Krystian Oppenheim

ACHIEVING QUALITY IN MANAGEMENT OF
DEVELOPMENT NGOS:

ANALYSIS OF FOUR NGOS IN RIO DE JANEIRO.
Abstract

Rio de Janeiro is among the cities with the highest amount of NGOs in the world. However, not all of the projects carried out by the NGOs are equally successful.

In this research, I would like to analyze a selection of some of the most well-known social development enterprises operating in Rio, in order to better understand how they operate, what difficulties they face, which factors play the crucial role in achieving peak performance.

Moreover, I would like to compare the field research findings with the academic theory on management of social development NGOs, and possibly come up with ideas for further improvements.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the people and institutions that have contributed to this research:

- FGV, in particular Mrs. Sonia Fleury, PhD – research supervisor

For intellectual guidance, enthusiasm, patience and kindness.

- AfroReggae, in particular Mr. Joao Madeira
- Criola, in particular Mrs. Lucia Xavier
- FASE, in particular Mr. Jorge Durao
- Ibase, in particular Mr. Candido Grzybowski

For their time, willingness to share information, know-how, and wisdom, as well as for their positive and friendly attitude.

If it was not for the Brazilian calor humano I have received from the people mentioned above – as well as for their professionalism – concluding the research would perhaps still be possible, but it certainly would not be as pleasant.
Contents

Part 1. Introduction, 6
1.1 The Raise of NGOs, 6
1.2 Types of NGOs, 7
1.3 Management of Development NGOs, 8
1.3 NGOs in Brazil, 9

Part 2. Theoretical Framework, 12
2.1 Advocacy & Service Delivery, 12
   2.1.1 Service Delivery, 12
   2.1.2 Advocacy, 14
   2.1.3 Project Planning, 16
      2.1.3.1 Logical Framework Approach, 16
      2.1.3.2 Participatory Rural Appraisal, 20
      2.1.3.3 Towards triangulation, 22
   2.1.4 Evaluating the results, 23
2.2 Internal Management, 25
   2.2.1 Stakeholder hierarchy, 25
   2.2.2 The role of board of directors, 26
   2.2.3 Leadership capacity, 29
   2.2.4 Employee compensation schemes, 31
   2.2.5 Volunteers, 34
2.3 Knowledge Management, 37
   2.3.1 Organizational learning, 37
   2.3.2 Knowledge sharing, 40
   2.3.4 Working within a network, 42
2.3.4 Accountability, 45

2.4 Communication & Fund Raising, 50
   2.4.1 Management of Relationships, 50
   2.4.2 Public Relations, 52
   2.4.3 Fundraising, 53
   2.4.4 Online Fundraising, 54
   2.4.5 Donor relationship management, 55
   2.4.6 Intermediary NGOs, 59

Part 3. Field research, 61

3.1 Research Methodology, 61
   3.1.1 Research tools, 61
   3.1.2 Research scope and objectives, 62
   3.1.3 Choice of focus areas, 62
   3.1.4 Choice of NGOs, 63

3.2 Presentation of NGOs Analyzed, 64

3.3 Research Findings, 69
   3.3.1 Advocacy & Service Delivery, 69
   3.3.2 Internal Management, 87
   3.3.3 Knowledge Management, 103
   3.3.4 Communication & Fund Raising, 114

3.4 Conclusions, 124
   3.4.1 Research evaluation, 124
   3.4.2 Key observations, 124
   3.4.3 Research limitations, 135
   3.4.4 Suggestions for further research, 135

Bibliography, 136
Part 1. Introduction

1.1 The rise of NGOs

The term NGO has been created by the United Nations after the Second World War – to name several independent international citizen organizations that supported UN in issues such as human rights, peace, environment and development. Many of these organizations were not new, some existed already in the nineteenth century (i.e Red Cross), yet only having received this new label they achieved wider recognition and clear identity. NGOs have come to be classified as a sub-group within third sector organizations with a very wide scope of objectives, yet with the primary focus on development and poverty alleviation around the globe. NGOs have often been portrayed as the citizens’ response to the excessive power of the state and the market (Van Rooy 1998, Howell and Pearce 2001). It is often said that ‘their presence is ‘legitimized by the existence of poverty’ (Fowler 1997).

The real NGO boom started as late as in the early 1980s. Until that period, there was almost no mention of the subject in the academic literature (Lewis 2005). Yet the growing disillusionment with the macro solutions attempted by government-led programs finally motivated a search for alternative means for development assistance, leading to NGOs gaining a particularly high status accompanied by generous funding (Edwards and Hulme 1995). There are at least three qualities that the traditional, centralized aid could not provide. Firstly, NGO are not involved in the geopolitical interests of the states and can pursue their development agendas independently. Secondly, NGOs offered the opportunity for ordinary Western citizens to engage directly with the social world issues, through financial contributions, volunteer labor, among others. Finally, NGOs can be also more direct when dealing with the citizens of the Third World, with communities that could never be heard otherwise. Although many development tasks cannot be achieved through paternalistic state-administered interventions, Thomas (1996) argues that the participatory, micro-level methods offered by NGOs and the traditional top-down interventions should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary approaches. This view is shared by Brett (1993: 228), who sees the role of NGOs as agents working alongside with the government, to deal with specific tasks on the basis of some common criteria. This would eventually lead to a ‘pluralistic organizational universe’.
‘Significant similarities exist between the three kinds of organization, which enable us to apply theories developed across the whole range; but real differences in philosophy and practice still remain between them, and this makes it possible for each to solve particular kinds of problems more effectively than the others. Thus, providing support selectively to all of them is likely to produce a pluralistic organizational universe which will expand the range of social and individual choice and potential’ (Brett 1993: 228).

The proliferation of NGOs immediately caught a lot of attention from the media, academia, and the general public, subsequently leading to a more critical approach to these institutions. Closer scrutiny revealed that the initial enthusiasm towards Third Sector aid was based more on wishful thinking than on the hard facts. Since the 1990s, NGOs started to be regarded much more realistically: they are no longer expected to be a ‘magic bullet’ for poverty reduction (Hulme and Edwards 1997). There is also a serious concern about their efficiency, effectiveness and accountability (Fowler 1997, 2000). Nonetheless, NGOs continue to play a key role in development and their position remains strong (Lewis and Opuku-Mensah 2006).

1.2 Types of NGOs

There are various types of NGOs within the Third Sector, ranging from human right NGOs, religious and environmental ones, to those dedicated to spheres such as arts and sports (Figure 1 illustrates the division). NGOs form a very diverse group: they can be large or small, externally funded or based on volunteer labor, charitable or empowerment oriented.

![Figure 1. NGOs as a subcategory of Third Sector organizations (Source Lewis 2007)]
It can be argued that NGOs are a very post-modern form of organization, as they can mean all things to all people. Clarke (1998) describes how they appeal to all sides in the political spectrum. For liberals and neo-liberals they provide a healthy counterbalance to the power of the state, move the provision of the social services from public to the private sector, and eventually increase the role of the market. For the left, though, NGOs are a promise of social transformation leading to greater equality, yet organized on different terms than the old radical state interventions. As a result, NGOs are very ambiguous when it comes to ideology. They can equally well encompass the theoretically opposing approaches, such as theory vs. action, professional vs. amateur, modernity vs. tradition, public vs. private, and so on.

1.3 Management of development NGOs

As Thomas (1999) and Vakil (1997) argue, management of development organizations is unique due to the fact that is has the unusual – as it is located outside of the organization – goal of improving the capabilities of the poor and powerless, rather than pursuing simpler, internal objectives such as making profit. Its point of origin is the belief in certain values, and its objective is their implementation for the benefit of a selected community, and indirectly of the society as a whole. Many NGOs face extraordinary challenges resulting from operating in volatile political and economic circumstances, usually with very limited resources. Moreover, NGO managers depend on the exigencies of donors, the political sensitivities of governments, and the needs and imperatives of the local community (Hailey & James 2004). Finally, finding the right balance between one’s beliefs and the pragmatic approach to reality is perhaps the key aspect of the ambiguity of development management. The traditional approaches to organizational management do not take these aspects into account. All these factors make it rather uneasy to apply the ideas known from the field of mainstream management to the practice of development.

Despite the NGO boom of the last decades, management of NGOs as a field of study still remains poorly developed. Lewis (2007) argues that the whole idea of management has not been taken seriously among development professionals – or has even been received with open hostility by many social activists – and he gives five reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, many NGOs are characterized by the culture of action – and not reflection – and many NGO leaders are reluctant to spend their time and energy on thinking about organizational issues. Secondly, it is a widespread view among donors that NGOs should use almost all of its funds for working with poor people and not spend it on
administrative burdens. ‘There is a powerful public myth that development should be cheap’ (Smillie 1995: 151), which leads to the misleading logic that the lower the administrative expenses the better. Thirdly, many NGOs are founded by alternative figures who disbelief the mainstream practices of the private and public sector and see the whole idea of management as ‘tainted ground’ that should be avoided at all cost. ‘Some NGOs actively espouse an ideological disdain for management of any kind, identifying with it the values and practices of normal professionalism, and placing it in a class with exploitation, oppression, and racism’ (Korten 1990: 156). Subsequently, most NGOs started as small, informal structures in which all issues can be solved spontaneously, through improvisation and common sense. However, as the organizations grow into bigger and more complex structures, their staff might not realize the emerging necessity of turning to more sophisticated management tools. Finally, it is a common fact that the pressure to professionalize the management practices does not emerge organically, but comes from outside, namely from the donors. As such, it tends to be regarded with suspicion and reluctance.

All these factors are obstacles to improvements in efficiency and effectiveness of development aid projects. It is a shame, resulting in waste of resources and underachievement, that many NGOs and their donors don’t realize that ‘management capacity is the lifeblood of all organizations, irrespective of whether they are private entities, public agencies, not-for-profit concerns or non-governmental varieties’ (Udoh James 1998: 229). The more development NGOs become subjected to the performance measures traditionally applicable to public and private sector management, the clearer their inefficiencies turn out to be. Organizations built on great ideals are usually founded by great idealists, and these, unfortunately, rarely make good managers. It is indispensible to enhance the marriage of development and management if the former is ever to come any closer the goals to which it aspires. Rather than mistrust the management tools, development practitioners should embrace them as soon as possible.

1.4 NGOs in Brazil

The schemes for implementation of development projects vary widely from one place to another. Although there are many generally-applicable principles, it is hard to achieve a full success without a deep knowledge of the circumstances one is operating within. For that reason, I have decided to focus on one particular context, the Brazilian one.

The grassroots organizational upheaval began in Brazil in the early 1960s. In particular, the Catholic Church encouraged the creation of thousands of Christian ‘base communities’, small producers’
associations, rural cooperatives, and neighborhood associations (Cardoso 2004). These social enterprises were interrupted by the 1964 military coup. Since then, the rise of civil society in Brazil can be seen as an alternative to the actions of the state. Under the twenty years of military dictatorship, (1964–85) societal initiatives were under tight control by state authority. Given these circumstances, the first civic manifestations were a clandestine struggle between the civil society against the state.

Initially, civic associations were endogenous efforts to create alternative ways of enforcing public action. Most of them were created to respond to demands for community organization, specialized training, technical assistance, and educational materials. Others were born of the desire to address wider issues, such as worsening economic trends, top–down development schemes, and the need to participate in debates on public policy. Their basic features were local orientation, voluntary work, and informality (Landim, 2002).

The first relatively well-organized NGOs in Brazil were set up in the late 1960s, and 1970s. On the one hand, these organizations established strong ties with the Catholic Church and its base communities, as they were one of the few civil society actors tolerated by the authoritarian regime. On the other, they established horizontal ties with grassroots social groups and movements. They were generally founded by dedicated leaders who had either been community activists seeking institutional refuge within the church from widespread repression; intellectuals who grew tired of the bureaucratic constraints typical of university structures; or political party activists willing to go beyond the ideological orthodoxies (Fernandes 1995). They shared a desire to create a new, autonomous institutional space which would allow them to provide services directly to the grassroots, while also introducing professionalism and programmatic content to their actions.

Many leaders of these emerging organizations in Brazil had experienced exile during the 1970s. With the amnesty in 1979, they returned to the country, bringing with them ties with foreign foundations and civil society organizations with which they had contact while in exile. Such ties guaranteed the most important financial sources and support for the emerging civic organizations (Landim, 2002). Up until today, many Brazilian NGOs are a great examples of cooperation on local and international levels: they provide services to grassroots groups while interacting with major global institutions.

Nevertheless, it was only in the 1980s that these organizations identified themselves under the name ‘NGOs’ and began to develop a common identity. In the Brazilian context, this common identity, encompassing the so-called Third Sector, comprises a large diversity of organizational types. NGOs have sought to distinguish themselves by associating their practices to the broader framework of
social transformation and advocacy. The establishment of the Brazilian Association of NGOs (ABONG), in 1991, clearly signaled in this direction.

After NGOs had consolidated themselves as a field and acquired significant visibility, they began to acquire direct financial support from official agencies, such as the World Bank and IDB, which earlier had only funded state projects (Landim 2002). With the democratization process, which offered favorable grounds to the institutionalization of civic action, came the explosion of civil society organizations. Today, NGOs provide services in non-formal education, community health, legal assistance, environmentally-sound agricultural technologies, community organization, public awareness raising, public-policy information and advocacy, urban micro-enterprise, and AIDS education, among others.
Part 2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Advocacy & Service Delivery

This section focuses on the activities undertaken by development NGOs. There is a vast variety of such actions, yet they can be generally classified as falling into one of the two categories: advocacy and service delivery. Having presented the nature of both of these areas of NGO activity, I will analyze some aspects that these areas have in common as far as management issues are concerned.

2.1.1 Service Delivery

Theories of the origins of the third sector have tended to focus on the issue of service provision and have frequently attempted to explain the general emergence of NGOs around the world in terms of either market failure or state failure (Kendall and Knapp 1999). Up until today service delivery is perhaps what NGOs are most famous for (Clark 1992) – provision of goods and services to communities in need. Services can be provided independently, or in some sort of cooperation with the government. Occasionally, the services are not provided directly by an NGO, which then plays a supportive role to the organization taking the direct action.

NGOs can be present in various sectors: agriculture, health, education, legal services, research, and conflict resolution are some of the most important ones. In any of these areas, NGOs can either start some process from the very beginning, they can reinforce the actions already carried out in the community, or they can help to better claim services from the government.

One particular type of service delivery is ‘empowerment’. Although there is no agreement what the universal definition of empowerment should be, the general idea is to enable people to participate in decision making, rather than being passive receivers of policies coming from the top. One of the most influential figures in the creation of this approach was
the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, who spoke of ‘conscientization’. The overlapping trend within the different understandings of empowerment is the focus on process that will let people become more aware of the power dynamics relevant to their community, and learning ways to increase the power of the given community in deciding its fate. However, empowerment is also a highly controversial subject. There is no consensus as to how the level of empowerment can be measured. Moreover, it is hard to find examples of an unquestionable success of empowering actions undertaken by an NGOs. Finally, empowerment initiatives sometimes might take radical forms and pursue far-reaching revolutionary ambitions, which can be potentially dangerous if it, for instance, encourages social or racial hatred by stressing the differences between social groups.

Despite countless cases when the impact of services delivered by NGOs has been positive, there are many critical voices. It is often argued that this kind of aid is not sustainable, and it undermines the role of the government (Fowler 1997). Another ambiguous issue is an identity of and NGO that carries out services as a contractor to the government. It is unclear whether these NGOs can still regard themselves as based on some other values apart from profit-making – as these services would have been probably delivered by the government anyway, through a different channel. According to Korten (1990: 102), NGOs working as public service contractors ‘are driven by market considerations more than values, and are therefore more like business than voluntary organizations’. The debate whether NGOs should be complementary or alternative service providers is one of the most important ones in the field.

On top of these concerns, there is the most common problem relating to service delivery: quality control (Robinson and White 1997). NGOs are expected to be effective and efficient in what they do – because of their flexibility, special dedication of its staff, etc. – yet who can actually tell whether they are doing a good job? While it might be laudable that NGOs engage in delivering services to destitute communities, it is a regrettable fact that it is very difficult to verify how these services are delivered.
2.1.2 Advocacy

The second key activity of NGOs is advocacy, in which NGOs make efforts to promote the interests of underprivileged groups through negotiations with powerholders – government and corporations in particular. In the words on Jenkins (1987: 267) advocacy is ‘an attempt to influence the decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest’, while Edwards (1993: 3) defines it as ‘an attempt to alter the ways in which power, resources and ideas are created, consumed and distributed at global level, so that people and their organizations in the South have a more realistic chance of controlling their own development’. There are two paths within advocacy. The first one strives to influence global processes, such as world trade, or bringing about lifestyle changes among their own supporters. The second option is influencing specific policies or projects. Ideally, these practices should be complementary, in an attempt to combine local and global impacts.

The main distinctive feature of advocacy, compared to service delivery, is the focus on longer-term effects of changing the status quo, rather than just meeting the immediate material needs of people. Many NGOs engaging in advocacy are also active providers of services, so these two functions are clearly not mutually exclusive (Young 1992). According to Bratton, advocacy should go beyond mere claims and information, it should seek direct contact with the decision makers in order to influence their choices. Advocacy implies ‘efforts to maximize control over the factors that affect the realization of shared goals, and seeking to influence – through lobbying and alliance building – these factors which cannot be directly controlled’ (1990: 91).

By the mid-1990s, advocacy had become widely acknowledged as an important NGO activity in building sustainable development (Covey 1995), and NGOs had come to see advocacy as a means for improving their effectiveness and impact, and as a potential strategy for ‘scaling up’. Korten (1990) sees advocacy as a mature and developmentally sound NGO activity, particularly for Northern NGOs, because it addresses the structural roots of poverty rather than the symptoms, and because it moves NGOs away from direct implementation in the South, and towards engaging with power structures based closer to home. Young’s (1992) accounts for the increase in the advocacy groups by suggesting that is has been facilitated by the growth in perceptions of the global nature of problems such as pollution, disease, and
poverty, as well as by the advancements in the communication and transportation technology.

Bratton (1990) remains one of the few researches who have conducted a systematic research on the effectiveness of advocacy. In his analysis of African NGOs seeking to influence the policy agenda, he points out some crucial factors for success:

- A homogenous membership leading to the clarity of goals
- A focused program with clear and simple objectives
- A coordinated network of community-based organizations
- A set of informal ties with political leaders
- A domestic funding base, as opposed to foreign funding which leads suspicions of a hidden agenda

In reality, it is a rare case to achieve a good combination of the above elements. As such, according to Edwards (1993) advocacy efforts have been rather disappointing. The NGO advocacy potential has not been fulfilled due to the absence of clear strategy, the failure to build strong alliances, an inability to develop alternatives to current orthodoxies and the dilemma of relations with donors. If NGO do achieve an advocacy success, it is mainly in the ‘low salience’ policies, such as environment, gender, and poverty, but never in ‘high salience’ issues: military spending, human rights, and economic reform (Van Rooy 1997).

Another issue that has to be considered with regards to advocacy, is the question of legitimacy. Whose interests exactly are being represented, by what authority? Who is responsible for the accuracy of the information conveyed? Legitimacy is still a real challenge for advocacy NGOs, the issue is open for debate as it lacks consensus among development activists and critiques.

Finally, there is still a very weak understanding of the impact of advocacy work and means of measuring it. Even when a certain goal has been achieved, it is virtually impossible to dissect the influence of the NGO campaigning in favor of the goal from other factors that might have played the role in shaping the outcome.
2.1.3 Project planning

Planning in development has many overlaps with strategic planning known from the private sector, yet it also displays some unique features that need to be considered in order to design projects in a satisfactory way. Actions to be taken should be analyzed with particular focus on stakeholders, underlying principles, and management of the key relationships – these aspects tend to be more complex and ambiguous in the development field than in the conventional business planning.

There are several dangers that should be avoided in development project planning. One is the view that a project should be carried out at all cost. Frequently the circumstances, external or internal, change during the implementation of the project, and the best solution is re-designing, or even giving up of the project on the whole. Sometimes, the conditions change for better, and new opportunities can be taken advantage of if the project managers react quickly enough. Sticking to the original plan too rigidly is one of the biggest sins committed by development practitioners. However, getting to close to the other extreme, that is relying too heavily on improvisation and not enough on clear directions for action can also cause a great deal of harm, as it disorients the staff and beneficiaries of a project. It is therefore crucial to stay alert during the whole project cycle, always being able to make alterations to a clearly defined strategy.

There have been several approaches to creation of development projects, yet two methods are clearly dominant over all the others. The first method presented here has been chosen to represent the rigid and structured approaches to planning, while the second one is meant to exemplify the style that embraces improvisation as a valuable solution. Although they are usually considered as self-excluding, I will consider an alternative that would combine the benefits of the Logical Framework Approach and Participatory Rural Appraisal.

2.1.3.1 Logical Framework Approach

Logical Framework Approach (LFA) is the methodology for project designing that has originated from the management school called Project Cycle Management. Project Cycle Management (PCM) is the term given to a specific style of planning and managing projects,
programs and organizations. It has been used widely in the for-profit sector, and has also been adopted by the Third Sector. PCM involves a set of planning tools which are part of the logical framework approach (also known as a log frame).

LFA was originally created for US military planning (Nancholas 1998), and it was adapted for development purposes in 1969 for USAID, so that the organization could become more accountable for the Congress (Practical Concepts 1978). LFA in its current form is a much more complex tool, with valuable additions coming from various parts of the globe (Sartorius 1996).

In its present shape, LFA is a seven-step procedure that is carried out during workshop session, or sessions (NORAD 1995). The LFA planning process is organized as follows:

1. Participatory analysis. Identification of all groups affected by the project. These groups are analyzed with consideration of their main problems, interests, power, and relationships. A decision must be taken on the groups and issues that will be given priority
2. Problem analysis. Identification of the key problem, and establishing of cause-effect relationships through the use of ‘problem tree’
3. Objectives analysis. Transformation of the problem tree into an ‘objective tree’.
5. Identification of main project elements. Long-term overall objective (goal), operational objective (purpose), results that are guaranteed by the project (outputs), activities, and inputs
6. Activity scheduling. Determining the sequence of activities, estimating their duration, and assigning responsibility
7. Resource scheduling. Creation of a list of needed inputs, deciding on the budget.

In LFA, the development process is regarded as a series of interrelated events. In order to reach the outputs, the assumptions must be correct, and the actions planned must take place. If there are the desired outputs, the purpose has been achieved. If there is purpose, and goal-related assumptions are fulfilled, the goal has been reached. The main results of this process can be summarized in a matrix (the Logical Framework Matrix or, the Logframe) with 16 boxes which shows the most important aspects of a project, summarizing:
• why a project is carried out (Intervention Logic)
• what the project should achieve (Intervention Logic and Indicators)
• how the project should achieve it (Activities, Means)
• which external factors are essential for its success (Assumptions)
• where to find the information required to evaluate the success of the project (Sources of Verification)
• which means are required (Means)
• what will be the project cost (Cost)
• Pre-conditions to be fulfilled before the project launch (Pre-conditions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Logical Framework Matrix Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the 1990s, LFA became massively popular among nearly all international donor agencies. LFA was recognized as a useful set of tools for planning, designing, implementing, and evaluating projects (Dearden & Kowalski 2003). Many authors including Coleman (1987),

The success of LFA can be attributed to its easy-to-understand, universally applicable format, and clarity with which it presents the problems to be solved, the actions to be taken, and the goals to be achieved. NGOs all over the world embraced this tool, as it is probably the most reliable way to attract the attention and gain the confidence of potential sponsors. The role of LFA can hardly be overestimated when speaking of growth of the development industry in the past decades.

When it comes to the usefulness of LFA in actual planning though, development practitioners have discovered some significant shortcomings of this approach. The flaws of LFA make it necessary to look for alternatives, or at least for complementary methodologies. The list below is based on the critiques by Gasper (1999), Dearden & Kowalski (2003), and Dale (2003).

a) LFA is often used only because the funders demand it. Often, it is invented after a project is ready, and not used in the process of creating it. As such, many development practitioners see LFA as just another bureaucratic requirement, rather than as helpful tool.

b) By default, LFA promotes a simplified vision of the world. Important aspects are usually left out, as not everything can fit in the logframe.

c) Once a logframe is created, it is quite complicated to revisit or update it. As such, it often blocks innovative solutions that come up during the implementation process, and it impedes quick reaction to context changes, if such changes occur.

d) Although LFA seems relatively easy to learn, it takes a lot of training, practice, and dedication to use it properly. Misuse by mediocre development practitioners can cause more harm than good.

e) Finally, the LFA is clearly a top-down approach, which tacitly assumes the superiority of the project managers over the community acted upon. The whole community, or at least large parts of it, are likely to feel excluded from the project, as they are not
going to understand the LFA structure and jargon, nor will they be encouraged to participate in the process of creating the logframe.

2.1.3.2 Participatory Rural Appraisal

In 1983, Robert Chambers used the term Rapid Rural Appraisal to describe techniques that could bring about a 'reversal of learning'. Initially RRA was a strategy which sought to arrive at a 'rough approximation of the value of many variables within a complex system in order to be able to decide what to focus on in more detail through more specialized studies' (Moris and Copestake 1993: 39). Chamber’s work caused rapid growth in the development of more holistic methods that involved rural people in examining their own problems, setting their own goals, and monitoring their own achievements. By the mid 1990’s, the term RRA had been replaced by a number of other terms including ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)’ and ‘Participatory Learning and Action’ (PLA). This approach is now widely used for any kind of development planning, without being limited to rural projects any more.

PRA is a selection of different methods such as wealth ranking, ranking matrices, seasonal profiles, mapping, role play, etc. The approach is focused on the active participation of the local people in the collection and analysis of data, use of visual techniques, group discussions, and information sharing (Aune 2000).
According to Chambers (1991) practitioners of PRA share a common rationale, principles and rigor that are embodied in five principles, namely:

a) Optimizing tradeoffs between the cost, quantity, relevance, truth and benefit of possessing information;

b) Offsetting biases from development ‘tourism’ and hurried visits;

c) Triangulating by using more than one method or source to obtain and cross-check information;

d) Learning directly from and with local people whose knowledge and capacities are generally underrated but required for sustainable development; and

e) Learning rapidly and progressively through flexible, iterative, interactive processes aimed at the conscious exploration of local peoples’ lives.
Like LFA, PRA has also received strong critique, especially from development academics. The main problems are related to the assessment of validity and credibility of data gathered through PRA. PRA, out of definition, is limited in time and resources, which is its strength for practitioners, and weakness for scholars. Another issue touches on the lack of transparency in reporting the techniques and procedures used in research, especially due to the fact that most PRA work remains unpublished. Huberman and Miles (1998) argue that the conventions of qualitative research require that sufficient evidence/data and information about research methods and procedures be provided to allow the conclusions to be assessed for ‘bias’ and fallibility. PRA proponents, however, appear not to be particularly concerned with academic validation of their findings, as this method is clearly oriented towards action, and not towards theorizing and fulfilling bureaucratic requirements. However, all researchers should be able to demonstrate how they have arrived at their conclusions by carefully documenting the research process in a way that the reader can be confident of, and can verify the findings – not for the sake of blind adherence to technique, but rather because of the need to clearly demonstrate that sufficient attention is given to the practice of social inquiry (Campbell 2001).

2.1.3.3 Towards triangulation

The value of triangulation is that the drawbacks of any one technique can be supplemented and/or cross-validated through findings from a second technique, thus improving the accuracy of data gathered by integrating more than one view point. As Jick points out, triangulation assumes ‘that the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counterbalancing strengths of another’ (1979: 604).

Both methods have their weaknesses and strengths and it is therefore of interest to discuss how it is possible to use the two methods in a complementary way. Chambers (1997) himself considers PRA to be completely opposed to LFA, and therefore not compatible. However, many other scholars think that LFA does not necessarily clash with the people-oriented approach of PRA (Mikkelsen 1995).
Aune (2000) gives good examples of how these two methods can successfully work together, one reinforcing the other. He proposes to use LFA for providing the general structure of the planning process and a complete list of relevant aspects to be analyzed. PRA, on the other hand, can serve in discussions and decision making at the grassroots level. Contrary to the orthodox LFA approach, the key decisions are not taken in an LFA workshop, but by the local stakeholders. The function of the project staff is to facilitate the process, but the final decision making should be left to the project beneficiaries.

PRA can help to identify various interest groups existing among stakeholders (step 1 in the LFA), as well as local problems and their causes (step 2). It should also be used to discuss with local stakeholders the purpose of the project and which activities should be undertaken (steps 3–6). Finally, consideration ought to be given to the external factors which can influence the project. PRA tools that seem particularly useful are, among others, wealth ranking and matrix scoring. Wealth ranking is necessary to distinguish between different wealth/interest groups in the community. This enables the weakest groups to express their needs and to provide their point of view on the project. It is very likely that there will be differences between the goals of different groups and the final decisions will have to be made after a careful investigation and consideration, on the part of the project staff, whose interest deserve the priority, and how they can be merged with the desires of other stakeholder groups.

There are good and bad practitioners of both methods. The success of either method in project planning depends very much on the skills and attitudes of the planners. Yet it seems worthwhile to go beyond the rigid paradigms and to promote the idea of creating a synergetic solution that could finally account for the flaws unavoidable when each of these systems is used on its own.

2.1.4 Evaluating the results

Evaluation of the outcomes of NGO activity – understood here as the process of assessing the performance against the objectives – remains one of the least researched areas (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001:237). NGOs have so far paid little attention to evaluation as a
tool for learning and increasing accountability. If NGOs do engage in evaluation processes, it is mainly due to the external pressure from donors or government. Many NGOs fear what the results of such evaluation might be, hence their reluctance. (Smillie 1995). Such attitude eventually leads to repetition of the same failures over and over.

Just like in planning of project, there are also two basic approaches towards their evaluation. The first one is the continuation of the LFA approach. This kind of evaluation is sometimes called ‘technocratic’, and is based on cost-benefit analysis and financial audit, staff and beneficiary interviews, charts, and so on. The main goal of this approach is the verification whether the funds have been spent effectively and efficiently. The second type of evaluation is the so-called ‘participatory evaluation’ developed by Chambers (1994, 2005) as the concluding part of PRA. The idea is that evaluation of development programs cannot be objective, it will always be based on perception. Therefore, the only possible and desired form of evaluation here is ‘combined judgment’, which is a reflection of the views of different stakeholders. It is also believed that evaluation should be based on long-term observation, rather than focused on some particular point in time after the project has been carried out. This approach is often criticized for its subjectivity and possibilities for manipulation of the results through subjective interpretation. The first approach, on the other hand, is seen as a top-down one, and as such disconnected from the reality of beneficiaries.

Another classification of evaluation types focuses on the agent carrying out the process (Mardsen and Oakley 1990). It can be either performed by the donor agency, by the implementing NGO together with all stakeholders involved, or purely by the NGO staff.

It is certainly a complex task to measure social development, as it is expressed primarily by qualitative data. Projects often take place in volatile environments, further complicating the measurements. Nonetheless, it should be sought at all costs, and tried in various forms, as it is perhaps the best way to learn and introduce improvements.
2.2 Internal Management

Just like in the business environment, nonprofit governance is about value creation and enhancing the cooperation among stakeholders that contribute certain resources in order to achieve a common purpose, in the most efficient possible way. Yet, many researchers, for instance Dichter (1989), complain that development NGOs often spend more time on ‘fancy’ ideas about participatory development than on the mundane and indispensable tasks of basic management – such as hiring the right staff, and ensuring effectiveness of the organizational structures. The collection of papers edited by Billis and Harris (1996) presents a wide scope of similar issues, such as the confusion over roles and internal structures, tensions between organizational aims and structures; managing volunteers, and issues of governance such as the relationships between headquarters and local organizations and between staff and other stakeholders. The so-called ‘culture of action’ often attributed to development NGOs should not jeopardize the clarity of structure and objectives, which is unavoidable if these organizations are to be managed successfully and efficiently.

2.2.1 Stakeholder hierarchy

It is a common view that the main difference between the governance of the private and third sector is that, unlike in the non-profit organizations, the governance of profit-seeking firms is characterized by a clear hierarchy of stakeholders, with the owners of physical capital (shareholders) as primary stakeholders. The shareholders possess the privileged right to make the key decisions, due to the fact that they make the largest, most valuable, and most specific investments and therefore are exposed to a particularly high risks (Zingales, 1998, and Williamson, 1985).

Applying this reasoning to nonprofit governance poses the question of whether there are also reasons for establishing a privileged group of stakeholders who possess the rights of control. In other words, is there a group of stakeholders who should play the role of “owners” of a nonprofit organization? This question is one of the key issues in the theory of NGOs and has been discussed by Williamson (1983), Ben Ner and Van Hoomisen (1994), Miller (2002), and Oster (1995), among others. Some scholars believe that different types of
NGOs should have different hierarchy of stakeholders and no generalization is possible. The argument is that non-profit organizations tend to have multiple stakeholders of similar importance, with equal needs for protection of specific investments. For instance, both donors and volunteers provide certain resources (money and work, respectively) that cannot be withdrawn after they have been offered. Hence, given this risk, both these parties should be entitled to the right of decision-making. However, it would not be reasonable to classify the NGO directors and project beneficiaries as secondary stakeholders, with no rights to participation in decision-making. The best solution to this situation might be to include several, or all, of these agents in the decision making process. On the other hand, Speckbacher (2008) argues that when there are many small primary stakeholders, it results in organizational chaos, and control is not executed effectively. He suggests that the third sector could benefit by imitating the practices known from for-profit enterprises, in which case the primary stakeholders would be the donors. The donors would then have the option to delegate decision and control rights to boards and managers.

Given the variety of types of NGOs and the contexts they operate within, it seems impossible to come up with a universal stakeholder hierarchy. Despite the inefficiencies of this approach, it might often be unavoidable to allow several agents the right to excerpt control over the shape of projects and organizations. Keeping all the decision-making power to the sponsors has its advantages, yet in the case of NGO management it is rarely feasible.

2.2.2 The role of board of directors

Existing research has found a clear correlation between board and organizational effectiveness, but much work remains to be done to understand the nature and causal direction of these relationships (Herman and Renz, 1999; Stone and Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001). According to Herman and Renz (2000) effective boards improve organizational performance, yet the mechanisms of that process have not yet been fully accounted for. Herman, Renz, and Heimovics (1997, p. 374) state that ‘the major challenge in the study of board effectiveness is the lack of criteria for defining and measuring board effectiveness. The elusiveness of board effectiveness is further aggravated by the elusiveness of organizational effectiveness for NGOs.’
In the corporate governance literature, **agency theory** is by far the framework most frequently used to link board performance to organizational performance (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella, 2003). Agency theory assumes the existence of a conflict relationship between the board and the managers. It is the board’s task to supervise the self-interested behavior of management in order to secure stockholder interests. Basically, the agency theory implies that since board member interests are aligned with those of stockholders, they will be acting primarily for the benefit of shareholders. For such situation to take place, certain incentives must be provided to board members (usually stock ownership). Moreover, board members should be kept distant from management – there can be no ‘insiders’. Insiders are typically those with significant ties to management, such as former or current executives of the organization (Fama and Jenson, 1983).

In NGOs, agency theory propositions might be explained by adherence to mission or purpose. Legally, NGOs are responsible to fulfill a duty of obedience, which effectively means that the directors are in charge of ensuring that the organization realizes its public responsibility as revealed in its organizational mission (Sasso, 2003). They boards prevent the organization from getting involved in activities outside their bylaws or statutes. Therefore, the boards should not be concerned purely about financial performance, but primarily about complying with the social rationale for the organization’s existence. The board makes strategic decisions for the future, but it should also be aware of the historical precedence of the organization and its reason for being. Within the work of Chait, Holland, and Taylor (1991), the contextual dimension mirrors the board’s function as a supervisor. This dimension stresses the significance of honoring historical precedence in mission direction of the organization. The board is expected to analyze all aspects of the context of the organization’s operating environment in order to successfully link decision making to organizational mission. The contextual dimension is just one element of the supervising function proposed by agency theory for corporate governance, yet in the case of the NGO boards it is the unique function within this theoretical framework.

In order to expand the scope of NGO board’s duties, it might be necessary to turn to the **resource dependency theory**, which suggests that boards function as a resource for organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) proposed an integrated perspective that recognizes limitations of the agency theory. They see the board’s role as the
resource catalysts for organizations. The board is expected to provide access to necessary resources, such as: legitimacy, advice and consulting, links to other organizations, and assistance in obtaining financial resources. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) promote the idea of ‘board capital’, which is made of human capital (expertise, experience, and reputation) and relational capital (networks and connections with external constituencies). Resource dependency is concerned with issues like the manner in which the board members enable access to powerful funders (private and public), introduce technical competencies (financial, legal, etc.) to an organization, and give strategic vision to the organization. In brief, on top of supervision of management, the board is in charge of bringing resources.

Another approach to the understanding of the role of the board of directors is the group/decision process theory. Here, the main focus is on the questions such as: how is information managed (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983; Seashore 1983), how decisions are made, and how group members interact (Zander, 1994). The point of departure for this line of thinking is that if attention is paid to the details – if correct measures and processes take place on every level of organizational activity – the organization as a whole will perform well. Three areas are crucial for investigations within the group/decision process theory: diversity of board composition, board development practices (training), and group dynamics (interpersonal relations) (Green and Griesinger, 1996). Research on board composition implies that increased board member diversity results in a better organizational performance, as it increases the pool of knowledge and expertise. The board’s capacity to dissect complex problems and draw on multiple perspectives is essential to good performance (Chait, Holland, and Taylor 1991). Diversity could also be viewed from the resource dependency perspective – bringing various persons into a group gives access to additional resources. Siciliano (1996) proved that high occupational diversity among board members led to greater organizational performance with regard to social performance and fundraising. The weakness of this approach, though, is that increasingly diverse boards likely to result in conflict and lack of consensus. Careful and thoughtful evaluation of benefits and disadvantages of different board diversification strategies should be carried out for any given NGO. As far as the importance of board’s training and self-evaluation are concerned, Green and Griesinger (1996) found that commitment to board development activities was positively correlated with management’s perceptions of organizational performance. These
activities help the board members to productively reflect on their roles and capabilities, verify whether new members are sufficiently oriented, and generate feedback on the organizational performance. So far, little research has been carried out to examine the group dynamics within boards, especially in relation to NGOs. Zander (1993, 1994) expressed his concern on understanding the role of group dynamics in enabling taking the full advantage of board members’ talents. Bainbridge (2002) suggests that certain board practices (such as formal agenda setting) ought to be promoted as a useful tool in increasing board performance. Clearly, more research of normative nature is needed in this field.

2.2.3 Leadership capacity

Writings on NGOs have revealed a tendency for these organizations to be centered around strong, often ‘charismatic’ founder leaders, who use their contacts to mobilize resources and to manage the political environment in which their organizations operate. There has been very little research as yet on the role of NGO leaders, though it would seem from casual observation that the ‘charismatic’ leader is a vital component of many NGOs, particularly in its early years. Edward’s (1999) study of South Asian NGOs found that the more successful NGOs tended to have ‘inspirational but not overbearing’ leadership, which was able to guide the organization through crises and provide a clear sense of direction while allowing room for initiative and ideas from throughout the organization and clients.

Despite the growing consciousness of the importance of boards of directors in NGO management, it cannot remain unnoticed that the nature of leadership in the sector is characterized by strong dependence on outstanding individuals. There are many anecdotal stories about the damaging impact of paternalistic founder leaders, ‘charismatic autocrats’, with ‘the guru syndrome’ (Hailey 1999). The paternalistic nature of leadership in the NGO sector is usually explained as the natural consequence of the high levels of personal involvement in the mission among the social development professionals (Fowler, 1997). Given the powerful influence of individual leaders in shaping the destiny of NGOs throughout the world (Fowler, 1997; Kelleher and McLaren, 1996; Smillie and Hailey, 2001), it is not surprising that more and more research is focused on leadership capacity building in
the Third Sector. Many researchers complain especially about the rapid turnover of NGO staff in leadership positions into business and government and the difficulty NGOs have in replacing them.

Exemplary development leaders should have a chameleon-like ability to adjust to various roles, styles, or organizational needs. They should be capable of combining ideals and values with analysis, technical expertise, and professionalism while still being able to clearly present the vision and to motivate the staff, stakeholders, and beneficiaries. They ought to demonstrate the ability to balance a diversity of demands according to the shifts in circumstances. They should know how to find the equilibrium between personal commitment to a long-term vision and the urgent needs of local communities, the expectations of donors, and the vested interests of politicians and local pressure groups. This ability to integrate often competing demands into a coherent strategy appears to be one of the hallmarks of successful NGO leaders.

Although the role of charismatic leaders in the growth of the Third Sector is undeniable, this type of command has also been heavily criticized. On one hand, the influential leaders clearly demonstrate valuable drive and commitment, and the priceless ability to mobilize people and resources. On the other hand, though, they are thrown-upon for dominating organizations, being unaccountable, and failing to adapt to changing circumstances. Chambers (1997: 76) acknowledges that such NGO leaders can accomplish many goals through their ‘guts, vision and commitment’, but the way they use power is a ‘disability’ that is harmful to the overall organizational effectiveness. In his view, such charismatic leaders are ‘vulnerable to acquiescence, deference, flattery and placation’ (Chambers, 1997: 76). They are often unwilling to engage in any dialogue. As a result they can actually suffocate promising initiatives if these undermine their power base, or position of patronage.

The training of a new generation of NGO leaders should be regarded as one of the critical elements in building the NGO community. The challenge for those involved in capacity building work is how to create influential leaders able to make a difference, yet who would still be able to resist the pursuit of selfish goals and the misuse their power for personal gain. Leadership development programs should also take into consideration the context in which leaders operate and the expectations of those they work with if they are to be relevant and
Effective. It is clearly not sufficient to create a checklist of characteristics or competencies to be worked on and ticked off. Leadership is complex, dynamic, and highly personal, and the skills are not easily transferred. Nonetheless, attempts to promote good practices in NGO leadership are crucial if the quality of NGOs is to match their rapidly increasing quantity.

2.2.4 Employee compensation schemes

There are three ideal types of compensation systems: individual-based, function-based, and performance-based (see Figure 3). Individual-based systems are dependent upon features such as age, organizational membership, education, experience, and specific qualities of individuals. Function-based systems are orientated to hierarchical position, related duties and responsibilities. Performance-based systems draw on the value of performance (e.g., goal attainment) for defining the salary’s variable level (Brandl & Guttel 2007).

Performance can be valued either ex-post by handing out rewards for outstanding accomplishments, or by setting performance goals ex-ante. The latter variant characterizes the Pay-for-Performance compensation scheme. It requires measurable variables that can be influenced by the person to which they are applied. This is because the employee actually needs to be able to influence the degree of goal attainment with his or her own efforts. Part of the salary depends on the observed performance delivery; in combination with fixed components it constitutes the total salary.
While there is a general consensus that individual- and function-based systems are a fair solution to be applied in the NGO context, there are many controversies regarding the use of the performance-based schemes. In particular, the Pay-for-Performance system causes very strong reactions among development practitioners (Kelly & Monks, 1998; Osterloh & Frey, 2000).

Pay-for-Performance compensation systems is perfectly suited for employees who are interested in income maximization and status improvement. Since in the NGO sector values such as loyalty, formalism, and self-actualization are of primary interest, employees might consider Pay-for-Performance compensation as somewhat irrelevant. Theuvsen (2004) argues that existing self-selection mechanisms in NGOs encourage the attraction of loyal employees who can identify with the NGO’s goals (Leete, 2000; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999). The adoption of Pay-for-Performance system might convert loyal NGO employees into income maximizing ones, which is likely to clash with the organizational culture of NGOs.
Empirical findings suggest that internal and external motivation can be conceived as additive, but internal motivation is crowded-out by the external one. The emergence of crowding-out is triggered by a perception of reduced autonomy and diminished acceptance of intrinsically motivated performance (Frey, 1993). This is particularly true for NGOs whose employees are mainly internally motivated, and not by monetary incentives or status symbols (Theuvsen, 2004, p. 129).

Pay-for-Performance compensation systems reward goal attainment. Whether they can be effectively used, thus, relies on the feasibility for output control, i.e., whether objectives can be defined, and whether actual performance can be measured based on these objectives. Knowledge of relevant goals among employees is a precondition for governance systems that are based on output control. In NGOs employees are often familiar with the organization’s mission, but the implications for practical work remain largely vague (Anthony & Young, 2003; Ben-Ner & von Hoomissen, 1994; Herman & Renz, 1999). If the objectives were rigidly specified, there is a risk of neglecting less precisely formulated goals which might be more relevant for the NGO’s long-term survival. Also, given the complexity of the missions of many NGOs, there must be a high degree of flexibility retained. The more the objectives are clearly defined, the higher the probability that objectives are mutually incongruent. Consequently, complex control problems typically arise when setting priorities. These dysfunctional effects of Pay-for-Performance compensation systems are known as multi-tasking problems (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991).

Finally, Theuvsen (2004) mentions difficulties in measuring goals as the main obstacle for the implementation of Pay-for-Performance compensation systems in NGOs. Performance is measured by being based on the degree of goal attainment, i.e., the comparison of expected and realized output. If variable salary components are connected to the output level, it is necessary to define ‘hard’ indicators for this output measurement and for a subsequent evaluation of goal achievement. NGOs might find it troublesome since their goals are often described rather qualitatively than by performance numbers (Speckbacher, 2003).

Overall, the NGO literature does not encourage implementing the Pay-for-Performance compensation system. However, there are areas of NGO activity where this approach can be highly advisable.
In areas where market logic dominates external relations, market logic also pervades the
design of internal activities and structures. For instance, employees responsible for fund
raising do have clearly measurable goals. In fact, it is difficult to imagine motivating fund-
raisers to struggle for the optimal results if they were rewarded regardless of the amount of
funding generated. Hence, whenever objective performance measurement is possible,
monetary differentiation should certainly be considered as it is bound to improve the
organizational effectiveness.

In expert positions (e.g., accounting, IT) the consistency with core values and norms is
perceived as far less important. Thus, in such peripheral positions, the exceptions from the
generally applied compensation systems are more acceptable. Here, monetary components
for motivation receive a greater emphasis. This does not automatically imply the
implementation of Pay-for-Performance compensation systems, but it does lead to creation
of separate compensation schemes (categories) in order to enable possibilities for higher
rewards for these personnel groups, as they are likely to be driven primarily by monetary
incentives. Consequently, cognitive components of motivation are more important.

Finally, while many NGOs reject any ex ante definition of performance measures by referring
to contradictions with their core values and norms, many of them react to perceived
performance differences by providing ‘functional equivalents’, such as ex-post bonuses.
Functional equivalents to Pay-for-Performance include extraordinary monetary bonuses for
remarkable performance, job enrichment, or through moving into a higher pay group within
the existing compensation system.

2.2.5  Volunteers

There is today some confusion over what constitutes the volunteer. The conventional view is
of a person who works for little or no money, sometimes in return for food, clothing, and a
bed. This is consistent with the role of missionaries dating back to the third century in
northern Africa, and more recently with those who served the needs of casualties in the two
World Wars. In the modern interpretation of the volunteer, as an outgrowth of volunteer
services in the post-war period, it is someone who willingly works (most often in ‘developing’
countries) for a package that amounts to less than what s/he would be earning in the same capacity in the for-profit sector. While terms and conditions differ, there is generally some kind of remuneration that enables the volunteer to lead a relatively comfortable existence where possible. Often s/he is remunerated sufficiently to be able to live in moderate lodgings in desirable areas, and to afford travel. While the term ‘volunteer’ probably found its origins in those who offered their services without conscript in assisting the war-wounded, it is applied here in a modern sense to the realm of civil service: providing for the ‘needs of those in need’ (Ehrichs 2001). The post-war vocation of the volunteer abroad has come to span the broad areas of development including emergency relief, community development, conflict resolution, and poverty alleviation.

The UN General Assembly endorsed as part of the 2001 International Year of Volunteers the following three basic criteria for volunteering (Devereux 2008):

- actions are carried out freely and without coercion;
- financial gain is not the main motivating principle;
- and there is a beneficiary other than the volunteer.

There are several advantages to using a combination of paid and volunteer workers, especially in terms of diversity of skills that lend themselves to organization knowledge with a workforce of differing employment status (Matusik and Hill, 1998). There can also be economic savings using a partially volunteer staff (Liao-Troth, 1999).

The international development sector is increasingly reluctant towards volunteers in an industry increasingly dominated by international agreements, high finance, large-scale programs, and professionalism. The main arguments, according to Devereux (2008), are as follows:

- International volunteers are a form of Northern imperialism which enhances Northern government interests rather than tackling the causes of poverty with actions for justice.
- International volunteering is elitist, because it is mainly white, highly qualified, middle-class Northerners who can afford to take one or two years out of paid employment to do charity work for poor people.
• Most of the benefit goes to the volunteer in the form of skills and personal development, while the partner and local community receive no measurable outcome, or indeed are drained in terms of the time, energy, and resources needed to accommodate and acclimatize a volunteer.

• International volunteers may simply be filling a gap where trained local staff are unavailable. This undermines local capacity development and can disadvantage local job seekers.

• International volunteers are expensive because they need airfares, living allowances, insurance, training, and preparation that locally contracted staff would not require. These funds could be used in other ways, to meet the partner organization’s priority needs.

• Volunteers may dominate local management styles and cultures, particularly in small organizations.

• The ability of volunteers to effect change is limited by the ambiguous nature of their role (including vague job descriptions), the limited resources at their disposal, and the lack of organizational support.

• Volunteers come from outside with limited skills, experience, and understanding of the local context.

• Success for volunteer-sending organizations has been measured more in numbers sent than in results achieved overseas or on return home.
2.3 Knowledge management

‘Even the best-constructed information has no value if it is not used. It is the flow and exchange of information which help to create its value’ (Powel 2003: 12).

Effective information systems are necessary for all organizations anywhere in the world if they are to function effectively, whatever their size or purpose. This is the case whether we are referring to a small one-person business, a nongovernmental organization, a governmental bureaucracy, or a multinational corporation. Information systems are not confined to the design and implementation of new technology. In fact they may not involve any information technology at all. At a fundamental level, an information system is a system of formal and informal communication within an organization. While the formal subsystem of an organization is often taken to be its rules and procedures, much of what actually happens within an organization is driven by an informal system of politics, norms, and culture influenced by wider environmental factors (Liebenau & Backhouse, 1990; Walsham, 1993, 2001).

2.3.1 Organizational learning

There are many approaches to organizational learning, yet perhaps the most well-known ones originate from the writings of Peter Senge. In his book *The Fifth Discipline* (1990) he sets out five key skills, which he calls ‘disciplines’, for managers to acquire: personal mastery (the need for staff to learn self-discipline and self-awareness), flexible ‘mental models’ which avoid the pitfalls of stereotyped thinking and reveal an openness to new ideas; the building of shared vision about what the organization wishes to achieve, a commitment to team learning in which people overcome the tendency to simply defend their own ‘patch’ and learn to share and cooperate; and finally a forms of systems thinking into account both long- and short-term outcomes of decisions, an awareness of the complex interrelationships between different levels of organizational activity and the need to address root causes of problems rather than symptoms. Together these skills, according to Senge, help to build a learning organization.
Ten years before the publication of Sange’s book, another important contribution to the field of organizational learning in the NGO context has been given by Korten (1980). He outlined a ‘learning approach’ for NGOs, in which he saw three stages through which an effective NGO should aim to proceed. The first of these was ‘learning to be effective’, in which an NGO considers how a task should best be performed. The second was ‘learning to be efficient’, which referred to asking questions about how a task can be performed so that it produces desired outcomes at an acceptable cost. The third was ‘learning to expand’, during which the NGO reflected and found ways to increase the impact of its work through replication or by increasing the scale of its activities.

Learning is indispensable if organizations are to be able endure the shifts of the contexts they operate within. It might be argued that an organization’s very survival is dependent on its capacity to learn: in an unstable environment, an organization’s rate of learning has to be at least equal to the rate of change in its external setting if it is to stay relevant and effective. If NGOs fail to learn at such a pace, then they will be ‘destined for insignificance’ (Fowler 1997:64).

Development, to a large extent, is a knowledge-based process. Hence, learning and knowledge management must been seen as key factors in development work. As Ian Smillie remarked, ‘knowing what works and why is essential to the success of NGOs, yet knowing what does not work is equally important. Knowledge involves awareness, memory and familiarity that develops with experience and learning’ (Smillie 1995:23). NGOs increasingly understand that the acquisition of knowledge and learning are a requisite to their success, which – as Korten (1980) concluded – depends on the suitability of their systems, their ability to embrace error, and their willingness to learn from the local communities with whom they work.

At the very basis of NGO capacity to learn lies the willingness for personal engagement, listening, and dialogue with the beneficiaries. The point of departure for any development action should be the deep understanding of the immediate needs of local people that can be achieved through developing friendships, building trust, and gaining the credibility on which the future work could be based. More and more NGOs see the poor as the main source of organizational learning. Hailey and Smillie describe how in many organizations they
analyzed ‘the staff would look back on the village dialogues as the most effective training they received’ (2001: 75).

Secondly, another means of learning for an NGO ought to be the conscious reflection and thorough analysis of past experiences. Barry Underwood, director of a major NGO in India identified the ‘importance of embracing one’s mistakes and learning from them, creating in the process a culture which accepts criticism’ (Hailey & James 2002). More and more organizations institutionalize their meetings to reflect on and learn from experience. Such practices need to be developed into well structured systems if learning from practice is to take place. Otherwise, NGO staff might become overly focused on meeting quantitative project objectives and end up with little time to sit and talk with each other and with the local people. The challenge for many NGOs is how to implement the reflexive approach without causing a significant decline in performance understood in quantitative terms.

Thirdly, NGOs should face the issue of effective internal knowledge sharing, so that individual learning can eventually become organizational learning. As Faruque Ahmed, the President of a Pakistani NGO Proshika, points out, ‘If I as the head of the organization had to remember everything, then probably there would not be much remembered. But if you use participation in the decision-making process then there is much more chance of institutional memory’ (Hailey and Smillie 2001:77). There are many ways to promote shared learning and to disseminate new ideas, such as regular meetings, retreats, workshops, and seminars. Another solution worth considering is moving staff around the organization or assigning them to new projects to encourage cross-functional learning. For instance, transferring staff from research posts to field positions and from specialist to management positions in an attempt to propagate and institutionalize learning.

Fourthly, an emphasis should be put on engagement in training and staff development. Although it might imply spending considerable sums on courses, research, and new information management systems, this investment in formal training complements informal processes of learning from the poor. Especially as organizations grow and the needs become more sophisticated and specialized skills are necessary, organizations should gradually became more reliant on formal courses and structured training processes. Larger NGOs can think about investing in purpose-built training centers.
Finally, it is advisable to develop systems that would allow for **monitoring and evaluation of the progress in staff knowledge and performance**. Such evaluations can be both an opportunity to capture and synthesize new learning as well as a mechanism to assess whether goals have been attained or funds have been well spent.

Organizational learning cannot happen without **individual learning**. Since leaders are the most influential members of organizations, an indispensable feature of a learning organizations is that their leadership and senior management team are eager to invest in developing the organization’s learning, that they aware of its role as a catalyst for change. But before becoming committed to organizational learning, they have to be committed to their personal learning.

### 2.3.2 Knowledge sharing

Amadou Hampate-Ba, who was born in Bandiagara in Mali, wrote in 1960: ‘In Africa, when an old person dies, it’s a library burning down’ (Dagron 2006).

One of the primary activities of NGOs should be preventing the loss of useful knowledge, valuable important information possessed and generating new constructive data. In addition to advocacy, networking, awareness raising, NGOs ought to conduct research, educate, train, and build capacity of their own, as well as take actions that can add to the pool of knowledge in the development field.

Information is awkward to buy and sell due to the fact that ‘it cannot be displayed to a potential buyer, otherwise he will possess it without having to buy. So those who buy information are always uncertain of precisely what it is they are buying’ (Macdonald 1992: 55). Precisely because of this impossibility of appropriation of knowledge, the nonprofit NGO sector, rather than the for-profit sector, should be particularly involved in information-transfer activities characterized by wide public benefits and few opportunities to collect returns.

Scholars have begun to draw a causal link: the now widespread use of communication and information technologies has facilitated the organization of those who work for common causes. Annis (1992) was among the first to suggest ‘informational empowerment’ due to
increased connectedness of grassroots organizations, domestic urban professional NGOs, and NGOs at the international level. In Latin America, he points to increased possibilities for electronic mail, access to Web sites, and computer conferencing in urban centers, while faxes reach even rural areas.

Nonetheless, there are some problematic issues related to knowledge management in the context of NGOs. In the first place, information misused – misinformation or the transmission of overly selective information - can be considered a public bad. What is a public good for some might be a public bad for others - information is usually highly political and the interpretation of information is a very delicate matter. Moreover, the usefulness of information may also be tied to time and place. Before applying new information to one’s practice, it is necessary to consider its limitations.

It is important to point out that the capacity for NGOs to share knowledge freely can be affected by a number of external barriers such as the competition for funds and the consequent pressure to show low rates of administrative burden. There are also internal barriers such as departmental rivalries and the short-termist project culture that often impede shared learning. There is deep-rooted resistance to investing scarce resources in such an intangible concept as research, in addition to the difficulty of identifying attributable and tangible impact indicators. Other barriers include the reluctance of many individuals to envision new ideas, technologies, new ways of working, and the hassle of dealing with the quantity of documentation generated. There is also the fear to admit to, or analyze, mistakes because of the possibility that this will attract criticism and incite a negative reaction from donors and government. The task- or action-oriented culture of many NGOs also does little to encourage the self-assessment or critical reflection that is essential if learning is to take place (Britton 1998; Hailey and Smillie 2001).

These barriers mean that NGOs have to work hard to enable successful knowledge sharing, as it does not come naturally or easily – it does not simply arise from the developmental orientation, it is not some innate process inherent in the culture of development NGOs. Instead, it is the outcome of conscious investment in a range of formal and informal learning routes. Only the NGOs that have worked hard and spent considerable time and money in
overcoming the internal and external barriers to knowledge sharing can productively receive, process, and produce information.

### 2.3.4 Working within a network

The phenomenon of organizations joining within a network has been described in detail by Fleury & Ouverney (2007). Formerly independent actors getting together in order to achieve a shared objective is a rather new trend, yet one that is growing rapidly. It encompasses wide scope of sectors, ranging from private enterprises and political groups to social movements and groups of psychological support. Despite the diversity of characters and goals of such networks, they all have many common features, such as the need to establish a management scheme that will facilitate reaching the desired outcome and enable survival of the network.

Two factors account for such proliferation of these cooperatives, which create a new reality within the field of administration. On one hand, the forces of globalization enhance communication opportunities through the disappearance of physical and legal borders as well as through the technological advancements. On the other hand, the shifting paradigm of the state leads to transformations within the pattern in which various institutional entities organize within societies.

This process is particularly visible in Latin America, where it merges with the effects of democratization of societies, resulting in exponential increase in the number of civic initiatives. Civil society nowadays plays a vital role in the shaping of public policies in Latin American countries, and the actors involved are well aware of the fact that it would be impossible to keep track of the constantly changing sociopolitical context, as well as to exert significant power if such actors where to act in isolation. Working within a network seems to be a perfect solution in the circumstances of scarcity of resources available and high complexity of issues to be dealt with.

Nonetheless, the management of such networks is far from simple, which has caused failures of numerous initiatives, in spite of the good will of involved parties. Creation and maintenance of the network structure is a huge administrative challenge. It implies coping
with process such as negotiations and consensus building, setting of guiding rules and principles, division of labor, distribution of resources, decision making, and follow through monitoring.

The point of departure to the discussion on management-related issues of the networks should be the recognition of the key characteristics of a successful network: horizontality and interdependence among its members. These are the features that distinguish the network from other forms of political cooperation, such as contracted cooperation or partnership. Subsequently, Fleury & Ouverney (2007) provide a list of factors that have a positive influence on the effectiveness of a network.

- Plurality of actors involved allows for a greater mobilization of resources and ensures diversity of opinions on the relevant matters
- Involvement of both governmental and non-governmental agents within a network leads to the network’s presence in the public policy debate, without the necessity of creating a bureaucratic structure
- Given the internal flexibility, the networks should have the facility to adapt quickly to the volatile social context, responding on time with adequate planning, execution, redesigning of its actions
- Given the horizontal structure in which the members preserve their autonomy, the established objectives and strategy should result from a consensus reached through a negotiation process. This in turn would increase the commitment of the members, and give the feeling of responsibility for the chosen goals.

On the other hand, the authors enumerate the obstacles in network management.

- Given the multiplicity of actors involved – from the public, private, and the third sector – there is likely to be an accountability issue as far as the use of resources is concerned
- The consensus building process is bound to be a difficult and time-consuming, slowing down the decision-making
- Shared goals do not automatically imply efficiency in reaching them, especially given the deluded responsibility
- The flexible dynamics can result in moving away from the initial objectives
• The terms of participation within a network are not rigid, which can end up in marginalization of various actors and elitist governance
• Coordination of the network and control of the interdependent relationships are particularly likely to create managerial problems

The key elements that should be analyzed when considering network management strategy are: the actors involved, the resources available, principles shared, and rules commonly accepted. The actors should be aware that their individuals goals are subordinate to the overall goals of the group. For such situation to occur, the network’s objectives must be negotiated among members that since the very beginning have similar mindsets. The patterns of interaction among the members should be institutionalized from the very beginning. When considering the availability of resources, attention should be paid not only to the internal resources of the members, but also to the potential resources that can be obtained through the external links of the members. These connections with the outside world should be also valued when determining the power of a given member within the network.

The coordinators of a network should be prepared for resolution of conflicts, either through direct supporting of certain options, or through encouraging interaction and coalition creation among members. They should also be ready for open debate that can re-shape previously agreed topics. They should promote evaluation and learning processes and encourage entrance of new members.

The network leaders should be able to sum up the forces of individual members in the struggle to reach the common goals. Yet there is no rigid prescription as for the style of such leadership – it can range from autocratic, mediator, or laissez-faire type to fully democratic governance.

Much of the academic knowledge-management literature also spotlights the phenomenon of online ‘communities of practice’. This form of communication has been successfully adopted from the business sector. The online development networks are generally inter-organizational: made up of individuals based in different organizations who share common professional interests. If the complexity of networks can be characterized by the number of boundaries they cross, online networks in the development field are characteristically highly
complex (Duarte and Snyder 1999). These networks are crossing organizations, job functions, time zones, many national cultures, and often language barriers, as well as including some members who do not have full access to electronic technology. The facility to create dialogue, learning, and collaboration among these groups, provided by the new technology, makes these networks a very attractive proposition for development organizations. These communities of practice can be the ideal place for promoting innovation, where new practices can be discussed, and where social learning can be taking place. This, for example, appears to be the case for the LEAP Impact community of information professionals, which seems to be successfully facilitating shared understanding of the model of evaluation (Cummings and Mchombu 2003). Indeed, these communities have the potential to become the most important field in promoting innovation within development.

There is a general understanding, then, that online networks could positively contribute to knowledge sharing among NGOs. However, research on the tools and concepts, and possible approaches is needed to understand better how ICT can be used to exchange knowledge among development professionals, how to manage these online networks, and how to get the best out of them.

2.3.3 Accountability

The potential of accountability as a tool to help NGOs advance improvements has now been widely recognized. Accountability enables an organization to learn from its mistakes and successes, as well as to exchange these experiences with similar institutions. Nonetheless, there is no universally accepted definition of accountability, as it is highly dependent upon the context and the purpose for which accountability is sought. However, descriptions of the concept tend to refer to ‘the right to require an account’ and ‘the right to impose sanctions if the account or the actions accounted for are inadequate’ (Leat 1988). Accountability can be used as a goal in itself, as a political requirement, or as a tool to improve project overall performance. Definitions of accountability are often made by way of contrast with the term responsibility. Oliver and Drewry (1996: 13) argue that the distinction between accountability and responsibility is charge: responsibility is having a job to do and taking the
blame when things go wrong, whereas accountability is having the obligation to explain and make amends without automatically accepting blame. Hence, unlike governments NGOs are accountable rather than responsible in their fight against poverty and injustice.

Accountability is expected to promote constant improvement and reflection in conduct, professional behavior, and values. The pressure for better accountability implies that NGO staff should subject themselves to the inquiry of others – by actions such as encouraging beneficiaries to assess their work, disclosing information, and living up to the requirements of donors or regulatory institutions. Yet, more importantly, accountability is designed to change the way in which individuals think of themselves as development professionals, so that staff can develop greater self-control over the way they behave. Successful accountability systems should be oriented at making individuals actively control their own performance, making them more self-conscious and capable of self-actualization (Dean 1999).

However, there are several other reasons for the growing indispensability of accountability. The prevalent crisis of the legitimacy and governance of global corporations and governments has also affected the NGO community. All institutions are now under suspicion and Third Sector is especially endangered. NGO misbehavior has often been heavily criticized in the press, all over the globe, for misuse of funds, the abuse of power over vulnerable people, dishonesty in fund-raising/advocacy, and poor management leading to ridiculously low efficiency. Wallace (2004) describes how NGOs are often perceived as having lost their core values. It will be hard to keep the concept of NGO credible without a visible shift towards greater transparency.

In addition to more participatory and client-centered funding proposals, greater accountability is one of the primary donor demands. Funders want to see professional management strategies supported by reporting of high standard, private-sector style.

More and more NGOs use their recognition gained in service delivery for lobbying and advocacy in public social policy area and to monitor the actions of governments. The growing influence of NGOs over decision makers and policy makers on behalf of marginalized constituencies has led to concerns about the power and objectives of NGOs.
Another question to be discussed is to whom should NGOs be accountable?

As we have noted in the earlier sections, NGOs are characteristically accountable to a number of different stakeholder, leading to various aspects of accountability, that can be classified as follows:

Upward accountability – to donors, funders, boards of trustees, and governments for ensuring that NGOs deliver value for money and meet development goals.

Downward accountability – to partners and beneficiaries: to whom they provide services or on whose behalf they speak. This is particularly significant, as clients rarely have any connections with the donors who finance services.

Horizontal accountability – to peers and fellow professionals, in terms of promoting shared values and to uphold the standards and reputation of the sector.

Inward accountability – to organizational mission and values and for acting in accordance with personal and societal norms and expectations.

Determining who exactly is accountable to these various stakeholders is rather uneasy. Bovens (1998) emphasizes the lack of clarity in assigning accountability in the NGO context because of the multiplicity of actors involved. According to his analysis, accountability might lie with any of the following.

The NGO as a whole: this is termed corporate accountability.

The director of the NGO: this is termed personal accountability.

Every member of the organization is equally liable for the organization’s conduct: collective accountability.

Individuals are accountable to the extent that their actions have contributed to the organization’ conduct in a particular sphere: individual accountability.

Most NGOs seem to adopt corporate accountability. However, Bovens (1998) questions whether corporate entities can really be held accountable for individual actions. He advocates a strengthening of individual accountability, whereby individuals are required to give an account of the actions that they undertake in their professional capacity.
Next issue is what actually are NGOs can be accountable for? There are two distinct tendencies in the literature on NGO accountability:

Practical accountability, which focuses on the use of inputs, and the way in which activities are performed and the outputs delivered. Strategic accountability, which look at how NGOs are performing in relation to their mission.

The divergence between the practical and strategic models of accountability is due to two different approaches towards development practice. As Ferguson (1994) notes, the development industry has two purposes: to produce an outcome (development) and to reproduce itself (to keep itself in business by justifying and legitimizing development interventions, and by re-inventing its institutions, techniques, and processes for bringing about change). Practical accountability is concerned with evidence of short-term outputs, meeting quality standards, and accounting for expended resources. Thus, practical accountability could be viewed as a way of legitimizing the existence of NGO, rather than achieving lasting political and social change. Examples of practical accountability mechanisms include audits, quality assurance, quantifiable targets, technical instruments (log frame), and performance indicators: i.e. the kinds of mechanism that typically result in distorted efforts, paperwork, demoralized workforce, and extra costs (Mawdsley et al. 2005). Strategic accountability focuses on the causes and effects of social problems. It is associated with political change to existing power relations and the social and economic structural factors that underlie poverty (such as lack of land, unfair law/property rights, lack of employment opportunities, gender-based division of labor, inadequate state provision of education and health care). Examples of strategic accountability mechanisms include popular movements, demonstrations, lobbying, and civil disobedience.

Now, let us have a look at some incentives that can be undertaken to enhance the drive for accountability within NGOs.

NGOs are most obviously accountable through their stated organizational mission, their standard operating procedures, and their values. The quest for accountability should start with re-thinking the mission.
Board of trustees has responsibility for the overall policy, the direction of the NGO, monitoring and approving the financial income and expenditure, while also ensuring that the organization operates in a way that complies with statutory obligations and in accordance with its own mission and values.

Many NGOs have developed their own self-regulatory accountability mechanisms to support quality assurance, expertise, and competence in their activities. In particular, dialogue with beneficiaries can serve as a great consulting tool, as it can verify to what extent the organization fulfills agreed objectives. It is also highly advisable to always disclose at least some basic financial information, it is perhaps the easiest and most obvious step towards greater transparency.
2.4 Communications & Fund Rising

Fowler (1997) argues that NGOs are not closed systems with clear boundaries around them, but are instead a part of an open system. As such, it is crucial for them to develop and preserve good relationships with the surrounding environment.

It is of particular concern in the NGO sector that many initiatives are not undertaken with due regard to the marketing process. Many NGOs try to sell what they can produce, rather than produce what they can sell. They are in effect reversing the law of business which says that production exists in order to satisfy demand, and not to satisfy producers.

2.4.1 Management of Relationships

Lewis (2007) suggests a classification of the relationships an NGO might have according to the degree of influence it can exert over them. Figure 5 illustrates his idea of three concentric circles. The first circle contains factors which can be controlled by the NGO: staffing, budgeting, planning specific activities, setting objectives, or choosing an organizational structure. The second circle encapsulates elements of the environment which can be influenced to some extent by an NGO – through persuasion, lobbying, patronage, or collaboration. These includes, among others, government policy, or the activity of donors. The last circle contains aspects that have to be accepted by an NGO as they are, such as wider political structures, the macro-economic system, the technological environment, etc.

It is not always the case that the elements which normally form the third circle cannot be an open system that can be influenced by an NGO (or a movement of which an NGO is a part of), but the idea of the model is primarily to show that NGOs need to prioritize strategies based on opportunities and constraints if they are to be effective. Lewis sees the value of the framework in that ‘it allows an NGO to develop a strategic approach to management in which priorities can be set and resources allocated, while still keeping a watchful eye on the ‘big picture’ within which the NGO operates’ (2007: 165). It is a dynamic framework, as it enables NGOs to both seek out opportunities to influence change, as well as to react to shifts in the wider context.
Figure 5. A framework for strategic NGO management (source: de Graff 1987, In Lewis 2007)

The boundaries around these areas are bound to shift over time, be it as a result of the actions of a given NGO, or by the changes within the external environment. In any case, NGOs should stay alert to keep track of the changes and use this knowledge to their favor. Moreover, organizations should not focus excessively on the factors under their direct control, at the cost of not taking the full advantage of influencing the outside environment. Being aware of the position of an NGO within the wider context is the first step towards increasing its power and enhancing its position, which are crucial elements for an ambitious NGO willing to expand.
2.4.2 Public Relations

The public relations function is important to organizations in the NGO sector, regardless of whether the function is defined by its oldest purpose (to publicize) or its newest (to manage relationships). The NGO management literature largely ignores the public relations function, and public relations scholars rarely study nonprofits.

NGOs pay insufficient attention to public relations. Salzman’s focuses on the function’s oldest purpose, and attempts to convince community organizers and nonprofit managers ‘to make media relations more of a priority’ (p. xiii). He summarizes the problem in his opening comments: ‘On tight budgets, they often argue that trying to get media attention distracts them from doing the real work. . . . So they are left struggling to save the world in the dim light of obscurity and wondering why more people don’t value what they do’.

Burnet (2007) reviews various techniques that can be used by an NGO hoping for recognition in the media. Firstly, NGOs are encouraged to publish through one of the channels:

- Brochures, containing some basic information about the NGO, such as its mission, past achievements, affiliations, ways of making contributions, etc.
- Electronic newsletters published at least quarterly. They should be sent free of charge to board members, members, political leaders, media, potential and current donors, and other influential parties. They should contain current relevant news
- News releases, a prepared statement sent to the media who are most likely to publish or broadcast them
- Annual reports which supplement the financial information provided to stakeholders. There is a large degree of freedom as to how they should be designed, yet they must be accurate and communicate the key results and proposed initiatives

Secondly, major NGOs can organize press conferences. Especially after some information concerning the NGO has been circulating in the media, it is advisable to hold a press conference to answer potential questions. The spokesman should be well trained to handle such an event.

Finally, NGOs can benefit from organizing any kind of events that are likely to attract publicity. The topic should be carefully chosen to ensure that the event will only bring
positive consequences for the organizer. For NGOs with modest resources, it might be a good idea to organize an open day. As long as there is a measurable benefit, only creativity sets the limits to the types of events to be held. Visibility should be a key issue for any ambitious NGO.

2.4.3 Fundraising

Historically, academic economic research has portrayed NGOs as passive recipients of donations from altruistic donors: papers such as Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) characterized NGOs as docile mechanisms for the provision of public goods. In this class of models, donors have some preference for a public good that can be satisfied by either private or public provision. NGOs are merely a passive mechanism by which those preferences are realized. This view contrasts with the modern popular management literature marketed to NGO directors, which portrays an ominous environment where firms must compete to survive. More consistent with this perception are articles that examine strategic decisions made by NGOs in the face of scarce donor resources, which confirm that NGOs compete on a variety of margins including efficiency, quality, or fund-raising. Yet modeling these decisions has remained an underdeveloped area of economic literature. A primary constraint to empirical analysis remains the obscure nature of the NGO objective when operating under a non-distribution constraint.

Donors are able to observe a variety of efficiency ratios publicized by watchdog groups and the nonprofits themselves. NGOs often report their ‘fund-raising-expense ratio’ that represents the fraction of total expenses allocated to fund-raising. A common assumption is that donors have preferences for charitable output. Consequently, they perceive management or fund-raising expenditures as an implicit ‘price’ of production. Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) originally tested the notion that donations depend on the fund-raising expenditures and the subsequent price of charitable output. They found that higher solicitation expenditures indeed boost donation revenue to nonprofits. As a secondary effect, their tests also determine that donors dislike higher fundraising costs and reduce their contributions when nonprofit organizations are less efficient. In a follow-up article, Okten and Weisbrod (2000) confirmed that donors are, indeed, sensitive to expense ratios,
implying a downward sloping demand curve for NGO services. Their results are similar to the previous article, in that the direct effect of fund-raising is to increase charitable gifts. However, the indirect effect of a higher price results in lower donation revenue.

2.4.4 Online Fundraising

In today’s digital era, particular attention should be paid to fundraising online, as the popularity of this form of collecting resources is increasing rapidly. Many books and articles have already given useful tips as to how the NGO websites should be designed to maximize their fundraising potential.

First, the **degree of accessibility** offered by a site is a critical issue. Authors such as Chaffey, Mayer, Johnston, and Ellis-Chadwick (2002), Chakraborty, Vishal, and Warren (2002), and Huizingh and Hoekstra (2002) stress the need for sites to facilitate the seamless flow of users through the material they offer. These authors argue that sites that are easily navigable are the most effective at generating sales. In the NGO context, sites should therefore be organized in such a way that it is easy to offer a donation, and this facility should be accessible from wherever a user may be in the site when he or she is sufficiently motivated to give (Reddy and Iyer, 2002; Sargeant, West, and Ford, 2001; Tapp, 2003). A further key dimension concerns the depiction of the service offering and the perceived quality thereof (Lui, Arnett, and Litecky, 2001). The site must make clear **what goal donations will accomplish** and develop in detail what fundraisers refer to as the case for support (Klein, 2001). If donors understand how their monies will be employed and why this is important, it is reasonable to expect that significantly more donations will be offered. Indeed, it is interesting to note how many organizations now package need into discrete ‘products’, making it clear what a donation of twenty-five, fifty, or one hundred dollars will achieve in a bid to create the strongest possible case for support (Sargeant and Jay, 2004).

Both the fundraising and the Web site performance literature stress the need for sites to be accountable for **how they manage and manipulate any personal data** that donors might share in the process of interacting with a site or making a donation (Burnett, 2002).
Authors such as Ghose and Dhou (1998), Wenham, Stephens, and Hardy (2003), and Wilhite (2003) have demonstrated a link between the **quality of interaction** and commercial success in the online environment. Sites permitting more levels of interaction tend to be those with the highest pattern of performance. The emerging nonprofit relationship literature suggests that fundraising performance may be similarly enhanced (Bennett and Barkensjo, 2004, 2005). Equally, Chaffey, Mayer, Johnston, and Ellis-Chadwick (2002) and Chakraborty, Vishal, and Warren (2002) have stressed the need for sites to be informative and have demonstrated a link between the perceived quality of information provided and site performance. Fundraising performance may therefore be enhanced if a site provides an appropriate education facility to learn about the cause or access information on a particular issue related to the charity’s mission.

The degree of **customization** the site affords users has been shown to drive user perceptions of site performance (Chaffey, Mayer, Johnston, and Ellis-Chadwick, 2002; Wang, Head, and Archer, 2000; Chakraborty, Vishal, and Warren, 2002). In addition, value may be added by empowering individuals to take action on a cause or issue and perhaps generating feelings of empowerment by informing them of the difference they have made. In the fundraising context, there is a particular need to feed back to donors how their previous donations have been employed (Tapp, 1995; Burnett, 2002). Although the concept of empowerment has a clear relationship with the giving of monetary donations it may also involve providing opportunities for campaigning, e-volunteering, purchasing from a trading catalogue, introducing friends and family to the site, and so on.

### 2.4.5 Donor relationship management

Relationship marketing is based on the fundamental assumption that an organization wishes to form a long-term relationship with its customers. When an organization reaches this goal, it effectively moves away from a transactional approach to one focused on the stimulation and development of relationships. The management of such relationships is driven by an understanding of their lifetime value, which permits organizations to invest in enhancing the experience for various segments of customers even if this might be loss making in the short term. So long as the lifetime return on investment is acceptable (typically because of
stronger satisfaction and loyalty), the initiative will be worthwhile. In the NGO arena, relationship marketing requires charities to view donors as partners in the achievement of the mission rather than as mere sources of funds.

The initial conceptual development in this field is credited to MacNeil (1978, 1980), who discussed the long-term impact of legal contracts on exchange relationships. However, Berry (1983) was the first to coin the phrase relationship marketing; he defined it as ‘attracting, maintaining and—in multiservice organizations—enhancing customer relationships’. He was particularly keen to downplay the role of customer acquisition, seeing it only as an intermediate step from which the organization could subsequently build. Although Berry was the first to espouse the term, the concepts that were later to form the backbone of relationship marketing can be traced much earlier (for example, calls for customer loyalty; Ryans and Wittnk, 1977), the need to market intangible products and constant reselling (Levitt 1981), and the need to improve the performance of service personnel as a key to retaining customers. Indeed, even Berry (1995) himself considers that relationship marketing is an ‘old-new’ concept. The idea of a business earning the customer’s favors and loyalty by satisfying needs and wants was ‘not unknown to the earliest merchants’ (Berry 1995: 237).

Relationship marketing is characterized by emphasis on customer retention and development. As Congram notes, ‘keeping a client is more desirable than attracting new business’ (1987: 177). This is largely because successive studies have determined that it costs up to five times as much to recruit a new customer as to do business with an existing one (Petersen 1997). Similar pattern appears to be evident in the NGO context, with returns from donor recruitment activity (excluding major gifts). Customer retention thus appears to be as much an issue for NGOs as it is for business. Indeed, Raphel (1991) criticizes organizations for the fervor they apply to attracting an ever-larger number of new customers, at the expense of looking after those they already have. Reichheld and Sasser (1990) give empirical evidence for the consequences of this omission. On the basis of an analysis of more than one hundred companies in two dozen industries, the researchers found that firms could improve profits 25–85 percent by reducing customer defection by just 5 percent. A business that loses customers is therefore spending more than necessary and wasting a most valuable asset.
So, how to avoid losing current donors? In the for-profit context, a number of studies have addressed the primary reasons customers stop doing business with a particular organization. De Souza (1992), for example, identified six causes of defection:

1. Price—customers defect because they identify a lower price elsewhere
2. Product—customers defect because they prefer the features or design of a product offered by another supplier
3. Service—the overall quality of service offered may be better in the case of an alternative supplier
4. Market—some customers may be lost to the market; they may die, move away, or cease to have a need for the product category in question
5. Technology—some customers may be tempted away by alternative channels of distribution that make it easier for them to do business, electing, for example, to buy directly from an Internet supplier
6. Organization—equally, some customers are lost to the organization, as when an alternative supplier is successful in achieving a greater ‘share of spend’ than the original supplier; it may be appropriate, for example, for a customer to rationalize the number of suppliers with whom it does business, even if satisfied with the quality of service given.

Translating these factors to the NGO context suggests that donors might stop supporting an organization because they can no longer afford it; or they elect to give to another organization; or they believe that they will receive a higher standard of service elsewhere; or they die, move away, or develop a change in attitude toward a voluntary organization and thus terminate their giving. De Souza’s results also suggest that donors may be lured into supporting other organizations because of the ease of giving offered by an alternative, or feel that they wish to rationalize the number of organizations they elect to support and thus offer a greater level of support to a smaller number of nonprofits.

It should be noted, however, that underlying these six distinct categories, from a service-quality perspective, there are only two types of defection. The first of these is natural (since customer demand for a specific product category often has only a finite lifetime) and the
second unnatural (caused by the manner in which the organization treats the customer concerned). Achieving a baseline of appropriate service quality is essential if the longevity of a customer relationship is to be ensured. Measuring satisfaction with delivered service quality—for example, on a five-point Likert scale from very dissatisfied to very satisfied—found substantial differences in loyalty among groups. Jones and Sasser’s article (1995) established that across a range of industries, customers who viewed themselves as very satisfied were six times more likely to repurchase than customers who viewed themselves as merely satisfied. In a bid to enhance customer loyalty, others have cited the importance of service quality, relationship quality, overall service satisfaction and handling of service encounter failures.

So, what about the NGO context? Burnett (1992) recognized the need for what he termed relationship fundraising – dealing with donors individually, recognizing each donor as unique in terms of giving history, motivation for giving, and the overall standard of care expected from the charities being supported. The entire relationship with a donor, he argued, should be viewed holistically and fundraising decisions taken in light of the perceived value of the overall relationship. Recognizing the benefit of a future income stream, fundraisers are not afraid to invest in their donors and allow them greater flexibility over the content, nature, and frequency of the communications they receive. This might make people feel important. Although the initial costs of implementing such a strategy are undoubtedly higher, the benefits in terms of an enhanced pattern of donor loyalty—and therefore the future revenue stream—far outweigh this investment. Donors should be able to choose when communication is initiated and the form that it might take. It seems that one way in which NGOs might achieve this goal is to ensure that they give ongoing and specific feedback to donors as to how their funds have been put to use, in particular the benefit that has resulted for the beneficiary group. If this feeling of impact on the cause is not strengthened, it seems less likely that donors will view other causes as being more deserving than those they already support.

Donors viewing the communications they receive as informative, courteous, timely, appealing, and convenient appear to remain loyal for a greater period of time. The issue then becomes how best to achieve this perception. The donor, ideally, should be able to select the pattern of communication he or she wishes to receive. Some NGOs offer donors
the opportunity to specify how frequently they would like to hear from the organization, whether they would like news about how their gift has been employed, whether they would like such news but not additional letters asking for money, and so on. Such practices are likely to improve perception of the quality of communication received and thereby enhance loyalty.

Furthermore, it seems clear that NGOs could also offer donors some choice over whether or not they wish to be asked for a specific sum. Some donors may welcome guidance about the appropriateness of certain gift levels. Others may prefer to take such decisions themselves and not be prompted by the NGO. Obviously, where specific sums are requested, NGOs should be sure they are appropriate given the financial ability of the donor.

### 2.4.6 Intermediary NGOs

One important reason for the NGOs inability to bring sustainable impact has been their failure to make the right linkages between their work at the grassroots level and the larger sociopolitical systems and institutional structures in which they are embedded (Edwards & Hulme 1995). In other words, the problem has been one of negotiating between local imperatives and global structures. The problem has become acute in the context of a globalized world, where lobbying global institutions is as important as delivering services locally to have a sustainable impact on development efforts.

Over the past two decades, a new type of NGO that aims to create linkages between local issues and global institutions has emerged. These NGOs have been variously termed as ‘intermediary NGOs’ (Carroll 1992), ‘bridging organizations’ (Brown 1991), and ‘support organizations’ (Brown & Kalegaonkar 2002). They have in common two features that distinguish them from conventional NGOs. First, they are located at the center of several constituencies—local groups, national bodies, and international institutions. Second, their activities include innovative programs like organizational capacity building, training and staff development, research and advocacy, collection and dissemination of information, networking, all of which are not considered to be traditional NGO activities.
These features enable such organizations to establish the ‘bridging ties’ between civil society groups and organizations and the institutional structures at the national and global level. Thus compared to conventional service providing NGOs, they have greater potential for making sustainable and large-scale impacts. As far as their political orientation goes, support organizations may be largely apolitical adopting political stands on an issue basis while lobbying governments and international organizations. These organizations often become suppliers of information and active participants in various social movements and transnational advocacy networks. Thus, these organizations are at the same time local actors and global actors depending on the nature of their issue involvement at a particular point in time. The unconventional nature of their functions and their structural location makes the issue of governance a problematic one for such organizations on one hand, but on the other they create a unique opportunity of going beyond the limitation expressed by Dagron:

‘At times I have the feeling that we are still engaged in an experimental phase, often congratulating ourselves on successful pilot projects that are certainly crucial in terms of our own learning, but which have little influence on how the world of development is being shaped’ (Dagron 2006).
Part 3. Field Research

3.1 Research Methodology

3.1.1 Research tools

In the second part of the paper, the facts from the previous part are confronted with the field reality. Four NGOs have been selected, each one analyzed with the focus on the four areas described above.

The field research was carried out using a qualitative approach. The methods of data collection included:

- Semi-structured interviews with directors and managers of the NGOs
- Visits to headquarters and branches
- Analysis of the institutional documents made available

**Semi structured interviews.** Four in-depth semi-structured interviews have been carried out with representatives of the four NGOs analyzed. All interviews were conducted in Portuguese, the translation was done by the author. The NGOs were represented by:
  - AfroReggae: Mr. Joao Madeira, Partnerships Coordinator
  - Criola: Mrs. Lucia Xavier, General Coordinator
  - FASE: Mr. Jorge Durao, Director
  - Ibase: Mr. Candido Grzybowski, Director

**Visits to headquarters and branches.** All the interviews were complemented by visits to the headquarters of the NGOs.

**Analysis of the institutional documents.** All four NGOs provided the researcher with a great deal of institutional materials and publications of different kinds, designed either for internal
use and for disseminating information to wider public. These documents have been thoroughly analyzed to complement the data gathered through interviews.

### 3.1.2 Research scope and objective

The research is expected to benefit both development practitioners and academic researchers on development – through the provision of knowledge that can be applied in management of development NGOs. In Brazil, there is a great deal of valuable know-how related to third sector management, and this paper aims at exploring and promoting this knowledge through academic analysis. It is expected that academic recognition will also be advantageous for the NGOs presented, both in terms of possible internal use – due to enhanced self-consciousness – and in the aspect of public relations.

The review of the literature related to NGO management has convinced me that there has been still insufficient amount of investigations of empirical character realized in the third sector context and I believe that this field research will be helpful in filling this void.

Although the focus is on the organizations operating in Rio de Janeiro, the research has a wider relevance, as most aspects under scrutiny are not strictly context-specific. The field research has focused on four areas described in the theoretical framework sections of the paper. These areas are now approached from an empirical angle.

### 3.1.3 Choice of focus areas

**Projects in Advocacy & Service Delivery** – I have decided to start the research by looking at the outcome of the NGO activity, and how the organizations go about achieving it.

**Internal Management** – this part of the analysis looks at the burdens of dealing with daily administration of the structure, which constitutes a necessary support upon which projects can be developed.

**Knowledge Management** – managing, disseminating, and sharing of information and knowledge is, in my opinion, a task so vital to the successful functioning of third sector entities that I have decided to investigate the issue on its own. It is essential both for internal
use – for organizational development, as well as for external use – to strengthen actors with similar objectives.

**Communication & Fundraising** – the activities of NGO communication are often termed as public relations or social marketing in the academic literature. I have chosen to use the term ‘communication’, as it was preferred by the organizations analyzed. Communication, as demonstrated in the theoretical part of the paper, is related strictly to fundraising. Both areas are indispensable for third sector organizations, so a scrutiny into the solutions used has been carried out.

### 3.1.4 Choice of NGOs

The NGOs were selected for three reasons. Primarily, they all are among the most credible and well-known organizations of this kind operating in Rio de Janeiro. Secondly, they are quite different among themselves, as far as the mission, objectives and methodology of work are concerned. Thirdly, I could access these NGOs easily and obtain the data without major obstacles.
3.2 Presentation of the NGOs analyzed

AfroReggae

**Mission:** Promote social inclusion and social justice using art, Afro-Brazilian culture and education; bridge differences and create the foundations for sustainability and citizenship

**History:** AfroReggae started as a group of poor young people who decided to publish a low-circulation music review magazine, under the name AfroReggae Noticias. The decisive point in the formation of NGO was the massacre of innocent people carried out by the police in the favela Vigario Geral, in 1993. The favela dwellers could not get over this sad event, and Jose Junior – the movement leader – came up with the idea of raising their feelings of dignity through culture and music. Determination of the NGO leaders enabled to attract famous figures to support the case – Caetano Veloso and Regina Case, among others. The goal has always been to offer a cultural and artistic formation for the favela youth as an alternative to narco-trafficking and menial jobs, so that they can transform themselves and empower others. It took a long time to obtain financial aid – the first donors appeared only when AfroReggae was eleven years old. Until it happened, the NGO was self-sufficient, financed with the money from the shows given by the AfroReggae bands. Nowadays AfroReggae benefits some two thousand children and teenagers from the favelas: Vigario Geral, Parada de Lucas, Cantagalo, Complexo de Alemao and Nova Era in Nova Iguacu. Besides music, AfroReggae currently works also with dance, theatre, graffiti, circus, digital-inclusion activities, and family support. AfroReggae is about to open a new cultural center in Vigario Geral, with ideal conditions for developing these activities.

**Highlights:** Great achievements in working with arts and culture in the favelas, successful cooperation with the police

**Problems:** The system of management and control can be further improved
**Criola**

**Mission:** Combat racism, sexism, and homophobia; Fight for the rights of the black population in Brazil

**History:** Criola was created in 1992, when a group of women working in another women’s organization decided to form their own independent NGO. They soon invited more women into cooperation. The founders came from diverse institutional backgrounds, various social movements. The funding came from an association of Brazilian women living in San Francisco. The first project was a campaign against female sterilization. Initially, Criola began working within five areas: children & teenagers, culture, health, violence prevention, and women’s empowerment. In the following years came the political and organizational maturation, and nowadays the NGO focuses on two objectives: women’s empowerment and advocacy. At present, the NGO is developing a network of 17 organizational partners united by shared political objectives to provide support to organic women’s organizations. Criola has gone through various crises, which had a huge impact on its evolution.

**Highlights:** Important voice in the national debate on public policy, gender issues, racism, homophobia; one of the very few organizations that provide tools for empowerment to black women

**Problems:** Shortage of financial resources, managerial know-how
FASE

Mission: Contribute to the democratization and environmental sustainability of the Brazilian society through empowerment of civil society actors and participation in the public debate.

History: The acronym FASE stands for Federation of Institutions for Social and Educational Assistance (Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional). FASE was established in 1961 by an American priest, member of the Catholic Relief Services. In consequence, the NGO was initially linked closely to the social action of the Catholic Church. Later on in the 1960s, FASE was heavily influenced by the Popular Education Movement initiated by Paulo Freire. During the military dictatorship, FASE gave support to countless social movements of resistance, such as labor unions of rural workers organizations. Since the end of the dictatorship period, FASE has been trying to influence public policy, participate in the debate around the concept of social development and potential alternatives, and empower individuals and civil society organizations working for the public good and against neoliberal policies. FASE, with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, operates nowadays in six Brazilian states.

Highlights: Credibility and recognition, nation-wide presence

Problems: Political isolation and difficulty in raising funds for the administrative purposes
IBASE

Mission: Foster democracy by promoting the principles of equality, liberty, civil society empowerment, diversity, and solidarity

History: The acronym Ibase stands for Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses (O Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas). The NGO was created in 1981 by the sociologist Herbert de Souza, Betinho. This charismatic leader created the institution shortly after coming back from his exile during the military dictatorship period and had since then played a vital role in the formation of the civil society in Brazil. Among many of his achievements, the most remarkable ones were The Combat of Famine: for Citizenship and Life and The National Campaign for Land Reform, with some events that gathered hundreds of thousands of people. Ibase succeeded in bringing new issues into the public debate, such as the situation of street children, or the commercial blood trade, practice now banned. Ibase has always put strong emphasis on democratization of information and it was the first entity to bring internet to Latin America, in 1989. Despite the death of Betinho in 1997, Ibase managed to stay strong and its actions now have a global reach and particularly innovative edge. The greatest success in recent history is the World Social Forum launched in the year 2000. Current lines of operating also include: democratic alternatives to globalization, development and rights, urban rights, solidarity in economics, youth: democracy and participation, citizenship watch, rights and diversity, corporate social responsibility, independence and security in alimentation.

Highlights: Legitimacy; innovativeness and courage to take up large-scale projects, global presence

Problems: Finding the right balance between militancy and professionalism; at times overly narrow focus; excessive power in relationships
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Permanent Employees</th>
<th>Annual Budget</th>
<th>Political Preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfroReggae</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>7,5 million R$</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criola</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASE</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>8-9 million R$</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBASE</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10-12 million R$</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Basic data about the NGOs analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Founder</th>
<th>Current leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfroReggae</td>
<td>Jose Junior</td>
<td>Jose Junior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criola</td>
<td>Jurema Werneck</td>
<td>Jurema Werneck, Lucia Xavier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASE</td>
<td>Father Leisinger</td>
<td>Jorge Eduardo Durao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBASE</td>
<td>Herbert de Souza, Betinho</td>
<td>Candido Grzybowski</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. NGO founders and current leaders
3.3 Research Findings

3.3.1 Advocacy & Service Delivery

AfroReggae

AfroReggae is currently present in 5 favelas, in which the NGO is providing various activities for children and teenagers:

- Vigario Geral – the first and the biggest center of AfroReggae, including 10 music bands, a theatre, graffiti facilities
- Parada de Lucas – digital inclusion program
- Cantagalo – circus
- Complexo de Alemao – all the activities above
- Nova Era – new center, not specialized yet

On top of the daily activities, AfroReggae operates two other major projects:

- Urban connections – Tour of shows in the favelas of Rio, developed in partnership with the government of the city of Rio. The objective is to bring high quality spectacles to the favela dwellers, who would not be able to pay for such events otherwise. Maintaining the highest quality of performance is a principle both for artists from outside of favelas, as well as for the AfroReggae bands. Each show is followed by investments in infrastructure carried out by the government of Rio. The first edition of the show took place in the year 2000. An indirect effect is that the favelas in which the events take place appear in media for the cultural reasons, and not in the context of criminality – which gradually improves the popular discourse on favelas.

- Youth and the Police – Project developed in partnership with the police of the Minas Gerais state, with the objective of integrating the sides traditionally hostile to each other: the police and the favela dwellers. Police officers become coordinators of cultural projects carried out under the name and supervision of AfroReggae. Working with art – music, dance, theatre, graffiti, circus – turned out to be a great mean to
overcome the stereotypes that foster mutual distrust. There was a considerable pressure from both these sides not to realize the project particularly because of these animosities. Nonetheless, the project has functioned successfully since the year 2000.

AfroReggae usually starts by hiring external teachers, but the final goal is to teach the students – favela dwellers – to become teachers themselves. It seems that AfroReggae is able to teach middle-class people how to approach the favelas and how to deal with the poor and frustrated youth. The best method to conquer the initial hostility is music, particularly percussion. It is relatively easy for anyone to learn the basics of percussion, and start producing an attractive rhythm that soon becomes addictive and contagious. The ice has been broken and a dialogue can start. The project Youth and the Police is the most extreme example of the application of the AfroReggae method, as the traditional enemies, the police officers, become teachers and friends of favela dwellers.

_We have a ‘bloco’ during Carnival, and even the police is participating. [...] We don’t want to work against the police, we want to work with the police. [...] The kids often end up willing to work for the police, which is normally impossible in the favelas. [...] And the police officers learn to enter the favela not to kill, but to teach culture._ (Joao Madeira)

Another unusual group of teachers and coordinators is formed of former drug dealers:

_The drug dealers admire our work. We have many former drug dealers who left the crime to work with AfroReggae, to become coordinators of our projects. They would like they kids to be a part of AfroReggae..._ (Joao Madeira)

There are many children and teenagers that do not believe in themselves, and sadly – often they really do not have any reason for self-confidence. To tackle this issue, AfroReggae coordinators often tell their students that they have a true talent and they just need to work hard to become professional in their discipline. Hope combined with lack of alternatives creates motivation that – to everybody’s surprise – is usually able to make the impossible happen. Many of today’s coordinators were not gifted at all, and it is only due to their constant efforts that they managed to become professionals indeed.
After the kids are already ‘hooked up’ on the activities, an emphasis is placed on their education. They are taught that they will only be able to participate if they do well at school. Kids tend to get angry at first, but eventually they make the effort to improve their grades. This is a good example of transforming people through some activity into becoming valuable citizens and human beings.

AfroReggae has developed a detailed scheme for project development and management. It encompasses all the elements of project cycle, such as planning, administration, evaluation, and presentation. The scheme has been created in-house, with the participation of the IBMEC university and other external consultants.

AfroReggae prefers projects of long duration, most initiatives are planned to last for indefinite period. Social transformation requires patience and it is a waste of resources to engage in development tourism, jumping from one community to another.

On top of being called to carry out social projects, AfroReggae bands are also appreciated for their artistic value and they have received countless invitations to perform worldwide. Perhaps the most spectacular success took place in China, when the local people – breaking the unwritten rules of their culture – started dancing in the middle of the concert hall. This is the kind of performance AfroReggae is looking for – true art, and not empathy with poor kids from favela. The goal is to reach dignity, not pity.

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the AfroReggae method is that it is universal and it can be applied in virtually any cultural context. AfroReggae receives numerous international invitations to launch social projects in other countries and to spread their know-how by teaching local NGOs how to do the same on their grounds. They have successfully worked in India – with young men preparing to become human bombs, in London – with the youth from the dangerous area of Hackney, as well as in Germany, United States, and Uruguay. The process of beginning the work in a new environment is always the same. First the team is welcomed with aggression, hostility, suspicion, and rejection. Afterwards, the team breaks the ice and creates a communication platform through working with art and culture. When the project is implemented, and local staff trained to proceed on their own, the kids are crying that the AfroReggae team is setting up to leave. Visits usually last one-month and they are likely to become more and more frequent in the future.
It was a big success when we went to India to work with boys who wanted to become human bombs in the Kashmir conflict. Now they don’t want it anymore. It was the Ford Foundation that invited us there. [...] We also worked with difficult youth in schools in London, in Hackney. First, the children would not want to speak to us, but at the end they would cry we were leaving... The professors were warning us to be careful with them, there is no way to work with them... But we found the way! Step by step we managed to conquer them... We have been there for three years now. (Joao Madeira)

Human nature is always the same. People are angry, because nobody cares about them, they are invisible, rejected by the society. They want to show their rage to the outside, by beating, or shooting. We know how to deal with it. Having learnt this aspect of human nature in the favelas of Rio, we can use our knowledge regardless of the language, or culture. [...] Middle-class people often wonder: ‘How am I going to talk to these kinds? They hate me, because I have better clothes than they do, better job, better life...’ We teach them how to approach the kids, how to give classes to them. (Joao Madeira)

Despite being considered innovative and successful, the NGO is very cautious in its plans for growth. The leader Jose Junior clearly states that he does not want his organization to follow the McDonald’s-type expansion strategy, which might initially seem like an attractive solution: the NGO’s experience is that all the children are the same, regardless of culture, language, or ethnicity. The reason for the moderation in growth prospects is that although the method can be practiced elsewhere, it has to be carried out painstakingly, never quickly and superficially. The leaders certainly believe more in quality than quantity.

We operate only in Rio, we don’t want to be like McDonald’s. Often people say: ‘let’s open AfroReggae in Manaus, let’s open in Porto Alegre!’. No, we tell them to come here and learn with us, this is the best way we can spread our method. [...] Our area is Rio, but we don’t keep secrets. (Joao Madeira)

Moreover, given the thorough understanding of the favela reality, AfroReggae has thought various companies, such as Natura and TIM to market their products in favelas. They have the unique knowledge of the communication channels that work in this unusual environment, which until now is virtually impenetrable to the traditional forms of marketing.

Favela has money, and it has many young people who like to look nice, use make up... Why not to sell Natura products there? We taught them and now they sell in Complexo de Alemão and Rocinha.
How to communicate in a favela? Favela is about banners, loudspeakers, cars with speakers, community radio, graffiti... Don’t try to come with newspaper ads... (Joao Madeira)

We taught TIM too. They used to sponsor our shows in the favelas... We organize shows in favelas just like the shows we do down town. We use the same stage, invite the same artists... We have had Marisa Monte, Seu Jorge, Caetano, Gilberto Gil... Every month we have a show in a favela! We don’t want low quality, we want the shows to be just like in Canecao, we would pay with the sponsorship money from TIM and we taught them to sell cell phones in favelas.[...] Now Banco Real will open its branch in Complexo de Alemao. (Joao Madeira)

Criola

The main focus of Criola are the advocacy campaigns and women empowerment. The NGO has been particularly successful with campaigns related to health care issues.

- The main objective of the NGO is empowerment women, black and homosexual population. For this purpose, Criola is now creating an action network comprising of 17 NGOs and women’s associations present in the state of Rio. Criola teaches and encourages women to become politically active in all areas relevant to their well-being, such as security, or education for their children. Organizing within a network will give greater power to the united association, it will enable development of new projects and sharing of know-how. Criola is willing to accept the leadership position within the network and is ready to support creative projects coming from the associated organizations, which alone might lack recognition, managerial experience, or financial resources.

We have an enormous number of partners associated with us, but not partners that copy our work, but partners that act politically with us to reach certain objectives. So it is task that requires to be constantly monitored... We have 17 organizations that work with us permanently, women organizations, so we need to be well-defined politically to reach a concrete result. It is not like other networks in which you adhere to the political objectives, someone pays, you just go to the meetings, that’s it... Here we must monitor the needs of this group, and vice versa, help to develop the political instruments that are needed for the activity... So there are women’s that mobilize our activities, some 200-300 women, but they need the instruments that
would allow this mobilization to really alter the reality in which they live now. (Lucia Xavier)

- The second line of activity of the NGO is to organize advocacy campaigns and events that aim to draw attention to the issues such as racism, sexism, homophobia. The goal of these campaigns is to challenge the often discriminatory discourses and negative attitudes towards the oppressed groups. The NGO also monitors public policy and targets the policies that it considers discriminatory or harmful to the part of the society it represents.

The direct reason for the founding of the organization was to reveal the racist character of female sterilization policy. The phenomenon of female sterilization was virtually absent from the public debate. Not only did Criola manage to draw attention to the evils of this widely spread practice, but the NGO also succeeded in proving that the vast majority of women targeted were black. Since then, the NGO has always been trying to put the spotlight on abuses of the health care service, but it has also matured and expanded considerable its focus and scope of enterprises.

What inaugurated the organization was the monitoring of the sterilization of women policy. This policy that started in the 1980s created the need of an organization that could monitor the sterilization of women. [...] Fertility control has never been an official policy, Brazil never admitted that it wanted to control the birth rates of the black and poor population... but this is how the policy worked: there were organizations that developed actions for this... Organizations that offered services of sterilization, carried out campaigns against having children... It was really the state behind these organizations.[...] It has shaped significantly the population curve in Brazil. What Criola did was to warn the society that sterilization campaign had a racist character, and was oriented against the poor. (Lucia Xavier)

In 1994-5 the changes started... We grew mature enough to understand what kind of political activity we should develop... Before our events were well coordinated, but they were primarily cultural, then the NGO started to have a more political character... We always had a political focus, but only then we really started to decide on public policy, unite women through working with them in the favelas, strengthen the work of educators, work with children and teenagers, rise the questions of gender and race, contribute to the thinking on the racial and sexist issues and its impact on the society... So we
managed to reinforce this political dimension, at the same time keeping our informational character... because Criola has always had this educational perspective for black women. [...] We are now 16 years old and we keep working with these two aspects: empowerment of women and monitoring of politics, and influencing the discourse... (Lucia Xavier)

On top of organizing campaigns to the wider public, Criola has always sought direct dialogue with health care officials and would always attempt to raise the conscience of women directly affected by health care policies. Given the scarcity of health-care-related information available to poor citizens, the needs are overwhelming and the NGO can only access very limited number of females. Nonetheless, being able to make the independent decision on what kind of medical treatment one should or should not undergo is always a life changing issue for those women who are given this opportunity.

The NGO goes beyond providing the basic knowledge concerning health treatments, as the goal has always been to teach the beneficiaries of the programs to understand how the public sector operates: to understand the public budget and the social policies that are of greatest importance to the beneficiaries of the NGO. Having such knowledge is essential for becoming a conscious citizen and for being able to make reasonable electoral choices, or even seek to exercise more direct influence on public officials and demand more provision of social services, or access to citizen rights.

The NGO is also in touch with the police forces to give and receive feedback, and incentivizes ordinary citizens to do the same, as it believes only through the creation of a strong civil society will it be possible to make a lasting change in the quality of people’s lives.

Criola is willing to engage in some projects developed by political parties representing the same line of thinking, but it refrains from declaring electoral support to any political party. The NGO has always defended its autonomy.

We don’t have any link with any political party... and what we ask from parties is exactly the same position. Some of our partners have even taken part in elections, but we put it clear that our network will never help them gain more votes. We can help them strengthen their political activity by teaching them to articulate their vision and defend their objectives, but also to show them that politics is not just about party activity... All our life is political activity] [...] Our agenda is very
progressive, which for many is considered left-wing... We have many positions that are considered radical. (Lucia Xavier)

Criola also gives advice on more pragmatic, day-to-day issues related to the private sphere of life. For instance, how to organize the household budget, or how to resist domestic violence. Despite the enormous problem of brutality of men towards their wives, there are very few entities providing support and legal advice to the victims, and Criola is one of them.

The experience of Criola shows that people have a very vague and weak understanding of racism and discrimination in general. Many people simply assume that certain discriminatory practices are natural social conventions. For instance, many black people choose to straighten their hair without being conscious that their decision might result from the social pressure to live up to the preferred model in order to, for example, get a job. Criola sees it as part of its mission to transform the society through bottom-up rising of awareness, which is seen as the basis for getting rid of racism.

Once we had a very interesting discussion here about hair. People would say: ‘we walk around with any haircut we want... I straighten my hair because that is my choice’... And we told them, no, you probably keep your hair the way the society is expecting you to have it. [Lucia Xavier]

Our mission is to prepare woman to defend themselves against racism, sexism, homophobia... to improve the quality of life of women, because these issues for the majority of women are very actual. So we act united so that women have the tools to deal with social discrimination, poverty, lack of rights, violence they are likely to suffer. [...] We, here, face the same problems, but what makes us different from the majority of women is that we are organized, we have the tools to face these problems. (Lucia Xavier)

One success that the NGO is particularly proud of is the victory in the court case against the production company Sony Music, which released an album of an artist whose lyrics were clearly offensive towards black women. Although the artist has been found innocent in the name of protection of freedom of speech and artistic expression, the company has been found guilty of promoting racist and sexist content. It has been a symbolic victory that helped to shape the standards of the public discourse. The victory would not have been possible if it was not for the social network of Criola, as the court demanded several
organizations to back the cause before it would effectively be considered. Criola immediately mobilized 10 female associations that gave their support.

The action against Sony Music was a big success... Not because it was visible in the media, not at all. But because it was an example of a path of political activity until the achievement of rights... until the recognition that there was discrimination and that a compensation had to be paid. [...] It created the possibility to act in the judicial environment and to succeed. [...] The court had initially said that we alone could not represent all women, and so we gathered ten women’s organizations, six of them of black women, and then our plea was accepted. (Lucia Xavier)

Criola is open to innovative project ideas, yet the process of project planning tends to be a very time-consuming one. Although it happens occasionally that a new project can be designed in a few weeks, it usually takes several months before it is ready. This is primarily due to meager financial resources. New projects are usually prepared in small groups, of 2 people or more, and then revised by the whole team. The leaders then take the final decision whether the project will be launched.

FASE

FASE has made the strategic decision to operate through 2 national programs, developed within two research centers.

• Agro-ecology and Alimentation Security Program (Programa Direito à segurança alimentar, agroecologia e economia solidária).

Program developed through the research center called Sustainable Brazil: Alternatives to Globalization (Núcleo Brasil Sustentável: alternativas à globalização)

The program aims to increase the universal access to healthy food and water for the Brazilian population. FASE believes Brazil should improve its independent strategies of production, distribution, and consumption of food. The program seeks to enrich the political debate on agro-ecology by questioning the current agricultural model oriented towards exporting and profit, which – according to FASE – causes social and environmental damage to the rural population. Instead, FASE promotes solutions
based on the idea of sustainability, biodiversity, and local production-consumption cycles carried out by rural cooperatives.

- **Urban Rights Program** (*Programa Direito à cidade: cidades justas, democráticas e solidárias*)

  Program developed through the research center called Center for Human, Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights (*Núcleo de direitos humanos econômicos, sociais culturais e ambientais*)

  The program is oriented towards actions that combat the urban inequalities, through enforcing the rights of people living in the peripheries of Brazilian cities. It encompasses both direct local actions, as well as participation in various national forums and debates focused on the quality of life of urban poor. FASE is also the seed of the National Forum for Urban Reform, which is divided into three areas:

  a) Urban rights advocacy – elaboration and promotion, through advocacy and lobbying, of public policies that would guarantee universal access to social services, such as water treatment, housing, employment, etc.

  b) Democratization of urban management – development of methods for monitoring public policy that can be used by local actors, which would increase their participation in the shaping of public policy and strengthen the interaction between the public sector and the society in the governance process.

  c) Culture and Identity as stimulants for new form of urban social cohesion – promotion of artistic and cultural expression as means for strengthening local leadership, youth empowerment, and gender sensibility.

  *I think if you consider the method of working of FASE, it is neither one or the other [service delivery and advocacy]. Our work always has, what we call, educational dimension. Based on the tradition of popular education that dates back to the 1960s, it attempts to give tools, and empower the popular groups, to claim from the public administration certain policies... But it is not advocacy aimed at the general public. It is a process that involves a bit of everything, for example the National Program for Agro-ecology will develop the capacity of rural workers to adopt new technologies, but it is never disconnected from putting pressure on the state to implement policies*
that strengthen family agriculture... It is a set of actions... We are certainly not an organization of social assistance in its traditional meaning. [...] But we are also not just an advocacy organization either. We simply seek to give answers to the immediate needs of the social groups with which we work. (Jorge Durao)

FASE acts nationwide, through its six regional branches: Pará, Pernambuco, Mato Grosso, Bahia, Espírito Santo and Rio de Janeiro. The branches have the autonomy to develop their projects in accordance with the local reality – as long as they correspond to the two national programs.

FASE develops tri-annual institutional plans, which contain the description of projects to be implemented in the forthcoming period. The inherent complexity of incentives undertaken is a managerial challenge, as the plan has to be constantly revisited – to reach an integrated and coherent whole, and to avoid inefficiencies. The plan often has to be divided into smaller units, which are then presented on their own to attract any missing funds.

We prepare our tri-annual institutional plan in a uniform way, for the agencies of international cooperation that finance us. But generally this financing is not enough, and so we have to fill the holes and we present parts of this plan to other financiers. And then we have to re-do what we had done within a new format. (Jorge Durao)

On top of that, every branch prepares annual operational plans for the forthcoming year and evaluation of the past year, and a briefing – twice a year.

Apart from strategic revision of our planning every three years, each unit prepares annual operational plan, later on, every six month, they prepare a monitoring report, and end the end of each year an evaluation report. With the basis on this evaluation report, they prepare the operational plan for the forthcoming year. (Jorge Durao)

Project planning is well institutionalized, since the donors are becoming more and more rigid in their demands for structured project plans. Moreover, each donor requires a different format, and the smallest mistake in form-filling can result in failure meaning immediate rejection of a project – which further complicates the task of preparation of project plans.

There are no fixed rules [for project planning]. There is no improvisation either, as it is a process that is now well
institutionalized, with monitoring, evaluations... [...] For us, there is a certain contradiction: projects are prepared not just to organize action, but also to obtain funding. The tendency of donors is of increasing rigidity in formalization of project formulation. This rigidity is not, let’s say, an institutional choice of FASE... but we deal with the European Union, with some fifteen, twenty organizations of international cooperation, with institutions of the Brazilian government... in each case we deal with different kind of rigidity, which is always present in the preparation of projects... One day we did an excellent project that went to trash bin, because those who prepared it [made a small mistake in form filling]. It was a disaster, but it happens. (Jorge Durao)

One of the key lessons from past is that micro-projects, with very limited scope and isolated from a broader context tend to result in failure. There are no quick-fix solutions to complex problems and this approach is bound to be disappointing.

Initially, in the first years of FASE, the organization realized thousands of small economic projects, that in general were a total failure. Because FASE hadn’t developed this methodology of work in which we seek interventions on multiple dimensions. It is not enough to deal with the economic questions. These initial projects involved groups of family agriculture... These were project that did not take into account commercialization, violence against these groups. [...] These were isolated projects that on their own couldn’t solve anything. This economic perspectives led to the experience of frustration. (Jorge Durao)

The relationship with the donors in project preparation and implementation is rather passive. Projects come first, they are not adjusted to the specific wishes of financiers. As such, often they must be given up, if there is too much discrepancies between the desires of the NGO and its financiers.

In the execution of the projects, the financiers don’t intervene. I think the power of donors is implicit in the choice of areas, priorities that they wants to finance. But sometimes there are certain pressures from the donors that we evaluate whether we can accept them. [...] In general, we are open to discuss new questions raised by the financiers... but being open for discussion does not mean accepting anything they want. For example, we have had many tensions related to the so-called corporate social responsibility. Because in general we see CSR as a marketing strategy, and due to our involvement in undermining the current development model, we got into conflict of
interests with many companies. And sometimes the financiers want to create a policy so wide, that it ends up being like lighting a candle for the God and another for the devil, which is not possible! But there are other issues, such as free trade, which is polemic topic. But there are agencies that have different views on this than we do, and they finance us. Other agencies are more imposing to the extent that we are not interested in accepting resources from these agencies. (Jorge Durao)

IBASE

Ibase does not work with any kind of social assistance projects, as it believes it is the role of the government to provide social services. Instead, it focuses heavily on advocacy. There are multiple projects operating at present, which target various aspects of public life in Brazil, here are just some examples of them:

- Citizenship Watch – project started in 1996 as a part of a network present in over 80 countries. Its goal is to monitor the public policy in order to promote racial and gender equality, and to get rid of poverty. There are reports published every year that target the abuses of power and neglect on the part of the public sector. Ibase is the executive coordinator of the project in which there are over 40 participating organizations (including Criola). The most recent task of the project is to monitor the government scheme for favela development Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC).

- People’s dialogue – the idea behind this project is to create a movement of resistance to the global capitalist hegemony. The dialogue is often called South-South, as its main participants are Latin America and Africa. The ultimate goal is to promote alternative model of development, one that would be based on high ethical standards, respect for diversity, and sustainability.

- Security and independence in alimentation – project aims at strengthening social actors that monitor the situation of food production and consumption in Brazil, in order to make sure that the cycle is beneficial to the Brazilian society, and not to private groups of interest.
One of the founding ideals of Ibase was to opt for democracy as a method for social transformation. [...] So what does it mean today? I say that the mission of Ibase today is to contribute to the new wave of democratization of Brazil, that goes beyond institutionalization. Because what we managed when we were facing the dictatorship was to put an end to the legality of the authoritarian regime and to create the constitution, the state based on participation... but this is not enough. The new wave would be how to subject the economy to democracy, what does that imply, how to shift the power of the economy. Of course, we continue with the ideals of equality, social justice with the dimension of diversity and the necessity to diversify to reach a sustainable society. (Candido Grzybowski)

In history, the event that really marked the position of Ibase on the scene of civil society was the Land and Democracy campaign.

The first great mark of Ibase was the campaign for agrarian reform. There were fights, but nobody was rising the flag of agrarian reform. [...] Betinho said we needed to take the campaign to the streets. In 1983 the campaign was launched, and it had an impact as in 1985 a ministry was created based on the people involved in the campaign. [...] In 1991 and 1992 Ibase organized a campaign Land and Democracy (Terra e Democracia), with an event that gathered over 100.000 people in Flamengo... Betinho called them, by saying: we won’t face the question of land reform if the urban population does not recognize that the land issue is a question of democracy for the Brazilian society, not a question of an independent movement. (Candido Grzybowski)

The most outstanding project of the recent history is probably the World Social Forum. It has been developed with 7 other partners, yet it would certainly not be possible without the participation of Ibase, which provided majority of financing and developed the methodology for the organization of the enterprise. The first such event took place in the year 2000 in Porto Alegre. The goal is to foster global citizenship in the fight against neo-liberalism. The point of departure is the belief that ‘another world is possible’. It has contributed greatly to the international recognition of civil society as an import actor in global issues.

Without the renown of Ibase, it would not have been possible to obtain financing for the enterprise. Ibase was bold enough to take up the innovative idea and to convince donor agencies to support the cause in its early stage. Oxfam agreed to provide 300.000 dollars before there was any clear vision of what the event should look like.
I took an important role in providing the resources [for the World Social Forum], until today I am in the resource committee, as well as in the one for methodology. [...] Nobody wanted to believe in it, nobody. I wrote the project, I went after the financing, I convinced the donors... I went to Oxfam and they gave me three hundred thousand euro. But they asked me: ‘So what is it that I’m financing here?’, and I replied ‘Do you believe or not in the things that Ibase does? So give me the money, bet on me...’ And they did. And it was vital, otherwise we would depend too much on the government. (Candido Grzybowski)

Good ideas are financeable. We only don’t manage to finance what is not a good idea, for good ideas there will always be money. So the problem is not money: the problem is to take the risk. (Candido Grzybowski)

It was the first major event in the world advertised almost exclusively online. It was planned for 3,000 participants, yet the actual number was as high as 12,000. It was a response to the economic forum in Davos, but the reality faced was quite different from the one in Switzerland. While the economic forum had the entrance fee of few thousand dollars, the Social Forum required only 10$. The latter was also a much bigger event.

The negotiations with politicians were particularly problematic, as the parties were trying to take over the control of the Forum in exchange for their support, while Ibase fought – successfully – to preserve the independence of the event. It is a recurring theme with donors that they expect unconditional backing and control over the NGOs and actions they finance, but Ibase has always maintained its autonomy. The principle is of equality: there are no heroes, no central actors, all opinions are of equal value. The only demand is to observe the basic code of conduct, such as non-violent behavior.

There are also logistic issues. It is not possible to manage the flow of the masses of people that attend the Forums, but it is important to minimize the chaos.

Nowadays there are the main Forums held every few years, as well as numerous smaller events organized worldwide. The event has grown too big to stay centralized. The organizers are only able to plan some central events, while the visitors take the opportunity to create countless projects and debates of their own organized around the main Forum. Another aspect of the decentralization is that even the ideas for the main events come primarily from the participants, and not from the organizers.
It was possible to attract many central players in the world politics, Presidents Lula and Evo Morales – before they won their offices, and Hugo Chavez when he was already holding power.

The next edition of the Social Forum will take place in 2011 in Dakar.

[The negotiations over the organization of the first World Social Forum] were difficult. PT tried to control the Forum. It was an open fight. Their conception was that if the government helps, it controls. It was difficult... But at the end it came out right. We were expecting three thousand people, double of Davos [World Economic Forum]... The surprise was that in January the thing went off, we had twelve thousand participants registered. [...] And we were doing one event, not a series. But it made people say: ‘We need to do another one!’... We ended up doing 2002, 2003, etc... It is difficult to organize for social movements, Davos is easy, because everyone has money and there is few of them. The entrance there costs twenty thousand dollars. Our registration in Porto Alegre was ten dollars. And we cannot charge more, there are some who don’t manage to pay this. Then we decided that to really make it a World Forum, we would have to travel, but this we only managed in 2004. Before that we had some regional forums, in Europe first in Florence, then Americas... But we moved the central event to India, Mumbai in 2004. But year later we came back to Porto Alegre. In 2006 we were going to go to Africa, but they replied they were not prepared yet. So we did a three-part event: Venezuela, Mali, Pakistan. Only in 2007 we managed in Nairobi. It was good, but problematic... Nowadays there are many forums around the world that we have initiated... In 2011 it will be in Dakar, Senegal. [...] (Candido Grzybowski)

The long-term future of the Forum is unknown, but it has certainly created a new quality for the political culture, civil society, and global citizenship. It has provided new dynamism, perspective, methods, and hope. It has cleared the path for many new initiatives in the future. It is a great opportunity for young people to express themselves on political issues, without having to participate in often despised political parties. The Forum is crucial for the understanding the political culture of Latin America, and more and more for the world public opinion.

While some projects are somewhat abstract, other ones are more reactionary – for instance, the struggle for transparency in the public sector. Ibase has largely contributed to the transparency of the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES, that now displays a full financial
statement online, which was not the case in the past. The struggle for its transparency nonetheless continues.

> We have a project on BNDES, on its transparency, etc. [...] Why the bank does not finance entities like ours? Not just Ibase, but others, which have problems as their cooperation is ending. And here is the debate: is it one thing or another? No, it’s not either one or another. The bank should be transparent, it should finance us, it should be public... So this is the struggle. The same thing with Petrobras. Some say that either you receive financing from Petrobras, or you criticize Petrobras... and I say: no. I only accept money if it is clear that if I want to criticize, I will criticize. (Candido Grzybowski)

The most criticized area of Ibase activity is the one oriented at monitoring and promoting corporate social responsibility. Many companies are willing to get involved in order to use this fact as a marketing tool, rather than for making a positive social impact.

Most ideas for projects come from the directors. Firstly, because they consider it as their duty to provide the guidance, but also because they are the only ones who can mobilize financial resources for the projects and know best what kind of actions can be financed.

Once the basic idea has come from the directors, the directors then try to find a donor that can finance the project. Afterwards, the team has to provide detailed framework for the development of the project. There is a detailed evaluation carried out every two months. The projects in implementation are constantly revisited and the necessary adjustments are made on the spot.

One interesting pattern is that the NGO does not develop projects in detail unless it has secured funding for them. While the project is already running, Ibase is always ready to revisit and fix it if necessary.

> Normally, to elaborate the project in detail, we must have the certainty that someone will finance it. It might still take time and negotiations... We don’t take planning as a formal act, but as a point of departure. Because there might happen things to which we will have to adapt. One has to be open to the challenges that appear. (Candido Grzybowski)

When necessary, Ibase seeks advice from other institutions. For instance, it consulted an advertising agency how to best organize a campaign against racism. The point of departure
was the disparity between the low level of Brazilians who consider themselves racist, and the high level of perceived racism. The campaign was entitled: ‘Where do you keep your racism?’

When Ibase decided to hire a person with experience in management of large project, they opted for a retired BNDES manager who had a unique know-how and introduced truly professional culture of work. It gave the NGO a comparative advantage over other third sector institutions as far as organization of big-scale enterprises is concerned.

*We have adopted a culture in which everything is defined with operation details, with schedule. It is the only way not to confuse militancy with technical capacity. How to combine the both? Alone, both technical capacity and militancy are a problem. We need people to get involved, but we need them to be competent. So we prepare the schedules [...] that is monitored by the team every two months. We have a culture of internal monitoring. [...] It started when we committed ourselves to organize large projects. To monitor public policy, for example, we created a team of sixty people, and Ibase used be five-six people. We hired a person who knew how to manage this and he brought this project culture, Sebastian Soares, who was our associate and a retired manager from BNDES. [...] This culture was introduced at the end of the 1990s.(Candido Grzybowski)*
3.3.2 Internal Management

AfroReggae

Figure 8. Structure of Afroreggae

1. Centers
2. Social Coordination
3. Artistic Directors
4. Coordination of Special Projects
5. Communication
6. Administration
7. Institutional Relations
8. International Relations
9. Government Public Relations
10. Coordination of Projects
11. Production
12. Human Resources
13. Supplements
14. Accounting - expenses
15. Accounting - revenues
16. Reception
17. Legal Department
18. Project Management
19. R&D of Projects
20. Accountability
21. Field Coordination
22. Vigario Geral
23. Parada de Lucas
24. Cantagalo
25. Complexo de Alemão
26. Nova Era
It is beyond any doubt that AfroReggae would not have become what it is without its charismatic leader, Jose Junior. He spent several years working voluntarily, despite his uneasy financial situation. His hope *contra spe* was the critical factor for the creation of the NGO and for its development to the present form. Moreover, as the organization grew, Junior was able to establish democratic governance. He is open to critique and does not let his charisma to result in autocratic domination.

Below the leader, there are two directors. Then, there is the managing committee made of AfroReggae employees – the executive coordination. Decisions are made democratically, through consensus or voting if necessary. In case of conflict of impasse, the last word belongs to the leader.

Some 60% of time of the board of directors is dedicated to internal management, and 40% to the contacts with the outside world.

*The decisions are made by the managing committee... and of course with the executive coordinators is the leader of the committee. He suggest, discusses the questions that are presented to the committee... It is democratic, even though Junior is a very charismatic leader, as it is seen from the outside too, not just internally... So, let’s say, he has a very influential power, but he listens a lot. Sometimes he would have a preconceived idea, and he would then improve it by hearing other people’s opinions.*

[...] *We don’t call him ‘president’, here we have the executive coordinator. The executive coordinator obviously has more power than the others, normally he gives the final word, ‘hits the hummer’ to confirm the final decision... It might be uniquely his idea, but usually it is an idea that he has discussed with others.* (Joao Madeira)

Each unit has a coordinator. For instance, there is a coordinator for each of the five centers in the favelas, every new project has a coordinator, every music band has a coordinator. After a project is completed, its coordinator is moved to another task.

There are currently some 250 working for AfroReggae, all formally registered. Most of them, around 70%, are recruited from the favelas. They know this reality much better than outsiders, as they already have their social networks and recognition in their favela. Hence,
the process of adaptation is usually much faster for new employees from favelas, as compared with outsiders. When an outsider is employed, it takes a long time not only for him to get familiar with the setting, but also for the favela people to trust him or her. The fact that the majority of AfroReggae employees come from the favela is also important for the institution’s authenticity and adherence to the mission.

*We receive may offers from people from the localities we work in... This is very good, because who lives there values our work, they know the reality better than anyone who would go there. If it was a foreigner, he would want to manage, govern our projects... no, we give priority to the people who are in the communities and who have the education we need. Only if we don’t find anyone suitable, we look for outsiders... But the priority is for those who live there... and they give more legitimacy to our work.*

[...]The community has to get to know them [outsiders], while the locals already know the noises, the movements... Outsiders need more time, learn it all, to 'get lose', to become known, to get used to the daily routine... When outsiders come to work here [the downtown office] it is normal, they don’t need this special care... But there [in favelas] they need it.(Joao Madeira)

It is a dream of most kids – beneficiaries of AfroReggae – to become a coordinator in the future. It is not only a source of income, but also of dignity, an alternative to drug trafficking, which traditionally has been the only option readily available.

Many coordinators are former drug traffickers. Some decided to quit the life of criminality voluntarily, some others have served prison sentences and joined AfroReggae upon their release.

There is always a great demand for AfroReggae jobs, so the NGO has no shortage of human capital. The first part of recruitment is carried out by the Human Resources department. The second part is the interview with the coordinator of the center in which the potential employee would be based. There is a database that stores all the profiles of people who have applied to the NGO, so that they can be called if their particular skills are needed.

The NGO is reluctant towards working with volunteers, as they have proven not to be reliable and their unexpected absence would often cause a distress. The only exception is
when the volunteers come to share their knowledge and their commitment is very short and pre-determined.

Many people offer to work as volunteers... We don’t work with volunteers, because volunteers in a organization like ours, especially working in a favela, cause a dependency for the kids who would like him... And suddenly they can come and say: ‘Look, I won’t come any more’. There are no established rules, no commitment, no contract. And we saw it was not doing any good. It was good when they were there, but the majority would leave immediately, after a day or two... And it is not possible to find a substitute from one day to another. We came to the conclusion that it was not a good solution... But maybe if someone wants to give a lecture, or give a course of two-days duration: music, dance, theatre... These courses are usually for the employees, not for students. This happens a lot. (Joao Madeira)

So far, AfroReggae works with fixed salary scheme, but it is planning on implementing a performance-based system of remuneration for some of its employees.

We have not come yet to a variable salary... yet. They are all fixed, so far! But we are preparing to have salaries with a part that depends on the function of performance, objectives reached... [...] Because it’s common to have exceptional performance! We are getting ready to reward it. [...] External consulting is important especially now, that we have IBMEC. One of the matters we work on is the management of human resources and various salary schemes: fixed, varying, depending on the performance, objectives-oriented... For this very reason we have specific courses on the issue. (Joao Madeira)

It is clear that the primary stakeholder are the beneficiaries. Various factors account for this healthy and comfortable situation. Perhaps the size and recognition of the NGO allows for being independent from donor or government pressures. Given the tough competition for being employed at AfroReggae, the directors do not need to worry about excessive pressures from the staff either. The media do not really dare to criticize the NGO, as there is no other organization that could match AfroReggae’s incredible history and innovativeness.

Our clients are the kids whose lives we want to transform... We work with the government, and donors, but we don’t work for them, we work for the youth. The only clients are the kids. (Joao Madeira)

Donors visit the projects regularly, either for formal reasons or out of sheer curiosity, but they do not interfere whatsoever in the way projects are carried out.
Criola

1. Black Women’s Health
2. Culture, Work, Income
3. Human Rights
4. Politics
5. Information Proliferation
6. General vision

There are 5 people in the deliberative council: two directors, two coordinators of Criola, and one associate. The executive council is formed of two directors, one of them being a founder of the NGO.

The division of functions is very flexible, mainly due to the small size of the organization. This is both an advantage, as well as a disadvantage. Initially there was a clear labor division by areas of operation, yet it resulted in a very narrow focus of the employees’ interest and knowledge. In order to enhance communication and flexibility of actions, the decision was made to free the staff from rigidly assigned tasks. Despite the lowered level of specialization, it has been a positive move.

*Initially we were divided by areas... so some of us would work with female health care, some with children and teenagers, some with culture... So we were very ‘closed’ into these areas. Who spoke of...*
female health care, wouldn’t speak about child care, who worked
with black culture, would only speak about the Afro-Brazilian culture,
and not culture in general.[...] So we realized it was limiting for us, we
need a more integrated vision. All of us should be familiar with all the
areas, even if it is means less specialization. Later on we started to
focus on action lines, each of us would be focused on some area, but
without forgetting the rest of the organization. So for instance, I
speak about health, about income generation, but my area is human
rights... and vice-versa. [...] It was necessary to do this. (Lucia Xavier)

The bad thing about it [flexibility of functions] is that there is too
much democracy for very limited situations. For example, when you
are managing a project and you think that what should have been
done in February will be done in April, you can say: ‘Look, I won’t
manage, it’s too little time’. You have this liberty. You can explain it to
them team... For me it shouldn’t be like this... Because it is changing
the rules of the project and many times it cannot be negotiated. I
can’t tell the donors: ‘You remember the project that was supposed to
last one and a half year? So it will take two years!’ . It doesn’t work.
Sometimes I even say this and they agree with me, but sometimes
they don’t. [...] It gives a headache. (Lucia Xavier)

In fact, the main highlight of Criola’s system of management is that all staff members have a
thorough knowledge of the projects they work with, as well as extensive knowledge of other
projects and all issues relevant to the functioning of Criola. It results from the flexibility and
interchangeability of employee functions. In consequence, people usually have the capacity
to manage their projects on their own, and they can be moved to any other project that is
currently under way without causing major disruption.

Criola has some difficulties in finding the right human capital that could make part of the
organization. Firstly, people with high qualifications rarely accept to work in an NGO, as the
salaries offered are not always competitive with the market ones. This is particularly visible
in the IT area and in consequence it is difficult to make the best use out of new technologies.
Secondly, Criola does not accept to work with people whose political views differ from the
mindset of the current team. It is often the case that a newly employed person must be
fired, as the ideological disparities become obvious only after a certain period of time.
Thirdly, employees of Criola must be especially sensitive towards the beneficiaries, which are
bound to lack self-confidence and therefore get upset easily. New staff members are
expected to adapt immediately to this unusual working environment and many do not succeed.

Given this complexity of the employee profile, Criola activates various recruitment channels. Although priority is given to recommendations and informal connections, it is often necessary to advertise the job offers in the media.

Salaries are fixed, and they can get increased if new financial resources are obtained. An exception would be a commission on newly raised funds by an employee. Criola regards the salaries not as administrative costs, but as project costs, as virtually all employees are involved in the implementation of projects.

Criola also works with volunteers and has had mixed experiences with them. It is hard to give a general opinion on the volunteer performance, as it depends heavily on the characteristics of each individual volunteer, there is no prevailing pattern.

We work with volunteers... We have had good and bad experiences with them... They often do very interesting things, but they often don’t understand that their work must be regular. Coming only when one has time cannot work. Many say: ‘I have only few hours a week, between one class and another’... No, like this it’s impossible. (Lucia Xavier)
Figure 10. Structure of FASE

1. Communication
2. Small projects support unit
3. Planning unit
4. Center Sustainable Brazil – Alternatives to Globalization
5. Center Human, Economic, Social, Cultural, Environmental Rights
6. Administration
7. Amazon
8. Pernambuco
9. Bahia
10. Espiritu Santo
11. Mato Grosso
12. Rio de Janeiro
The key decisions on new projects are taken by the board of directors, yet the regional branches have the autonomy to develop their own projects, as long as they are in accordance with the institutional plan.

The main role of the director, in his view, is political coordination. Therefore, it is a great challenge for the director to remain ‘impersonal’ – his decisions should be primarily in accordance with the institutional objectives and priorities, and not with his personal preferences. This is a clearly different approach than the one favored in Ibase, where the working of the NGO does depend directly on personal preferences of the director and the team does not have such a large degree of freedom. In FASE the employees are much more encouraged to be creative and to think independently. Both approaches obviously have some advantages and disadvantages.

[The role of the director] is one of political coordination. It is important to ensure a certain normative. Like in the public administration, there must be the principle of impersonality. In my job, I cannot be identified as someone who has a preference for one program at the expense of the other. And I think I have a certain responsibility to guarantee institutional reproduction. [...] It is also my job to insist that there is a deadline to make some decisions, or else the life of FASE will be threatened. This is not very difficult, because here there is a huge collective involvement with the projects of FASE...

(Jorge Durao)

The second most important function of the FASE director is to ensure ‘institutional reproduction’. Long-term and pragmatic thinking is necessary to ensure longevity, and the directors of this NGO have doubtlessly succeeded on this front, as the organization exists since 1961.

Minor decisions are taken democratically by the team, while decisions on major or difficult issues are taken by the three executive directors. The objective is to reach a consensus, and avoid voting, which is the solution of last resort.

There are situations in which the majority wants the directors to decide, Sophie’s choices... For example, when you have a budget deficit, you have to cut on something... It is not really viable to make this kind of decisions in a wide collective. Somebody has to take the responsibility. [...] Imagine the team deciding who is going to leave
In order to keep track of the macro-strategy, there is the body called National Executive Coordination. It is a council with directors, managers, coordinators of the regional branches, comprising of some 15 people. The NES meets twice a year.

The directors have had to put a lot of effort into enhancing horizontal channels of communication, as the information exchange within departments was far from perfect. There are now regular meetings within project departments, which has greatly alleviated the decision-making burdens of the directors. Nonetheless, all employees participate in monthly meetings with the directors, in which they are expected to give accounts of their actions and to receive the current directives. There are also extra meetings when necessary.

The headquarters of the NGO are in Rio de Janeiro, and the communication with the regional branches is very well organized. The dispersion of the branches around the country used to be a managerial nightmare, but after a great deal of effort there is now a well-functioning system based on centralization, through an online network. The online centralization has proven particularly useful in the areas of finance and accounting. The system now allows for transparency of the financial situation and for efficiency in decision making. This digital model of financial control is without any doubt advisable to be adopted by any NGO with a high degree of complexity.

We have what we call here centralized administration, let me explain what it is... Accounting is located here in Rio. We have adopted a software for this. When a cheque is issued, it is automatically accounted for. When a payment form is issued for a bank, it is issued simultaneously for the accounting department. [...] It allows to have a system of financial control that is virtually online. [...] So the system we have adopted is I think adequate for any non-governmental organization with a high degree of complexity... Our donors recognize the transparency of the financial management of FASE, they believe in our accountability. (Jorge Durao)

The emphasis on transparency is appreciated by the donors and partners. The audits findings are published in important newspapers and also available online.

There are no fixed rules for employee recruitment. Given the recognition of the NGO, there is an abundance of good quality human capital. The human resources strategy that is
necessary and likely to be expanded in the future is a meeting for new employees for centralized seminars and training.

[Training for new employees] is done through practice. We used to have encounters for new technicians, thing I would like to start doing again. Because the problem is... a new person enters to work in FASE Pernambuco in the urban program. This person lacks an integrated vision of FASE. (Jorge Durao)

FASE does not work with volunteers, but it does accepted committed interns. Given the amount of high-class human capital willing to work with FASE, there is no need to accept volunteers, which do not have any serious commitment with the organization, and therefore are not very reliable.

Every three years, FASE organizes external institutional evaluation to bring a fresh perspective and new ideas. Various individuals and institutions, both national and international, are invited to carry out their analyses.

For example, our last evaluation was done by a Peruvian Eduardo Bayon, from a well-know NGO from Lima, this evaluation was financed by two Dutch agencies, and it had a part related to gender and working with women, that was carried out by a Professor from UFRJ, specialist in gender issues... So we presented it, and our financiers agreed. [...] [The choice of consultants] depends on the aspect that we want to emphasize in the evaluation. (Jorge Durao)
Although the NGO is effectively managed by the board of directors, the associates and the monitoring council play a very important role and bear huge responsibility.

*These hundred-and-twenty [associates] are volunteers. And they elect among themselves the monitoring council, which, legally, is more responsible than we are. If we were sued, it would be them who would have to defend themselves in the court. Because they delegate the powers to us [directors].* (Candido Grzybowski)

Since the leadership has been taken over by Mr. Candido Grzybowski, Ibase has been paying more attention to the managerial issues. Betinho charisma and ability to mobilize masses for
spontaneous actions can hardly be matched, but as the institution has become more mature, it was necessary to focus more on the mundane reality of everyday management.

Mister Candido Grzybowski, the director of Ibase, believes in powerful, centralized leadership. As director, he has the greatest commitment and responsibility among the Ibase staff. He is often criticized for exercising too much control over the organization, but he nonetheless believes it is the best way of managing the organization.

*Today we don’t have so spectacular actions, it’s not in the same way… Because Betinho was a very charismatic figure… Today our activities are more collective, more institutionalized. [...] The difference between me and Betinho is that I take up a lot of management. I go less to the outside than he did, but I accept great responsibility. Another different type of a director is Jorge Eduardo from FASE: he lets the organization go with the flow, I don’t. He knows how to tackle problems, take the final decisions, but he lets it flow much more than I do. That’s why often they see me as someone who ‘runs over’ things. (Candido Grzybowski)*

*I am accused of being very centralizing here. Some others will say it is fundamental to have this type of direction. [...] I am not a director that lets the institution go with the flow. It think it is essential to have clarity in house. Director must be able to decide where do we go… It is better to make a wrong decision than not to take any. So it’s heavy, stressful. (Candido Grzybowski)*

Another function of the director is to be the ambassador, the representative of the NGO. He is often invited to events worldwide, but he understands that he is there to represent the NGO, and not himself. Hence, it is important to reflect on the image of the organization that he is trying to convey. His agenda is very tight, time management is essential. It involves contacts with all sorts of people, from presidents to the most humble members of the society.

There is a deliberative council that includes the directors, and project coordinators. This body meets regularly to revisit short- and long-term strategy.

The stakeholders hierarchy is complex. There are at least four groups of direct interest in the NGO: its employees, its donors, the associates, and the beneficiaries.
The associates are called ‘Amigos de Ibase’ and they are both a source of legitimacy and financial resources for the NGO. There is about 1,100 of them. Majority of them are employees of the public sector companies. They are encouraged to participate actively in the life of Ibase and to bring new ideas for projects.

Beneficiaries are often understood as the society in general, as in campaigns against racism for instance. However, in case of local projects, it is easy to determine which community is particularly benefited. There is a meeting called Ibase Platform organized every three years oriented precisely at dialogue with the stakeholders of the NGO.

*We wanted the program Amigos de Ibase to bring people’s support to Ibase. Because the agencies that financed us cared about it. [...] First we managed to mobilize many employees of public companies: Banco do Brasil, Caixa, Petrobras... Today we have one thousand and a hundred, almost all from this area. It took ten years to create it. It gives little money, sure. But it gives primarily legitimacy, as it costs us more than they give: brochures, materials... But politically it is worth a lot. We would like to expand it. [...] We would like to include as our friends all those who have any relationship with us. [...] I think it is an innovation among NGOs. (Candido Grzybowski)*

*There are different stakeholders. There are associates, beneficiaries, employees, donors, and among the donors there are various differences. Ibase has one thousand and a hundred individual donors. We call them ‘friends of Ibase’. There are also the cooperation agencies, there are public companies that give us money, and sometimes there are relations with the government, governmental agencies. And those who benefit from the activities are very heterogeneous – for example, how can we define the millions that have seen the campaign against racism? We did it in the name of the black people, but at the same time it is the society that benefits from greater justice and equality – so it’s a type of beneficiaries. The magazine that we publish, it goes to opinion setters: ministries, politicians, judges, lawyers, leaders of entities and movements, journalists... They are beneficiaries of course, but really it is the society again. So it is very varied. In local development it is very clear who is the beneficiary, but it is not always like this. In one project we can say the population of the favela Manguinhos is the beneficiary. But we want the society to benefit. So there this whole universe. (Candido Grzybowski)*

*When I entered, I thought Ibase should discuss with all its different partners: financiers, movements that we work with, other entities,*
associates...well gather them all for a forum... of course not all of them come, but the representatives come. So we organized the fist platform in 1993, then after Betinho’s death in 1997, then we decided to have it every three years: 2000, 2003, 2006... It’s an event for a hindered, a hundred-and-twenty people. Twenty from Ibase, the others are all invited. Various international networks: Indians, Africans, Europeans, Arabs, Latin-Americans... It is a space to discuss together [...] the challenges and where do we go. This September we are expecting some one hundred people, from Ibase and from the outside, who will discuss for three days.(Candido Grzybowski)

Most salaries are fixed, only project coordinators and directors can receive bonuses for exceptional performance. The minimal salary is of 1.200 R$. There are rigid rules concerning the requirements for promotion, and the ladder of posts is also clearly structured. On top of the salary, the employees receive also health care plan, transport and food vouchers. There is also a self-improvement program, described in more detail in the next section. Employees with children also receive support for school fees.

[Recruitment] is dominated by indications. So we organize a committee here and select. Our employees have always the priority for new posts, so it is very rare for us to publish vacancies. If we do, we publish offers at universities, other NGOs, website... but it’s not very open. (Candido Grzybowski)

It don’t do it much [training for new employees]. Normally the person is oriented by the one who is going to coordinate him or her. If it’s a coordinator, which is rare for a coordinator to change, it is the directors who introduce him. What we do have is education and improvement program. Who wants to do languages, Masters, PhD... has support from us: flexible hours, financial support. We have a program for children that go from kindergarten, from six months old until fourteen years old, it is a fixed support for those who want to use it, for all children. There is this law that entities like ours should help in education, but it has never been regularized. But we practice it. (Candido Grzybowski)

We have had little experience with volunteers. The only volunteers that we work with are international collaborators, which actually have some remuneration from abroad. This experience has actually been very good. They come for a long period and they are treated as if they were a part of the Ibase team. They are usually young, with different perspectives. But we don’t have typical, local volunteers, we have never found a solution for this. (Candido Grzybowski)
One dilemma that ought yet to be resolved is how to best reach the right balance between militancy and professionalism.

*Our challenge is how to be militant and professional at the same time. How to do things well, as sometimes the excuse of being militant is used for not doing things well. It is our weakness and a part of the culture of the world of NGOs... commitment itself justifies even the mistakes. [...] Here are speak of three ‘C’: commitment, competence, creativity. But we have a problem here...* (Candido Grzybowski)
3.3.3 Knowledge Management

AfroReggae

After 2 years of preparation, AfroReggae has launched a course ‘Afro-capacitar’ with the private business university IBMEC. The course is centered around AfroReggae, and students try to learn technique of social entrepreneurship inspired by the way in which the NGO operates. The course is designed for people from various social classes and backgrounds, united by the desire to make a social change.

There a strong network of practice, a formal forum for cooperation and knowledge exchange, formed by four NGOs from Rio. It is called F4 and its members are AfroReggae, Cufa, Nos do Morro, and Observatorio das Marres. There are regular formal meetings and countless informal ones. Many projects are developed in cooperation between these subjects.

We have formal [network cooperation]. There are four organizations, we call them F4, Favela4: AfroReggae, a Cufa, Nos do Morro, and Observatorio das Marres. These are four quite well-known NGOs from Rio and we exchange a lot of knowledge, we have many meetings, formal and informal, partnership... So this is a formal forum of knowledge exchange. And we have informal ones with other organizations that get in touch with us to see how we operate, kind of... benchmarking. They look for us thinking that we are the best. So we share, and see that they too have many things that we didn’t know... So this is the informal part.

Our recent partnership project is with Cufa... We work in Bangu with the prisoners, men and women, and we try to bring culture to them... Theatre, music, dance, percussion... (Joao Madeira).

AfroReggae also receives frequent visits from leading universities from USA. It is a sign of growing international recognition that the NGO does not initiate the international relations, it is always sought and invited by foreign institutions.

AfroReggae keeps no secrets and is willing to share all of its know-how with all interested NGOs. Representatives from other institutions are welcome to come and learn, without any costs, and they often do. The only exception in which AfroReggae does charge is when its staff is contracted to provide consultancy and training services in far away locations.
Its staff is encouraged to give public lectures to various audiences from a wide scope of institutions, universities, and high schools. There is huge and rapidly growing interest in AfroReggae, which shows how great is the demand for innovation in social entrepreneurship.

_We share our knowledge a lot... Many people exchange emails, come here personally, they often say: 'I want AfroReggae in my city'... We have loads of such offers, also from other countries. We don't accept them, AfroReggae is only in Rio de Janeiro. So what do we do? We invite people to come and see us in Rio de Janeiro, to visit the favelas and see how we work, to see what we call 'our social technology'. They can stay here as many days as they want... [...] When they go back they call us: 'I need you to help me start the office, I need you to give a lecture, to do a workshop...' So we go there and do it. Only that when we travel we ask them to pay, because we don't have the money to cover the transport, food, accommodation... So many of them manage to get local sponsorship to bring us there and do their office... We do this constantly, there is a big demand._ (Joao Madeira)

Subsequent way of supporting other institutions is through delegating some part of the financial resources collected to other institutions with good project ideas, but no money. Such move is always explained to the donors, which one the whole agree with the strategy.

The magazine AfroReggae Noticias has come a long way from its humble origin, and will soon become an integral part of the Globo newspaper, a leading journal in Brazil. Once more, AfroReggae did not have to make special efforts to start this partnership, as the invitation came from the newspaper.

AfroReggae is dedicated to increasing the level of its human capital, both for the benefit of the NGO, and the employees. Staff is given incentives to continue education, everyone is expected to complete high school, and many people are sent to universities.

The NGO also monitors the families of the kids participating in the activities and the kids themselves, to make sure that they receive proper schooling and are generally well treated at home. There are formal meetings with parents oriented at presenting the organization – to obtain the parents’ support for the participation of their kids in the activities – but also to give guidance of parenthood issues and receive feedback of their views of the NGO.
We have a social area in which pedagogy specialist monitor the progress in formal education of our students, they make sure that they don’t get discouraged. If you see a formal professor from a public school... if you bring him to the favela you see he is threatened, he is not at ease when giving his class... even more so because the teachers in Brazil are not well respected, they don’t receive the salaries they deserve... Sometime the teachers are even attacked by the students... So we convince the students not to give up, to continue... Because it is even worse to stay without education than to receive bad education... [...] And sometimes the problem is not even with the kids, but with their families. Sometimes the whole family wants some money so they push the children to work... Sometimes the kids have the will to study, but the mothers, who are the family bosses, make them skip classes and work... When they are not even old enough to work! But this is the reality. [...] So we have many formal meetings with the families of people who work and study at AfroReggae. (Joao Madeira)

A great deal of work has been put into the development of the website. As the primary source of information on the NGO and is crucial in attracting partnerships, high quality professionals, researchers, donations, and invitations. Enormous interest in the NGO indicates that the website is meeting its purpose.

Internet is the main source of information about us. Our website is visited a lot... We update the website daily, we even have a person just do this and to answer the questions that people ask. (Joao Madeira)

AfroReggae contracts external consultancy services from various organizations in order to obtain new perspectives that can foster improvement.

**Criola**

Criola – in partnership with the University of Texas – has created a course ‘Political Questions and Theories of the African Diaspora in the Americas’. The course is now three years old and the classes, all in English, are given in the facilities of UERJ. It is a one month course oriented at presenting and debating various issues concerning the African diasporas in Brazil and worldwide. There is also an emphasis on the theory of feminism. Every year
some 20 people enroll. Students come from Brazil, USA, as well as other countries; they should be politically active in some way in order to be admitted.

The main objective of the course is to deepen the knowledge of the African diasporas, with the basis on feminist theories, American, but also Brazilian. So the course covers anything from racism, political formation of black women, black groups, how do these people live outside Africa, what kind of actions they get involved in... we work with international and diasporal feminism, American literature on the problems women have to face, what has been discussed about blackness, or we discuss the impact that the black presidency of USA will have... But also how to carry out a research... and so on. (Lucia Xavier)

There is a vast library in the Criola headquarters, including current books and publications on a wide range of topics. Books have been selected by the employees or suggested by beneficiaries, as Criola is willing to purchase any books needed by the beneficiaries.

We have books on women, gender issues, homosexuality, public policy, history, culture, social sciences, literature... human rights reports, poetry, black women, photography, Masters and PhD theses, racial issues... everything you can imagine! When we have money, people tell us what they need and we buy... When we have extra money we go to a bookshop and buy what we like... We also receive many books. (Lucia Xavier)

Criola has developed a scheme for personal development, in accordance with which employees are encouraged to constantly reflect on their professional skills and needs and seek constant improvement. Criola is happy to support, also financially, employees willing to enroll in courses relevant to their professional performance, or personal development. For this purpose, Criola has agreements for certain courses, such as language classes.

We have had very good experience with 'personal improvement’. We would ask our employees: ‘what do you think you should learn to improve your professional performance’. So they would want to do university courses, technical courses, English, even dance classes... So we would guide people what they could do get better and help them, as long as it was directly connected to work. We have a lot of books here too. We have agreements with many organizations that offer English courses, seminars, national and international travels – all this to expand the capacity of our employees. We invite many people from different backgrounds too... Recently we had one person who had just started a masters at the University of Texas, with which we have a
partnership, and one person that was doing a PhD and ended up doing post-doctoral studies about this partnership... We have had many young people from high school that with our perspective decided to go to universities, we have widen one partnership so that we could send students to study medicine in Cuba. We are always trying to promote education and information... (Lucia Xavier)

There are regular meetings held with members of other NGOs. Usually these meetings are informal, unless the issue to be discussed is particularly complex – in which case a formal agenda is set to facilitate the organization of the reunion.

Criola has a vast networks of partnerships, which emerged from one of the three channels: centered around the networks in which the NGO participates, the people employed, or the political views held. Perhaps the most strategically important are the partnerships with institutions directly related to Criola’s mission, such as human rights agencies, or lawyers specialized in cases involving racism.

Internet is an essential tool in communication, yet the level of digital fluency among many employees of NGOs leaves a lot to desire. Criola’s staff is quite familiar with digital communication, partly as the outcome of the personal improvement scheme mentioned earlier, but members of other organizations often lack training in IT solutions. In consequence, the IT communication is mainly limited to the very basics, such as email.

_We have a long experience in working with internet, both to learn, to see what others are doing – and to spread information. It has been really helpful for contacts with other organizations of black women: all the communication is done online. There are twenty seven such organizations, we talk, exchange information online constantly. We are not good at this, but we do it... We use email mostly, because even MSN is difficult for them, sometimes we do meetings through Skype, but it’s more complicated... (Lucia Xavier)_

**FASE**

FASE is actively seeking innovative solutions for knowledge and information exchange. The most fruitful means for this purpose has been so far the participation in numerous networks organized around themes of concern. The exchange of information within such networks is usually informal and plays a crucial for organizational learning. The networks are also vital
for creation and legitimization of shared visions. The power of individual organizations is greatly expanded if they act as a united body. Only getting together and acting as a large group provides a real chance for exercising power in relevant matters. Even if being a part of a network might be time-consuming or imply certain compromises, it is regarded as a necessary step towards successful advocacy and lobbying.

In order to take even more advantage from network collaboration, FASE is currently working on an evaluation summarizing its participation in various networks. The research has the objective of defining the role and relevance of FASE within each network, as well as to come up with suggestions for increasing the efficiency of participation.

FASE is a member of various networks. Some of them are theme networks. For example, environmental justice, water-related issues… So some topics are elaborated collectively within networks, which has an impact on the organization too, although the networks are not created as a function of the participating organizations. But we obviously incorporate the results of some of these debates in strategic planning, in defining our future work. […] FASE participates in so many networks, that one consultant suggested preparation of a document that we are about to finish, on evaluation of the relevance and function of FASE within each of these networks. […] I think that the networks and forums have an important role in making viable individual actions… It is a way of unifying and amplifying the voice of various organizations. FASE alone, although it is not a small NGO or a little known one, has a relative weight. If you have a forum that is recognized by the state, by the society as a unified voice of various organizations it is a different thing. […] We have a certain institutional modesty, we don’t want to be always visible, and it facilitates working within a network. Working within a network is, I think, not really compatible with a very individualistic institutional attitude. So our style is discrete. (Jorge Durao)

A common way to learn is through elaboration of joint-projects and publications with partner institutions. There is a great demand for high quality brochures on topics present in the public debate, as they can be a valuable counterpart to the discourse of the political parties and other interest groups. Some other documents are prepared primarily for the internal use. For instance, documents systematizing the opinions on the most burning issues.

We systematize certain visions of FASE on some questions… For example, we wrote a document on the policy on the Amazon. It was a
collective work that took some three months, it was done by ten to fifteen people: writing, debating, re-writing... And I coordinated the preparation of this document. Other colleagues coordinated a work on monocultures in Brazil. (Jorge Durao)

There is also the Proposta Magazine published by FASE, which covers themes such as working with the youth, popular education, housing, sanitation, and other urban and environmental issues. Publishing of the magazine is also a great excuse for the realization of a detailed research into the main theme of each issue. The themes are usually prepared with the participation of external actors, and often include international perspectives as well.

We have the magazine ‘Proposta’, that is a theme magazine. So it covers various topics, such as working with the youth, popular education... we did an issue on Paulo Freire..., housing, water, Amazon – to mention the most recent ones, urban issues, these issues are debated and each issue of the magazine has a space for going deep into a topic – sometimes about experience, sometimes about theory on the topic, these are often prepared with external collaborators. (Jorge Durao)

To complement the short life cycle of a magazine, there is also a great deal of permanent information online, available at FASE website.

FASE is very dedicated to learning from the past by realization of detailed evaluation reports, carried by either internal staff, or external auditors and consultants. It is a perfect tool for institutional learning, as it requires self-reflection and unavoidably leads to debates around the past achievements and mode of operating, resulting in continuous drive for self-improvement.

A vital platform enabling constant learning is the informal exchange of ideas, information, and knowledge among the NGO staff. Under no circumstances it should be underestimated or neglected: FASE is a vast forum on which numerous development practitioners from diverse educational and professional backgrounds can compare their experiences.

And the conversation on the corridors are important too... Sometimes even more important than formal mechanisms. (Jorge Durao)

FASE is a member of the Pedras Negras group, formed by eight NGOs (including Ibase). The group has the objective to promote information exchange and dialog on essential issues among its members.
This group [Pedras Negras] meets periodically to discuss a series of topics that we think should be actualized in our view. For example, international cooperation, critique of the idea of development, financing of NGOs, public funds... It is the directors [of member organizations] that take part. It happens with the frequency of some three to four times a year. (Jorge Durao)

Another example of an incentive for organizational development is the active communication with the beneficiaries. For instance, inclusion of the gender issues and gender sensibility has come directly from the complaints of female beneficiaries of a project, which had the impression that FASE was perpetuating the sexist attitudes present in the wider society. Responding to these complaints, FASE started a cooperation with the NGO SOS Corpo, which has a long experience of working with women. Only then was it possible to enrich the organizational mindset and become more conscious of gender issues.

Given the size and budget of FASE, accountability must be of the highest quality. Due to the legal regulations, FASE has to be accountable, primarily, to a wide range of public institutions. Secondly, FASE has to give an account to its internal general assembly and its advisory council. Thirdly, many donors are obliged to obey the national regulations of their countries, a great bureaucratic burden for FASE, which has to provide an account as the receiver of donations, with each country demanding different types of forms and requirements. Fourthly, there are annual reports prepared for the donors themselves, mainly concerning the financial matters. Fifthly, financial data are also published for the general public in the journal *Yearly Balance*. General public can also read the reports from external evaluations, which are carried out every three years. Finally, FASE must be accountable to the beneficiaries of its actions – mainly through direct relations and daily contacts. They have the unique opportunity to express their discontent with NGOs performance by simply withdrawing from cooperation. Despite the informality of this type of evaluation, this might nonetheless be the most relevant one. So far, their constantly growing desire to engage with FASE is the best sign of good performance. Beneficiaries always play an active role in project planning, as it is believed that it would be pointless to make top-down plans in isolation from them.

A form of accountability that is very important is the one coming from the direct, daily relations with the target public, that is the beneficiaries of the work. Because they have the mechanism most
efficient to sanction the going of the track in actions of an organization like ours, by simply going away from it. That means, the continuous presence of these groups in our work for me is the least formal and the most relevant of these processes [of accountability]. (Jorge Durao)

The ultimate responsibility is always taken by the executive director. In case of a court case, FASE would be sued along with the executive director in person.

**IBASE**

Ibase initiated a group called Pedras Negras – named after the hotel in which the members first met – that consists of eight NGOs (including FASE). The goal of the group is to create a platform for close cooperation between major NGOs. The issues debated concern the strategy for the future, sources of financing, changes in the socio-political context and possible responses, development of common projects. The group is now looking for a seed, in which various actors of the civil society could meet and strengthen their relationships.

There is certain ambivalence resulting from being an unofficial leader in the sphere of knowledge production and exchange, too.

*The most important example [of cooperation with other NGOs for knowledge exchange] is the Pedras Negras Group. It was our initiative to call up others to talk... [...] Ibase is famous for its attitude to open and call up others. Social Watch is a group of reference, People’s Dialog is a group of reference... Other entities discuss with us how to prepare projects, we have a reference group in Africa... We unite these groups, divide projects. Ibase is valued for this work, but it also causes jealousy, tensions. (Candido Grzybowski)*

Virtually all projects are carried out in some sort of network, partnership, or cooperation. The value of working together is greatly appreciated as a way to improve the know-how available, the amount of resources, but also to increase the legitimacy of projects.

*There are so many [networks in which Ibase participates] and so complex, that I, as a director, I am not able tell you all of them... But I would say that all of our work is done within a network, or alliance, forum, partnership. (Candido Grzybowski)*

Ibase advocates for full accountability of NGOs. They publish online their financial statements, and they would like it to become a standard for all NGOs. There has been some
progress in this matter, yet it has not been fully achieved yet, as there is some resistance from other NGOs.

We publish our financial data online. We demand it from companies, so we have to give a good example. For years we have been publishing: how many resources, how it was obtained, how it was spent... (Candido Grzybowski)

There are theme forums for Ibase employees every month. All the employees are encouraged to take part: to learn and share their knowledge both on subjects concerning directly the functioning of the NGO, as well as on social issues and the position Ibase should take to respond to them. It has proven to be a great learning and unifying tool.

There are also informal lunch debates on world issues once a month, every first Monday of the month.

There are also cinema session, held irregularly, some 3-4 times a year. The employees interested can watch outstanding documentaries and engage in debates afterwards.

What we also have are theme forums. In this structure there is a tendency for team to have different logics. The collective space is limited. So we started doing monthly theme forums. These are discussions on important questions about Ibase, independently from the projects. [...] Everyone is invited to participate, regardless of the function. [...] And we have once a month, every first Monday of a month during lunchtime, analysis of the circumstances. So for those who want, we get together and discuss new events in Brazil and in the world. We also have CineIbase. [...] This one is more irregular, depending on the occasion. (Candido Grzybowski)

A great deal of significance is attached to the evaluation reports written at the end of a project cycle. Employees are encouraged to learn from the solutions used and from the mistakes made. Reflection on the past actions is a must in Ibase.

Ibase was the first entity to bring internet to Latin America, in 1989. It has always put great emphasis on the access to information as a condition for democratization and citizenship and the NGO was the first to appreciate the power of internet for these purposes.

We use [internet] a lot. Don’t forget that Ibase created the first internet provider for the civil society for Latin America, in 1989. [...] The fact that Ibase was based on the idea that to democratize society
first we need to democratize information is why Ibase communication is now better than that of many other organizations. [...] People who look for information but in a different version [than the mainstream one] often choose Ibase. [...] We don’t say that everything has to be the way we see it, that our version is correct. But it is the version from our field, version of the civil society. What is important is that already there is some three, four hundred journalists that consult our website looking for information. (Candido Grzybowski

One idea that is not yet implemented, is to make Ibase function as an independent world news source. Ibase has an extensive network of correspondents that can provide first-hand, instant information from regions that are currently being covered in the media. That would give another perspective on the issues and events, which would be a great counterbalance to the mainstream media. It would be even easier given that Ibase already has a team of in-house journalists working full-time.

Another idea that might be particularly promising is to combine the magazines issued by the NGOs united within the group Pedras Negras into one magazine, a real and strong voice of the Brazilian civil society.
3.3.4 Communication & Fund Raising

AfroReggae

AfroReggae relies on five donors, each contributing the same amount of money. These are Petrobras, Banco Real, Natura, Government of the state of Rio de Janeiro, and Government of the state Minas Gerais. Together with the resources generated by AfroReggae, the total budget is of 7,5 million R$.

AfroReggae also generates its own income. It has sold the rights to use the brand to the clothing company Hering. It is organizing numerous shows and performances. It charges small fees for consultancies for other NGOs carried out at the location of the inviting NGO. They release music albums produced with professional recording companies – the NGO was the first social entrepreneurship initiative that succeeded in signing a professional contract with a commercial recording company.

_We generate own resources too... Our cds, dvd, books, clothes – that are now licensed by Hering clothing company, lectures... all this is charged. So we create income. In the future we want to be self-sustainable. It will take a while, but that’s the goal._ (Joao Madeira)

Donors rarely withdraw from supporting AfroReggae. The only case so far has been Vale, due to the external factors: the world crisis.

The communication strategy with donors is referred to as ‘pro-active’. It means that the NGO actively seeks the donors participation in the projects and activities. While planning is done autonomously by the NGO, donors are welcome to give their ideas, suggestions, and critiques, as well as to visit the centers at any time.

Some project can be funded with extra money from other sources. For instance, the brand new center in Vigario Geral has been funded with the donations from Petrobras, Unibaco, Government of the state of Rio de Janeiro, and BNDES.

AfroReggae does not accept donations from individual donors. It was tried in the past, but the average size of donations was very low, leading to a situation in which it was more problematic – due to bureaucratic burden – than helpful. It is felt by the NGO directors that in Brazil there is no culture of individual donating.
The cost of AfroReggae activities is of around 500 to 600 R$ per child per month. It includes the small amounts that need to be paid to the poorest kids as an alternative source of income to drug trafficking. It is necessary to give at least symbolic amounts, starting from 50 R$ a month, as there might otherwise be pressure from the family not to engage in activities that do not bring any financial profit.

*We keep fighting for the resources. We are not small, but we are only in five favelas so far, there is over a thousand. [...] But the cost is high, we need to pay food, teachers, control, administration... on average 500R$ a month per child. (Joao Madeira)*

*Mothers often have the decisive voice in the families and they expect their children to bring money home. This is one of the reasons why so many young boys become drug dealers, and so many girls work as prostitutes... [...] When they participate in the activities of AfroReggae, we often give them little pocket-money so that they can give it to the mother and avoid trafficking or prostitution. [...] We want the kids to learn to earn their own money, so that later they can go to the market and sell the skills they have learnt with AfroReggae... So that they can sustain themselves, have dignity, so that they don’t die young, so that they have some values in life. [...] Basically, our goal is social rescue. (Joao Madeira)*

AfroReggae outsources many of its communication activities to a public relations company, which takes care of the AfroReggae brand.

*We have a department of communication, and we also have external consulting, for free, that takes care of our brand. They know where we should go, where not to go, what we should do... Nowadays brand management is business. So we have a contract, for which we don’t need to pay, with a company that does it for us. They know our mission, they know which commitments we should reject... And we have the department of communication, internal and external, that helps to manage the flow of information... (Joao Madeira)*

AfroReggae has made a great choice by engaging in the production of a documentary film ‘Favela Raising’, released in 2005. The NGO’s directors managed to convince two American film-makers to focus their film on the organization, which resulted in an international blockbuster. It is certainly a valuable answer to the other famous Brazilian production ‘City of God’, which presented a very dire vision of Rio de Janeiro. Favela Raising brought good publicity not only to the NGO, but also to the city itself. Motivated by this success,
AfroReggae produced another film, under the title *Nenhum Motivo Explica a Guerra* (No Reason Explains a War).

We met two American film makers who came to Brazil to produce a documentary on the Carnival. We told them: ‘don’t do this cliché, make it about us!’ It was their luck and ours. *Favela Rising* helped us a lot. The film won 25 international prizes. There was an article in *Globo* that *Favela Rising* is among the most popular Brazilian films in China! (Joao Madeira)

International relations, which are becoming more and more frequent, are handled by the leader, Jose Junior. With its frequent travels, either in the role of social development expert, or artistic performer, the NGO is a great example of linkage between local and global activity. If AfroReggae maintains this pace of growth in recognition and credibility, it is likely to become one of the most famous NGOs worldwide.

*In the United Kingdom, there is a registered company UK Partnerships AfroReggae, with 300 people that were trained by AfroReggae... It’s been seven years already. [...] We have done shows in London, and we work constantly in the district of Hackney. It’s a very violent area. [...] The main band goes there every year to give shows. [...] To India we were invited by the Ford Foundation, which had already sponsored us before, now they are our friends. We work there with men who wanted to become human bombs, we work with music, theatre, dance... They have even been to Brazil. And they don’t want to be human bombs anymore. [...] All the international relations are done by Junior, he is the leader of these activities. For example, he went to India, he brought videos... Also the film *Favela Rising*, which is our ‘visit card’ in the world. (Joao Madeira)*

**Criola**

Criola has certain difficulties in raising financial resources. Firstly, the NGO does not accept funds from organizations that do not share the same political views, or that expect unconditional support for their donations. This is especially problematic with public sector donors. Secondly, due to the limited number of employees, it is not easy to develop large social projects that could be well marketed and attract the attention of potential sponsors. Given the small scale of the NGO, it is also not doable to contract an external agency that would manage the fundraising activities.
It’s an interesting history, but it’s a history of a crisis... The organization is now 16 years old, we have had ups and downs, especially since the year 2000... We used to have a unique source of funding and now we have a huge diversification of sources... It is good for us, because we learn to deal with different jargons, but it is also bad, because we don’t have a solid financial base that would let us have longevity of projects... It happens that we cannot manage well some projects exactly for the lack of resources. (Lucia Xavier)

It is very delicate to receive public funding, because people who work for public administration also have their interests... they give you money so that you act in accordance with their activity. It is very difficult, because many times we feel that the money will not benefit us as much as it will benefit the politician. So we say no, [accepting the funding] does not mean unconditional support, it won’t make us agree with anything you say... So it causes a certain exhaustion. (Lucia Xavier)

Most donors do not get involved in project planning, as only those few that have supported Criola for a longer period of time have the sufficient understanding of the circumstances that would allow them to engage actively in the planning process.

There are some donors that get together with us to talk, discuss [the projects], but these are very few. They come here, because they have a strong partnership with us, they want to listen, and we want to listen to their opinions too... But the majority doesn’t do this. (Lucia Xavier)

Due to a modest budget (at present 200,000), Criola has learned to use its resources wisely, and it manages to keep the administrative costs at a very low level – around 5%. This number does not include salaries – these are calculated as projects costs, since all the employees participate in the implementation of projects.

Criola has a relatively good record of donor relations. The only serious problem with a funding agency happened when Criola overestimated its project goals and the donor was not flexible enough to finance the project after the necessary adjustments had been made.

A challenge for the future will be to adjust the website for fundraising. At the moment, it only presents the basic data, which is not enough to attract potential donors.

Criola does not have enough time to become more visible in media. The NGO accepts the incoming invitations, but is itself unable to seek promotion more actively, so the visibility of
the NGO is volatile. In accordance with the flexibility-over-specialization principle, there is no specific person dedicated to media relations, it is handled by the person who is the most knowledgeable in the area of inquiry.

*Anyone of us [talks to the media]. Sometimes we chose the person who is the most well informed on the matter, or the one who was promoting the action...Or sometimes even someone who is not from here. For example, we realized an action related to health care and it was not us who answered to the media – we called for other specialists to do it. They don’t have anything to do with our work, but they had better data, more precise, so they responded to the media. (Lucia Xavier)*

*We had a partnership with Firjan, the Federation of Industries, and from this partnership emerged another project, ‘art & industry’. A part of this project was to produce and sell objects. In this process we really managed to attract media, big media... (Lucia Xavier)*

Criola manages to maintain relations with numerous public sector institutions, such as the police. It is crucial, as the public sector employees, which often make significant decisions for the black population, often have a distorted view of the society, racial and gender issues in particular, and Criola sees it as its duty to challenge all such ignorance, prejudice or misinformation.

Criola is an active publisher and their brochures are widely sought. Yet, shortage of financial resources is the limitation in the publishing frequency and volume. Publications are sent by post to registered associates and available in the NGO seed.

Criola is very active also in the international networks operating around the issues important to Criola. The NGO receives many visits from similar organizations working in other states or other countries. Recently they held a meeting with Panteras Negras. The NGO is also looking for new contacts with intellectuals and influential people from Brazil and worldwide.

*[Apart from the partnership with the University of Texas] We participate in international networks, we articulate the position of black women in the world... last weekend there was a meeting of women that act against AIDS and we had had this activity already in USA and our partnership with them resulted in presence of an African network, with which we wanted to learn how the operate a continental network in the situation of war, hunger, poverty... We participated in the World Social Forum... We have brought many*
people here to debate with us, we have had a member of Black Panters here recently... We also brought a women that only analyses data, how to make a census... We brought here an author who writes on homosexuality to show the situation of black women in Brazil, we have a partnership with a female university from Atlanta... (Lucia Xavier)

FASE

After a long and complex story of experimenting with various means for fundraising, FASE now relies upon a more stable support of cooperating agencies, public funds, and to a small extent on individual donations (symbolic share).

Many donors have given up to support FASE throughout the history, yet most of their reasons for withdrawal were not influenced by the NGO. Nonetheless, the volatility of aid flows has encouraged the organization to seek more permanent partnerships with selected donor agencies, which turned out to be the right solution. Relationship with these selected donor agencies is highly customized, according to the preferences of each donor. FASE employees are always eager to participate in the events indicated by the donors. They also frequently receive visiting groups in Brazil. FASE is ready to engage in various types of cooperation, as long as it is beneficial to at least one of the sides.

[The relationship with the donors] depends on the profile of the donor. [...] We participate in the campaigns developed by some agencies [...] Some other send groups here and we receive them and organize field visits for these groups. (Jorge Durao)

One great problem concerning international donations is the volatility of exchange rate. Although the situation in Brazil is now more stable, the financial instability used to be a big obstacle for international obstacle in the past.

Recently, however, the aid flows to Brazil have started to decline, affecting equally all third sector actors in the country. Given the multiplicity of institutions and decision-makers within government, as well as the volatility resulting from electoral changes, it is very difficult to count on the public sector as a base of financial support for particular projects. FASE is not affiliated with any political party that would ensure a stable basis of support. On top of that, the bureaucratic burden on the use of public resources is overwhelming. Therefore, the public funds constitute no more than ten percent of resources in FASE.
We are certainly not with the right wing, but the left, unfortunately, is not really aligned with us. [...] We are now going through a moment of fragility due to isolation. That is, since we always work in a narrow alliance with social movements, I think the political scenario is unfavorable, because the movements are divided, fragmented, without a clear perspective. I think this is our weak point. (Jorge Durao)

Another weak point that we have, that is not exclusively a problem for FASE, but also for other NGOs... Brazil is less and less important for the so-called international cooperation for development. That is... From the point of view of our sources of financing, the tendency is declining. And from the point of view public funding, there is a huge inadequacy in terms of legal solutions. FASE has actually managed to increase the fundraising from national funds, but we struggle a lot with problems related to accountability, because the legislation is horrible. There is a system of ‘agreements’ (convenios), which is the most common system of transferring public resources. But it is a mechanism that has been created to transfer resources from one governmental entity to another. For instance, these resources cannot be used for payment of salaries, as employees of governmental entities already have their salaries paid – it is not our case. So our weak point is not so much the ability to raise funds, but the ability to raise funds with conditions adequate to the institutional needs. [...] Last year we calculated that we had sixty percent of resources to be spent on projects and forty percent for institutional needs, of which we had to spend eighty percent on salaries. [...] Sometimes we have theoretically excessive amounts of money on the one hand, but budget deficit on another... (Jorge Durao)

The government is schizophrenic. That means, who sells the idea of a project is one person. Who will later have to approve of the quotas, is another. And these two don’t talk to each other. So it’s crazy. For example [some government institution] is mad for you to do a certain project. Five years later, someone from the public accounting sector comes and says you don’t have the right to this: because in the receipts for taxi it was not specified on what exactly was this money spent. It’s crazy... Sometimes we spend money on lawyers, we spend hours and hours to redo the reports... Before, five years ago, we didn’t receive one cent from the government. Today, we are learning with the mistakes we made at the beginning. But, despite having increased, public funding is not even of ten percent of our funding. (Jorge Durao)

In order to prevent misunderstanding with the donors, FASE prefers not to accept funds from potential donors whose demands seem excessive and cannot be met, although small
ideological divergences on minor issues are not necessarily an impediment to cooperation, the NGO does not bend its ethics even if it would increase the flow of funding.

Our strong point is that we are very coherent in our policies... You are more likely to hear someone accusing FASE of rigidity than of opportunism. We have even had problems with important donors, because there are some values and some principles that we never break. (Jorge Durao)

FASE does not yet use internet as a fundraising tool, although it does plan on doing so in the future.

There is no department dedicated specifically to public relations. The responsibility of managing the relationship with media is usually taken by the director, or by a person knowledgeable in the area of media’s interest.

FASE is eager to engage in international and global dialogues and debates on the development-related issues. A task to develop in the future is to expand the participation of external actors in the projects of FASE.

IBASE

Ibase, like all NGOs, has been affected by the decrease in funding from international agencies coming to Brazil. While large part of the donations still comes from international agencies, the rest is generated by Ibase activities, or provided by national public companies, or private donors. Receiving money directly from the government development resources is particularly complicated.

There has been a great change [in the structure of financing]. When the dominant form was cooperation, we would discuss with people who had very similar conceptions like ours, there was a dimension of solidarity. When you are discussing with a company, it is not solidarity. It might be a support for some cause, but there is an interest that you don’t control, the interest of the company. (Candido Grzybowski)

There are [public financing] policies for philanthropic organizations, like hospitals, schools, kindergartens, for those who deliver services and for labor unions, there is a stable mechanism for this. But there is no mechanism for social movements, popular organizations, entities like ours. (Candido Grzybowski)
Among the private donors, there are the Amigos de Ibase. There are currently some 1,100 associates, and the turnover is of about five a month. More than the financial value of the contribution, they are important as a source of legitimacy for the NGO. Amigos de Ibase can stay in close touch with the NGO through online communication.

The relationship with the donors is passive. They do not influence the projects, nor the day-to-day functioning of the NGO.

The autonomy from donors and the government is crucial for Ibase. They do not accept to declare unconditional support to any entity, regardless of the amount of contribution provided. Many donors expects that helping Ibase financially will grant them immunity, yet it is not the way things work at Ibase.

The idea is to be autonomous. We accept cooperation with the government as long as it recognizes that we are autonomous. We don’t accept to be service providers: this is the role of the government. Who wants to do it, it’s legitimate, but we don’t do tasks that belong to the state. (Candido Grzybowski)

There are also rigid criteria as to who can become a sponsor of Ibase. The NGO does not accept funds from tobacco, and alcohol industry, nor from weapon producers. Many companies have been rejected for other reasons too, related to their poor CSR record.

There is no department dedicated exclusively to PR, yet Ibase uses consulting services of PR agencies in order to organize its campaigns. The campaigns are also the best visit card of the NGO.

Another thing that gives legitimacy to Ibase is the researches that we do. Because we don’t do research for the sake of it, but research directed at public debate, action, so we produce with the intention of provoking. [...] So we direct the research with the objective to build a problematic question, more than to answer it. [...] Many people must make it their objective to force various institutions to analyze a problem, otherwise many problems remain unseen, they are not problems. To transform issues into problems requires a certain analytical capability. And I think Ibase has achieved it. (Candido Grzybowski)
It is common for donor agencies to contact Ibase without being sought by the NGO, but normally the funding has to be obtained actively, through getting in touch with potential donors.

One of the biggest ideas that emerged from the cooperation of the Pedras Negras network is to create a common fund to which sponsor can contribute without specifying how the resources should be spent. The division of capital would then depend on the NGOs and perhaps a civil council. It would result in greater flexibility and efficiency, and probably would increase the fundraising potential.
3.4 Conclusions

3.4.1 Research evaluation

I consider the research as a success that has lived up to the initial expectations. Vast majority of the questions debated in the theoretical framework section were mirrored and answered by the field research findings. Moreover, the investigation discovered a significant number of additional practices that can be recommended to third sector organizations.

The research methodology applied resulted to be a correct one, as a large amount of data could be extracted without any serious difficulties.

What follows is a normative list of substantive observations and prescriptions that can be of potential use for other development NGOs.

3.4.2 Key observations

Advocacy

- It is crucial that in order to be successful in advocacy, NGOs must maintain internal clarity of visions and objectives. To ensure it is the case, FASE has systematized its opinions on vital issues in written reports prepared collectively

- A complicated question related to advocacy is the one of legitimacy. Who gives the authority to an NGO to represent some social groups, i.e. women? Criola has found a practical answer, as the NGO was able to prove the validity of its cause by mobilizing several other organizations that expressed the same views and confirmed Criola’s legitimacy as a defender of women’s rights

- On top of organizing general advocacy campaigns, it might be more efficient to seek direct dialogue with public sector officials to influence their opinions on relevant matters. It is an approach used by Criola, and, to some extent, by other three NGOs as well

- Public relations or marketing agencies can be of great help when formulating advocacy campaigns and slogans, as shown by Ibase
Service delivery

- Given the low self-esteem of the poor population, it seems reasonable to actually lie to them by saying that they are gifted and special, if it can encourage them not to give up in their lives. It is a white lie practiced by AfroReggae.

- When working with the youth, it is advisable to adopt a holistic approach, meaning including dialogue with the families of the beneficiaries. Experience of AfroReggae shows that families often push their children in the wrong direction—towards prostitution and crime—as it is the easiest way to obtain income. Without convincing the parents, it might be impossible to convince their children to follow the right path in life.

- Long-term projects are far more preferred than ‘development tourism’ of small projects. Although the latter are easier and cheaper, only the former can result in a worthwhile impact, as it has been experienced by AfroReggae and FASE.

Project planning

- All the NGOs analyzed use the triangulation approach, in which there are certain fixed rules regarding the planning, yet there is also some space left for improvisation and dialogue with beneficiaries.

- It is a good idea, which can save time and money, not to develop a detailed project plan before having secured funding through a brief project proposal, the way it is practiced by Ibase.

- Some projects can encompass both service delivery and advocacy elements at the same time. The perfect example would be the projects of FASE, which provide direct help and empowerment to certain oppressed groups, while at the same time involve advocating for their cause.

- Methodology developed in one context can often be successfully applied in a completely different environment. An example has been provided by the AfroReggae method of initiating dialogue with difficult youth, which has worked equally well in various international settings.

- One must be aware of the distinction between planning for practical purpose of organizing the action, and planning as bureaucratic burden necessary for providing...
funding. These are two types of plans, and in the case of the latter particular attention should be paid to form-filling, as the smallest mistake can destroy the whole project, as has been experienced by FASE

- Impossible is nothing. Global success of World Social Forum, event almost nobody believed in, as well as AfroReggae’s successful cooperation with the police and the favela youth are examples that in the NGO reality incredible things are doable if one is ready to take the risk and knows how to approach challenges

Evaluating the results

- Internal evaluation reports are a must once a project has been concluded. All employees should become familiar with the reports, and new employees should be encouraged to read the historic reports
- It is advisable to contract external evaluators and consultants from different fields and backgrounds to bring fresh perspectives on the results and suggestions for improvements

Internal management

- It the case of small NGOs, like Criola, it is advantageous to maintain the functions flexible. This approach is not applied to large NGOs where it would probably cause chaos
- Deliberative council can be of great support to the directors and coordinators. It can comprise both of staff members and associates
- Democratic governance can sometimes be irrelevant and harmful as observed by Criola, for instance when the will of the majority is to be applied to issues that cannot be negotiated, i.e. project deadline
- Another situation when democracy is not the best option are the ‘Sophie’s choices’ – difficult choices of lesser evil. These should be handled by the NGO leaders
- There is certainly a conflict, as confirmed by Ibase, between militancy and professionalism, or between culture of action and institutionalization. Mundane tasks of everyday management cannot be omitted while developing grandiose ideas in the longevity of the NGO is to be ensured
In order to maintain clarity of strategy, it is wise to set both long-term, and short-term agendas. Ibase and FASE practice correspondingly tri-annual and annual operational planning.

It is advisable to reflect thoroughly on the desired expansion strategy. AfroReggae has received countless invitations to growth by opening new national and international branches, yet it has decided to resist the temptation of vast expansion, as it would have a negative impact on the quality of performance delivered.

**Stakeholder hierarchy**

While all NGOs recognize the confusion imminent in the stakeholder hierarchy in third sector organizations, the recurring theme was that beneficiaries should come first, followed by the NGO staff. Importance of other actors is secondary and subjected to the interests of NGO and its beneficiaries.

**Leadership**

While Ibase prefers strong leadership, in which the actions of the NGO are directly correlated with the preferences of its leader, other three NGOs maintain more democratic approach. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages, so it is up to the leader to decide what solution will work best for the organization.

The leadership system is rather fluid than constant. AfroReggae managed to pass from authoritarian governance to more egalitarian one without major disruptions, and FASE shifted from extremely charismatic to more pragmatic leadership.

NGO leaders should also assume the function of ambassadors of their organizations. This function is very important in attracting partners and resources, but the leaders should never forget that their role as ambassadors is to promote the organization and not themselves.

**Employee recruitment**

While recruiting, attention should be paid not only to the professional qualifications of potential employees, but also to the compatibility of their mindset with the ideology of the NGO. Criola was forced to discontinue cooperation with various new staff members due to the political discrepancies.
• AfroReggae maintains a database of people who have applied for jobs in the NGO, but have not been accepted. While their particular skills will be needed in the future, the recruitment should be much faster if such database exists

Compensation schemes

• All four organizations work primarily according to fixed salary schemes, with exceptions being made for fundraising staff. Nonetheless, all NGOs would be happy to adopt more flexible, performance-sensitive systems in the future and plan on doing so. However, designing such a system is not an easy task
• Employee benefit packages are practiced in various forms by all four NGOs. They increase the staff loyalty, but also the legitimacy of the NGO as an organization truly dedicated to bringing positive impact to the society

Volunteers

• Three NGOs expressed their reluctance towards working with local volunteers. Lack of formal contract and low level of commitment was the most common reason given. The only exception here was Criola, which has had mixed experiences with volunteers – each case was different.
• Ibase maintains a group of associates who monitor the work of the NGO without receiving any payments. It is not the classical type of volunteering, but it can be a viable solution for NGOs seeking legitimacy from this form of internal auditing
• Ibase accepts international volunteers, who receive payment from various external sources of financing. It has been a good experience, but it happens very rarely
• Working with volunteers can be particularly dangerous when they are employed as coordinators or teachers in the favelas, as their sudden withdrawal is very harmful to the morale of their students
• Volunteers can be a good solution if they are contracted for a very limited and predetermined period of time. For instance, they can give short, few-days courses to NGO staff. Short duration of the cooperation limits the risk of their ‘disappearance’
• A mid-term solution between volunteers and paid employees are interns. FASE and Criola use this option – it can be seen a trial period, during which young people work
in exchange for little money, experience, and the opportunity to be contracted as full-time professionals in the future, in case of their good performance

Organizational learning

- Two of the NGOs analyzed developed courses in partnership with universities. AfroReggae, together with IBMEC, runs a course on NGO management inspired by its history and method. Criola, together with the University of Texas, organized a course of African Diasporas. Both ideas are promising and innovative
- All NGOs analyzed have programs for personal improvement for their employees. They support continued learning of their staff in various ways – financial aid, flexible hours, agreements with educational institutions – which has a good impact on the development of human capital, as well as on the loyalty
- Organizing cinema sessions is an attractive way to encourage employees to reflect on world issues and issues relevant to the work of a given NGO
- All NGOs stressed the importance of informal, internal communication as a learning platform. Although it might seem that such communication should flourish naturally, it is not always the case. Sometimes an active and conscious effort of the NGO leaders in needed to foster horizontal information exchange, like it was done by FASE
- Preparation of publications is a great opportunity to elaborate in detail some themes of interests. The internally educational aspect of publishing should not be forgotten
- FASE and Ibase practice various types of staff encounters, which are formal platforms for knowledge exchange between the ‘old’ employees, but also a great introduction into the organization for new staff members
- A great way to increase the pool of knowledge is to hire an experienced professional from a renown institution. These would normally be very costly, so opting for a retired manager is a wise move proposed by Ibase, which employed a former project manager of BNDES

Knowledge sharing

- There is a great demand for professionally elaborated independent publications on burning issues and NGOs should certainly dedicate time and resources to produce such publications
• It seems to be a great idea to publish a magazine as a joint-venture with other NGOs of similar profile. The initiative of Ibase, that is yet to be implemented, is really worthwhile in the age of information overload. It is certainly better to produce a great collective magazine than to publish several ones of worse quality

• Another solution for promotion of a magazine is to attach it to some journal of large circulation – an idea of AfroReggae and Globo that is being worked on

• Ibase has recently decided not to publish its magazine in a printed form, but to send it in a digital form to the relevant institutions and individuals, which can print the issues themselves and therefore reduce the publishing cost of the NGO

• The idea of developing the NGO website into an independent news source, although costly and uneasy, is certainly worth pursuing. Practice of Ibase, which is yet to be expanded in the future

• In order to enhance the flow of information and perspectives from the civil society to the mainstream media, it is good to maintain direct relations with mainstream journalists and encourage them to use a given NGO as a news source, as it is practiced by Ibase

• Advertising events online can be more fruitful that it might seem, as the popularity of the World Social Forums shows. It is cheap and very increasingly effective

• Keeping a library rich in volumes of books and fields they cover is a simple move practiced by Criola that can certainly be advised to other NGOs. Ibase, on the other hand, keeps a collection of films, which are still used and valued nowadays, in the era of internet

• Racist discourse is so strong in the Brazilian society, that even its victims take some racist attitudes for granted – as a normal social rule. Awareness rising concerning discrimination, therefore, should be oriented towards the affected groups as well as at the perpetrators, as has been discovered by Criola

Networking

• For all four NGOs, working within networks is indispensible. Some networks serve as a learning platform for internal use (F4, Pedras Negras), while others are established for advocacy: to create and articulate shared visions strengthened by the unity of participating NGOs
• The report on the relevance of participating in each active network, with analysis of the function played, is an excellent idea implemented by FASE. It brings clarity of network activity to the directors and staff.

• Having a strong voice within a network doubtlessly has enormous benefits, yet one has to be conscious that dominant NGOs, such as Ibase, will usually end up marginalizing the more modest ones. Although some degree of dominance is unavoidable and perhaps even desired, it is crucial to provide an opportunity for expression to anyone involved.

• There are at least three axes around which new networks can be established, as pointed out by Criola: personal connections of NGO members, political views of the NGO, and partnerships established previously.

• Compromising is part of being a member of a network. Although bending one’s beliefs is surely painful, reaching a consensus might be worth the sacrifice if it results in unity and, hence, greater chance for achievement of a shared goal.

• Although personal meetings are a must, it is also vital to develop a functioning system of online communication for network members, as it is more efficient than direct personal communication. Even modest organizations like Criola can benefit a great deal from ICT solutions.

Accountability

• Transparency is crucial for third sector organizations, also for the practical reasons such as fundraising credibility, and Ibase sets a good example by publishing its financial data online.

• Experience of FASE shows that it is worth investing time and money into development of internal online accounting system. It is not only a tool of great use for the staff, but it also results in faultless transparency, which is appreciated by donors and partners.

• NGOs willing to engage in advocacy campaigns for transparency or corporate social responsibility, like Ibase, must maintain a spotless image of themselves in order to preserve the legitimacy of their cause.

• The most visible types of accountability among the NGOs analyzed are the corporate accountability (NGO as a whole), and personal one (director/leader).
• The NGO leaders should not underestimate the importance of any of the two levels of accountability: practical one – related to the long-term survival of the organization, and strategic one – related to the adherence to the mission
• Beneficiaries are the best indicator of accountability, as stated by all four NGOs

Management of relationships

• All the NGOs analyzed declare that they are not willing to break their principles to satisfy the donors. They prefer not to accept funding than bend their ideals. Although this attitude might seem harmful in the short-term, on the long run it would probably be destructive to allow ideological concessions towards donors
• It seems reasonable to maintain a ‘pro-active’ relationship with the donors, as it is termed by AfroReggae. It does not imply financiers’ interference in the life of the NGO, but it does imply encouraging the donors to participate in the events organized by the organization. It is natural to return the favor and to accept the invitations sent by the donors, too. Welcoming international donors in Brazil and assisting them during their stay in the country is also recommendable. Such initiatives are practiced to some extent by all the NGOs analyzed
• For NGOs working in excluded areas, such as favelas, there is an opportunity to create a win-win deal by teaching potential sponsors how to sell their products in these environments – idea developed by AfroReggae with Natura and TIM
• NGOs willing to engage in CSR campaigns should be particularly careful and aware of the fact that companies will strive to use this relationship as a marketing tool, rather than as a means for providing positive social impact
• Developing a stable, long-term relationship with international donor agencies is perhaps the best way to ensure financial stability, according to FASE, Ibase, and Criola

Public relations

• AfroReggae and Ibase don’t hesitate to use the services of professional public relations agencies to improve its image and the effectiveness of their campaigns
• NGOs involved in advocacy should be well aware of the fact that the type of campaigns they organize, and the style of these campaigns, will become trademarks
of these NGOs. For instance, Ibase deliberately engages in provocative campaigns, accepting the resulting advantages and disadvantages of this approach

- It might be a salvation for new and small NGOs to attract some famous people to back their cause and help promote them. It is hard to imagine the growth of AfroReggae without figures such as Caetano Veloso, Regina Case

- Another ‘golden shot’ of AfroReggae was to produce an international film of high quality documenting the work of the NGO. It is certainly advisable for any NGO to engage in such ventures

- A proven way of attracting attention of the society and media is to organize events. AfroReggae bands give shows at home and abroad, and the NGO organizes a bloco during the carnival. Ibase initiated the World Social Forum. Criola had a great experience giving an open day focused on Afro-Brazilian craftwork

- Some donors are more valuable as a sources of legitimacy, than funding. Maintaining the network ‘Friends of Ibase’, for instance, costs more than their actual contribution, yet it they are vital for the credibility of the NGO

**Fundraising**

- It might be a perfect solution to fundraising difficulties and tough relationships with donors to create a social fund shared by several NGOs. It is an idea of Ibase and the Pedras Negras Group (still a future prospect), in which donors send the resources to a common pool, from which they are divided between the member NGOs by the decision of a civil council

- Brazilians are not eager to donate their private money, hence actions oriented at individuals are bound to fail

- International agencies are the most reliable source of financing for the NGOs analyzed, followed by the state-owned national enterprises

- It is a headache of many NGOs, like FASE, that donors tend to distinguish between the resources for projects, and for administration. It leads to situations in which there can be an abundance of money, and yet shortage of capital to pay the salaries. A good solution can be the one practiced by Criola, where administrative personnel is also actively involved in the projects and therefore can be legitimately financed with the projects funds
• The example of World Social Forum shows that truly good ideas, no matter how incredible, can be financed. A necessary condition here is the credibility of the NGO, set by an outstanding record of past achievements.

• Exchange rate volatility cannot be forgotten when relying on international flows of resources, as a theoretically successful fundraising can result in a budget failure due to monetary instability. The same can be said about inflation, what has been felt by FASE in the past.

• As the golden times of high in-flows of financial aid to Brazil are ending, the NGOs must engage very actively in fundraising and have the courage and conditions to contact potential donors, national and international.

• Once a recognizable brand has been created, the rights to use it can be sold to a commercial company, i.e. clothing company. Example: AfroReggae and Hering.

**Online Fundraising**

• Website is the primary source of information for potential donors, so it ought to be as professional and informative as possible.

• Creating an option for direct donating does not seem essential for the NGOs analyzed, as Brazilians tend not to donate through this channel. Nonetheless, this trend might change in the near future, so the NGOs should stay alert.

**Global vision**

• There is a good niche to be occupied by third sector organizations, the one of youth political activity independent of political parties. World Social Forum confirmed that young people are willing to express their views and they are willing to engage in political struggles, as long as it does not involve parties. Hence, NGOs should make the best use of this opportunity and provide options to young people for being heard in unconventional ways.

• All four NGOs have some important contributions to offer to the development on the global level. AfroReggae method should certainly be spread to other contexts, as it is a unique tool in the struggle to control the burning issue of youth violence. Criola’s cooperation with international institutions, including the creation of a course on African diasporas with the University of Texas is an example proving that even small
NGOs can reach global impact. FASE has very practical know-how on empowerment and articulation of reluctance to neo-liberalism, and it should seek to promote it by engaging in international cooperation. World Social Forum initiated by Ibase is a masterpiece of civil society activity and a confirmation of the strength of civil society in Brazil, of which the country can be truly proud of.

3.4.3 Research limitations

The NGOs analyzed were investigated through data collected from one representative from each organization. As such, it was not possible to explore the difference in perspectives present among their members.

The imminent limitation resulting from the choice of case study qualitative approach was that no quantitative comparisons of multiple organizations were carried out.

3.4.4 Suggestions for further research

Analysis of project planning techniques revealed that the preferred approach is actually the triangulation between LFA and PRA. Very little research has been done on the various ways in which the two methods can be combined.

I believe it would be constructive to carry out a detailed research focused exclusively on NGO networking. The theme has been analyzed here, but perhaps it was not possible to explore it with the depth it deserves.


• Dagron, A. G. (2006), 'Knowledge, communication, development: a perspective from Latin America', Development in Practice,16:6,593 — 602
• DANIDA (1992) Guidelines for Project Preparation, Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• Devereux, P. (2008), ‘International volunteering for development and sustainability: outdated paternalism or a radical response to globalization?’, Development in Practice,18:3,357 — 370


• GTZ (1988) ZOPP (An Introduction to the Method), Frankfurt: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH.

• Hailey, J. (1999), ‘Charismatic Autocrats or Development Leaders? Characteristic of First Generation NGO Leadership’, draft presented on the UK Development Studies Association Conference, University of Bath, September
• Hailey, J., James, R. (2004), ‘Trees Die From the Top’: International Perspectives on
NGO Leadership Development”, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and
Nonprofit Organizations Vol. 15, No. 4, December 2004


Effective Local Nonprofit Organizations’, American Review of Public Administration,
30, 146–160.

Effectiveness in Local Nonprofit Organizations’, Nonprofit Management and
Leadership, 7, 373–386.


Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives’, Academy of

contracts, asset ownership, and job design’, Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, 7, 24–52.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds) ‘Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials’, New


Donors’, London: Macmillan

Press


• Project Cycle Management Handbook (2002), European Commission, EuropeAid Co-operation Office


