The Evolving ‘Doctrine’ of Multilateralism in the 21st Century

Elena Lazarou, Geoffrey Edwards, Christopher Hill and Julie Smith

Series editors:
John Peterson, University of Edinburgh (john@peterberg.org)
Gunilla Herolf, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (herolf@sipri.org)
Nadia Klein, University of Cologne (nadia.klein@uni-koeln.de)
Wolfgang Wessels, University of Cologne (wessels@uni-koeln.de)

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Abstract

Multilateralism is a concept which has been given increasing attention, particularly by western democracies, since the end of the Cold War, even if its practice dates back at least to 1815. The issue of whether it has now become a ‘doctrine’, that is a coherent guide to policy practice, is more arguable. If it has, then the European Union is the leader in conceptualising and articulating such a doctrine. Indeed, it comes closer than any other single concept to expressing what the EU stands for in world politics. The idea of multilateralism is used often to legitimise EU actions, although it has been qualified after 9.11. by the term ‘effective’, thus hinting at the European wish to avoid mere idealism, and willingness to make hard choices. This dilemma is matched by that between regional and universal multilateralism, which faces all actors in international politics. The EU experiences it keenly in the areas of both security and trade. A further sharp difficulty is over multilateralism as end and multilateralism as means: in practice the EU looks on the concept from both perspectives, and codifies it in the form of declarations, recommendations and speeches which, however, usually serve to make it even more difficult to identify a coherent ‘doctrine’. The European Security Strategy of 2003, updated in 2009, which adopted the idea of ‘effective multilateralism’, did not amount to a parsimonious solution to this problem. More consensus, but also more research on the EU’s practices, will certainly be needed if a clear doctrine of multilateralism is to be enunciated.

Introduction

In an increasingly interdependent world multilateralism becomes ever more important across a plethora of policy sectors traditionally deemed to fall within the purview of nation-state. Issues such as trade through the WTO, security via OSCE, or defence via, eg, NATO, have been joined by others such as climate change (Kyoto) or, less formally, internal security, through bodies such as the Club of Berne. The EU made “effective multilateralism” the priority in its Security Strategy of 2003. Yet however necessary multilateralism has become, the question remains of whether there is consensus on the foundations, rules and principles that should guide policy and the construction of multilateral solutions.
This paper assumes that this question can be answered by tracing the “doctrine” of multilateralism and its development in the 21st century. It conceptualizes doctrine in this instance as a set of principles that guides the behaviour of states and international actors in formulating and negotiating multilateral solutions to global, regional or individual issues. The conceptualization of a “doctrine of multilateralism” aims to enrich current debates about multilateralism in an era of emerging multipolarity focusing on the aims and motives of those promoting multilateralism, the principles that have guided them and the observable changes in these principles and their operationalisation in the 21st century.

The paper begins with a theoretical discussion of the role of doctrine in the formulation and legitimisation of policy choices, and proceeds by exploring the sources, codification and practice of a doctrine of multilateralism as advocated primarily by the EU in the 21st century. In particular, it looks at the cases of trade and security as manifest in the WTO on the one hand, and the European Union’s CFSP/ESDP on the other. Drawing on these cases it questions the emergence of a “doctrine of multilateralism” and addresses the following research questions:

1. Is there a single doctrine of multilateralism governing different policy areas?
2. How has the EU contributed to the evolution of the doctrine of multilateralism?

The Concept of Multilateralism

In 1992 James Caporaso criticised international relations theory for having neglected multilateralism and its study as a basic concept in IR. Explanations for the lack of theorising vary from the argument that IR remains an American-dominated discipline (Hoffmann 1977), and thus tends to follow US foreign policy which has rarely embraced the practice of multilateralism, to the simple explanation that as there is actually not too much multilateralism in practice it has not preoccupied scholars substantially (Caporaso 1992: 600). Ruggie (1992: 572) adds the point that as by nature multilateralism is a highly demanding institutional form, its historical incidence is likely to be less frequent than that of alternatives such as bilateralism. However, the 21st century has marked a notable increase in the study of multilateralism. The
emergence of complex global problems and threats and of a global market, as well as the empowerment of new actors with a strong belief in the benefits of multilateral cooperation (EU, Brazil\textsuperscript{1}) has led to dynamic developments in the practice of multilateralism, which have not gone unnoticed in the scholarly world. Furthermore, the success of the European Union as a unique and longstanding example of multilateralism in practice has given birth to a new sub-discipline all together, that of European Studies. Nonetheless, however much has been written about the EU, it has rarely, until recently, been in the context of a wider debate on multilateralism. This is one of the aims of this paper and of the MERCURY project as a whole.

The MERCURY programme of research is only one of many newly EU-funded projects aimed not only at promoting the study and understanding of multilateralism, but also at locating it within the EU"s wider approach towards global governance, comparing it to other actors’ approaches towards international organisation, and shedding light on its various forms and manifestations. The specific purpose of this paper is not to define the concept of multilateralism. This issue is addressed elsewhere in the Mercury project where we have agreed upon a working definition of multilateralism as:

"Three or more actors engaging in (more or less) institutionalised and voluntary cooperation governed by norms or rules that apply (more or less) equally to all" (Bouchard & Peterson 2008).

However, what is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, something applicable to other organizational forms (transgovernmentalism, networks, alliances) but that “it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those states” (Ruggie 1992; 567). What is addressed in this paper is Ruggie’s suggestion that we should recover “the principled meanings of multilateralism from actual and historical practice” (Ruggie 1992: 567), show how these principles have come to be institutionalized and explore how and why they may perpetuate themselves, even though conditions

change. The idea of an evolving “doctrine” of multilateralism is proposed here as a potential tool for the investigation of these questions.

**Doctrine in International Relations**

In ordinary language the term ‘doctrine’ usually refers to a principle or a ‘body of principles’ that is taught or advocated. Such advocacy or instruction has been particularly significant in the development of traditions, institutions, and practices of religion, which is usually the primary connotation of ‘doctrine’. In this context, principles have been taught or advocated as a necessary way of action and of practice because of a specific need or moral responsibility and as a means to a better end.

In the realm of foreign policy, the use of the term has been most strongly associated with the defining approaches taken by various US Presidents, from Monroe onwards. In this context ‘doctrine’ has been used to refer to a statement of very broad principle(s) which shapes and justifies policy at the strategic level. Historically, American foreign policy doctrines, such as the Monroe Doctrine or the Truman Doctrine have, for the most part, sought to address moments of crisis and have been grounded equally in ideology, as well as in the concern and language of national security (Selverstone 2002). Thus the Monroe doctrine (1823), perhaps the most famous example of doctrine articulation, served to establish the United States as a global power and, has since remained “the most recognizable and perhaps most venerated of diplomatic principles, [whose] hold on the popular imagination has been so strong that it has defined the limits of acceptable policy options, shaping the range of choices open to presidents for the better part of two centuries” (Selverstone 2002: 521).

Beyond the context of specific approaches to foreign policy articulated by state leaders, in the wider area of International Relations, doctrine has often been used almost interchangeably with the term ‘practice’ or ‘strategy’ as in the “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine; the “Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention”, the “Prevention Doctrine” or the doctrine of Democratic Interventionism (Hodges 1915; Mortier 2004).
These doctrines have been named mostly on the basis of the means they propose (e.g. prevention, intervention) as the most effective and morally justified instruments for the achievement of greater goals, such as the prevention of conflict and the promotion of democracy. The same applies to the proposed “Doctrine of multilateralism” although, as discussed further on, the means vs. ends question is more convoluted in this case.

Perhaps the most frequent incidence of the concept of doctrine in international relations is found in the study of military strategy, where reference is made to “military doctrine”. In this case too, the articulation of doctrine serves to justify a course of action as consonant with certain principles deriving from a higher objective. Barry Posen (1984) defines military doctrine as a component of national security policy or “grand strategy”, the latter referring to a state’s theory of how it can best bring about security for itself. According to Posen (1984: 13), a “grand strategy” is a means-end chain which identifies specific threats to security and devises political, economic and military remedies to those threats. Military doctrine, in turn, is the component of grand strategy which deals explicitly with the military means, in terms of what means will be employed and how they will be employed to respond to recognized threats and opportunities.

The articulation and analysis of military doctrine was particularly relevant throughout the Cold War, as the employment of military means and the demonstration of hard power defined international relations within, for the West, the framework of the containment of the Soviet Union. The post-1989 shift to unipolarity led to a reconfiguration of power relationships, particularly in conjunction with Europe’s rejection of power politics, its relative devaluing of military force as a tool of international engagement and its promotion of other aspects of soft or “civilian” power. The emergence of other kinds of threats, particularly terrorism and international crime, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the fragility of several states (in a number of regions) has necessitated an understanding of doctrine as a

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component of strategy that goes well beyond military strategy to addresses the means required to respond to these different threats and challenges.

Nonetheless, in attempting to conceptualize doctrine within this new context, the definition of military doctrine remains a useful starting point for conceptual rethinking. According to Posen’s assumptions, “grand strategy” encompasses a political, an economic and a military aspect, drawing on tools and “remedies” from all three areas as means towards confronting identifiable threats. Yet, the preoccupation with doctrine as part of “grand strategy” has predominantly been geared towards the analysis of military doctrine. Here, we can move beyond this tradition, and propose that doctrine is the component of “grand strategy” which deals with economic, political and military means, in terms of what kind of means will be employed and how they will employed to respond to current challenges and opportunities. Thus, for example, a doctrine of multilateralism proposes multilateralism as a political or economic means which is effective in combating new types of transnational problems and will outline conditions and rules governing the specific types of multilateral cooperation that is best suited to the particular challenges.

Combining this latter definition with the initial discussion of doctrine as a set of principles taught or advocated as a means to a better end, we can deduce that the existence of a doctrine justifies the pursuit of those ends on the basis of explicit principles. Moreover, these principles are advocated as the basis of the “right” approach to international affairs, as the guidelines towards a “better world”. In this sense, the types of cooperation which conform with an accepted doctrine of multilateralism will be in line with particular norms, such as democracy, equality and legitimacy, which are embedded in the doctrine.

The “principle-means” emphasis which accompanies the concept of doctrine, qualifies the term as related yet different from “grand strategy”, the latter being geared towards “defining the long term foreign policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to this end” (Biscop 2009: 9) and thus representing a means - ends chain. On the basis of this distinction, Biscop is justified in claiming that, in the field of security, the EU lacks a “grand strategy”: the

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3 Biscop’s statement is based on the definition of “grand strategy” by John Gaddis as “the calculated relationship between means and large ends” (Gaddis 2005: viii).
analysis of key strategic documents of the EU suggests that while the principles and instruments are clearly defined, the objectives are too broad and the priorities, at times, unclear. Sometimes what should be done is clearer than how to do it – and sometimes the reverse. Indeed, ends and means are by no means always easy to distinguish. Thus, to the extent that the EU does have a doctrine, it needs to be translated into strategy – but that in itself is easier to say than to do.

This brings up the issue of doctrine interpretation. In how doctrine can or should be interpreted, the conceptualization of “military doctrine” offers some useful initial insights by introducing the issue of how much discretion and flexibility is entailed in a doctrine. NATO offers a working definition of military doctrine, describing it as the set of “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives”, adding the key comment that doctrine is “authoritative but requires judgment in application” (NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2000: 2-D-6). In other words, while the “what means?” and “how should they be used?” (and on the basis of which principles) are clarified in the articulation of the doctrine (texts, statements), the exact circumstances and mode of operation in which they will be employed is liable to interpretation. Biscop (2005: viii) puts forth the same suggestion about the European Security Strategy, namely that, “like holy scriptures, it is liable to interpretation” and that its prospects for successful implementation lie in the interpretation of the document’s content by the Member-States.

In spite of these preoccupations, doctrine does serve two essential functions in the creation of collective and coherent policy: coordination and legitimization. As an accepted authoritative guide, it can serve as a powerful coordinating device. In the case of an EU-wide foreign policy doctrine, this would, of course, presuppose some consistency of interpretation of the doctrinal texts. Policy-makers are likely to refer back to and seek justification in, or at least conformity with the doctrine, leading to a greater consistency and coherence of EU policies. In Biscop’s (2005: 133) account, this would be the ultimate achievement of a “Grand Strategy” for the EU.

The coordinating function of doctrine is particularly useful and relevant to the promotion of multilateralism, as the latter’s “highly demanding nature as an institutional form” (Ruggie 1992: 572) renders the existence of a strong coordinating device a necessary precondition for sustainability. If a defining feature of
multilateralism is that it organizes states (and perhaps other actors also), it does so on the basis of a set of principles and — it would be safe to add — certain objectives. It is in the deconstruction and interpretation of these principles, the sources of their codification but also of the mechanisms for their diffusion and incorporation into actors’ preferences towards multilateral forms of cooperation that the “doctrine” of multilateralism can be found and its evolution followed. This can be observed in the way in which EU Member States approach their policy collectively, even if their individual preferences diverge quite widely, with Poland concerned about the Ukraine and Belarus, in contrast (say) to the Franco-Spanish focus on the Maghreb. The need to incorporate this diversity into a multilateral approach has become part of the foreign policy consensus.

An equally valuable function of doctrine is that it legitimizes certain types of action, while excluding others as either incompatible with the advocated principles, or as employing the wrong means. Consequently, an actor’s doctrine also defines the characteristics of its actions. In the discussion on “types of powers” which is currently engaging the IR community, this also suggests that the “what kind of power” question can be found in the sources of doctrine. Thus, for example, the fact that the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States legitimizes action taken unilaterally, outside the collective security framework of the UN (p.6), or that the Bush pre-emption doctrine legitimizes action taken against emerging threats before they are necessarily fully formed (George W.Bush, Covering Letter to the NSS), defines the US as an essentially different type of power from the EU and its multilateral approach to the confrontation of the same threats. As Vasconcelos points out, in a multipolar system, multilateralism is “an expression of how power should be used and to what ends” (Vasconcelos 2008: 22), therefore the endorsement of a doctrine of multilateralism is a defining feature of a particular approach to power.

4 The term “actors” is used here to refer to state and non-state (multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, secretariats of international organisations), since the latter may push states to agree to multilateral commitments, or even agree to such commitments between themselves. For more on the emergence of non-state actors see Risse-Kappen, T. (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge University Press.

5 This does not assume that the concepts of multipolarity and multilateralism are necessarily connected: multipolarity refers to the way power is distributed at world level, and to the emergence of a plurality of global actors, who limit the power of the US superpower and that of other ‘poles’ such as
The emergence of new types of power, such as the “normative” or “ethical” power represented by the EU, as a result of the changing dynamics of the international environment, has contributed to the evolution of the doctrine of multilateralism in the late 20th and early 21st century. The next section briefly overviews the course of this doctrine during this timeframe, setting a basis for the analysis of the principles currently advocated by the EU as the basis of multilateral cooperation.

**Evolution and changes in the doctrine of multilateralism in the 21st century**

While the EU’s explicit focus on promoting “effective multilateralism” in Europe and beyond designates it as the principal advocate of multilateralism in the 21st century, it is hardly a doctrine exclusive to the Union. Principles guiding multilateral cooperation, particularly within the framework of multilateral institutions and regimes, have been advocated in one way or another by other actors within various contexts since the nineteenth century.6

Historically, multilateralism has been linked to functional considerations but also to the power relations in the system of actors7. Thus, while multilateral forms of cooperation were based on the central principles of cooperation and collective decision-making for the generic purposes of stabilizing the international property rights of states, of managing coordination problems and resolving collaboration problems (Ruggie 1992), they clearly acknowledged the relative balance of power of the actors involved. In this context, the development of a “doctrine of multilateralism” was inextricably linked to the balance of powers in the international order and to the foreign policy doctrine of the dominant world power(s) at particular instances. Multilateral cooperation in the field of security, for example, took the form of collective security as a consequence of Woodrow Wilson’s belief in the need for a community of democratic nations to guarantee and enforce international peace, and the

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6 The departure from the multivalent Westphalian system of states established in 1648 can be chronologically situated in the nineteenth century with the establishment of the world’s first standing interstate organizations eg. Danube River Commission, International Postal Union which represented a nascent multilateralism (Schuller & Grant 2003).

7 This is consistent with the way many scholars and politicians in the US still view multilateralism, i.e. in terms of its efficiency in solving problems, as a means to an end, as opposed to the EU view of multilateralism as an procedure, an organizational form, which gives a say to everyone (Krause 2004: 44).
subsequent replacement of the balance of power system and the Concert of Europe - itself an early form of multilateralism - with the League of Nations after World War I (Krause 2004; Weiss 1993).

The end of World War II spurred an unprecedented rise in the creation of rules and organizations laying down a global framework for international relations. International regimes such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were created, largely as a result of the United States’ initiative to promote global institutions which would safeguard its economic and security interests (Keohane & Nye 1985). To a great extent, the rules governing these multilateral organisations in the early days of their operation were defined by the US approach to international cooperation, which viewed multilateralism as a means to an end, as an efficient way of addressing collective threats, but which did not challenge the distribution of power.

Gradually, however, multilateral institutions took on a life of their own, as the new “international bureaucracy” that was created through the institutionalisation of multilateral cooperation gained power through its function as the representative of collective state interests. Increasingly multilateral organisations displayed a tendency towards collectivistic and shared-wealth doctrines, which famously raised concerns on the behalf of the Reagan Administration regarding the values of these organisations for the promotion of the US’s interests. But as early as the 1960s US Administrations also questioned whether a “doctrine of multilateralism” was consistent with US foreign policy goals and its perception of its role in the world, arguing that multilateral negotiations often placed limits on the behaviour of large states by introducing principles such as “one state, one vote”, regardless of relative state size or power, or the principle of “equal redistribution” (Krause 2004: 47).

The institutionalisation of multilateral cooperation and the subsequent emergence of multilateral organisations with a lesser or greater degree of “autonomy”, most famously the EU which included supranational institutions such as the Commission, led to further changes in the initial principles guiding multilateral cooperation which were based on a traditional state-centric view of global society. While the earliest, US-advocated, “doctrine of multilateralism” was based on the principle that no
multilateral organisation could impose its will on members, the strictly state-centric view displayed signs of erosion as institutionalist and neo-institutionalist understandings of multilateral organisation gained ground. After all, from the outset governments wishing to receive the benefits deriving from membership had to accept some restraints on their domestic and international behaviour,

Even before the end of the Cold War, the evolution of communication and globalisation brought about an additional change in the moral and values foundation of multilateralism (Hufner & Naumann 1990: 325). As the concept of a modern “world society” gradually emerged, competing with state-centred views, the concept of multilateralism was widened to encompass actors rather than states, and interests beyond state-based interests. The principles and ends which formed the basis of multilateral cooperation were no longer only those endorsed and advocated by states, and specifically states in power, but were redefined through the institutions themselves, aiming to address greater needs. This new phase of multilateralism was captured characteristically in the words of Javier Perez de Cuellar (1987): “By multilateralism I mean a common effort by the international community, based on the principles of the United Nations Charter, to address in a pragmatic manner the world’s many needs and problems, so that the entire human family can realise its full potential”. In this new phase the idea of a “human family”, a modern world society and the discourse of “one world” beyond national societies had began to influence the ideational premises of multilateralism as the “doctrine” behind multilateral cooperation found its codification not only in the strategies of leading states, but in the collectively agreed upon declarations of the UN. As the advocators of those collective agreements, international organisations themselves, mostly via their secretariats, moved beyond mere fora status to expand their own role in the international system. This was also consistent with the times and with the authors’ description of “attempts to bridge, or at least temper, the schism between the two great “secular ideologies”, capitalism and socialism, by identifying common interests, possibilities, and prospects of shared evolution” (Hufner & Naumann 1990:326).

The concern for “global society” and the provision of benefits for all actors participating in multilateral regimes which were voiced through international organisations from their new positions as actors in their own right, gradually led to the
emergence of the principles of the indivisibility of welfare (Ruggie 1993; 1998); non-discrimination; and “diffuse reciprocity”, whereby participants in multilateral cooperation perceive and expect reciprocal balancing to occur in the aggregate and over time (Keohane 1990; Ruggie 1998:110). The multilateral approach towards sustainability captured in the “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development” which resulted from the meeting of the UN Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992 was indicative of the UN’s promotion of these principles. The Declaration emphasised that “all States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development” (Principle 5) and that “Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible” (Principle 25). While to a certain extent these principles were socially constructed, at times creating perceptions and expectations of indivisibility, non-discrimination and diffuse reciprocity, rather than actually putting them into practice (Wilkinson 2000: 41-42), these principles functioned as the basis for the creation of a certain set of “rules of conduct” within multilateral institutions in the aftermath of the Cold War. Consequently, the principle of a “rule-based” international order also became inherent in the practice of multilateralism.

Enthusiasm and idealism was short-lived, however, as the only superpower which had remained in the new unipolar order was reluctant to embrace the multilateral wave unconditionally and wholeheartedly. This reluctance was epitomised by the George W. Bush Administration, which endorsed the position of “a la carte multilateralism” (Haass, 2008), steering away from the principles of indivisibility and non-discrimination in their initial form. But the seeds of American hesitation had been planted much earlier. As Sir Crispin Tickell pointed out in a lecture in Cambridge in 2003 “John Major had to twist President Bush Senior’s arm to get him to the Rio Conference in 1992; but no one could persuade President Bush Junior to go to the Johannesburg conference ten years later”.

Towards the end of the 1990s attitudes towards multilateralism became more sceptical, largely as a consequence of a crisis in the collective security system, a central cause of which was the failure of the United Nations, the “intended centrepiece of multilateralism” (Krause 2004: 43) to guarantee a global system of
Collective security and to deal with a number of conflicts and threats that emerged with the dawn of the 21st century. Combined with the withdrawal or abrogation of the US from a number or multilateral treaties (ICC, Kyoto protocol, ABM Treaty) under the George W. Bush Administration, this led to wider scepticism about the effectiveness of multilateralism, including but not limited to cooperation on security issues. As Krause (2004: 43) points out: “As long as the crisis of collective security is not directly addressed, the reputation of other forms of multilateral foreign policy will suffer collateral damage, with potentially disastrous consequences for international order”.

In spite of the disillusionment it brought about outside the US, who saw the neo-con attitude as an aberration, the realisation of a “crisis in multilateralism” in the wake of Iraq highlighted the need for a more coherent and detailed definition of the aims and principles guiding multilateralism and the best means of promoting it. From the perspective of doctrine, the crisis was not unrelated to issues of interpretation, namely to different actors’ interpretation of the principles that governed multilateral cooperation and action, the degree of flexibility allowed (eg. on the issue of intervention) and the limits of principles such as the responsibility to protect. In other words, the necessity for a reformed, clearly articulated and widely accepted “doctrine of multilateralism”, which would enable the international community to take effective multilateral action, was highlighted by the failure of Iraq and henceforth became a priority, particularly for the EU.

Actors engaged in the process of doctrine formulation, including the EU and the UN itself, have acknowledged that the reformed approach to multilateralism had to take into account the new circumstances. Multilateralism should be geared towards confronting new types of threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration, infectious disease, the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, global warming, environmental degradation, extreme poverty and financial turmoil. It

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8 Collective security is a very particular form of multilateralism whereby a multilateral committee is entrusted with the task of guaranteeing member states’ security either through mediation or by issuing sanctions and punishment, including military intervention, to combat threats to international peace (Weiss 1993). It has been redefined since the 1990s to include new threats beyond military or conflict, such as migration, epidemics, climate change, food shortage and to include both intra-group (internal) security as well as externally facing (alliance).

9 For a detailed analysis of threats which need to be confronted on a Multilateral level see, for example, the 2004 report of the SG High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled...
should take into account new non-state actors with global reach in fields as diverse as international health, environmental management, security, peace-building, human rights, and trade. It should acknowledge that in an era of accelerated globalisation, where new modes of information sharing, communications and transaction have become widespread, there is indisputable need for collective action to address problems that transcend national and regional boundaries. According to this logic, this action should expand beyond the developed world and include as many partners as possible on the basis of the principle of fair representation (Macedo 2008). In re-establishing the principled basis for multilateralism, actors should take into consideration that globalisation-related developments have also fortified the threats faced, and that a combination of instruments is needed to combat these threats effectively. Hence, cooperation with and support for ad-hoc/hybrid interstate and institutional arrangements and decision making forums (regional, bilateral, state and non-state actors, private actors) has become instrumental in order to combat transnational threats and problems. Admittedly a change in the face of multilateralism, in terms of the openness towards experimentation of various types of interstate cooperation to complement multilateral forms, is taking place (Forman & Segaar 2006; Macedo 2008).

The preoccupation with the reform of the UN is indicative of the recognition of those new circumstances, and of the effort to reinvigorate multilateralism in the last few years. In the words of Kofi Annan:

"We have come to a fork in the road […] It is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some states feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can and will be addressed effectively through collective action" (Kofi Annan at the opening of the 58th plenary session of the General Assembly of the UN, 23 September 2003)

In recognition of the circumstances, and of the need to reinvigorate multilateralism, in 2003 the EU made “strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively" a European priority (ESS 2003: 9) and placed the advocacy of “effective multilateralism” at the centre of its security strategy. As the new broader concept of security goes beyond the confrontation of military threats,
spilling over into policy areas such as trade, development, justice and home affairs, environment and health, to name a few, the observation can be broadened to suggest that in prioritising multilateralism in the ESS, the EU made multilateralism a focal point of the entirety of its foreign policy.

**The EU and the Doctrine of Multilateralism**

As the actor leading the promotion of multilateralism as a basis for global governance and international cooperation, the EU holds the central role in the formulation of the doctrine of multilateralism. Since the establishment of the EU in 1993 conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter has been at the core of the EU’s external action, while today the 27 EU Member States contribute around 50% of all UN Member-States’ contributions to UN funds and programmes (Wouters 2007). While there is no explicit reference to the existence of a “doctrine of multilateralism” in EU texts, we examine here whether the treatment of multilateralism in key EU documents which formulate its foreign policy in issues of security, trade and beyond, as well as in the statements and practices of high-level EU officials and EU member-state leaders, justifies the argument that the EU is in a process of formulating an “evolving doctrine of multilateralism”. Furthermore, we perceive the EU’s continuous engagement in advocating the need and benefits of multilateralism both internally, towards its own public, and externally, towards existing and potential partners, as the articulation and promotion of this doctrine.

In that sense, the use of multilateralism as a focal point of the EU’s foreign policy on a number of issues encompasses all the characteristics of a doctrine:

1. Multilateralism is presented as a need in itself, as a means towards the effective accomplishment of specific goals and, ultimately, towards the construction of a ‘better world’.
2. Multilateralism is based on a set of principles.
3. The belief in multilateralism forms the basis for decisions on strategy and action taken to face identified threats and problems.
4. Confronting these problems and convincing others to join the EU in confronting them via the multilateral approach is viewed by the EU as its moral responsibility.

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What is often not made clear in the EU’s treatment of multilateralism in strategy documents and declarations (eg. in the European Security Strategy or the 2008 “Global Europe” strategy for trade) is whether multilateralism is to be treated as a means to an end (an instrument) or as an end in itself (a multilateral global order) for the achievement of which other instruments (eg. partnerships) can be used. Scholars, such as Sven Biscop also use the concept in both ways. Understanding the fine difference between the two and determining the function of “multilateralism” in EU discourse is an essential prerequisite for the conceptualisation of an EU-wide doctrine of multilateralism and, in turn, for its homogenous interpretation. This in turn, is important, as, on the basis of the definition of doctrine and of its functions, coordination and legitimacy, it also follows that a wide endorsement and support of a single “doctrine of multilateralism” by all EU member-states is likely to increase its effectiveness, in other words the “translation” of advocated principles into coherent and coordinated actions.

Consequently, one prerequisite for effectiveness, which lies at the core of the EU’s approach to multilateralism, is to “minimise the disagreement among Europeans themselves […] about the very meaning and purpose of multilateralism – its efficiency and utility in pursuit of broadly liberal goals” (Krause 2004). In the pursuit of this goal, the EU is engaged in a practice of formulation and reformulation of collectively agreed upon texts reiterating the principles and aims of the EU’s approach to multilateralism (EU in the UN documents; documents submitted to the WTO; ESS and the Report on its implementation) producing a range of texts which make up the evolving “doctrine of multilateralism”.

Sources and Codification of the doctrine of multilateralism

The analysis of the “doctrine of multilateralism”, as the set of principles advocated as the basis of multilateral cooperation touches on the delicate differences between “doctrine” and other concepts which refer to the norms, rules and principles guiding multilateral/international organization, particularly that of the regime. A “regime” is defined as representing a set of principles, norms, rules and procedures around which participants” expectations converge with reference to a more or less distinct issue area (Keohane & Nye 1977; Puchala & Hopkins 1982; Krasner 1983).
Multilateral regimes “roughly reflect the appropriate generalized principles of conduct” (Ruggie 573). Drawing on this definition, it may be posited that multilateral regimes are the manifestation, the expression of the “doctrine” and that doctrine is embedded in the rules and procedures that define the limit of acceptable behaviour on various issues and in the “recognized patterns of practice that define the rules of the game” (Keohane & Nye 1985: 151). Keeping in mind, however, that the main feature of doctrine is that it is advocated, the focus should be on the sources of these principles and the articulation of these patterns.

The sources of doctrine codification in national foreign policy are found primarily in strategy papers (eg. in the National Security Strategy), as well as in the grand statements of state-leaders and policy-makers (eg. Truman’s speech to Congress on March 12, 194711). Policy-makers through their statements can further or strengthen the doctrine (Mortier 2004) emphasising the need or moral responsibility behind a specific type of action. Thus, observations in the doctrinal literature are more likely to be operationalised if they are strengthened by supportive statements on the policy-level12. Often policy-makers are the intermediaries between the codification and operationalisation of doctrine. For example, while the doctrine of multilateralism may have been incorporated in the ESS, the principles embedded therein are only put into practice if policy-makers use them as the basis for formulating and justifying specific foreign policy choices13.

When considering actors beyond and above the state, such as the EU and NATO, where decision-making is collective and leadership shared, the identification of doctrinal sources becomes a more complex issue. While declarations and founding treaties which outline goals and principles can perhaps be viewed as the equivalent of strategy documents, the lack of one specific spokesperson suggests that it is the policy-makers within the organisation, as well as the leaders of its member-states

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12 See for example CIA Document on the Evolution of Soviet Doctrine on Limited War (SR-IM 67-9, 10/1/1967) where the author explains: “these observations in the doctrinal literature were strengthened on the policy-level statement of Minister of Defense Malinovskiy”.
13 Beyond the policy-maker level, it could be argued that the operationalisation of doctrine would also require a wider social acceptance of the principles embedded therein, although this applies in certain kind of societies and on the European level would also presuppose the existence of an EU-wide public opinion.
that articulate the doctrine. In the particular case of the EU, with its unique institutional makeup, this is linked to the complex issue of representation and the famous question of “who speaks for the EU”. As the concept of doctrine is linked to an actor’s intention to convey the principles they advocate to others, then the speeches and discourse of Commissioners, EU heads of state and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, together with those of key EU officials, such as the High Representative for the CFSP, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council (under the Lisbon Treaty), can also be regarded as sources of the doctrine of multilateralism when their aim is to promote the value of multilateralism as an instrument and a goal.\footnote{See for example Lord Mandelson’s “The larger trend: China, Britain and Europe in a multilateral world” speech, Party School Beijing, September 8, 2009; Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s speech “Effective Multilateralism: Building for a Better Tomorrow” to the United Nations Association of Spain, Barcelona 14 April 2009; Angela Merkel’s recent address to the US Congress urging for multilateralism in the area of climate change. (see http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-GreenBusiness/idUSTRE5A20NR20091103)}

Undoubtedly, the issue is also linked to the discussion on the nature of the EU itself and its identity as an actor in international affairs. Under the assumption that the EU is a normative power, seeking to act as “a changer of norms in the international system” (Manners 2002: 252), any text or speech through which the EU – and its member states - promotes or “exports” multilateralism on the basis of the principles embedded in the EU’s own approach towards multilateralism, can be considered as an expression of the doctrine of multilateralism as it is advocated internally and towards third parties.

It follows from the above that sources and expressions of the doctrine of multilateralism put forth by the EU abound in the form of declarations, recommendations and speeches and policy documents. What is missing, however, is a continuous interpretation and clarification codification of the doctrine, the identification of one or more texts or speeches which stand out as the “guiding light” of the EU’s approach to multilateralism, and which legitimise and coordinate EU member-state approach to multilateralism across foreign policy areas. The following sections look at the areas of security and trade, and, in particular, at the beliefs and instruments that constitute the EU’s approach to multilateralism in these areas, in an
attempt to tease out the underlying principles which ultimately form the evolving doctrine of multilateralism.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{The Doctrine of Multilateralism in the European Security Strategy}

Perhaps the most clearly articulated commitment of the EU to the advocacy of multilateralism is found in the EU’s security policy. While perhaps not originally conceive as such, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) has become in many ways the clearest yet codification of a doctrine on multilateralism, encompassing a set of principles, a structure of guidance/instruction and the clear suggestion of need and moral obligation to pursue multilateral cooperation in particular areas. The need for multilateralism is repeatedly emphasised as a consequence of the complex nature of today’s problems which “no single country is able to tackle on its own” (ESS 2003: 1). At the same time, engagement and cooperation with other actors is viewed as a moral duty of the EU as part of its effort to build a better world and to share responsibility for global security. The “credo of effective multilateralism” (Wouters 2007: 2) which is enshrined in the section entitled “An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism” is presented as a necessary precondition for security and prosperity, suggesting that any alternative jeopardises the future of global society. In this sense, multilateralism is framed as a doctrine, as a moral responsibility of the EU and, beyond that, every global actor.

As mentioned, the ESS presents a number of the characteristics of “doctrine” as these were summarised in the beginning of this paper. Firstly, the document clearly identifies the current challenges and opportunities which call for action.\textsuperscript{16} It then proceeds to enumerate the means needed to address these challenges, emphasising that “in contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments” (ESS 2003:7). With this phrase the ESS recognises the need for a foreign policy doctrine including all three elements of grand strategy in Posen’s definition: economic, political and military means, towards the greater end of a “secure Europe in a better world”.

\textsuperscript{15} Security and trade are also the two areas used as cases by Ruggie to detect the general principles which govern the practice of multilateralism.

\textsuperscript{16} The ESS identifies terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organised crime as the key threats confronting the EU (ESS 2003: p.2-5)
Within this context, multilateralism is treated in the ESS both as an instrument and as a goal in a circular quest for the best means and concrete ends. This is demonstrated by the statement that “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based international order is our objective” (ESS 2003: 9). The tools for the attainment of a multilateral world order are presented in the document as:

(1) Promoting the principles of good governance and democracy in the rest of the world in order to be able to enjoy close and cooperative relations;
(2) Ending the cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty by promoting development;
(3) Enhancing the legitimacy of the UN as the fundamental framework for an effective rule-based international order with “international organisations, regimes and treaties […] ready to act when the rules are broken” (ESS 2003:9);
(4) Widening the membership of multilateral institutions such as the WTO and the IMF “while maintaining their high standards” (ESS 2003: 9);
(5) Displaying flexibility towards other forms of cooperation as mechanisms which hold the potential to reinforce multilateralism by achieving greater efficiency and coordination depending on the nature of particular issues which may be regional or issue-specific (partnerships or instruments such as the Quartet\textsuperscript{17}; the Quadro group).

The ESS explicitly states that “we need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors” (ESS 2003:13);

(6) Advocating multilateralism beyond the EU and providing incentives for other actors to endorse the EU’s doctrine of multilateralism through the use of diplomatic sanctions: “Those who are unwilling to [rejoin the international community] should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union” (ESS 2003:10);

(7) Acknowledging the links between policy areas and promoting a coherent agenda of multilateralism not only in security, but also development, trade and environmental policies (ESS 2003:13).

Up to a certain extent, the basic principles which remain behind these clearly articulated guidelines are still those of *indivisibility*, *non-discrimination* and *reciprocity* outlined by Ruggie and the ensuing principle of rule-abiding noted by Wilkinson. Strong echoes of a principle of *responsibility* towards less developed regions or those parts of the world stricken by conflict, poverty, disease, natural disasters and illegal regimes, also resound in the doctrine, as do the principles of peace and democracy and their simultaneous promotion, in accordance with the theory of democratic peace.\(^{18}\) Finally, legitimacy, cooperation and respect for international law add themselves to the doctrine almost automatically. Nonetheless, in the face of complex and global threats, flexibility and effectiveness are treated as paramount, at times suggesting the allowance for a certain degree of stretching in the adherence to the outlined principles. Thus, the ESS proposes a less rigid, more malleable “doctrine of multilateralism” where responsibility and the need for effective outcomes at times overrides the priority of, for example, non-discrimination, allowing for the bilateral and the regional to co-exist with the wider multilateral setting.\(^{19}\)

**Multilateralism in the EU’s Trade Policy: The EU and the WTO**

Since its inception in 1995, the World Trade Organisation has been at the heart of the multilateral trading system and is consequently a core focus for EU trade policy, based on the belief that “a system of global rules is the best way to ensure that trade between countries is open and fair” (European Commission, DG Trade Website). While the EU’s policy of trade liberalization is pursued through bilateral and regional, as well as multilateral initiatives, the overview of the EU’s action in relation to the development of the WTO suggests that the EU is also becoming a stronger advocate of a doctrine of multilateralism in the field of external trade. This has a significant similarity to the fundamental principles of its approach to collective security. In the words of the WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, during his term as European Commissioner for Trade, in spite of its openness towards other instruments of

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\(^{19}\) The urgency of the moment and the emphasis on responsibility and security is also expressed in the 2004 Report “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility?” produced by the SG High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The resemblance of the two documents in terms of the threats identified and the advocacy of multilateralism as the means to confront them, points towards Wouters’ assumption of bidirectional interaction between the EU and the UN as two levels of governance represented by two actors which are partners in multilateralism (Wouters 2007).
international cooperation (eg. inter-regionalism and bilateral FTAs), since 1995 the EU has had a “multilateralism first” policy (Lamy 2002:1401).

Perhaps the biggest indication of the EU’s endorsement of multilateralism in the area of trade is its promotion of the WTO, its expansion and empowerment. In the late 1990s the EU was one of the leading proponents of a new round of comprehensive negotiations to broaden the agenda which had been built in to the Uruguay Round (“European Union: July 2000" WTO Trade Policy Review) and later promoted the Doha Development Agenda as a top priority. Indicatively, in 2008, following the Doha Round suspension of negotiations, the EU parliament adopted a resolution calling on India and the USA, as well as the G20, to “assume their responsibilities and make every effort to reach a deal as rapidly as possible” (“EU Parliament adopts resolution on WTO Doha Round”, EU@ UN 2008). In the 2000s the EU also became an ardent supporter of the extension of WTO membership, on the basis of the conviction that widening membership was linked to the promotion of more multilateralism. The Union is also a leading user of the WTO dispute settlement procedures, convinced that its own compliance to the agreements can act in a paradigmatic manner for other WTO trading partners (WTO Secretariat, 2009: paragraph 36). It follows that the emphasis on multilateralism in the EU’s trade policy is inextricably linked to upholding the rules that form the WTO and to advocating the necessity for the WTO’s expansion and extension.20 Thus, to understand the principles that form the EU’s doctrine of multilateralism in this area it is necessary to clarify the values and goals that form the basis of the creation, existence and functions of the WTO.

According to the Agreement Establishing the WTO the basic rules underlying trade multilateralism are reciprocity, non-discrimination and collective actions, both in dispute-settlement, and in consensual decision making, based on a strict “one state - one vote” mechanism (Article IX). These rules set the ground for the achievement of the greater aims of the organisation which are captured in the Preamble of the Agreement. In it, the signatories state their commitment to the “elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations”, to the obligation to “ensure

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20 It is noteworthy that in spite of the fervently pro-WTO and trade liberalisation rhetoric, in practice the EU finds it difficult to make sacrifices which would highlight the priority of ‘multilateralising’ trade (for example, at the cost of intra-European trade).
that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development”, to the development of a “more viable and durable multilateral trading system” and the preservation of the principles underlying this system in the future (Preamble, Agreement Establishing the WTO). Most importantly, the agreement envisions that upholding these commitments, will lead to a more prosperous future for global society, with higher standards of living, optimal use of world resources, sustainable development and environmental protection. On a functional level, the agreement creates a binding type of multilateralism, as it specifies that Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs) are binding on all members (Article II, paragraph 2). In addition, it establishes impartial international adjudication by providing for a mutually accepted dispute settlement mechanism guided by specific rules and procedures (Appellate Body).21

The principles of equality and non-discrimination are firmly embedded in the WTO, which is open to “any state or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations” (Article xii, paragraph 1) and allows any member to withdraw from the Agreement (Article XV). Thus, the binding nature of the multilateral trading system presupposes that states and other actors will voluntarily enter the agreement establishing it, convinced of its benefits and willing to uphold its principles. On this basis, the WTO also allows room for flexibility, for example through plurilateral agreements which give member countries the choice to agree to new rules on a voluntary basis (without all members necessarily being members of the particular agreement), or through room for its members to also engage in regional and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).

The latter point, on flexibility, is strongly endorsed by the EU, and is also reminiscent of the EU’s “doctrine of multilateralism” in the field of security, in which multilateralism is viewed as an end, allowing for other instruments, such as partnerships, to be used

provided that they act as mechanisms which can support multilateralism. Thus, as Lamy (2002: 1408) points out, regionalism and multilateralism are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather, the “WTO rules constitute a floor in two senses: in the sense of a basic minimum, but also in the sense of underpinning additional commitments at the regional level”. Deeper regional integration, for example, is favoured by the EU as a mechanism which can support multilateralism by underpinning market liberalisation with new and better rules for the region. At the same time, the primacy of multilateralism is maintained by giving the multilateral system the power to police agreements (Lamy 2002: 1411). This is the case with the WTO Trade Policy reviews of its members which, among other things, evaluate the complementarity of its members’ various FTAs with the principles that govern the Organisation. However the balance does seem to have swung back towards an assertive bilateralism, to some extent in reaction to the United States’ own strategies. This shift was evident in the 2009 Free Trade Agreement with South Korea, which revealed that the EU was clearly determined not to rely on the WTO and universal multilateralism to protect its competitive advantage.

Beyond the regionalism vs. multilateralism compatibility debate, the EU’s promotion of the WTO as part of its doctrine of multilateralism is a wider consequence of the overlap of EU trade policy objectives and instruments with the ideas embedded in conception of the WTO. Summarised, these ideas are that multilateral trade liberalisation is best in generating and maximising welfare gains, in ensuring equal treatment for collective benefit and promoting best practices, while ensuring that they are upheld by developing a collectively accepted, principled, system of dispute resolution. The EU’s perspective on trade and multilateralism is found in numerous documents which include Council Conclusions, submissions to the WTO, speeches and policy documents. In its entirety, however, this collection of documents is based on the same main points, namely:

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22 See also the European Commission Press Release on “Global Europe: Some Questions and Answers” (Brussels, 4 October 2006) in which the Commission clarifies the “Global Europe Strategy” and emphasises its commitment to multilateralism, and explains that “The EU’s priority is “to ensure that any new FTAs, including our own, serve as a stepping stone, not a stumbling block for multilateral liberalisation” (p.2).
(1) that trade policy must build on the premise that Europe’s economic prosperity is inextricably linked to that of other regions of the world; thus the EU should adopt a policy of openness;

(2) that barriers to trade, activity and investment should be addressed;

(3) that the completion of the internal market is linked to external considerations and thus “the EU must play a leading role in sharing best practice and developing high quality global rules and standards. To do so effectively it must look for means to improve the compatibility between its regulations and those of its main trading partners” (p.6, Conclusions, Council of the European Union 2006).

(4) that the EU should remain the cornerstone of a strong and rules-based multilateral trading system, while also engaging in the development of complementary mechanisms towards the same ends;

(5) that the EU should engage in the development of WTO-compatible FTAs with the aim of further liberalising trade, and taking into consideration economic and political considerations in terms of its geographical priorities (Council of the European Union 2006);

(6) that the goals of poverty reduction, sustainable and economic development, and the improvement of social and environmental standards, as well as the impact of any policy on developing countries, should be taken into consideration in the formulation of multilateral trade policy.

The striking resemblance between these goals and the summary of the WTO founding agreement suggest that a strong element of the EU doctrine of trade multilateralism is the practice and promotion of the principles embedded in the WTO. Indeed, in its review of the EU’s trade policy in 2009, the WTO praised the EU’s stance on multilateral trade and support for developing countries. The report acknowledged that the EU had been a major driving force for the promotion of WTO aims in the period since 2006, by supporting the Doha negotiations and actively engaging in the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. Among the EU’s efforts, the report commended the negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements with the ACP countries, the implementation of the

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23 For example, the Council clearly stated that a prerequisite for the launch of trade negotiations with Russia and Ukraine would be the completion of their WTO accession processes. (Conclusions, Trade Policy, p.10)
reformed EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries, and the fact that the EU has become the major sponsor of trade-related technical assistance within the Aid for Trade framework (WTO Secretariat, 2009). The EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’ regulation of 2001 is also noteworthy, as it gave the world’s 50 poorest countries duty-free access for virtually all their exports. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that practice does not always live up to principle – the EU’s record of agricultural protectionism, and export subsidies, has often impeded the achievement of a level-playing field for developing countries in world trade.

As in the area of security policy, the principles of responsibility, non-discrimination, legitimacy – deriving from a rules-based cooperation and adjudication system - and diffuse reciprocity on the basis of increased participation in the multilateral trading system underlie the strong advocacy of trade multilateralism. Thus, an initial overview of the two cases justifies an attempt at conceptualising a more generalised doctrine of multilateralism promoted by the EU as an international actor.

**Beyond security and trade: Why the EU needs a doctrine of multilateralism**

The comparison of the EU’s approach towards multilateralism in the areas of security and trade, offers a basis on which to judge whether the “doctrine of multilateralism” spans the entirety of EU foreign policy. In spite of the significant differences in the content of these policy areas, but also in the existing multilateral arrangements that guide actor cooperation in these fields, there are striking resemblances in the principles advocated by the EU as the basis for multilateralism in both. More importantly, there are considerable similarities in the language used to address the goals of “multilateralising” both these areas on the basis of these principles.

As has been discussed, in the ESS engagement in multilateral cooperation is viewed as a moral duty of the EU as part of its effort to build a better world and to share responsibility. Similarly, in the preamble of the Agreement establishing the WTO, the signatory member states resolve to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system, which is viewed as the way to build a better world and simultaneously promote growth and sustainable development. Both in trade and security the approach to multilateralism is based on the idea of durability, stability and
protracted peace. Thus, in both cases arbitration, peaceful dispute resolution and cooperation are central. At the same time, conflict in all its manifestation is viewed as the root of instability and threats to global society. The promotion of multilateralism is seen as the opposite of conflict, in line with the vision of the world that the EU aims to promote, where the realization of durable peace becomes the ultimate goal. Ultimately, the set of principles guiding the EU’s approach to multilateralism is the response to the EU’s approach to the question of power. As Kagan (2002: 3) has said: “Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’”.

Beyond the centrality of peace and cooperation, the observations from developments both in security and trade policy, suggest that while indivisibility, non-discrimination and reciprocity remain the central principles of the doctrine of multilateralism, efficiency and effectiveness may require a degree of flexibility and allowances which go beyond rigid homogeneous arrangements. Flexibility and discretion are entailed in the doctrine to ensure its constructive application and the potential for a greater number of partners, with more or less differing ideas on the new world order (for instance, China) to participate in multilateral systems of cooperation. Thus, in pursuit of greater inclusion the evolved doctrine of multilateralism goes beyond past attempts at moral universalism\(^{24}\). However, the potentially democracy-inducing effects of multilateralism (Keohane et al 2009) can be perceived as counterbalancing more lenient criteria relating to the inclusion of actors in multilateral schemes.

One might reasonably question the purpose of teasing out the distinct principles and mechanisms that guide the EU’s engagement in multilateralism, and of articulating those principles and mechanisms in the form of a single Doctrine of Multilateralism. Objections can be made to the rather academic nature of the project, and to the contrast between rhetoric and practice. Yet there are two important and distinct reasons for proceeding. While trade and collective security constitute relatively long-standing “multilateralised” policies, multilateral cooperation in more recent policy

areas has yet to be institutionalised or even collectively agreed upon. The quest for suitable multilateral arrangements in policy areas such as climate change, disease prevention and illegal migration, to name a few, is ongoing and at times hindered by the lack of consensus and competing approaches among partners. In this challenging process, a common point of reference, an overarching doctrine of multilateralism, would significantly improve the EU’s capacity to advocate its positions on the type of multilateralism that is most suitable and effective in the confrontation of these threats. This goes along with Biscop’s (2005: 133) point on the need for an EU Grand Strategy, reference to which “should come intuitively to all policy-makers involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of EU external action” in order for “greater consistency and coherence of EU policies to follow automatically’. As mentioned in the beginning of the paper, doctrine can be a useful coordinating device, but only when it is clearly articulated and when its interpretation is not disputed.

The second reason is linked to the EU’s character as a promoter of norms and values both internally – through the Europeanization of its member-states foreign policies (Wong 2005) and processes of socialisation (Smith 2000) - and externally, by means of its normative power (Manners 2002). These characteristics qualify the EU as an ideal mechanism of advocacy by its nature, as an actor with a strong degree of power to persuade and to export the principles guiding its action. In the particular case of multilateralism, the degree of persuasion is even stronger as the EU leads by example, having attained the highest and most complex level of multilateralism among its members.

For these reasons, among others, the exploration of a research agenda on multilateralism based on the concept of doctrine has the potential to inform the EU’s foreign policy in the new global order constructively, and to guide the radical reforms needed for effective multilateralism across numerous policy areas.
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