemes. The non-existence of non-degenerate steady-states and the associated immiseration results are now well understood consequences of back loading incentives that typically characterizes such environments.} \]
and private risk due to the reasons found in Holmström [1982]. Namely, that the aggregate state may serve as a signal about the agents’ private information. Instead, the rationale for our results is closer to Levin [2002], in the sense that the provision of incentives may alter the marginal value of aggregate resources.\textsuperscript{2,3}

We conduct some numeric exercises to: i) illustrate some of the results obtained analytically; ii) produce ‘aggregate’ data used in a business cycle accounting exercise.\textsuperscript{4} Our focus for this latter point is on the variation of the labor wedge with the economic cycle.

Chari et al. [2007], Shimer [2009], among others, have shown that the labor wedge associated with a representative agent economy varies countercyclically along the business cycle. Because incentives in our model are provided in the leisure/consumption margin in a time and state varying fashion, our prototype economy is potentially useful for understanding state-dependent labor wedges. To summarize our findings, for risk aversion greater than one, the data generated by our prototype economy has the same property one finds in the data: a representative agent would have to be facing countercyclical labor wedges to make these choices. Although the results are reversed when risk aversion is less than one and wedges are invariant when preferences are of the log type, our results raise the possibility that countercyclical wedges may characterize efficient responses to aggregate shocks.

It is also important to mention that, for wedges to vary with the aggregate state of the economy, allocations must display a form of non-separability with respect to aggregate shocks. This form of non-separability also plays an important role in our discussion of memory: an allocation is memoryless only if it is separable in previous periods. Due to the relationship between separability and memory, an allocation exhibits state-varying wedges only if it displays memory. This will pose an important challenge for future cal-

\textsuperscript{2}Here, the resource constraint induces an interdependence in the provision of incentives across agents while in Levin [2002] the same type of interdependence arises due to an endogenous restriction on what may be credibly promised to the pool of agents. We thank Vinicius Carrasco for pointing this out.

\textsuperscript{3}In the class of utility function studied here, this reduces to the coefficient of risk aversion. As shown by Demange [2008] it is possible to define an incentive premium that makes the marginal utility of consumption for a representative consumer identical to the marginal value of resources for the society. Under our constant relative risk aversion — CRRA — specification, the sign of this premium only depends on whether risk aversion is greater or less than one. For log preferences this premium is zero.

\textsuperscript{4}In the sense of Chari et al. [2007].
liberation exercises since interesting business cycle dynamics comes at the cost of an increased dimensionality problem. Or taken from a different angle, this separability result should be seen as an important cautionary note. Assumptions commonly used to eliminate history dependence—e.g., ln utility—are bound to eliminate interesting business cycle variations.

Although our focus is on the labor wedge, we also analyze the asset pricing implications of our model. We first use the relevant pricing kernel as defined in Kocherlakota [2005] to generate the price for a risk free asset and a stock, understood as a claim to aggregate income. Next we use the aggregate data generated in our heterogeneous agent economy as if it were a representative agent economy to try and price these assets. We calculate the asset pricing errors that one incurs by using the representative agent formulation of Lucas [1978] to price the assets of our model economy and emphasize the role of idiosyncratic risk as opposed to pure heterogeneity in generating these errors.

Our model is capable of generating countercyclical risks premia. However, our oversimplified numerical examples precludes a quantitative assessment of the model, which is in contrast with Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2007] or Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2009] which use real consumption and asset pricing data. Our dynamic agency model is potentially useful for one to accommodate asset pricing anomalies.

**Brief Account of Related Literature**  With regards to memory of aggregate shock, closest to our work is Phelan [1994]. Using a perpetual life overlapping generations model, with individuals’ preferences of the constant absolute risk aversion—CARA—type, Phelan [1994] provides a full characterization of the steady state of a dynamic moral hazard model with i.i.d. shocks and aggregate uncertainty. By eliminating income effects through the CARA assumption and by killing the tendency for ever increasing inequality through the use of an OLG formulation Phelan [1994] is able to find closed form solution for optimal allocations. Although it is not the focus of his paper, Phelan [1994] shows that memory of aggregate shock does characterize optimal allocation.

In our model we consider different levels of persistence of private shocks and focus, instead, on a dynamic Mirrlees economy with agents whose preferences are of the con-
stant relative risk aversion—CRRA—type. Our numerical simulations indicate that the presence of memory which characterizes an environment with i.i.d. private shocks—reminiscent of Phelan [1994]—and the lack of memory which characterizes the pure heterogeneity case—explored by Werning [2007]—are not knife-edge results: there is a monotonic relationship between private persistence and aggregate memory.

Because we consider a dynamic Mirrlees economy we are able to discuss how labor supply, and, the labor wedge varies along the business cycle. Finally, by varying the coefficient of relative risk aversion we can show the important role played by this parameter in determining the direction of departure from separability in optimal allocations.

More recently Scheuer [2009] and Demange [2008] study the interaction between risk sharing and moral hazard. Both Scheuer [2009] and Demange [2008] models are static, which means that they cannot address memory. We must also mention the numerical exercises conducted by Golosov et al. [2006] in a two period Mirrlees economy with aggregate risk. Golosov et al. [2006] do not exploit models that generate memory of aggregate shocks, nor do they emphasize the behavior of aggregate variables. Also related are the numerical exercises found in Kocherlakota [2005]. The emphasis in this case is on optimal taxes on capital returns.

The idea of using our normative framework to produce empirical predictions is in the spirit of Townsend [1993]. The underlying idea is that many different institutional arrangements are capable of inducing a given allocation. The fact that we do not see labor income taxes vary at the frequency required by the model does not mean that other formal or informal arrangements may generate these state-varying wedges. One lesson we take from mechanism design is that we should focus on allocations first, and maybe exclusively in the case of positive questions—e.g., Ligon et al. [2002], Attanasio and Pavoni [2008].

Although most of the literature of the so-called Dynamic Public Finance literature is normative, in recent years, a relatively large body of research has arisen on the Macroeconomics implications of private information. Representative of this literature are Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2007, 2008b, 2009] who explore the asset pricing implications of these models. There are some reasons why our model is capable of generating non-trivial de-

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partures from the representative agent CCAPM. First, although idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are independent, the same is not true for allocations. Second, to implement efficient allocations, agents must have restricted access to financial markets, a point that is crucial for an incomplete markets model to generate any type of interesting asset pricing behavior; a point emphasized by Cochrane [2001]. We differ from Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2007, 2008b, 2009] in that we do not take a partial characterization of the equilibrium and try to match the data, an exercise in the spirit of Hansen and Singleton [1983]. Instead, we generate the data from a fully specified model in the spirit of Mehra and Prescott [1985]. Contrary to this last work we do not calibrate the model, but use a very simplified setting to understand ‘qualitative’ properties of the data it generates.  

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a general setting that encompasses both economies that we investigate. The Atkeson and Lucas [1992] framework is studied in section 2.1 while the Mirrlees [1971] setting is covered in section 3. The macro implications of our model are considered in 4. Numerical exercises are conducted in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Basic Setting

The economy is inhabited by a continuum of measure one of ex-ante identical individuals, each living for $T$ periods. Agents have preferences defined on a consumption set $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+^T$. In every period, agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, $\theta_t \in \Theta = \{\theta(H), \theta(L)\}$, with $\theta(H) > \theta(L)$, which affects not only their welfare but also the way they rank different streams $\{x_t\}_{t=1}^T \in X^T$ of the relevant bundle. We use $\theta^t = (\theta_1, ..., \theta_t)$ to denote a history of idiosyncratic shocks up to period $t$. For any $\theta^{t+\tau}$ and $\theta^t$, we say that $\theta^{t+\tau} > \theta^t$ if the first $t + 1$ entries of $\theta^{t+\tau}$ are equal to $\theta^t$.

Given a history of shocks, $\theta^T$, individuals rank deterministic streams $\{x_t\}_{t=1}^T \in X^T$, according to

$$\sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} U(x_t, \theta^t),$$

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This is a crucial difference that, in some sense, makes our point very different. Recall that the Equity Premium Puzzle is an assessment of a quantitative failure of the CAPM. Our exercises aim not at producing any reliable quantitative assessment.
where \( U(., \theta) : \mathbb{R}_+^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) is a smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave function, for all \( \theta \in \Theta \).

These idiosyncratic shocks are not the only source of uncertainty in this economy. In each period, an aggregate shock represented by a random variable \( z_t \in Z \equiv \{\bar{z}, \underline{z}\} \), with \( \bar{z} > \underline{z} > 0 \), affects the economy’s technology. Let also \( z^t = (z_1, ..., z_t) \) denote the history of aggregate shocks. We assume the aggregate shocks to be i.i.d. and distributed according to \( \pi(z) \). \( \pi_t(z^t) \) is the product measure induced on \( Z^T \).

Conditional on \( z^t \), idiosyncratic shocks, \( \theta^t \), are drawn from independent distributions \( \mu_t \) defined over \( \Theta^t \). We assume that a law of large numbers applies so that, at period \( t \), state \( z^t \), the cross-sectional distribution of agents coincides with the ex-ante distribution \( \mu_t \). We use \( \mu_t(\theta^t|\theta^{t-1}) \) to denote the period \( t \) conditional distribution, following history \( \theta^{t-1} \).

Idiosyncratic shocks are private information while aggregate shocks are publicly observed.

An allocation is \( x \equiv \{x_t\}_{t=1}^T \) with \( x_t : Z^t \times \Theta^t \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^L \) for each \( t \), where \( x_t(\theta^t, z^t) \) is a \((\theta^t, z^t)\)-measurable function that denotes the bundle allocated to an agent with history \( \theta^t \) at period \( t \), when aggregate history is \( z^t \). Agents’ preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function,

\[
E \left[ \sum_t \beta^{t-1} U \left( x_t(\theta^t, z^t), \theta_t \right) \right] = \sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum z^t \sum_{\theta^t} \mu_t(\theta^t) \pi_t(z^t) U \left( x_t(\theta^t, z^t), \theta_t \right). \tag{1}
\]

Technology is represented by a transformation function \( G : \mathbb{R}_+^L \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \). We say that an allocation \( x \) is resource feasible if

\[
G \left( \sum_{\theta^t} \mu_t(\theta^t) x_t(\theta^t, z^t), z_t \right) \leq 0, \text{ for all } t, z^t. \tag{2}
\]

A benevolent planner maximizes individuals’ expected utility. From a period 1 perspective this is equivalent to our assuming that the government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function.

Due to the presence of private information, we write the planner’s program as a mechanism design problem. Throughout the analysis we assume that the planner is endowed with a commitment technology. This will allow us to restrict implementation to direct
revelation mechanisms, in which agents are asked to report their types at each period, and are assigned corresponding bundles.

Define a reporting strategy, \( \sigma = \{ \sigma_t \}_{t=1}^T \), as a sequence of mappings \( \sigma_t : Z^t \times \Theta^t \rightarrow \Theta \), which associate to every history \((z^t, \theta^t)\) an announcement \( \hat{\theta} \). Two things are worth mentioning here. First, since individuals cannot lie about the aggregate state of the economy, reports are restricted to idiosyncratic shocks. Announcement strategies may, nonetheless, depend on \( z^t \). Second, we assume that the agent only announces the current shock, \( \theta_t \), in period \( t \), and not the history \( \theta^t \). Alternatively the mechanism could be described by requiring the agent to announce \( \theta^t \) instead. However, given that we assume perfect recall by the government, strategies that do not respect the condition \( \sigma_t(\theta^t) = (\sigma^{t-1}(\theta^{t-1}), \theta^t) \) for some \( \theta' \) are ruled out. As a consequence, asking \( \theta_t \) each period is without loss of generality; our choice being due to notational simplicity. The set of all admissible strategies is represented by \( \Sigma \). We also use \( \sigma^{TT} = \{\sigma_t^{TT} \}_{t=1}^T \) to denote the truth-telling strategy \( \sigma_t^{TT}(\theta^t) = \theta_t \) for all \( t \).

Let \( U(x, \sigma) \) be the utility derived from an agent choosing reporting strategy \( \sigma \) given allocation \( x \), i.e.,

\[
U(x, \sigma) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_t \beta^{t-1} U \left( x_t \left( \sigma_t(\theta_t, z^t), z^t \right), \theta_t \right) \right].
\]

An allocation \( x \) is incentive compatible if

\[
U \left( x, \sigma^{TT} \right) \geq U \left( x, \sigma \right), \text{ for all } \sigma \in \Sigma.
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

We shall (partially) characterize the solution to the problem of maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3) for a dynamic Mirrlees economy—Section 3. However, we first consider a taste shock example—Section 2.1— which will allow us to illustrate some of the concepts and issues to be discussed in our main setup. Before moving on, it is worth emphasizing that under our assumption that the sets of all possible shocks is finite, and assuming for the moment \( T < \infty \), existence and uniqueness of this solution is trivially verified for both models.

### 2.1 A Preference Shock Example

Consider a two period version of Atkeson and Lucas [1992] with aggregate shocks. Individuals care only about consumption; \( x_t = c_t \in \mathbb{R}^+ \). An allocation, \( x \), is therefore
a \tilde{\theta}^t \text{--measurable mapping from history of announcements, } \tilde{\theta}^t, \text{ to a consumption stream, } c = \{c_t\}_{t=1}^2 \in X \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+^2. \text{ In each period, individuals are exposed to taste shocks that determine their temporary utility of consumption in each period. That is, individuals preferences are of the form}

\[ U(c, \theta) = \begin{cases} 
\theta c^{1-\rho} / (1 - \rho), & \text{if } \rho > 0, \rho \neq 1, \\
\theta \log c, & \text{if } \rho = 1,
\end{cases} \]

where \( \theta \) is the taste parameter. For the moment let taste shocks be i.i.d.

The way in which the aggregate shock, \( z_t \), determines the total amount of resources the economy is given by the feasibility condition: an allocation, \( c \), is, feasible if and only if:

\[ G \left( \sum_{\theta^t} \mu(\theta^t) c(\theta^t, z^t), z_t \right) = \sum_{\theta^t} \mu(\theta^t) c(\theta^t, z^t) - z_t \leq 0, \text{ for all } t, z^t. \]

As a benchmark case, consider the first best allocation,

\[ c^{FB}_t(\theta^t, z^t) = z_t^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1}{\theta^1} \right]^{-1}. \]

Four important features of this allocation are noteworthy. The allocation is: i) independent of \( \theta^{t-1} \); ii) increasing in \( \theta_t \), iii) independent of \( z^{t-1} \) and; iv) linear in \( z_t \).

With private information, things change substantially. Because temporary utility is defined in terms of a single good (consumption) in this setting, private information is revealed only through intertemporal trade-offs. For an allocation to be incentive compatible, more transfers today must generate lower expected transfers tomorrow, thus creating persistence of allocations, even though shocks are i.i.d. This is in opposition to i.

The last two features: independence with respect to \( z_{t-1} \), and linearity in \( z_t \) are the ones we shall focus on. Note that, because aggregate shocks are public information and independent across periods, one might expect these properties to still characterize (constrained) efficient allocations. As we shall see, this is not true, in general. First, however, some definitions.

**Definition 1** If an allocation is such that in period \( t \) there are functions \( \eta : Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \) and \( \tilde{x} : \Theta^t \times Z^{t-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^L \) such that \( x_t(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{x}_t(\theta^t, z^{t-1}) \eta(z_t) \) we say that it is separable at \( t \).
For our purposes it will also be important to define a function that displays this property in all periods.

**Definition 2** If an allocation is separable at $t$ for all $t$ we say it is **separable**.

Separability is a property of allocations which will play a role in the discussions that follow. In the current setting, for example, first best allocation are characterized by a particular form of separability in which $\eta(z_t) = z_t$.

Finally, one last definition.

**Definition 3** If an allocation is such that, is independent of $z_{t-1}$ for all $t$, $z_t$, $x(\theta_t, z_t)$, i.e., it is of the form $\hat{x}(\theta_t, z_t)$, then we say it is **memoryless**.

Note that the definition only applies to memory of past aggregate shocks. It is still the case that the allocation may, and will at the optimum, depend on past idiosyncratic shocks.

We define $w(\theta_1, z_1, z)$ as the expected utility promised to an individual that announces $\theta_1$ in aggregate state $z_1$ if period 2 aggregate state in period 2 is $z$. Define

$$w(\theta_1, z_1) \equiv \sum_{z^2 > z_1} \pi(z^2) w(\theta_1, z^2),$$

$$= (1 - \rho)^{-1} \sum_{\theta^2 > \theta_1} \sum_{z^2 > z_1} \pi(z_2) \mu(\theta) \theta c^*_2(\theta^2, z^2)^{1-\rho}.$$ 

Truthful revelation is obtained by trading-off current consumption for utility promises. Therefore, no revelation of private information takes place in the last period.\(^8\)

Utility promises will take, in this case, the form

$$w(\theta_1, z_1) \equiv (1 - \rho)^{-1} \mathbb{E}(\theta) \sum_{z_2 \in Z} \pi(z_2) c^*_2(\theta_1, z_1, z_2)^{1-\rho}.$$ 

In the last period, all that is inherited from period one is a set of utility promises, which must be fulfilled. Using $c^*$ to denote the (constrained) optimal allocation, we have that,

\(^8\)Take any fixed $\theta', \theta'' \in \Theta$ and any $(\tilde{\theta}, z^2) \in \Theta \times Z^2$, then consider $\sigma = (\sigma_{1T}, \sigma_2)$ where $\sigma_2(\tilde{\theta}, \theta', z^2) = \theta''$ and $\sigma = \sigma_{1T}$ otherwise, then $c_2(\tilde{\theta}, \theta', z^2) \geq c_2(\tilde{\theta}, \theta'', z^2)$. Analyzing the reverse deviation we get that $c(\tilde{\theta}, \theta', z^2) = c_2(\tilde{\theta}, \theta'', z^2)$. We, then, realize that $c_2$ can be represented as a function $c'_2 : \Theta \times Z^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$. 

conditional on period 1 promises, consumption in period 2 displays optimal risk sharing relative to the aggregate shock, i.e., for any \((\theta_1, z_1, \theta_1', z_1')\), \(c^*_2(\theta_1, z_1, .)\) and \(c^*_2(\theta_1', z_1', .)\) are perfectly correlated.

Also, utility promises fully determine the period 2 consumption distribution,

\[
c^*_2(\theta_1, z_1, z_2) = z_2 \frac{w^* (\theta_1, z_1)^{1-\rho}}{\sum_{\theta_1 \in \Theta} \mu_1 (\theta_1) w^* (\theta_1, z_1)^{1-\rho}}.
\]

Note that the last period allocation is separable, and there is perfect aggregate risk insurance, conditional on previous utility promises. Consumption in period 2 is perfectly correlated across agents and its distribution is determined exclusively by period 1 distribution of utility promises.

The direct relationship between utility promises in period 1 and consumption levels in period two imply that we can roll back the resource constraints from the last period by deriving the feasible subset of promises. This procedure allows us to characterize and solve the planner’s problem as a static one.

Solving this static planning problem one finds that, for \(\rho \neq 1\):

i) first period consumption is not separable on aggregate shock \(z_1\), i.e., there exist no functions \(\tilde{c} (\theta_1)\) and \(\eta (z_1)\) such that \(c^*_1(\theta_1, z_1) = \tilde{c} (\theta_1) \eta (z_1)\), and;

ii) second period consumption depends on period 1 aggregate shocks, i.e., \(c_2 : Z^2 \times \Theta^2 \to \mathbb{R}_+\) cannot be independent of \(z_1\).

Endowment shocks in period 1 could be accommodated by increasing proportionately each agent’s consumption, but this is not optimal. Indeed, were we to use a proportional increase, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the two periods would vary in a non-linear fashion with \(z\)—except in the case \(\rho = 1\)—which would ultimately alter the incentives/insurance trade-off. Therefore, even though previous aggregate shocks are independent of present information structure of the economy, current consumption distribution may depend on the history of the economy. Finally note how separability in the first period and lack of memory are closely associated, a point we make more forcefully in the Mirrlees economy.

We have assumed idiosyncratic shocks to be i.i.d. Next, we provide a brief heuristic account of how the dependence on aggregate shocks may be influenced by persistence.
Persistence  Let $E[\theta'|\theta]$ denote the expected value of second period taste parameter $\theta'$ conditional on one’s having realized $\theta$ in period 1. We can re-write preferences as

$$
\theta \left\{ \frac{c_1^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} + \frac{E[\theta'|\theta]}{\theta} \sum \pi(z) \frac{c_2(z)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \right\}
$$

The marginal rate of substitution between future and current consumption is, then,

$$
\pi(z) \frac{dc_2(z)}{dc_1} \bigg|_{\theta} = \frac{\theta}{E[\theta'|\theta]} \left( \frac{c_2(z)}{c_1} \right)^\rho.
$$

Note that $\theta(H)/E[\theta'|\theta(H)] \geq \theta(L)/E[\theta'|\theta(L)]$, with strict inequality for less than full persistence. In other words, a form of single-crossing is valid here whenever there is some idiosyncratic risk. Monotonicity in $\theta$ is thus sufficient for implementation. It is also apparent from the expression above that, the higher the persistence, the smaller the difference between marginal rates of substitution between individuals.

Because there are no transfers at the (constrained) optimum, there is no dependence on history; in particular, on aggregate history. There is a sense in which this result is of limited interest, however: memory with respect to aggregate shocks only disappears when the allocations are the ones that individuals obtain if no transfers occur in any period. This will not be the case in the Mirrlees economy for which insurance is possible even in the last period through the consumption-leisure trade-off.

3 Mirrlees Economy

Consider a dynamic Mirrlees economy, where agents temporary preferences defined as a function of consumption, $c$, and effort, $l$, are of the form $u(c) - v(l)$, where $u(.)$ strictly increasing and concave and $v(.),$ strictly increasing and convex.

The parameter $\theta$ is associated to an individual’s productivity. An agent with productivity $\theta$ produces $y = l\theta z$ efficiency units with effort $l$ if the aggregate state is $z$. The technology is once again linear. One efficiency unit of labor produces one unit of consumption.9 As in Mirrlees [1971], we redefine choice variables. Instead of $(c,l)$ we consider $x = (c,y)$, where $c$ is consumption and $y$ denotes efficiency units of work.

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9To map technology exactly in the terms of Section 2 we would instead define $\tilde{y} = l\theta$ and let

$$
G \left( \sum \mu(\theta)c(\theta,z), \sum \mu(\theta)g(\theta,z),z \right) = \sum \mu(\theta)c(\theta,z) - \sum \mu(\theta)g(\theta,z)z \leq 0.
$$
The Social Planner’s problem (program $P_0$) is

$$\max \sum \beta^{t-1} \sum \pi_t(z') \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ u(c(\theta^t, z')) - v\left(\frac{y(\theta^t, z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right)\right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

subject to

$$\sum \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ c(\theta^t, z^t) - y(\theta^t, z^t) \right] \leq 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

and

$$\sum \beta^{t-1} \sum \pi_t(z') \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ u\left(c\left(\theta^t, z^t\right)\right) - v\left(\frac{y(\theta^t, z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right)\right] \geq$$

$$\sum \beta^{t-1} \sum \pi_t(z') \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ u\left(c\left(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t\right)\right) - v\left(\frac{y(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right)\right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$.

It is a general feature of repeated screening and moral hazard problems that allocations keep track of individuals’ private shocks histories. This allows the principal to go beyond repeating the static optimal allocation by linking future allocations to present type reports.10

This whole argument is false for the aggregate shock for one simple reason: it is observable. Since the aggregate state of the economy is assumed to be known by everyone, and is unrelated with idiosyncratic shocks, there is no obvious reason to believe that the optimal allocation will present history dependence with respect to this variable. Our first result makes this point clear by providing an example in which such dependence does not exist.

**Proposition 1** Let $u = \ln$ then there exist functions $\tilde{c}_t(\theta^t)$ and $\tilde{y}_t(\theta^t)$ such that $c_t(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{c}_t(\theta^t) z_t$ and $y_t(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{y}_t(\theta^t) z_t$.

As it turns, the definition of variables we adopted is more convenient.

10The extreme poverty result presented in Atkeson and Lucas [1992] and Phelan [1998] is a long run consequence of this feature of optimal allocations. At each period, the cross-sectional distribution of consumption and labor inherits the heterogeneity of previous period and brings a new source of variation, since you have to generate further distortions to separate agents with different types at the current period. With i.i.d. private shocks, an assumption frequently adopted in the literature, the extra dispersion in allocations is independent of previous heterogeneity. This pattern generates ever increasing inequality across agents.
utility gap, associated with strategy

takes the general dynamic Mirrlees economy, and define the temporary

property fails to be optimal in general, i.e., of why memory is relevant,
generally. As we shall see, absence of memory is a very particular result. An heuristic

Proof. Let \( u(c) = \ln(c) \) and consider the following transformation of variables \( \tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t) = c(\theta^t, z^t)/z_t \) and \( \tilde{y}(\theta^t, z^t) = y(\theta^t, z^t)/z_t \). In this case we can write program \( P_0 \) as

\[
\begin{align*}
\sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{z_t} \pi_t(z_t) \ln z_t + \max_{\theta_t} \sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{z_t} \pi_t(z_t) \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ \ln \tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t) - v \left( \frac{\tilde{y}(\theta^t, z^t)}{\theta_t} \right) \right]
\end{align*}
\]

subject to

\[
\sum_{\theta_t} \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ \tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t) - \tilde{y}(\theta^t, z^t) \right] \leq 0
\]

and

\[
\begin{align*}
\sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{z_t} \pi_t(z_t) \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ \ln \tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t) - v \left( \frac{\tilde{y}(\theta^t, z^t)}{\theta_t} \right) \right] \\
\sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{z_t} \pi_t(z_t) \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ \ln \tilde{c}(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t) - v \left( \frac{\tilde{y}(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)}{\theta_t} \right) \right]
\end{align*}
\]

for all \( \sigma \in \Sigma \). Note that \( z_t \) only appears additively in the objective function, which shows that, with some abuse in notation, \( \tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{c}(\theta^t), \tilde{y}(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{y}(\theta^t) \). \( \blacksquare \)

The main normative goal of this paper is to find out whether this result applies more generally. As we shall see, absence of memory is a very particular result. An heuristic account of why this property fails to be optimal in general, i.e., of why memory is relevant, goes as follows. Take the general dynamic Mirrlees economy, and define the temporary utility gap, associated with strategy \( \sigma \) at history \( (\theta^t, z^t) \), \( \Delta^c(\theta^t, z^t) \), as

\[
\Delta^c(\theta^t, z^t) = U \left( c(\theta^t, z^t), \frac{y(\theta^t, z^t)}{\theta_t z_t} \right) - U \left( c(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t), \frac{y(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)}{\theta_t z_t} \right)
\]

Consider, then, the specific case \( \Delta^c(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z) = \)

\[
U \left( c(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z), \frac{y(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z)}{\bar{\theta} z} \right) - U \left( c(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z), \frac{y(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z)}{\bar{\theta} z} \right),
\]

and assume that the constraint associated with the one period deviation at history \( (\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z) \) binds. In this case, the difference between the continuation utilities must be equal to \( \Delta^c(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z) \). If the allocations do not display memory, continuation utilities cannot depend on \( z^t \), in this case, either \( \Delta(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z') = \Delta^c(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t-1}, z) \), or the same constraint cannot bind in the alternative state \( z' \). This imposes a strong restriction on the possibilities for the planner, and will generate sub-optimal allocations, in general.
We will now formalize these ideas. We start by deriving an intertemporal restriction on allocations that will play an important role in what follows. The result is akin to the inverse Euler equation derived by Kocherlakota [2005]. Because there is no technology to transfer resources across periods, however, the following lemma simply relates allocations along different paths.

**Lemma 1** At the optimum,

\[
\sum_{\theta^{t+1}|\theta^t} \mu(\theta^{t+1}|\theta^t) \frac{u'(c(\theta^t, z^t))}{u'(c(\theta^{t+1}, z^{t+1}))} = \sum_{\bar{\theta}^{t+1}|\bar{\theta}^t} \mu(\bar{\theta}^{t+1}|\bar{\theta}^t) \frac{u'(c(\bar{\theta}^t, z^t))}{u'(c(\bar{\theta}^{t+1}, z^{t+1}))},
\]

for every, \( \theta^t, \bar{\theta}^t, z^t \) and \( z^{t+1} \succ z^t \).

**Proof.** Let \( \{c, y\} \) be our candidate optimal allocation. We shall construct a new allocation \( \{\hat{c}, \hat{y}\} \) as follows. We increase consumption in period \( t \), public history \( z^t \), for the agent with history \( \theta^t \) in such a way that \( u(\hat{c}(\theta^t, z^t)) = u(c(\theta^t, z^t)) + \Delta \). Because aggregate resources are fixed, this can only be done by reducing consumption for another individual, say, that with history \( \bar{\theta}^t \). This agent’s utility will be reduced by an amount \( \epsilon \). That is, \( u(\hat{c}(\bar{\theta}^t, z^t)) = u(c(\bar{\theta}^t, z^t)) - \epsilon \). For simplicity, consider \( \mu(\theta^t) = \mu(\bar{\theta}) \). For small enough \( \Delta \), the two are related by

\[
\epsilon = \frac{u'(c(\bar{\theta}^t, z^t))}{u'(c(\theta^t, z^t))} \Delta. \tag{7}
\]

For this reform not to have impact on incentives or on any individual’s utility, it must compensate the change in utility for every continuation history. Hence, for every \( (\theta^{t+1}, z^{t+1}) \succ (\theta^t, z^t) \),

\[
u(\hat{c}(\theta^{t+1}, z^{t+1})) = u(c(\theta^{t+1}, z^{t+1})) - \Delta.
\]

Similarly, for every \( (\bar{\theta}^{t+1}, z^{t+1}) \succ (\bar{\theta}^t, z^t) \),

\[
\hat{u}(\hat{c}(\bar{\theta}^{t+1}, z^{t+1})) = u(c(\bar{\theta}^{t+1}, z^{t+1})) + \epsilon.
\]

For every \( z^{t+1} \), the cost of such reform is

\[
- \sum_{\theta^{t+1}|\theta^t} \frac{\mu(\theta^{t+1}|\theta^t)}{u'(c(\theta^{t+1}, z^{t+1}))} \Delta + \sum_{\bar{\theta}^{t+1}|\bar{\theta}^t} \frac{\mu(\bar{\theta}^{t+1}|\bar{\theta}^t)}{u'(c(\bar{\theta}^{t+1}, z^{t+1}))} \epsilon. \tag{8}
\]
Substituting (7) in (8) it is then clear that, unless
\[
\sum_{\theta_{t+1} > \theta} \mu(\theta_{t+1} | \theta) \frac{u'(c(\theta_{t}, z^t))}{u'(c(\theta_{t+1}, z^{t+1}))} = \sum_{\bar{\theta}_{t+1} > \bar{\theta}} \mu(\bar{\theta}_{t+1} | \bar{\theta}) \frac{u'(c(\bar{\theta}_{t}, z^t))}{u'(c(\bar{\theta}_{t+1}, z^{t+1}))},
\]
there is a reform that preserves utility, preserves incentive compatibility and saves resources. ■

To formally prove the result for a much used specification of preferences, let us now specialize to the class of iso-elastic utility functions; i.e, constant relative risk aversion in consumption and power disutility of labor effort,
\[
u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} \quad \text{and} \quad \nu(l) = \frac{l^\gamma}{\gamma},
\]
for \(\rho > 0, \rho \neq 1\) and \(\gamma > 1\). For \(\rho = 1\), \(u(c) = \ln(c)\).

Under this iso-elastic preferences assumption, our first result relates memory to separability.

At any given period, individuals care about the current allocation and how the current report will affect their prospects in further periods. Lemma 1, above, states that, since it is always possible to distort future consumption to separate individuals today, differences in current consumption are preserved in the future in such a way as not to interfere with future incentive compatibilities.

**Proposition 2** With iso-elastic preferences, if period \(t\) consumption is not separable in \(z_t\), then the allocation displays memory in \(t+1\).

**Proof.** If an allocation is not separable in \(t\) then, given any function \(\eta(z)\) such that \(c(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t)\eta(z_t)\) for some function \(\tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t)\), there must be a pair \(\theta^t, \tilde{\theta}^t\) such that \(\tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t) / \tilde{c}(\tilde{\theta}^t, z^t)\) is a function of \(z_t\). Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, however, gives
\[
\frac{\tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t)^\rho}{\tilde{c}(\tilde{\theta}^t, z^t)^\rho} = \frac{E \left[ \tilde{c}(\theta^t, \theta', z^{t+1} | \theta, z^{t+1}) \right]}{E \left[ \tilde{c}(\theta', \theta', z^{t+1} | \theta', z^{t+1}) \right]}. \tag{10}
\]
Since the left hand side depends on \(z^t\), so does the right hand side. Hence, either the numerator or the denominator varies with \(z^t\), thus violating independence. ■
One interesting and straightforward consequence of (10) result is the case in which \( u(\cdot) \) is a natural log. Consider \( u = \ln \), then, letting \( Y(z^t) \) denote total production, we have

\[
\frac{c_t(\theta^t, z^t)}{Y(z^t)} = \frac{\sum_{\theta^{t+1}} \mu(\theta^{t+1}) c_{t+1}(\theta^t, \theta^t), (z^t, z^t))}{\sum_{\theta^{t+1}} \mu(\theta^{t+1}) c_{t+1}(\theta^{t+1}, (z^t, z))} = \frac{E[c_{t+1}|\theta^t, z^{t+1}]}{Y(z^{t+1})}.
\]

The fact that the expectation in the right hand side of the expression above is conditioned on \( z^{t+1} \) allows for a simple interpretation of the expression above. Namely, the expected share of aggregate output an agent gets to consume in any aggregate state tomorrow is equal to the share of current output that she consumes today. This means that, two agents are entitled to different shares of total output today, they will necessarily receive different shares of total output for at least one realization of private shocks and this will be true for all aggregate states.

More importantly for our discussion is the fact that, if the share of aggregate output that an agent with private history \( \theta^t \) is entitled to in aggregate state \( z_t \) differs from the share she would be entitled to had state \( \hat{z}_t \) realized, instead, then the expected share she would be entitled to in state \( (z_{t-1}, z_t, z) \) would differ from the expected share she is going to get in \( (z_{t-1}, \hat{z}_t, z) \). The consequence of Proposition 2 is that, with logarithmic preferences, it is either the case that optimal shares are independent of \( z \) or allocations must display memory with respect to aggregate shocks. Proposition 1 shows that it is the former, rather than the latter.

To check whether this result extends to other values of \( \rho \), recall that our intuition was based on how continuation utilities must accommodate variations in temporary utility gaps. We were implicitly invoking a recursive structure that will not be present, in general, if we do not impose any restrictions in the stochastic process governing the changes in skills. Toward this goal we assume the following: \( \mu(\theta^t) \) is a Markov process,

\[
\mu(\theta^{t-1}, \theta, \theta'|\theta^{t-1}, \theta) = \mu(\theta, \theta'|\theta), \forall \theta^{t-1},
\]

and \( \mu(\theta|\theta) \geq 0.5 \).

We shall also restrict the rest of the analysis to the case \( T < \infty \).

Finally, to use the approach of Fernandes and Phelan [2000] we assume that \( \mu(\theta|\theta) \in [.5, 1] \) and postpone until Section 3.1 the limit pure heterogeneity case, \( \mu(\theta|\theta) = 1 \).
For now, define \( w(\theta^{t-1}, z^t) \) as the expected continuation utility for an agent with history \( \theta^t \) conditional on aggregate history \( z^{t+1} \),

\[
w(\theta^{t-1}, z^t) = \sum_{\theta' > \theta^{t-1}} \mu_t(\theta' | \theta^{t-1}) \left[ u(c(\theta', z^t)) - v\left(\frac{y(\theta', z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right) + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1})w(\theta', z^{t+1})\right]
\]

Similarly, let \( \bar{\theta}^{t-1} = (\theta^{t-2}, \bar{\theta}) \neq (\theta^{t-2}, \theta) = \theta^{t-1} \). We may, then, define

\[
\bar{w}(\theta^{t-1}, z^t) = \sum_{\theta' > \theta^{t-1}} \mu_t(\theta' | \bar{\theta}^{t-1}) \left[ u(c(\theta', z^t)) - v\left(\frac{y(\theta', z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right) + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1})w(\theta', z^{t+1})\right]
\]

Following the steps of Fernandes and Phelan [2000] we can show—Lemma 4, in the appendix—that any incentive compatible allocation must satisfy the one period incentive constraint,

\[
u(c(\theta^t, z^t)) - v\left(\frac{y(\theta^t, z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right) + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1})w(\theta^t, z^{t+1}) \geq u(c(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^t)) - v\left(\frac{y(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right) + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1})\bar{w}(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^{t+1})
\]

Assume that the incentive efficient allocation does not exhibit memory, in which case, neither \( w(\theta^t, z^{t+1}) \) nor \( \bar{w}(\theta^t, z^{t+1}) \) depend on \( z^t \), and let \( u = \ln \). Under the transformation of variables used in the proof of Proposition 1, the incentive constraint becomes

\[
\ln c(\theta^t, z^t)z_t - v\left(\frac{y(\theta^t, z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right) + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1})w(\theta^t, z_{t+1}) \geq \ln c(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^t)z_t - v\left(\frac{y(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z^t)}{\theta_t z_t}\right) + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1})\bar{w}(\theta^{t-1}, \bar{\theta}, z_{t+1})
\]

It is easy to see that \( z_t \) plays no role in providing incentives. Because \( z \) plays no role in the redefined resource constraint and is additive in the objective function it does not change the planner’s optimization problem.

Let us now consider the case \( \rho \neq 1 \), and recall that the disutility of labor is iso-elastic, \( v(l) = l^\gamma \). In this case, another convenient change of variables makes the resource
constraint and the objective function independent of $z$. Namely, $c(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^t)\eta(z_t)$, and $y(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{g}(\theta^t, z^t)\eta(z_t)$ where $\eta(z) = z^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}$.

Contrary to the ln case in which the transformation, $\eta(z_t)$, is additive in utility this transformation is multiplicative, which will make matter for the incentive constraints.

Assume that the allocation is memoryless and using the suggested transformation of variables, the one period incentive constraint becomes

$$\beta \left\{ \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1})\tilde{w}(\tilde{\theta}^t, z_{t+1}) - \sum_{z^{t+1} < z^t} \pi(z^{t+1})w(\theta^t, z_{t+1}) \right\} \eta(z_t) \rho^{-1}.$$ 

If this expression holds as an equality for both $z_t = \tilde{z}$ and $z_t = z$, because the right hand side is independent of $z_t$, the term in curly brackets in the left hand side must depend on $z_t$, which implies that period $t$ allocation is not separable.

Proposition 2 shows that if an allocation is memoryless, then consumption must be separable in consumption, if we can extend the result to the whole allocation $(c(\theta^t, z^t), y(\theta^t, z^t)) = \eta(z_t)(\tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^{t-1}), \tilde{g}(\theta^t, z^{t-1}))$ then we have arrived at a contradiction. Because $c(\theta^t, z^t) = \eta(z_t)(\tilde{c}(\theta^t, z^{t-1}))$, it is immediate to see that $\sum \mu(\theta^t)y(\theta^t, z^t)/\eta(z_t)$ does not depend on $z_t$. Although this does not directly imply that $y(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{g}(\theta^t, z^{t-1})\eta(z_t)$, we can show that this is exactly the case in our setting—Lemma ?? in the appendix.

The other implicit assumption in our argument is that the analogous constraint binds in two different aggregate states of the world; i.e., there is at least one period $t$ and one private history, $\theta^t$ such that the same one period deviation binds at the optimum at both states. This is a very weak condition, which does seem to be valid in general. Still, for now we shall just assume that this is the case.\footnote{It is also possible to show that for all histories $(\theta^{t-1}, z^t)$ and all $t$, $E[y(\theta^t, z^t)^{1-\gamma}|\theta^{t-1}, z^t]/\eta(z_t)\gamma^{-1}$ is independent of $z_t$. For the case of more than two types per period, these two restrictions need not imply the result. However, if only neighborhood constraints bind at the optimum, that is, if the solution of the relaxed problem—see Kapicka [2010], Farhi and Werning [2010]—solves the complete problem, then, the result is, once again, valid.}

**Assumption A:** At the optimum, for some $t < T$ there is a history $(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1})$ such that $U(x(\theta^{t-1}, \theta, z^{t-1}, z)) = U(x(\theta^{t-1}, \tilde{\theta}, z^{t-1}, \tilde{z})|\theta^{t-1}, \theta)$ and $U(x(\theta^{t-1}, \theta, z^{t-1}, z)) = U(x(\theta^{t-1}, \tilde{\theta}, z^{t-1}, \tilde{z})|\theta^{t-1}, \theta)$.}
Under this assumption it is possible to prove the following result.

**Proposition 3** Assume that $\rho \neq 1$ and that there is some idiosyncratic risk, then if Assumption A is valid the optimal allocation exhibits memory of past aggregate shocks.

**Proof.** See Appendix. ■

If shocks are i.i.d., it is always the downward constraint that bind, which means that Assumption A is not needed. Hence, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.

**Corollary 1** Assume that $\rho \neq 1$ and idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d., then the optimal allocation exhibits memory of past aggregate shocks.

Proposition 2 states that, for an allocation to be memoryless in $t$ it must be separable in $\tau < t$, not that a separable allocation is necessarily memoryless. We cannot, therefore, infer from Proposition 3 whether the allocations associated with $\rho \neq 1$ are separable or not. For that we shall rely on our numeric exercises. The next Proposition, however, shows that separability always characterizes the period $T$ allocation.

**Proposition 4** The optimal allocation is separable in period $T$, i.e., there are functions $\eta(z_T)$, $\tilde{c}(\theta^T, z^{T-1})$ and $\tilde{y}(\theta^T, z^{T-1})$ such that $c(\theta^T, z^T) = \tilde{c}(\theta^T, z^{T-1})\eta(z_T)$ and $y(\theta^T, z^T) = \tilde{y}(\theta^T, z^{T-1})\eta(z_T)$

**Proof.** See Appendix. ■

### 3.1 The Pure Heterogeneity Limit

In this section we address the pure heterogeneity case: $\mu(\theta', \theta|\theta') = 1$ for $\theta' = \theta$, $\mu(\theta', \theta|\theta') = 0$ for $\theta' \neq \theta$. In this case there is no uncertainty beyond the productivity one is born with, and we solve the Utilitarian planner’s problem. This is a particular case of Werning [2007]. Indeed, if $\mu(\theta', \theta|\theta') = 1$, for $\theta = \theta'$, then, the Planner’s problem is

$$
\max \sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \sum_{t} \beta^{t-1} \sum_{z_t} \pi_t(z^t) \left[ u(c(\theta, z^t)) - v \left( \frac{y(\theta, z^t)}{\theta z_t} \right) \right]
$$
subject to
\[ \sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \left[ c(\theta, z^t) - y(\theta, z^t) \right] \leq 0 \]
and
\[ \sum_{t} \beta^{t-1} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \left[ u\left(c(\theta, z^t)\right) - v\left(\frac{y(\theta, z^t)}{\theta z^t}\right)\right] \geq 0 \]
\[ \sum_{t} \beta^{t-1} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \left[ u\left(c(\theta, z^t)\right) - v\left(\frac{y(\tilde{\theta}, z^t)}{\theta z^t}\right)\right] \geq 0 \]
for \( \theta, \tilde{\theta} = \theta(H), \theta(L) \).

It is important to note that there are only two incentive compatibility constraints, which are independent of time and aggregate state. We associate to the IC constraints the multipliers \( \phi(\tilde{\theta}|\theta) \) and \( \phi(\theta|\tilde{\theta}) \). The first order conditions associated with \( c_t(\theta, z^t) \) and \( y_t(\theta, z^t) \) are
\[
\left[ 1 + \sum_{\theta} \left[ \phi(\tilde{\theta}|\theta) - \phi(\theta|\tilde{\theta}) \right] \right] c_t(\theta, z^t)^{-\rho} = \lambda(z^t),
\]
\[
\left[ 1 + \sum_{\tilde{\theta}} \left[ \phi(\theta|\tilde{\theta}) - \phi(\theta|\tilde{\theta}) \right] \frac{\theta^\gamma}{\theta z_t^\gamma} \right] y_t(\theta, z^t)^{\gamma-1} = \lambda(z^t).
\]
Hence, \( c_t(\theta, z^t) = \lambda(z^t)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \kappa(\theta) \) and \( y_t(\theta, z^t) = (\theta z_t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \lambda(z^t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \omega(\theta) \), for some \( \kappa \) and \( \omega \). Substituting this in the resource constraints,
\[ \sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \left[ \lambda(z^t)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \kappa(\theta) - (\theta z_t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \lambda(z^t)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \omega(\theta) \right] = 0, \]
which means that \( \lambda(z^t) = a z_t^{-\frac{2\rho}{\beta+\gamma-1}} \). Therefore,
\[ c_t(\theta, z^t) = \tilde{c}(\theta) z_t^{\frac{1}{\beta+\gamma-1}}, y_t(\theta, z^t) = \tilde{y}(\theta) z_t^{\frac{\gamma}{\beta+\gamma-1}}. \]

Separability thus characterizes this pure heterogeneity case. As we shall see in the next section this has important consequences for the possibility of heterogeneity generating any type of interesting business cycle behavior.
4 Macro Consequences of Private Memory

Although most of the New Dynamic Public Finance Literature has been of a normative nature, there has been some recent attempts to derive testable implications from these models—e.g., Sleet [2006], Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2007], Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2008a], Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2009], Ales and Maciero [2008], etc. The underlying idea is that many different, and sometimes informal, institutions can implement optimal allocations which mean that one cannot ‘a priori’ rule out the possibility that current institutions are producing constrained efficient outcomes.

When focus is shifted from specific policies to allocations, one possible path is to use partial characterizations of optimal allocations to create testable restrictions in the observed data. This type of approach has been the focus of an important literature that has made intensive use of micro data—e.g, Townsend [1994], Ligon et al. [2002] etc. An alternative path, the one we shall follow here, is to derive the macro consequences of these models. By macro consequences we simply mean the consequences for aggregate variables and prices. In taking this path we follow the lead of Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2007] and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2009] who have used the pricing kernel associated with a dynamic Mirrlees economy to try and price the excess return of equity over risk free bonds and the conditional return on forward exchange rate. We follow this agenda by addressing the business cycle behavior of the labor wedge.

Chari et al. [2007] have shown how equilibrium allocations for disaggregated model economies may in many circumstances be viewed as equilibrium allocations for a representative agent economy with suitably defined time-varying wedges. This observation is used to identify which particular wedges are more important to generate the observed behavior of macroeconomic aggregates for a representative agent along the business cycle; a procedure they have named Business Cycle Accounting. They find that for a disaggregated model to account for the business cycle behavior of macroeconomic aggregates it must generate a countercyclical wedge in the associated representative consumer economy. We check in our numeric exercises is to check through numerical simulations whether our model is capable of generating countercyclical wedges for the associated rep-

\footnote{A very interesting application of this approach is found in Townsend [1993] analysis of medieval village economies.}
representative consumer economy.

We also use our model to measure the potential pricing errors associated with using a representative agent consumption capital asset pricing model a la Lucas [1978] to try to account for the asset price data generated by our model economy.

4.1 The Labor Wedge

Chari et al. [2007] emphasize the role played by the so-called labor wedge in generating the observed pattern of ‘choices’ for the representative agent through the business cycles. Many potential explanations for these wedges are considered in Shimer [2009]. We ask whether the underlying informational problems that characterize a repeated Mirrlees economy may offer an alternative explanation. We shall try and see if they may generate the qualitative movements of the labor wedge.

A dynamic Mirrlees economy may potentially allow one to take the real business cycle literature idea that fluctuations are optimal responses to real technological shock one step further and ask whether state-varying labor wedges are optimal (constrained efficient, in this case) responses to real shocks in a world where asymmetric information precludes full insurance. Chari et al. [2007] and Shimer [2009] point out to the fact that the labor wedge increases in economic downturns and decreases in good times.

The current model is particularly promising in this regard for it endogenously generates wedges at an individual level. Whether these individual wedges imply a time-varying labor wedge for the representative agent, and whether this variation follows the pattern found in the data is one of the questions we try to answer in our numeric exercises.

It is important to emphasize that we are not siding with the strand of the literature that views tax shocks as causes of business cycle, which would naturally explained the observed correlation between recessions and labor wedge. Instead, in our model state varying wedges (are they to exist) are optimal responses to real shocks in a second best world.

We start by defining the aggregate variables we are going to use. Aggregate consumption is \( C(z_t) \equiv \sum \mu(\theta^t) c(\theta^t, z_t) \), while output is \( Y(z_t) \equiv \sum \mu(\theta^t) y(\theta^t, z_t) \). Because there is no aggregate savings in our economy, \( C(z_t) = Y(z_t) \) for all \( z_t \). To derive the economy’s
productivity, \( W(z^t) \), we need first to define aggregate hours,

\[
L(z^{t-1}, z) = \sum_{\theta^{t-1}} \sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta^{t-1}, \theta) \frac{y(\theta^{t-1}, \theta, z^{t-1}, z)}{\theta z}
\]

and, finally, \( W(z^t) = Y(z^t) / L(z^t) \).

We shall endow the representative agent with the same preferences as individuals. Hence,

\[
W(C(z), Y(z), W(z)) = C(z)^{1-\rho} + Y(z)^{\gamma} - Y(z)^{1-\rho} W(z)^{\gamma}
\]

Note also that without taxes, the representative agent’s optimal labor/consumption choice would be given by \( W(z^t) Y(z^t)^{\gamma} = Y(z^t)^{1-\rho} \). Naturally, there are taxes, both in the model and in the real world, and this equality should not be observed in practice. We shall, then, define the labor wedge,

\[
\tau(z) = 1 - W(z)^{-\gamma} Y(z)^{\rho+\gamma-1}
\]

where we have used the fact that \( C(z) = Y(z) \).

**Separability and The Labor Wedge** We have seen that if we are in a pure heterogeneity case or if \( u(c) = \ln c \) then optimal allocations are of the form \( c(\theta, z^t) = \hat{c}(\theta) \eta(z_t) \), and \( y(\theta, z^t) = \hat{y}(\theta) \eta(z_t) \).

In this case, \( Y(z^t) = \eta(z_t) \sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \hat{y}(\theta) / \theta \). Hours, are, then

\[
L(z^t) = \eta(z_t) \sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \hat{y}(\theta) / \theta^t
\]

while the estimated productivity is

\[
W(z^t) = \frac{Y(z^t)}{L(z^t)} = z_t \frac{\sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \hat{y}(\theta) / \theta}{\sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \hat{y}(\theta) / \theta^t}
\]

Deriving the wedge is now a simple task

\[
\tau(z^t) = 1 - \left\{ \frac{\sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \hat{y}(\theta) / \theta}{\sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \hat{y}(\theta) / \theta^t} \right\}^{\gamma} \left\{ \sum_{\theta} \mu(\theta) \hat{y}(\theta) \right\}^{\rho+\gamma-1}
\]

---

13In the spirit of a calibration exercise in which instead of allowing for free parameters, we take them from micro data. See Chari et al. [2009].

14footnote discussing some aggregation issues
where we used the fact that $\eta(z_t)^{\rho+\gamma-1}z_t^\gamma = 1$.

As is clear from the right hand side of the expression above, the labor wedge is invariant with respect to $z$. We had already shown that when allocation is separable labor wedges for each individual do not vary with $z$. This does not imply that the aggregate wedge will not vary. Changes in the distribution of income could generate such variation through composition effects, but this is not the case.

An important consequence of this observation is that simply allowing for heterogeneity will not do. We need partially insured private risks to generate variation in wedges. Moreover, separability also obtains when $\rho = 1$, according to Proposition 1. The fact that for risk aversion equal to one wedges are invariant through the business cycle raises the possibility that if it is to vary for $\rho \neq 1$ it may correlate with different signs with the cycle depending on whether $\rho > 1$ of $\rho < 1$—see our discussion in Section 3.

Finally note that Proposition 2 establishes that an allocation that is non-separable displays memory. We have seen that memory characterizes allocations when $\rho \neq 1$ and there is idiosyncratic uncertainty. What we would want to know is whether we can guarantee non-separability in general. Of concern are allocations of the type $x(\theta^t, z^t) = \tilde{x}(\theta^t)H(z^t)$ with $H(z^t) = \prod_{t} \eta(z_t)$. Such allocation displays memory and is separable. To understand why this type of allocation should not be optimal, note that the cost function is strictly concave, so increasing the volatility of promised utility is costly. The optimal allocation strikes a balance between efficiency in previous periods in which case the separable allocation is desirable and the volatility it generates in future allocations if $\rho \neq 1$.

4.2 Asset Pricing

Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2007] and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2009] have shown how the pricing kernel associated with a dynamic Mirrlees economy is compatible with the behavior of excess returns in foreign and domestic markets. Using the fact that the pricing kernel is a function of the cross-sectional harmonic mean of marginal consumption—as derived by Kocherlakota [2005]—they use cross-sectional consumption data to estimate the preference parameters associated with a CRRA specification for three economies. Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2009] show that a low coefficient of relative risk aversion is needed to account for the equity premium found in the data, while Kocherlakota and
Pistaferri [2007] find similar low coefficients can account for the forward exchange rate premium.

A natural next step in this agenda is to calibrate such models to generate pricing data compatible with the underlying primitives of the economy.\textsuperscript{15} It, thus, becomes important to understand how private information regarding idiosyncratic shocks interact with public aggregate ones to generate optimal allocations from which the pricing kernels are derived. This paper considers very simple two period economies that display these elements to explore how the dynamic nature of incentives induces persistence in allocations with respect to aggregate shocks. Hence, we are not doing a true calibration exercise, but pointing out the potential results to expect from such exercises.

First, to focus on asset pricing, we may define the ‘representative agent’s pricing kernel’, \( \Lambda(z_{t+1}) = C(z_{t+1})^{-\rho} / C(z_t)^{-\rho} \). Following the idea of using parameters estimated from micro-data to calibrate the model, we may compare \( \Lambda \) with the true pricing kernel,

\[
Q(z_t|z_{t-1}) = \left[ \sum_{\theta_t > \theta_{t-1}} \mu_\Theta(\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}) \frac{c(\theta_t, z_t)^{\rho}}{c(\theta_{t-1}, z_{t-1})^{\rho}} \right]^{-1}.
\]

Using the pricing kernel \( Q(z_t|z_{t-1}) \) we can also derive the return of a risk free assets and the expected return of stocks.\textsuperscript{16}

As we have shown, last period allocation exhibits a form of separability with respect to last period shock that has interesting consequences for the form the kernel varies with last period’s shock. Another interesting feature has to do with the fact that heterogeneity per se has consequences for the magnitude of the pricing kernel, but not with the way in which it varies with the states of nature.

\textsuperscript{15}Grossly speaking, while their exercises is akin to Hansen and Singleton [1982], which looked at some of the moment restrictions that needed to prevail in equilibrium, a calibration exercise would be akin to Mehra and Prescott [1985], which calibrated the full economy to see if the model was capable of generating the behavior of asset prices anywhere near what is seen in the data. Although we have not offered a serious attempt to calibrate the economy, our qualitative results are suggestive of the possibilities to arise when such an exercise is attempted.

\textsuperscript{16}We take the economy’s GDP to represent the stock’s dividends. This idea has been recently criticized by, among others, advocates of long run risks as being the relevant cause of most problems with the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model, e.g, Bansal and Yaron [2004].
More generally, consider (14). Pre-multiplying by $\mu(\theta^{t-1})$ and summing across $\theta^{t-1}$ yields

$$c(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1})^\rho Q(z^t | z^{t-1}) = \left[ \sum_{\theta^{t-1} > \theta^{t-1}} \mu(\theta^t | \theta^{t-1}) c(\theta^t, z^t)^\rho \right]^{1/\rho}.$$  

Separability and Asset Pricing  
Separability necessarily arises either when there is no idiosyncratic risk or when preferences are of the log type. In the pure heterogeneity case,

$$Q(z^t | z^{t-1}) = \frac{\eta(z_{t-1})^\rho}{\eta(z_t)^\rho},$$  

which is the pricing kernel associated with a representative consumer economy. So simply adding heterogeneity does not alter the predictions of the CCAPM, hence, it cannot solve its empirical shortcomings.

As we have seen in Section 3, when $u(c) = \ln(c)$, allocations take the form $(c(\theta^t, z^t), y(\theta^t, z^t)) = (\tilde{c}(\theta^t), \tilde{y}(\theta^t)) z_t$, the return on the risk free asset is

$$Q(z^t | z^{t-1}) = \left[ \sum_{\theta^{t-1} > \theta^{t-1}} \mu(\theta^t | \theta^{t-1}) \frac{\tilde{c}(\theta^t)}{\tilde{c}(\theta^{t-1})} \right]^{-1} \frac{z_{t-1}}{z_t}.$$  

Now, stock returns are given by

$$\frac{C(z^t)}{Q(z^t | z^{t-1})} = z_{t-1} \left[ \sum_{\theta^{t-1} > \theta^{t-1}} \mu(\theta^t | \theta^{t-1}) \frac{\tilde{c}(\theta^t)}{\tilde{c}(\theta^{t-1})} \right]^{-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \mu(\theta^t) \tilde{c}(\theta^t),$$

which is independent of $z_t$.

5  Numeric Exercises

In this section we conduct numerical exercises that help illustrate some of the properties that we have derived in Section 2. This exercise is similar to the one presented in Golosov et al. [2006], in which a two period Mirrlees economy with government spending shocks, that are public information. However, they have a different focus and only characterize how last period shocks affect optimal labor tax wedges. More precisely, Golosov
et al. [2006] do not allow public shocks in the first period, which would allow them to address the persistence issues that is the focus of our work.

Kocherlakota [2005] provides a numerical example that is similar to ours in many ways, but analyzes the impact of individual shock persistence and the size of the public shocks on capital taxation, which is the main focus of his paper. He does not mention labor tax nor the possibility of persistent effects of aggregate shocks.

In our exercises we fix $\gamma = 2$, $\theta(L) = 1$, $\theta(H) = 2$, $\mu_1(L) = \mu_1(H) = .5$, $\pi_1(z) = \pi_1(\bar{z}) = .5$, $z = 1$ and $\bar{z} = 2$. Our measure of persistence, $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, is the value of the non-unit eigenvalue of the transition matrix for idiosyncratic shocks.\footnote{We use the term transition matrix in the traditional sense for Markov chains. In our case the Markov nature of idiosyncratic shock is trivial.} The probability of maintaining the same productivity in the next period, i.e., $\mu(\theta, \theta|\theta)$ for all $\theta$ is directly associated with our measure in this two type context. In particular, because we vary $\mu(\theta, \theta|\theta)$ in $[0.5, 1]$, our persistence measure ranges between 0 and 1: where 0 persistence is i.i.d. case and 1 is the case of pure heterogeneity.

We analyze how relevant individual shock persistence is on the allocation and what is driving the non-existence of persistence of aggregate shocks effects in the model for the pure heterogeneity case.

The first set of figures shows how consumption, output and marginal tax rates vary in each state for low and high type agents according to how persistent is the shock. For this set of figures we have chosen $\rho = 5$

Not unexpectedly, consumption is increasing in aggregate productivity for all agents. Also, in both states, agents who realize a high type have more consumption than agents who realize a low type. Low productivity individuals face a positive marginal tax rate, while high productivity individuals face a 0 marginal tax rate (we, thus, omit marginal tax rates for high types from the figures). This reproduces the classic result of a static Mirrlees economy, and indicates that only downward constraints bind at the optimum for both states.

Our emphasis in those figures is on the way allocations vary with persistence. It is apparent that while consumption for low productivity individuals decrease with persistence, it increases with persistence for a high productivity agent. The more persistent
a shock is, the less one gains from backloading incentives. For the exact same reason, income displays the opposite behavior, although it varies with persistence much less significantly than income. A consequence of this behavior for consumption and income is that temporary utility declines with persistence for low productivity individuals and increases for high productivity individuals. It happens so dramatically that for very low levels of persistence the temporary utility is higher for the low productivity individuals. Of course, for this type of utility reversion to take place in an incentive compatible way, promised utilities behave in the exact opposite way.

The second set of figures is intended to show the presence of memory. We compare, in percentage terms, consumption in each possible second period state with consumption in the first period. That is, for each type \( \theta^2 \) and each second period aggregate state \( z_2 \), we calculate \( \frac{c(\theta^2, \bar{z}, z_2)}{c(\theta^2, z, z_2)} \). Consumption growth declines with persistence for those who realized high productivity in the first period and increases with persistence for those who realized a low type.

Allocations display memory of previous aggregate shocks, in our simple model. Second period consumption depends on first period aggregate shock. Better aggregate states in the past are associated with smaller differences in consumption of low and high type, which points out to the fact that the value of backloading incentives in the first period is higher in bad economic states. Given the extreme variations in aggregate productivity that we have assumed, memory is apparent. For more realistic variations in aggregate productivity, memory does not seem to be quantitatively relevant.

In the third set of figures we show how backloading varies with persistence and across states of nature. To define backloading we borrow from the concept of seed values in Fernandes and Phelan [2000]'s auxiliary problem. Assume that the individual has learnt his type. What is the expected utility that she gets from the government utility maximization problem? This is the seed value. The measure of backloading we shall use here assumes that we calculate this starting one period ahead and assuming that nothing happened in the first period, which we call the 'one step ahead seed'. The seed and the one step ahead seed coincide up to a constant in the infinite horizon case, but will differ, in general, for a finite horizon. Our backloading measure is calculated by taking the difference between

\[ ^{18}\text{To make it sound a little less paradoxical, recall that the utility for a low type is higher in the first best.} \]
this ‘one-step-ahead seed’ and the utility promise made after the first period in the actual mechanism.

This measure is very easy to illustrate in our two period example. The ‘one step ahead seed’ is simply the utilitarian optimum with the relative measures of the two types given by the probabilities associated with each different type. One important characteristic with this measure is that it compares the optimal utility promise with another feasible one. As a consequence, this one step ahead seed can also be used to bound the expected utilities associated with the optimal allocations.

As expected, our backloading measure is positive for the high productivity individual, which means that he defers some of his utility to the second period, and negative for the low productivity individual, meaning that he borrows from future utility. Another interesting although anticipated aspect is that backloading decreases in absolute value with persistence.

What is more of a novelty is the way in which backloading varies across states of nature for the two different levels of risk aversion. While backloading is more intense in the high state for \( \rho = 5 \) it is less intense for the \( \rho = 1/2 \). As a consequence, more redistribution is made using temporary utility in the high state for \( \rho = 1/2 \). The practical consequence is shown in the next set of figures which compare marginal tax rates for the two cases in the first period. It is apparent that marginal tax rates are larger in the low state for \( \rho = 5 \) and smaller for \( \rho = 1/2 \).

The last set of figures deals with the macro consequences of our micro facts. The single most important aspect is that labor wedges vary with output in the first period, provided that persistence is not full.

As we have shown they do not vary with current (although they do vary with previous) output in the second period, but it does vary with past aggregate shock. When \( \rho = 1/2 \) the labor wedge varies in the opposite direction from what has been documented; see ?. That is, wedges are pro-cyclical. When, however, \( \rho = 5 \), labor wedges are countercyclical, in agreement with the stylized facts about business cycles.

Finally, with regards to asset pricing the representative agent mis-prices both, the risk free bond and the stock if persistence is not full. The amount of mis-pricing does not seem to be very important when compared to the absolute size of the returns we are
considering. Once again, differences in the behavior of a representative consumer when compared to our model depends on the existence of idiosyncratic risk. Finally note that the model does generate state varying risk premia, but very similar to what we would observe with a representative agent.

6 Conclusion

Our numeric exercises show that a countercyclical labor wedge may characterize constrained efficient allocations in a dynamic Mirrlees economy. One important aspect of our findings is that we have imposed complete independence between private and aggregate shocks. All movements in labor wedges are, thus, endogenously generated.

Asset pricing implications of our economy do not seem to diverge too much from the aggregate consumer’s one. This result, which is in contrast with Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2007], Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2008a] and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri [2009], should be taken with some caution. First, as we have emphasized in the previous paragraph, the distribution of productivity is independent of aggregate shock, in our model. Second, we take dividends to be a claim to GDP, a procedure that has been under increasing criticism.

The model presented in the numeric example is very simple with only two periods and states of the world. There is still much to be done to advance our comprehension of the intricate relationship between constrained optimal insurance under aggregate uncertainty and its macroeconomic implications.

This should not be an easy task. As we have shown here, the business cycle movements of labor wedge—at least in the separable iso-elastic preference case—depend on a form of non-separability that is associated with the presence of memory with respect to aggregate shocks. In other words, for the model to endogenously produce any interesting business cycle pattern, constrained efficient allocations must depend on aggregate shocks in a non-trivial fashion. This type of memory makes it harder to generate a stationary environment where a solution to a fully dynamic model can be handled with well known computational techniques.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19}There are some possibilities, though. Using a perpetual life framework, Phelan [1994] focused on show-
Ours is just another step toward evaluating the potential gains from assessing the importance of endogenous market incompleteness in understanding macroeconomic patterns. Although our preliminary findings are not quantitatively meaningful, one interesting lesson we get from them is that counter-cyclical business cycle wedges and risk premia need not suggest inefficiencies in a second best world.

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## A Proof of Proposition 3

The first step of our proof is to define a cost minimization program that the efficient allocation must solve. We then show that, associated with this program is an auxiliary problem—a finite version of Fernandes and Phelan [2000]—which has a nice recursive structure which will be used to partially characterize the efficient allocations.

Toward this goal, using Lemma 1, define $Q_t(z^{t+1}|z^t)$ through

$$Q_t(z^{t+1}|z^t) = \left( \sum_{\theta_{t+1} > \theta_t} \mu_t (\theta_t^{t+1} | \theta_t) \frac{u'(c(\theta_t^{t+1}, z^{t+1}))}{u'(c(\theta_t^{t+1}, z^{t+1}))} \right)^{-1}.$$ 

Now consider the cost minimization problem (program $P_1$)

$$\min \sum_{z^t} Q_t(z^t) \sum_{\theta_t} \mu_t (\theta_t) \left[ c(\theta_t^t, z_t^t) - y(\theta_t^t, z_t^t) \right]$$

subject to

$$\sum_{\theta_t} \sum_{z_t} \pi_t(z_t^t) \mu_t (\theta_t) \left[ u (c(\theta_t^t, z_t^t)) - v \left( \frac{y(\theta_t^t, z_t^t)}{\theta_t z_t^t} \right) \right] = w(\theta_0, z_1)$$
and
\[ \sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ u(c(\theta^t, z^t)) - v\left(\frac{y(\theta^t, z^t)}{\theta^t z^t}\right)\right] \geq \]
\[ \sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ u\left(c(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)\right) - v\left(\frac{y(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)}{\theta^t z^t}\right)\right] \]
for all \( \sigma \in \Sigma \), where \( Q_t(z^t) = \prod_{t=1}^T Q_{t+1}(z^{t+1}|z^t) \), \( Q_1(z_1) = 1 \) and \( w(\theta_0, z_1) \) is the expected utility associated with an individual with ‘seed’ value \( \theta_0 \). Note that we have start the economy after the realization of first period shock, \( z_1 \).

**Lemma 2** At the optimum, there are no idle resources in any period \( t \), and any state \( z_t \).

**Proof.** Assume that there are idle resources at a given state \( z_t \). Split them across agents in such a way that utility is increased by the same amount for all agents. This reform is incentive compatible since preferences are additively separable between consumption and effort. This contradicts welfare maximization. \( \blacksquare \)

**Lemma 3** If allocation \( \{c, y\} \) solves \( P_0 \) it also solves \( P_1 \).

**Proof.** From Lemma 2, period by period, flow utility is attained in the most efficient, i.e., cost saving, way with \( \{c, y\} \). Thus any possible gain should come from redistribution of resources across periods. But, \( Q_1(z^t) \) was constructed in the exact way as to make any possible gains from intertemporal transfers to disappear. \( \blacksquare \)

Given the ‘price’ process \( Q_1(z^t) \), program \( P_1 \) has a nice separable structure that we shall exploit. Hence, in what follows, we shall focus on program \( P_1 \).

**Lemma 4** An allocation is incentive compatible if and only if it satisfies inequalities (13).

**Proof.** Because our proof is a simple adaptation of Theorem 2.1 in Fernandes and Phelan [2000] we shall just sketch its steps. First we show that if an allocation satisfies (13) then, following any history of past announcements \( \sigma(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1}) \) and true history \( (\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1}) \), the allocation is incentive compatible after history and announcements \( ((\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1}), \sigma(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1})) \). Suppose that this is not the case, then, following some \( ((\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1}), \sigma(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1})) \)
it is possible to find a continuation $\zeta_t = (\tilde{\theta}_t, ..., \tilde{\theta}_{t+s}, ...)$ that yields higher expected utility than telling the truth. But, in this case, following the strategy of telling the truth until period $t - 1$ and following the continuation strategy $\zeta_t$ yields more utility than truth-telling, which is a contradiction with the fact that the allocation is incentive compatible. To show that (6) implies (13) is immediate. Just note that if there were any one period deviation that yielded more expected utility following any history that occurs with positive probability (since we are not considering the pure heterogeneity case, this means all finite histories), then the strategy of only lying at the specific node in which one period deviation is welfare increasing; i.e., yields a larger expected utility than truth-telling. This contradicts the assumption that (4) is satisfied. To prove the converse we assume that (13) is satisfied for all $(\theta^t, z^t)$ For the last period, this simply amounts to static incentive compatibility. Now assume that the continuation strategy of telling the truth from period $t$ on delivers higher expected utility than any other continuation strategy. In this case, (13) guarantees that the continuation strategy of telling the truth from period $t - 1$ on delivers more expected utility than any other continuation strategy starting in period $t - 1$. Because telling the truth is optimal in period $T$, then it is optimal in all periods. ■

For the preferences defined in Section 3, consider the following transformation of variables,

$$u(\theta^t, z^t) = \frac{c(\theta^t, z^t)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho}$$

and

$$v(\theta^t, z^t) = \frac{y(\theta^t, z^t)^{\gamma}}{\gamma \theta^t z^t}.$$ 

It will also be convenient to define

$$u(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t) = \frac{c(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho}$$

and

$$v(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t) = \frac{y(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)^{\gamma}}{\gamma \sigma(\theta^t, z^t) z^t}.$$ 

Note that

$$u(\theta^t, z^t) = u(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)$$

while

$$v(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t) = \frac{y(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t)^{\gamma}}{\gamma \sigma(\theta^t, z^t) z^t} = v(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t) \frac{\sigma(\theta^t, z^t)^{\gamma}}{\theta^t}.$$
Finally let $C(u(\theta, z)) = u(\theta, z)^{1-r}[1 - \rho]^{1-r}$ and $V(v(\theta, z)) = \gamma^{T} v(\theta, z)^{1-\theta}$.

The first thing we shall do is to recursively define the expected continuation utility for an agent with history $\theta^t$ conditional on aggregate history $z^{t+1}$ as

$$w(\theta^{t-1}, z^t) = \sum_{\theta^t > \theta^{t-1}} \mu_t(\theta^t | \theta^{t-1}) \left[ u(\theta^t, z^t) - v(\theta^t, z^t) + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1}) w(\theta^t, z^{t+1}) \right]$$

for $t < T$ and

$$w(\theta^{T-1}, z^T) = \sum_{\theta^T > \theta^{T-1}} \mu_T(\theta^T | \theta^{T-1}) \left[ u(\theta^T, z^T) - v(\theta^T, z^T) \right],$$

for $t = T$.

Similarly, for $\theta^{t-1} = (\theta^{t-2}, \theta) \neq (\theta^{t-2}, \theta) = \theta^{t-1}$. We then define

$$\hat{w}(\theta^{t-1}, z^t) = \sum_{\theta^t > \theta^{t-1}} \mu_t(\theta^t | \theta^{t-1}) \left[ u(\theta^t, z^t) - v(\theta^t, z^t) + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1}) w(\theta^t, z^{t+1}) \right]$$

for $t < T$ and

$$\hat{w}(\theta^{T-1}, z^T) = \sum_{\theta^T > \theta^{T-1}} \mu_T(\theta^T | \theta^{T-1}) \left[ u(\theta^T, z^T) - v(\theta^T, z^T) \right],$$

for $t = T$.

Assuming that the 'seed values' $\theta_0$ are publicly known, and starting from $z_1$ (i.e., using $\pi(z_1) = 1$) we may define as in Fernandes and Phelan [2000] an auxiliary problem of the form:

$$\min \sum_t \sum_{\theta^t} \sum_{z^t} Q(z^t) \left[ C(u(\theta^t, z^t)) - V(v(\theta^t, z^t)) \right]$$

subject to

$$\sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \mu_t(\theta^t | \theta_0) \left[ u(\theta^t, z^t) - v(\theta^t, z^t) \right] = w(\theta_0, z_1),$$

$$\sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \mu_t(\theta^t | \theta_0) \left[ u(\theta^t, z^t) - v(\theta^t, z^t) \right] = \hat{w}(\theta_0, z_1),$$

and

$$\sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ u(\theta^t, z^t) - v(\theta^t, z^t) \right] \geq$$

$$\sum_t \beta^{t-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ u(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t) - v(\sigma(\theta^t, z^t), z^t) \frac{\sigma_t(\theta^t, z^t) \gamma}{\theta^t} \right]$$

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for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$, which defines a function $\zeta(w(\theta_0, z_1), \hat{w}(\theta_0, z_1))$.

Our goal is to characterize as much as possible any solution to this problem. Since any solution to $P_1$ is also a solution to this problem, this will allow us to partially characterize the solution to $P_1$.

We start with the period $T$ problem,

$$\min \sum_{\theta^T > \theta^{T-1}} \mu_T (\theta^T|\theta^{T-1}) \left[ C(u(\theta^T, z^T)) - V(\nu(\theta^T, z^T)) \right]$$

subject to

$$\sum_{\theta^T > \theta^{T-1}} \mu_T (\theta^T|\theta^{T-1}) \left[ u(\theta^T, z^T) - \nu(\theta^T, z^T) \right] = w(\theta^{T-1}, z^T),$$

$$\sum_{\theta^T > \theta^{T-1}} \mu_T (\theta^T|\theta^{T-1}) \left[ u(\theta^T, z^T) - \nu(\theta^T, z^T) \right] = \hat{w}(\theta^{T-1}, z^T),$$

and

$$u(\theta^T, z^T) - \nu(\theta^T, z^T) \geq u(\theta^{T-1}, \hat{\theta}, z^T) - \nu(\theta^{T-1}, \hat{\theta}, z^T) \frac{\partial \gamma}{\partial \gamma}.$$
Then, the right hand side of the expression above is also independent of
\[ \tilde{\theta} \].

Take, then the type which allocation is not envied. Then, the left hand side of (16) is
\[
\sum_{\theta^t, \theta^{t-1} \sim \theta^{t-2}} \mu_t \left( \theta^{t-1} \mid \theta^{t-2} \right) \left[ u(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1}) - v(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1}) \right] + \beta \sum_{z^{t-1} \sim z^{t-2}} \pi(z^t) w(\theta^{t-1}, z^t) = \hat{\omega}(\theta^{t-2}, z^{t-1}) ,
\]

and
\[
u(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1}) - v(\theta^{t-1}, z^{t-1}) + \beta \sum \pi(z^t) w(\theta^{t-1}, z^t) \geq\]
\[
u(\theta^{t-2}, \tilde{\theta}, z^{t-1}) - v(\theta^{t-2}, \tilde{\theta}, z^{t-1}) \frac{\partial \gamma}{\partial \gamma} + \beta \sum \pi(z^t) \hat{\omega}(\theta^{t-1}, z^t) .
\]

Once again, this defines a strictly convex problem, which solution we represent with
the strictly convex cost function \( \tilde{z}_{t-1}(w(\theta^{t-2}, z^{t-1}), \hat{\omega}(\theta^{t-2}, z^{t-1})) \). Hence, the whole program is convex and we can characterize the solution to period \( t \) problem by solving the associated Lagrangian.

**Lemma 5** If the allocation is separable in \( c \) it is also separable in \( y \).

**Proof.** Consider first order condition with respect to \( c(\theta^t, z^t) \),
\[
u(\theta^t \mid \theta^{t-1}) \lambda(z^t) - c(\theta^t, z^t) \nu(\theta^t \mid \theta^{t-1}) = \sum \delta(\theta^t, z^t \mid \theta^t) / \pi(z^t) - \sum \delta(\theta^t, z^t \mid \theta^t) / \pi(z^t).
\] (16)

Under separability on consumption, the left hand side is
\[
\eta(z_t) \left[ \mu(\theta^t \mid \theta^{t-1}) \mathbb{E}[\hat{c}(\theta^t, z^{t-1})^\rho] - \hat{c}(\theta^t, z^{t-1})^\rho \mu(\theta^t \mid \theta^{t-1}) \right]
\]
which is separable in \( z^t \). Because we have only two types, only one multiplier \( \delta \) is positive. Take, then the type which allocation is not envied. Then, the left hand side of (16) is
\[
\delta(\theta^t, z^t \mid \theta^t) / \pi(z^t) = \eta(z_t) \hat{\delta} \left( \hat{\theta}^t, z^{t-1} \mid \theta^t \right) / \pi(z^t)
\]
with \( \hat{\delta}(\theta^t, z^{t-1} \mid \theta^t) / \pi(z^t) \) independent of \( z_t \). Since the first order condition with respect to \( y(\theta^t, z^t) \) is
\[
\theta_t^{-\gamma} \left\{ \mu(\theta^t \mid \theta^{t-1}) \lambda(z^t) + \delta(\theta^t, z^t \mid \theta^t) / \pi(z^t) \right\} = \mu(\theta^t \mid \theta^{t-1}) z_t^\gamma y(\theta^t, z^t)^{\gamma-1}
\]
Then, the right hand side of the expression above is also independent of \( z_t \). Therefore,
\[
\frac{y(\theta^t, z^{t-1}, z)^{\gamma-1}}{y(\theta^t, z^{t-1}, \tilde{z})^{\gamma-1}} = \frac{\eta(z)}{\eta(\tilde{z}) z_t^\gamma}.
\]

A similar procedure applies to \( \tilde{\theta} \) to show that both are separable. ■
Lemma 6 If the allocation is separable then \( \eta(z) = z^{\frac{\gamma}{1+\rho}} \).

Proof. Note that adding the first order conditions with respect to \( y \) and using \( \lambda(z^t) = \mathbb{E}[c(\theta^t, z^{t-1})^\theta \theta^t] \eta(z_t)^\rho \) we get

\[
\frac{\mathbb{E}[\theta^t \theta^t | \theta_{t-1}] \mathbb{E}[c(\theta^t, z^{t-1})^\theta | \theta^t] \eta(z_t)^\rho}{\mathbb{E}[y(\theta^t, z^{t-1})^\gamma | \theta^t]} \eta(z_t)^\rho = \eta(z_t)^{1-\gamma} z_t^\gamma,
\]

which implies \( \eta(z) = z^{\frac{\gamma}{1+\rho}} \).

Proof. of Proposition 3: Assume that the optimal allocation does not display memory. This implies that utility promises in \( \tau + 1 \) are independent of \( z_\tau \). Define \( \bar{c}(\theta^t, z^t) = c(\theta^t, z^t) / \eta(z_t) \) and \( \bar{y}(\theta^t, z^t) = y(\theta^t, z^t) / \eta(z_t) \), with \( \eta(z) = z^{\frac{\gamma}{1+\rho}} \). Note that due to Lemma XX, above, if the allocation is separable then both \( \bar{c}(\theta^t, z^t) \) and \( \bar{y}(\theta^t, z^t) \) are not functions of \( z_t \). Next, re-write program \( \mathcal{P}() \) as

\[
\xi(\bar{w}(\theta^{t-1}, z^t), \bar{w}(\theta^{t-1}, z^t)) = \min \sum_{\theta^t > \theta^t} \mu_t \left( \theta^t | \theta^t \right) \left[ \eta(z_t) \left[ \bar{c}(\theta^t, z^t) - \bar{y}(\theta^t, z^t) \right] \right] + \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} Q(z^{t+1}) \xi(\bar{w}(\theta^t, z_{t+1}), \bar{w}(\theta^t, z_{t+1}))
\]

subject to

\[
\sum_{\theta^t > \theta^t} \mu_t \left( \theta^t | \theta^t \right) \left[ \eta(z_t) \left[ \bar{c}(\theta^t, z^t)^{1-\rho} \frac{\bar{c}(\theta^t, z^t)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \bar{y}(\theta^t, z^t)^\gamma \frac{\bar{c}(\theta^t, z^t)^{1-\rho}}{\gamma \theta_t^\gamma} \right] \right] + \beta \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1}) w(\theta^t, z_{t+1}) = w(\theta^{t-1}, z_t),
\]

and

\[
\frac{\bar{c}(\theta^t, z^t)^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \frac{\bar{y}(\theta^t, z^t)^\gamma}{\gamma \theta_t^\gamma} \geq \beta \left\{ \sum_{z^{t+1} > z^t} \pi(z^{t+1}) \left[ \bar{w}(\theta^{t-1}, \theta, z_{t+1}) - w(\theta^t, z_{t+1}) \right] \right\} \eta(z_t)^{\rho-1}
\]

(17)
Under assumption A, (17) holds as an equality for some \( \theta^t \) at both aggregate states. The term in curly brackets in the right hand side of expression (17) is independent of \( z^t \) since the allocation is memoryless. But, in this case, the left hand side must depend on \( z^t \), meaning that \((c(\theta^t, z^t), y(\theta^t, z^t))\) is not separable. However, from Proposition 2, this cannot be the case.

\[ \text{B Appendix: Mirrlees’ period } T \text{ allocation} \]

**Proof.** Consider the problem being analyzed,

\[
\max_{c,y} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \beta^{t-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ c(\theta^t, z^t) \frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho} - y(\theta^t, z^t) \gamma \theta^T t \right]
\]

subject to

\[
\sum_{\theta^t} \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ c(\theta^t, z^t) - y(\theta^t, z^t) \right] \leq 0
\]

and

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \beta^{t-1} \sum_{\theta^t} \sum_{z^t} \pi_t(z^t) \mu_t(\theta^t) \left[ c(\theta^t, z^t) \frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho} - y(\theta^t, z^t) \gamma \theta^T t \right] \geq
\]

Suppose that the variable of choice is \( \bar{c} \) and \( \bar{y} \), but that the actual consumption and labor implemented in period \( T \) are given by \( c_T(\cdot) = \bar{c}_T(\cdot) \bar{T}^{\frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho}} \) and \( y_T(\cdot) = \bar{y}_T(\cdot) \bar{T}^{\frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho}} \), since \( \bar{c}_T \) and \( \bar{y}_T \) also depend on \( z_T \) potentially, this change of variable is without loss of generality. Assume that \( c_t = \bar{c}_t \) and \( y_t = \bar{y}_t \) for \( t < T \). Given that we are in a finite period model, the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as a restriction that agents do not lie at period \( t \) given any history and that they do not plan to lie from \( t \) onwards. Then the last period incentive compatibility becomes

\[
\frac{(1-\rho)}{\bar{T}^{1-\rho}} \left\{ \frac{\bar{c}(\theta^{T-1}, \theta, z^{T})^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho} - \frac{\bar{y}(\theta^{T-1}, \theta, z^{T})^{\gamma}}{\gamma \theta^{T T}} \right\} \geq
\]

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And the resource constraints turns into

\[ z_T^T \rho^T \gamma \sum_{\theta^T} H_t \left( \theta^T \right) \left[ \tilde{c}_T(\theta^T, z^T) - \tilde{y}_T(\theta^T, z^T) \right] \leq 0. \]

Then the constraints on \( \tilde{c} \) and \( \tilde{y} \) do not depend explicitly on the aggregate shock in the last period. From this and the concavity of the objective function, we get that \( \tilde{c} \) and \( \tilde{y} \) do not depend on \( z_T \). ■
Figure 1: Memory - $\rho = 5$

![Graph showing consumption memory for low and high states with different types (LL, LH, HL, HH) at $\rho = 5$.](image)

Figure 2: Memory - $\rho = .5$

![Graph showing consumption memory for low and high states with different types (LL, LH, HL, HH) at $\rho = .5$.](image)
Figure 3: Separability in Consumption
Separability Measure $\rho = 5$

Separability Measure - Consumption

Low Type  High Type  Eta

Separability Measure $\rho = .5$

Separability Measure - Consumption
Figure 4: Backloading - $\rho = 5$

Figure 5: Backloading - $\rho = .5$
Figure 6: 1st Period Consumption and Output - $\rho = 5$

Figure 7: 1st Period Consumption and Output - $\rho = .5$
Figure 8: Labor Supply and Mg Tax Rates - $\rho = 5$

Figure 9: Labor Supply and Mg Tax Rates - $\rho = .5$
Figure 10: Labor Wedge

Labor Wedge $\rho = 5$

Labor Wedge $\rho = .5$
Figure 11: Pricing Kernel: Rep. Agent and True - $\rho = 5$

Figure 12: Pricing Kernel: Rep. Agent and True - $\rho = .5$
Figure 13: Risk Premium and Pricing Errors - $\rho = 5$

Figure 14: Risk Premium and Pricing Errors - $\rho = .5$