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"WHY NOT TOGETHER?" HOW DIFFERENT ROLES REGULATE INCLINATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A *PEER-TO-PEER* ACCESS-BASED MARKET

Rio de Janeiro
December, 2016

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Dissertação para obtenção de grau de mestre apresentada à Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas

Área de Concentração: Ciências Comportamentais e de Tomada de Decisão

Orientador: Fabio Caldieraro

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RESUMO

Este estudo trata de mercados (na perspectiva de oferta e de demanda) baseados na partilha de bens, um tipo de comércio que está passando por um processo de inovação. Resultado das relações de partilha, o mercado *baseado no acesso* caracteriza-se pela diminuição da tradicional maneira de comprar e vender a propriedade de produtos e começo (ou aumento) da compra e venda do acesso a esses bens. Apesar do compartilhamento ser uma prática bem conhecida, a internet não só mudou a dinâmica como ela acontece como também multiplicou sua adoção. Surpreendentemente, análises dos possíveis papéis que as pessoas adotam e como esses papéis se relacionam com os itens compartilhados ainda não foram feitas em moldes acadêmicos. Este artigo cobre parte dessas lacunas, levantando a hipótese de que as pessoas continuam tendo sentimentos de ganhos e perdas quando estão compartilhando, o que é comumente observado em situações em que estão comprando ou vendendo. Mais do que isso, este estudo está atento às diferenças nos *papéis* das pessoas (consumidor x provedor) e às *intensidades* de compartilhamento e como isso interfere na propensão a compartilhar, verificando o esforço que cada papel faz para mudar (ou não) de condições distintas de intensidade da partilha e, mapeando os principais antecedentes que determinaram os julgamentos de cada papel quando inseridos em um processo de compartilhamento. Os resultados sugerem que quanto maior (menor) a intensidade da partilha, maior a propensão dos fornecedores (consumidores) a compartilhar; isso porque a *propriedade psicológica* se manifesta de forma distinta entre os papéis: os provedores estão ligados aos seus bens e ao controle sobre eles, enquanto os consumidores valorizam mais o dinheiro envolvido na troca e a privacidade como benefício adquirido com ele. Neste contexto, cinco grupos de antecedentes representam 80% de todas as razões para se inserir ou não de um processo de partilha.

Palavras-chave: Sharing, Access-based market, roles.

ABSTRACT

This study is about markets (supply and demand) based on sharing, a type of exchange that is going through an innovation process. In an *access-based* market, people diminish the traditional way of buying and selling the ownership of products and start (or increase) to buy and sell the access to these goods. Despite the well-known practice of sharing things, the internet not only changed this dynamic but also multiplied its adoption. Surprisingly, the relationship between people's possible roles and their shared goods has not been explored in several academic perspectives. This article addresses part of these gaps, hypothesizing that people still carry on feelings of gains and losses when they are sharing as is commonly observed in situations in which they are buying or selling, enlarging previous researches. More than that, this study is attentive to the *roles* of people (consumer x provider) and *intensity of sharing* on willingness to share, checking the effort that each role makes to change (or not) the intensity of sharing and, mapping the main antecedents that determined the judgments of each role when about to share. Results suggest that the higher (or lower) the intensity of sharing, the higher is the providers' (or consumers') propensity to share; this because the *psychological ownership* manifests divergently between roles: providers value their assets more and the control over them, while consumers value their money and the privacy acquired with it. In this realm, five groups of antecedents represent 80% of all reasons for whether or not people engage in sharing.

Keywords: Sharing, Access-based market, roles.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, people are vivaciously integrated thanks to the internet. Among the uncountable transformations that such a platform has been creating, certainly "...distributing what is ours to others for their use and/or the act and process of receiving or taking something from others for our use" (Belk 2007, p. 127) is one of the most perceptible behaviors that is being readopted and rearranged through this mechanism. This practice has been creating a novel branch in the tree of economy; it is not difficult to find someone that has already experienced *sharing* music, a house, knowledge, a car, some tools or even his/her feelings through the web. Common sense sees consumer behavior based on people's attitudes toward properties that may be managed through transference of custody, and apparently only in this way. The custom of buying and selling items is intuitively thought to be the unique "pattern" by which people may commercialize products; individuals' choices are not driven completely by feelings of acquisition and forfeiture (Dahr and Wertenbroch 2000) of ownership but also by feelings of gain and loss of access. In this process of gaining and losing access, there is a temporary connection between people and products.

The act of sharing something is not unknown or new, it has arguably been present as long as humankind. Recently, however, digital devices are transforming the way people may commercialize products, changing the market dynamic and consequently leading us certainly to share more, as well as more broadly, than ever before. This tendency is getting easier to notice and comprehend as days go on. As sharing a drilling machine or a vehicle with a relative, these practices exemplify the fact that we can often exchange something without losing or gaining its integral property. Sharing, as a behavior, has been commonly understood as an attitude that happens between familiar people as parents and children, brothers and sisters or even among neighborhoods or school friends that unsurprisingly divide their clothes, toys, and personal objects. Newly, this need for "minimal proximity" between the "sharers" is sinking and the new perspective that is emerging affects individuals' possibilities by expanding their margins to people who are not only within their limits of familiarity and friendship, but much beyond.

In modern days, the desire to have constantly more and more ownership seems to be less of a priority than it was once. People gradually are comprehending that an unbridled consumption based on buying and selling items, in many instances, is not functional (in the broadest definition) anymore, meaning an unintelligent attitude of mature consumption. Why should we buy a car if

we can rent one for half the daily cost? Or sell ours if we may make regular money leasing this asset? What about staying in an apartment that we have never imagined that we could for a fair price (with no concerns about cleaning and security) and in the periods that are interesting to us? Visionaries, aware of these possibilities, have been creating several platforms to manage and facilitate this process, that is, to bring together those who own desirable items with those who aspire for access to them; a *peer-to-peer* market-mediated relation. In contrast to the solid emotional, social and property relations embedded in a market of ownership transference, access is a more transitory mode of consumption, enabling flexibility and adaptability suitable for fluid markets. Accessing through sharing has emerged as a way to manage the challenges of a liquid society (Bardhi, Eckhardt and Arnould 2012). But even though these advantages are being provided by a vast presence of platforms where assets may be shared (i.e. *Craigslist*, *Uber*, *Airbnb*, *Wikipedia*), people still seem uncomfortable with the idea of dividing something. Furthermore, while the *psychological ownership* (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2003) is still salient on them, a great proportion of "accumulators" will continue to stiffen the economy. The factors behind individuals' cognitive processes that feed sharing economies and how these factors perform to enable sharing are some examples that may be explored by academicians of the consumption field in this auspicious topic.

The study of sharing in the consumer behavior stream remained scarcely explored theoretically and empirically for several years. Recently, there was an increase of studies about sharing via the internet, including series of books, articles, and web discussions on the topic, but the net result is still minimal compared to others spheres. Some papers like Rifkin (2000) checked if the consumption of access produced a different object-self relationship compared to ownership. Oreg and Nov (2008) explored motivations associated to open source initiatives (software). Chen (2009) developed an empirical study of experiential access to art via museums and galleries to see the sense of community. Ozanne and Ballantine (2010) explored the anti-consumption reasons behind the sharing adoption rather than owning. Moeller and Wittkowski (2010) analyzed different consumer preferences associated with possession versus access in a peer-to-peer sharing online network. Albinsson and Perera (2012) developed a study in non-monetary events to check the sense of community. Bardhi and Eckhardt (2012) worked on the sense of mutuality across Zipcar's users. Jai and King (2016) dived into the effect of loyalty

programs on *willingness to share* (WTS)[1] personal information. Despite the presence of studies, the stream is still passing through a "embodying process" and losing its invisibility in the consumer literature. Belk (2010) listed some reasons explaining why there has been an underutilization of sharing studies. According to him, one is that sharing has sometimes been treated as either *gift exchange* or *commodity exchange*, not having its "own soul". The second reason is that sharing may escape recognition and it is an activity that is more characteristic of the interior world of the home rather than the exterior worlds of work and the market. The last explanation concerns the majority of daily sharing of food, money, and possessions that goes unnoticed and is not perceived by most people for whom it is routine.

This reality motivated the development of this work, not only because there is still much to be explored about the theme, but also because of its relevance considering the growing representativeness of transactions based on sharing to compose the modern economies. Academicians in consumer research pay little attention to the sharing phenomenon, although this is critical to comprehend consumption further. Sharing is essential to the current style of market that exists in the internet realm. There is an undeniable role of sharing in consumer behavior; therefore, there is a great necessity to make this area more representative, developing new explorations. The understanding that people assume different roles when exchanging ownership is well explored (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Carmon and Ariely 2000; Hanemann 1991), but nothing has been done in this direction adopting market by access. This is a great example about the lack of work in the area.

People may perform as different players in market transactions and these roles may determine the way they make a decision. This assertion has been deeply studied outside the *sharing* environment. As long as people do different tasks, they have distinct perspectives, contrasted parameters; thus, elicit peculiar evaluations, making distinct decisions.

Working with two experiments and one exploratory survey, my research examines the two possible roles that people may assume when sharing an object: providing or consuming it. Furthermore, I also apply different intensities for sharing an object. Thus, I check if people's WTS a good is different depending on the roles assumed by them and on the intensity of sharing

[1]WTS is conceptualized as the propensity to give personal items to others people for their utilization (providers' perspective) or the propensity to get other people's items for personal use (consumers' perspective); in this transaction the time for use is limited and no ownership transference takes place (author's definition).

where these roles take place (study 1). Further, I extend the way this product is evaluated, bringing the literature of *willing to pay* and *willing to accept* (WTP/WTA),[2] quantifying the value of the product and exploring the minimum prices that people establish to change from a 'pleasant' to an 'unpleasant' condition (study 2). Finally, I name the antecedents that possibly predict the behaviors observed in study 1 and 2 (complementary study).

Thus, my research has four main objectives: the first is to confirm the differences between roles of people (provider x consumer) through their propensities to share products; the second is to check how intensity of sharing (low x high) is processed across roles; the third is to quantify the WTS across conditions, therefore checking prices for change and probabilities for an agreement between roles; and the fourth is to investigate possible predictors that affect people's decision making when they are about to share.

In addressing these objectives, this research contributes to discussions about *extended self* (Belk 1988, 2013), *psychological ownership* (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2003), *endowment effect* theory (Thaler 1980) and *loss aversion* concept (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). Prior contributions on ownership and extended self, for example, have focused on a huge variety of studies from child development (Isaacs 1933) to psychological and neurophysiological mechanisms on branding affection (Reimann et. al 2012). The *endowment effect* and *loss aversion* have been used is an uncountable number of studies in marketing, psychology, finance, accounting and consumer behavior (So et. al 2015; Brown 2005; Weaver and Frederick 2009; Frederick 2012; Reb and Connolly 2007). I am adding value for these four concepts by aggregating an analysis of growing perspective of sharing.

2. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT

2.1 *Ownership* and the development of *Extended Self*

To comprehend further sharing behavior, it is necessary to understand that behind the process of dividing an object there is a feeling of possession that must be assimilated. This excitement of ownership toward various objects has important and potentially strong psychological and behavioral effects (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2003).

[2]WTP is the propensity to pay and buy an object's ownership or access; WTA is the propensity to accept and sell the same object's ownership or access.

The idea that we are what we have (Van Esterick 1986; Feirstein 1986; Rosenbaum 1972; Sartre 1943) may be the most primitive and compelling fact in consumer behavior. The premise that we regard our possessions as parts of ourselves is not new. Belk (1988, 2013) said that possessions can also symbolically *extend self*, as when a uniform or trophy allows us to convince ourselves (and others) that we are a different person, who we would not be without them. Belk also claims that having possessions can contribute to our capabilities for doing and being, where people seek, express, confirm, and ascertain a sense of being through what they have. Tuan (1980, p. 472) argued that "our fragile sense of self needs support and this we get by having and possessing things because, to a large degree, we are what we have and possess". The only logical explanation for why to have something is to amplify our sense of self and that the only way we can know who we are is by examining what we have. In other words, having and being are different but inseparable. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) provided a more psychological explanation in suggesting that we invest "psychic energy" in an object to which we have directed our efforts, time, and attention. This energy and its products are regarded as a part of self because they have grown or emerged from the self. The same principle has been suggested to apply to objects that are appropriated from others (Veblen 1898).

Accompanying maturation and an awareness of social relationships, people move toward experiences of ownership involving more complex three-way relationships (i.e.: self–object–other). As a result, individuals begin to think of possessions in terms of *meum et tuum* (this is mine and not yours; that is yours and not mine), which leads to the importance of controlling the possessions (Tuan 1984; Furby 1978; McClelland 1951). These studies suggested that external objects become viewed as part of the self when we are able to exercise *power or control* over them, just as we might control an arm or a leg. In the case of tools or instruments, envisioning the basis for the extended self metaphor is easy. The greater the control we exercise, the more closely allied with the self the object should become. Self-extension occurs not only through control and mastery of an object, but also through creation of an object, through knowledge of an object, and through contamination via proximity and habituation to an object. The extended self operates not only on an individual level, but also on a collective level involving family, group, sub cultural and national identities. These additional levels of self were posited to account for certain behaviors that might be seen as selfless in the narrower individual sense of self (Belk, 1988). Still, this author summarized that the major categories of extended self are our body, internal

processes, ideas, and experiences, and those persons, places, and things to which one feels attached. Of these categories, the last three appear to be the most clearly extended. However, given the difficulties in separating mind and body in philosophies and psychologies of the self, objects in all of these categories are treated as parts of the extended self. Owning an item has the function of providing to people both an identity and a place as well (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2003). A key to understand what possession means is recognizing that, knowingly or unknowingly, intentionally or unintentionally, we regard our possessions as parts of extended self. It is seen not to be limited to external objects and personal possessions, but also includes persons, places, and group possessions.

The radical hedonism based on possession has been criticized (Fromm 1976; Marx 1930) based on the constant having mode of existence that see things, experience, time, and life itself as possessions to be acquired and retained constantly. In the alternate being mode of existence that Fromm proposes, this orientation to have is rejected in favor of an opposing orientation to share, to give, and to sacrifice. The outcome of practicing this being mode of existence, according to Fromm, is to realize one's identity without the threat of losing it, a threat that is inherent in a solid society (Bauman 2000).

2.2 Sharing and the access-based market

The attitude of giving our assets to other people for their utilization as well as getting other people's assets for our personal use was previously conceptualized as a *sharing* behavior. John (2013) notes that sharing carries in itself interdependence, trust, community, leveling, selflessness, giving, and caring, a virtual kumbaya of joy, commensality, and fellowship, even if the majority of those with whom we are sharing are unseen and unknown others. When sharing, two or more people may enjoy the benefits (or costs) that flow from possessing a thing. Rather than distinguishing what is mine and what is yours, sharing defines what is ours. The literature about sharing behavior raises a variety of other similar notions that may be apparently the same but in fact they are not. Some are familiar and commonly spoken such as *lending* and *borrowing* (Tinson and Nutall 2008). Others are intuitive as *gift giving* and *commodity exchange* (Belk 2010). On the other hand some are more technical definitions such as *sharing in* and *sharing out* (Ingold 1986) and *pseudo-sharing* (Belk 2014). All of these terms may be distinguished and further comprehended in Table 1.

We may share a vacation home, a park bench, or a bag of jelly beans; besides, we may also share more abstract things like knowledge, responsibility, or power. In each case all of those involved in this process have something (a share) of the costs or benefits of a thing.

TABLE 1

THE MAIN CONCEPTS IN THE FIELD OF SHARING

	Term	Definition	Example
Belk, Russell. "Sharing." Journal of consumer research 36.5 (2010): 715-734.	**Sharing In**	Sharing in is closer to the prototype of sharing within the family in that it involves regarding ownership as common, such that the others are included within the aggregate extended self.	Sharing a car with family or a couple.
	Sharing Out	Sharing out involves giving to others outside the boundaries separating self and other, and is closer to gift giving and commodity exchange.	Sharing a car within a large-scale commercial
	Gift Giving	Form of exchange that is friendlier than buying or ex-changing commodities. Is a holdout or counterforce to the encroachment of the market. Gifts make friends, express love, and celebrate human bonds.	Products given on birthdays, Valentine's days, Christmas and so on.
	Commodity Exchange	Commodity exchange is about the reproduction of rights to objects, not the reproduction of relationships between people. Therefore, ideally the exchange is simultaneous so that there is no lingering debt to tie the parties to one another.	Paying for a laundry service, taxi, tourism support.
Belk, Russell. "Sharing versus pseudo-sharing in Web 2.0." The Anthropologist 18.1 (2014): 7-23.	**Sharing**	The act and process of distributing what is ours to others for their use and/or the act and process of receiving or taking something from others for our use. (It is not profit-based, nonreciprocal and do not require a "thank you")	Writing a blog, product exchange (regarding feeling of community), MP3 file sharing, hosting
	Pseudo-Sharing	Is a business relationship masquerading as sharing. Pseudo-sharing is distinguished by the presence of profit motives, the absence of feelings of community, and expectations of reciprocity. It may not be altogether unwelcome and it may be beneficial to all parties as well as friendly to the environment.	Short and long-terms cars' rentals, SNSs information share.
Tinson, Julie and Peter Nuttall (2008), "Insider Trading? Exploring Familial Intra-generational Borrowing and Sharing," European Advances in Consumer Research,8,41–42	Lending/Borrowing	Although it is a one- way (i.e., nonreciprocal) temporary use of durable goods, nevertheless it has some elements of gift giving. So long as it is not "covert borrowing," it would likely generate a thank you.	Borrow/Lend a pencil, a book or a dress.

Note: Table developed by the author.

Undoubtedly, new technologies and the internet have changed the way people manage these things. Individuals are closer, their communication easier, the commercial structures less bureaucratic, the services less regulated, wishes and practices more tied than they have ever been before. And as part of much of this novel scenario are the sharing initiatives, largely represented by virtual platforms. It is true that these tools have opened up new possibilities for both *sharing* and *pseudo-sharing* (see Table 1). Bringing people together for both communal and utilitarian purposes is now greatly simplified compared to pre-internet days. Before the advent of the internet, if you wished to find others with a passion for series, creating a model to build airplanes, discovering how to prepare foods without *know how* of cooking or even having access to top papers, it would be a tough challenge. What may start as *sharing out* may quickly become *sharing in*. The internet is a realm that hypnotizes us, showing its charms, making us participate, interact and very likely engage to share.

One of the possibilities renewed by the web service and by sharing practices is the *access based market* (Botsman and Rogers 2010), defined as transactions that can be market-mediated but where no transfer of ownership takes place (Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012). In a *peer-to-peer* access-based perspective (the case of this work), two (or more) individuals exchange the access (get and/or give) and a company just participates to mediate the process. While possessions and property continue to exist, they are less likely to be exchanged in the market (Rifkin 2000). Instead of buying/selling the ownership of things, consumers now want access to goods, and prefer to pay for the experience of briefly accessing it. Ownership is no longer the ultimate expression of consumer desire (Marx 2011). Some instances of access-based markets, built on collaborative models, vary from car or bike sharing programs (i.e. *Uber*, *Zipcar*, *ItaúBike*), to online borrowing programs for bags, fashion or jewelry (i.e. *Netflix*, *Bag Borrower Steal*, *Rent The Runway*). The access-based concept is just one member present in the potential realm of sharing studies. Academicians have been working on many concepts to treat the act of sharing, bringing other definitions that are straightforwardly linked, such as: *the mesh* (Gansky et. al 2010), *commercial sharing systems* (Lamberton and Rose 2012), *co-creation* (Lanier and Schau 2007), *co-production* (Humphreys and Grayson 2008), *prosumption* (Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010), *product-service systems* (Mont 2002), *access-based consumption* (Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012), *consumer participation* (Fitzsimmons 1985) and *online volunteering* (Postigo 2003). All of these terms bring similar ideas. Within this maze of terms, it is sometimes difficult to discern where

sharing ends and commerce begins. Table 2 summarizes these terms and the studies in which they were built.

The stream of sharing is in an attempt to understand people's behavior when they have an opportunity to share, observing this attitude and how it performs in others contexts, like: d*iversity* - the occupational similarity broke down barriers between self and other and increased the likelihood of a certain form of sharing (Lastovicka and Fernandez 2005); *me x other* - we seem more willing to share our children's possessions than our own (Gregson and Crewe 2003); *online x offline environments* –

TABLE 2

PREVIOUS WORKS IN SHARING STREAM

RESEARCH	NAME	ABSTRACT
Botsman, Rachel, and Roo Rogers. "What's mine is yours." *The Rise of Collaborative Consumption* (2010).	Collaborative consumption	This theoretical review distinguishes the concepts and features between *sharing in* and *sharing out*.
Gansky, L. (2010). The mesh: Why the future of business is sharing. New York: Portfolio Penguin	The mesh	Her book conceptualizes "The Mesh" as a new dynamic in which consumers are based on network-enabled sharing, on access rather than ownership. The strategy is to sell the same product multiple times. She anlyses this new trend.
Lamberton, C., & Rose, R. (2012).When is ours better than mine? A framework for understanding and altering participation in commercial sharing systems. Journal of Marketing, 76,109–125.	Commercial sharing systems	Here, the authors conceptualize commercial sharing systems within a typology of shared goods. Using three studies, they demonstrate that beyond cost-related benefits of sharing, the perceived risk of scarcity related to sharing is a central determinant of its attractiveness. The results suggest that managers can use perceptions of personal and sharing partners' usage patterns to affect risk perceptions and subsequent propensity to participate in a commercial sharing system
Lanier, C., & Schau, H. (2007). Culture and co-creation: Exploring consumers' inspirations and aspirations for writing and posting online fan fiction. In R. Belk, & J. SherryJr. (Eds.), Consumer culture theory: Research in consumer behavior, Vol. 11. (pp. 321–342)Amsterdam: Elsevier.	Co-creation	This paper explores how consumers use the media products of mass culture to co-create the meanings of popular culture. (They use a Harry Potter case to comprehend why and how this co-creation takes place).
Humphreys, A., & Grayson, K. (2008). The intersecting roles of consumer and producer: A critical perspective on co-production, co-creation and prosumption. Sociological Compass, 2,963–980.	Co-production	The authors built their work analyzing consumers performing tasks usually handled by the company and consumers producing exchange value for companies. At the end they check in which case there this does represent a fundamental change.
Ritzer, G., & Jurgenson, N. (2010). Production, consumption, prosumption: The nature of capitalism in the age of the digital 'prosumer'. Journal of Consumer Culture, 10,13–36.	Prosumption	This article states about the rise of prosumer capitalism which involves both *production* and *consumption* created by the same person. This work emerge also the nowadays' trend toward unpaid rather than paid labor and toward offering products at no cost, and the system marked by a new abundance where scarcity once predominated.
Mont, O. (2002). Clarifying the concept of product-service system. Journal of Cleaner Production, 10,237–245.	Product-service systems	This work build a framework based on the concept of product-service systems (PSSs), that is a new way of minimizing the impact on environment. It also identify alternatives to adopt such dynamic and finish maping three main uncertainties stated in this work regarding the applicability and feasibility of PSSs: the readiness of companies to adopt them, the readiness of consumers to accept them, and their environmental implications.
Bardhi, F., & Eckhardt, G. (2012). Access based consumption: The case of car sharing. Journal of Consumer Research, 39,881–898.	Access-based consumption	This work defines the concept of access-based consumprion (transactions that can be market mediated but where no transfer of ownership takes place) and build a study around Zipcar company and custumers' feelings about it.
Fitzsimmons, J. (1985). Consumer participation and productivity in service operations. Interfaces, 15,60–67.	Consumer participation	This classic work deals about how operations managers have traditionally increased productivity by substituting machines for labor, simplifying work, and devising employee incentive plans. States also about how consumer represents an untapped productive resource. A service delivery system can be designed to permit greater consumer involvement in the production process thereby achieving productivity gains and revising the concept of employment.
Postigo, H. (2003). Emerging sources of labor on the Internet: The case of America online volunteers. International Review of Social History, 48,205–223.	Online volunteering	AOL case.

Note: Table developed by the author.

online cooperative arenas are more conducive to sharing than offline real world arenas (Giesler 2006; Hemetsberger 2006); online sharing is a good predictor of offline sharing, although direction of influence is a question as well (Gaskins 2010); *community sense* - physical presence is not needed in order to develop a sense of community in such online sites (Steinkeuhler and Williams 2006). This last topic has a considerable number of studies (Martin 2008; Born 2011; Brown and Sellen 2006).

Despite these examples, it is right to claim that few studies have been done that consider the future of the field; not surprisingly, studies, until now, ignored the role that people may play when they are sharing. This divergence in roles was vastly explored analyzing ownership transference, but not in the access dimension. I try to cover this gap.

2.3 One person, two roles

People behave differently depending on which task they perform. In usual commercial transactions based on ownership transference, they may wear consumer or provider accoutrements. That is, on one side, there are those who are about to buy the possession of an item; on the other side, there are those who are in position to sell it. In a peer-to-peer access-based market, this logic is not much different; the main asymmetry among the roles refers to who gets and who gives the *access* of an item. The two possible roles that people may perform are not only settled in their task but rather, it is established by how they evaluate each exchange and consequently which final decision they take.

The *endowment effect* (Thaler 1980) and the *loss aversion* (Kahneman and Tversky 1984) concepts cover much of this cognitive difference across consumers' and providers' decisions. The first theory claims that people often demand much more to give up (providers) an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it (consumers). The second says that the disutility of giving up (providers) an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it (consumers). Expanding on this idea, the literature of *willingness to pay* and to *accept* (WTP/WTA) claims that the lowest price at which consumers agree to part from a good (selling price) is often considerably higher than the highest price at which they agree to acquire the same item (buying price). This assertion has been largely explored (Liberman, Samuels and Ross 2004; Rege and

Telle 2004; Hershey, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker 1982) to confirm the natural estimation gap across roles. The lack between selling and buying prices is typically described as a manifestation of loss aversion (Bar-Hillel and Neter 1996) and that is why people may diverge depending on the role they are in. In the realm of ownership, the losses and gains involve the property, but in the access realm, the losses and gains considered by individuals refer to limited connection with an item. More than this, both roles have different considerations, depending what exchange (which items) is being managed. Hence, Carmon and Ariely (2000) claimed that, in a commercial transaction, the buying-price estimation tends to correspond more closely to feelings regarding the expenditure, whereas selling-price estimates correspond more closely to feelings about forgoing ownership of the asset. Unfortunately, few studies examined this issue to check if the same behavior takes place in an access-based market. This work and its hypothesis were developed in an attempt to do that.

3. HYPOTHESIS

An access-based market is defined as transactions that can be market-mediated but where no transfer of ownership takes place. Instead of buying and owning things, consumers want access to goods, and prefer to pay for the experience of temporarily accessing them. (Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012). In this form of consumption, despite the inexistence of losses and gains of property, there are the losses and gains of access. Pierce, Kostova and Dirks (2003) claimed that not only the entire property but also a piece of a targeted item (proportionate by the temporary access) could be thought of as “theirs” (providers or consumers); thus, I presume that, despite the absence of ownership exchange, both roles still consider access as a temporary manifestation of ownership. Consumers and providers, when facing the possibility of dealing an item temporarily (getting or giving), bring with them necessity for control, identity and home.

Considering this, in the access-based sphere, the utilization of an asset may occur under low and high degrees of sharing. In *low-intensity* contexts of sharing (where there is a small integration between the parts, for instance, a significant absence of provider – or consumer – during the process of sharing), there is a limited capacity of exercising control by providers (those who give the access). Hence, they will tend to have a low WTS without having this control in their hands (until they achieve an acceptable level of controllability). Consumers (those who get the access), comprehend the environments of low-intensity as a benefit (low control from

providers, enhancing their home and control sense, for instance). On the contrary, in contexts of *high-intensity* sharing (where there is a high integration between the parts during the process of sharing an item), the control by providers will remain elevated because of their physical presence during the process, permitting them to exert power, and therefore, the comfort to share more. For consumers, the benefit of controllability will be restricted, and this will reduce their WTS. Under both roles, there are gains and losses involved. The difference in their WTS will be settled in what is being lost and gained according to the role (i.e. control, privacy). The maintenance of control is crucial for providers in a way that losing it is more painful that gaining more "exclusivity". Consumers' loss of "exclusivity" and control go together. Therefore, I hypothesize:

H1a: In low-intensity contexts of sharing, consumers will be more willing to share (WTS) than providers;
H2b: In high-intensity contexts of sharing, providers will be more willing to share (WTS) than consumers.

According to the *endowment effect*, people tend to pay more to keep something they own than to obtain something they do not own, even when there is no cause for attachment, or even if the item was only acquired minutes ago (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). In an exchange paradigm, people given a good are reluctant to trade it for another good of similar value. When an item is a part of one's endowment, giving it up is perceived as a loss, whereas passing up the opportunity to obtain the same item is perceived as a forgone gain. According to the basic idea of *loss aversion*, losses have greater hedonic impact than gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991); that is, letting go of an item is more painful than not obtaining this same item. The gap between selling and buying prices presumably reflects this difference in pain. As long as my predictions foresee that the access-based market carries features of ownership transference, I anticipate that in both intensity of sharing conditions, providers weigh the burden of possibly "giving it up" and/or "letting it go", because they are in the role which gives the access and then carries the ownership burden; thus:

H2a: Providers will evaluate their items (WTA) more than the consumers (WTP) in both intensity conditions;

H2b: The effort to change from an acceptable condition of sharing intensity to an unacceptable one is higher for providers than for consumers; that is, the addition in providers' WTA will be significantly higher to change from a high to low-intensity sharing condition compared to the discount in the consumers' WTP to change from a low to high-intensity sharing condition.

4 STUDY 1

In study 1, I tested my predictions that providers and consumers behave differently under different peer-to-peer access based contexts (low x high). One might imagine that the WTS of a person is not linked and/or is constant to the position in which that person is inserted (as a giver or a getter). However, because there is a permanent state of *psychological ownership* present in both consumers and providers, they tend to share (WTS) less without being able to exercise, for example, the control inherent to this state. Consumers see the provider's increase in control as a decrease of an item's benefits, while providers see the opposite. Hence, low-intensity environments of sharing are preferred by consumers since there is a loss of controllability by the providers. On the other hand, high-sharing environments are preferred by providers; once in this situation, they may keep their control over their asset. Thus, study one analyzes if under low-intensity (high-intensity) sharing contexts, consumers (providers) are WTS more than providers (consumers).

4.1 Method

4.1.1 Overview

This study employed a 2 (role of people: consumer vs. provider) x 2 (intensity of sharing: low vs. high) between-subjects design. Two hundred and thirty five participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. Responses were collected online through a *Qualtrics* link and through *Amazon's mTurk* under the supervision of the author. The scenarios simulated an opportunity to share an apartment with another person; in each of these scenarios, I manipulated the roles that subjects assumed and the intensities of sharing. Specifically, I displayed an apartment in which the owner and the host would stay apart (low-intensity condition) and an apartment in which the owner and the host would stay together (high-intensity condition). Moreover, I varied whether the participant might give access to the apartment

(provider) or if the participant was getting access to it (consumer). Then, I obtained their WTS the apartment.

4.1.2 Stimuli

The scenario of a peer-to-peer access-based market described the possible access (giving/provider x getting/consumer) to a "*two-bedroom apartment conveniently located close to the beach with a pleasant view*" as an option for the respondent to stay in or lease (depending the condition of role of people) "*during a weeklong entertainment event*" of his/her interest. It is important to note that I fixed the product with mixed features, that is, with hedonic and utilitarian characteristics[3] (no prevalence of one type) across conditions; this decision nullifies any effect related to product characteristics. I tested if the product was balanced across features in the manipulation check.

In the provider condition, the respondent owned an apartment and had an opportunity to lease. In the consumer condition, he/she had the option to stay in it temporarily. Moreover, in the low-intensity (high-intensity) condition, the respondent was not staying present (staying present) in the space. The formal scheme is presented in appendix D.

4.1.3 Procedure

The experiment was framed as a study that attempted to collect information about consumers' attitudes when facing decisions that involve risk and uncertainty.

Participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which an enticing weeklong entertainment event would take place: a) in the city that the respondent lives (providers) *or* b) in another city of the country (consumers), which would bring an opportunity to lease an apartment. Respondents, across the conditions, were asked to answer how likely they would be to offer (providers) or rent (consumers) the apartment. The main difference is that in the low-intensity condition, both providers and consumers would stay in different locations, separated. In the high-intensity situation, they would share the same space, dividing the apartment. Finally, participants rated their WTS using a *Likert* scale ranging from 1 to 7 (from "extremely unlikely" to

[3] Hedonic goods are those whose consumption is primarily characterized by an affective and sensory experience of aesthetic, sensual pleasure, fantasy and fun. On the other hand, utilitarian products are those that are seen as useful, practical, functional and may help to achieve a goal (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1982).

"extremely likely"). With this measure, I assessed people's preferences comparing not only the roles that they performed, but also considering the intensity of sharing of their situation.

Participants were also asked to state their agreement (on a seven-point *likert* scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree) with: a) the process of sharing and the manifestation of their identity in this process: "*an object that I share with another person is an object that says something about my identity*", b) their feeling of gaining (losing) in the sharing process: "*when I am sharing something that does not belong to me, I feel that I am gaining (losing) it (or part of it)*", c) the frequency of their use of collaborative platforms (on a seven-point *likert* scale, where 1 = never and 7 = all the time) and also, d) the convenience of sharing things (on a seven-point *likert* scale, where 1 = totally inconvenient and 7 = totally convenient).

4.1.4 Manipulation check

Sharing intensity. On average, participants from the four conditions understood the scenarios as environments where there was a sharing process. For instance, consumers in high-intensity and providers in low-intensity conditions (the most different conditions) were compared and no statistical significance was found [Mc.high = 4.18; Mp.low = 4.05; $F(1, 113) = 0.12$, $p > .05$].

Type of product. The product was fixed across conditions; all the groups comprehended the apartment as slightly utilitarian (Moverall = 3.18; Mc.high = 2.90; Mc.low = 3.37; Mp.high = 2.97; Mp.low = 3.50). An ANOVA was performed to check the difference of means between the condition of the consumer in the high-intensity context compared to the condition of the provider in the low-intensity context (both with the highest difference of means); no significant difference was found; [$F(1, 113) = 3.48$, $p > .05$]. The objective regarding the type of product was to keep the feature of it mixed, that is, well balanced between hedonic and utilitarian characteristics. All the conditions evaluated it equally, and the characteristic stayed fixed across respondents.

Feelings of ownership. To test the access-based market validity, that is, to check if in fact there were not any perceptions about transfer of ownership, three main questions were posed to the subjects. The first question concerned *identity* through the process of sharing. An ANOVA revealed that all the conditions were similar (Moverall = 4.27; Mc.high = 4.09; Mc.low = 4.07; Mp.high = 4.37; Mp.low = 4.60) with no difference of means between the most distant conditions (Mp.low and Mc.low); [$F(1, 114) = 7.91$, $p = .05$]. The second and the third questions concerned *gain feeling* and *loss feeling*; to test both, two ANOVAs were used and all the results confirmed

the assumptions. Gain feeling: (Moverall = 3.59; Mc.high = 3.54; Mc.low = 3.47; Mp.high = 3.77; Mp.low = 3.59) with no difference of means between "Mp.high" and "Mc.low"; [F (1, 118) = 1.69, p > .05]. Loss feeling: (Moverall = 3.84; Mc.high = 3.81; Mc.low = 3.58; Mp.high = 3.95; Mp.low = 4.02) with no difference of means between "Mc.low" and "Mp.low"; [F (1, 114) = 2.17, p > .05].

Convenience. The time and energy expenditure/effort (Berry, Seiders and Grewat 2002) involved in a decision might be a barrier that prevents individuals from sharing an apartment with someone unfamiliar. That is, dividing the same space with a stranger may be inconvenient, determining the way providers and consumers evaluate such a possibility. I tested this extra factor through all conditions using a question that asked about "*sharing an apartment with a stranger for one week*". All the conditions provided similar results (see Table 5 in Appendix A).

4.1.5 Results

People's role. In support of hypothesis *H1a*, an ANOVA revealed that, in low-intensity contexts, there was a greater proportion of consumers' WTS (M = 5.05, SD = .22) than providers' (M = 3.36, SD = .27); [F (1, 114) = 24.41, p<.001]. On the other hand, under high-intensity contexts the preferences invert; in this environment, providers' WTS is higher (M = 4.15, SD = .25) than consumers' (M = 3.20, SD = .28); [F (1, 117) = 6.38, p < .05], confirming my hypothesis *H1b*.

Sharing intensity. Additionally, another ANOVA was performed to check the difference of sharing intensity means across the same role. Both roles, consumers [F (1, 117) = 101.44, p<.001] and providers [F (1, 114) = 18.21, p<.05] were significant.

Interaction. An initial ANOVA test showed an interaction between the two independent variables; [F (1, 231) = 26.93, p<.001]. Then, the simple main effects of each condition were performed.

FIGURE 1

WTS AS A FUNCTION OF PEOPLE'S ROLES AND SHARING INTENSITY



4.1.6 Discussion

The results indicate that participants in the consumer condition preferred to access an exclusive apartment, where sharing does not happen (or is superficial). On the contrary, providers, as a way to keep their control constant, are more willing to share under high-intensity conditions. Experiment 1, thus, corroborates that the people's roles influence the way people share. More than that, individuals consider the intensity of sharing as a determinant before engaging in access. The results showed that control (based on the *psychological ownership* concept) has a disproportional influence in roles:

Low intensity:

- Providers*: WTS.p = (-) Control.p (+) Privacy.p*
- Consumers*: WTS.c = (+) Control.c (+) Privacy.c*

High-intensity:

- Providers*: WTS.p = (+) Control.p (-) Privacy.p*
- Consumers*: WTS.c = (-) Control.c (-) Privacy.c*

As long as providers have a strong preference not to lose control, despite a loss of privacy (high-intensity condition), I may claim that:

- *Control.p > Privacy.p*

The logic above is comprehensible since interacting with the asset enables the providers to keep it, diminishing the risk and keeping the power over his/her product. For providers, the loss of control is more painful than the gain of privacy is beneficial; this explains why they are prone to share in high-intensity condition. Consumers, conversely, have control and privacy walking side by side, explaining why low-intensity sharing is advantageous. Thus, there is clearly a *burden of controllability* for providers that makes them exert excessive effort to keep it.

To go deeper in understanding consumers' and providers' movements in the contexts of sharing, experiment two introduces the concepts of WTP and WTA, examining the financial effort that each role makes to change their condition, that is, how much consumers and providers are prone to pay and accept, respectively, to go from a low-intensity context of sharing to a high-intensity context (and vice versa). This second experiment confirms the first study, quantifies the "prices for changing" and tracks the means people use to reach an agreement.

5 STUDY 2

Study 2 had three objectives. The first, and most important, was to check in which sharing contexts an agreement between people's roles is more likely to occur. The second was to quantify consumers' propensity to pay to have access (WTP) and providers' propensity to allow access to consumers (WTA). The third was to give robustness to the findings of the first study by observing if the interaction proved before in fact takes place within a different design. As the first experiment showed, despite the fact there is no ownership transference between consumers and providers in an access-based context, typical ownership features (need for control) are still present when access is being considered. Thus, comprehensions that were assumed to be exclusive to losing/gaining ownership deals (for instance, WTP/WTA) are expected to be present also in sharing environments and to operate similarly to ownership circumstances. Therefore, consumers' WTP will be always lower than providers' WTA, but this relationship will be narrower under high-intensity conditions as experiment one suggested. Thus, my forecast is in accordance with previous studies in the WTP/WTA literature based on ownership transference (Olsen and Smith 2001; Carmon and Ariely 2000), but now applied in situations of sharing.

5.1 Method

5.1.1 Overview

This study employed a 2 (role of people: consumer vs. provider) x 2 (intensity of sharing: low-to-high vs. high-to-low) within-subjects design. One hundred and twenty-five respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. Slightly different from the previous study, answers were collected online only through *Amazon's mTurk* under the supervision of the author. The design asked respondents assigned to the consumer's conditions to specify their WTP to rent an apartment in a first scenario (low-sharing intensity or high-sharing intensity) and after they elicited their WTP to rent the same apartment but now in the opposite scenario (i.e. if the first scenario was presented as a high-intensity sharing then the following one would be framed as low-intensity and vice versa). The same pattern was applied to the respondents who were assigned to the provider's conditions, but asking about their WTA the apartment. The features of the apartment and the roles of people were kept constant, as in the first experiment.

5.1.2 Stimuli

All four scenarios had the following differences compared to the first experiment:

- WTP and WTA were free elicitations, that is, subjects answered open-ended questions to establish their prices. The dependent variable was then obtained and after this the ratio of differences (R) was calculated to check the level of the differences (see equations 1 and 2 bellow).[4]

$$(1) \quad R = \frac{\sum_i WTAi}{\sum_i WTPj}$$

$$(2) \quad R = \frac{\sum_i WTSproviders}{\sum_i WTSconsumers}$$

- A reference price was previously provided to give a realistic idea about the region of analyses from the sample.[5]

[4] In the second equation, the two dependent variables of the first equations (WTP and WTA) were reframed as WTS.
[5] The reference price was adopted based on the *myapartment.com* which provides the average rental price of many apartments in each region of U.S. monthly.

- The order of sharing intensity (high-to-low x low-to-high) was counterbalanced through conditions to identify possible order bias.

5.1.3 Procedure

The experiment was framed as a survey which aimed to collect information about housing costs and market tendencies in different regions of United States.

First, participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which an important weeklong entertainment event (that was of interest to both roles) would take place in a city in Florida, USA[6]. This city varied from a city that the respondents currently lived in (for providers) to another city in Florida in which respondents did not live (for consumers). Respondents had to indicate the rental price they were WTA (providers) and WTP (consumers) to share the apartment depending on the situation (high-to-low x low-to-high). Take one example (high-to-low condition): first, providers (consumers) were asked to indicate a minimum price - WTA (WTP) – they would require to lease their apartment (rent someone's apartment) for one week, sharing the space with someone else (with the owner). After this first price evaluation, they had to establish a second price evaluation, now representing the value they were WTA (WTP) to let the guest stay alone (stay by himself/herself) in the same apartment. The conditions (high-to-low x low-to-high) varied across roles. Here, WTP and WTA were administered, and then consumers' and providers' WTS were measured.

5.1.4 Manipulation check

Sharing intensity. As in the first experiment, I tested how participants perceived sharing an apartment for a week. All of the participants evaluated the scenario similarly (Mc.low-to-high = 3.16; Mc.high-to-low = 2.90; Mp.low-to-high = 3.24; Mp.high-to-low = 3.41). Adopting the same technique as before, I ran an ANOVA to see the difference between the two most distant evaluations (Mc.high-to-low and Mp.high-to-low). The difference was not significant; [$F(1, 63) = 1.29$, $p > .05$].

Incentive compatible requirement. As the literature of WTP/WTA claims the importance of real payment and compatible incentives across conditions (Horowitz and Kenneth 2002), at the

[6] Florida was chosen based on the product features and on the rental indexes. All the respondents currently live in Florida.

beginning of the study participants were told that the payment (US$0.50) would only be given to those who were in fact attentive to the scenarios. To check this involvement, two confirmatory questions were included across the survey (check appendix D). There were excellent hit ratios on them (Q1 = 95%; Q2 = 93%).

Order effect. Furthermore, to confirm that the order of appearance (High-to-low x Low-to-high) did not influence the evaluation (for instance, if subjects that answered their WTA a high-intensity option in the first scenario had similar evaluations (not significant difference of means) compared to subjects that answered their WTA a high-intensity option in the second scenario), four ANOVAs were operated. All of them were not significant: for consumers evaluating low-intensity (at first x secondly); [$F (1, 60) = 0.94$, $p>.05$]; for consumers evaluating high-intensity (at first x secondly); [$F (1, 60) = 0.54$, $p>.05$]; for providers evaluating low-intensity (at first x secondly); [$F (1, 61) = 0.52$, $p>.05$]; for providers evaluating high-intensity (at first x secondly); [$F (1, 61) = 1.43$, $p>.05$]. Thus, the presentation order did not interfere with the respondents' judgment, which shows the robustness of my design.

Convenience concern. I asked how convenient was for subjects divide an apartment with a stranger for one week (across all conditions). All conditions had similar means (Mc.low-to-high = 2.87; Mc.high-to-low = 2.35; Mp.low-to-high = 2.21; Mp.high-to-low = 2.85). An ANOVA revealed that there was no difference of means between the two conditions with the most distant values [Mp.low-to-high = 2.21 and Mc.low-to-high = 2.87; $F (1, 58) = 2.85$, $p>.05$]; then, all other conditions had no difference of means. Another ANOVA was performed (comparing just providers' conditions) to check how convenient it was for them to stay in their relatives' house for one week. Both had similar means (Mp.low-to-high = 3.38; Mp.high-to-low = 3.03; $F = (1, 60) = 1.07$, $p > .05$. Thus, the magnitude of convenience is not an alternative explanation for the difference of evaluations observed.

5.1.5 Results

Probabilities of an agreement. To achieve my first goal, I first investigated the distribution of results and identified that the data has a good fit toward lognormal distributions for WTP and WTA in low and high-intensity contexts (see Figure 2 and 3).

FIGURE 2

PROBABILITY AND VALUES OF WTA AND WTP UNDER HIGH-INTENSITY SHARING (*LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION*)



Note: In horizontal axis (x) are the values paid and accepted by consumers and providers, respectively. In vertical axis (y) are the frequencies of each value of 'x'.

FIGURE 3

PROBABILITY AND VALUES OF WTA AND WTP UNDER LOW-INTENSITY SHARING (*LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION*)



Note: In horizontal axis (x) are the values paid and accepted by consumers and providers, respectively. In vertical axis (y) are the frequencies of each value of 'x'.

Thus, assuming that WTP and WTA are both lognormally distributed, then the probabilities that providers and consumers will make a deal, that is, that WTA will be smaller than WTP, are:

In *low-intensity* contexts**: 27,76%**
In *high-intensity* contexts**: 29,25%**

In absolute terms, these are small probabilities, and they are very consistent across sharing-intensity conditions, indicating that it is much more likely consumers and providers will choose not to transact than to agree on closing a sharing deal.

Roles of people. Confirming hypothesis *H2a*, an ANOVA revealed that, under low-intensity contexts the difference in WTA/WTP based on the person's roles is significant; [$F (1, 123) = 16.19$, $p<.001$; $R = 1.55$]. In the same way, under high-intensity contexts, this difference is still significant despite its increase in ratio; [$F (1, 123) = 16.72$, $p < .001$; $R = 1.66$].

Sharing intensity. A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare consumers' WTP in low and high-intensity sharing conditions. There was a significant difference in the scores for low-intensity (M=513, SD=291) and high-intensity (M=324, SD=218) conditions; [$t (61) = 6.95$, $p < .001$]. Furthermore, another t-test was conducted to check the differences in providers' WTA in low and high-intensity sharing scenarios. There was also a significant inequality in the levels for low-intensity (M=796, SD=474) and high-intensity (M=539, SD=353) conditions; [$t (62) = 5.81$, $p < .001$]. These results thus quantify values for consumers' WTP and providers' WTA and provide further evidence for the findings of study one, achieving my second and third goals.

Changing from a pleasant to an unpleasant condition. Another paired-samples t-test was performed to check my fourth hypothesis. There wasn't a significant difference between providers going from high to low-intensity sharing and consumers going from low to high-intensity sharing [$Mp = 130$; $Mc = 94$; $t (124) = 1.09$, $p > .05$]. Thus, my hypothesis *H2b* was not confirmed. Figure 4 shows this behavior better.

FIGURE 4

AVERAGE WTA/WTP AS A FUNCTION OF PEOPLE'S ROLE AND SHARING INTENSITY



Note: P – Providers' WTA; C – Consumers' WTP; D. – The difference between providers' WTA subtracted the difference between consumers' WTP; A.L. – Agreement line; R.P. – Reference price.

5.1.6 Discussion

The results of experiment two clarify the behavior observed in experiment one. Consumers were willing to share more (less) in low-intensity (high-intensity) conditions, linked with their higher (lower) WTP (WTA) in this situation. In contrast, providers required higher (lower) levels of payment by consumers in low-intensity (high-intensity) conditions, explaining why they were willing to share less (more) in the low-intensity (high-intensity) context of a peer-to-peer access-based market. The average discount for changing from low to high-intensity contexts is higher for consumers (37%) than for providers (32%). This means that, as long as entering a high-intensity shared context represents a loss of privacy for both, it represents a restoration of control for providers specifically.

To provoke changes in peoples' customs is usually a tough task because of the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) that permeates their decisions about innovation. This experiment shed light on the myopic understanding that forcing/encouraging people to share might go against their "unbreakable" status quo of avoiding sharing. Left adrift, the chance for consumers and providers to make a deal is constant across different intensities of access, since

they adjust their considerations balancing prices according to the levels of privacy and control (this last one just for providers). Interestingly, profound sharing forms do not indicate fewer possibilities of agreement; this possibility behaves similarly to traditional not-shared transactions as Figures 2 and 3 proved. As experiment 2 showed, the increase in agreements between roles does not concern money; there are others factors that may encourage these roles toward an understanding. The complementary study explores these possible variables.

6 COMPLEMENTARY STUDY

To uncover the main reasons that possibly affect the likelihood of an agreement between consumers (WTP) and providers (WTA), participants in this study were invited to elicit propellants and barriers that they frequently take into consideration before deciding to share. This approach accomplished two goals. First, I examined possible antecedents for sharing behavior more deeply, not restricting my work to pure interactions conclusions. Second, I provided a considerable number of promising variables for new investigations on peer-to-peer access-based markets and, furthermore, for studies in the field of sharing economy.

6.1 Method

6.1.1 Overview

After responding to experiment 2, all of the one hundred and twenty five participants randomly assigned to the four experimental were invited to participate in a third study, in which they had to elicit pros and cons of sharing an apartment. This method is known as the *knowledge elicitation technique* (Reilly 1990). More precisely, I used a single open unstructured question[7] (Olson and Reuter 1987) as an alternative to amplify the board of answers, thus, building an exploratory study.

Quantitative methodology was not used here, that is, my intention was not to prove difference of means, confirm a main effect or even establish that some construct performs a moderation/mediation role. The core of this study was to list possible antecedents (positive and negative) for sharing (or not) items, more precisely, to name determinant antecedents for participating in a peer-to-peer access-based market. Thus, a qualitative method of research, through a unique exploratory question, was adopted in an attempt to map these variables.

[7] Available in Appendix D.

6.1.2 Procedure

Immediately after responding to the first scenario of the second experiment, participants faced two questions: those who had the consumer condition were asked to write three pros for "*taking a shared apartment instead of a private place*" and three cons for "*not taking a shared apartment, preferring to stay in a private place*". On the other hand, those in the provider condition were asked to cite the same number of pros and cons, but now for "*leasing your apartment, choosing to share (keep it privately) the space with others instead of keeping it privately (share with others)"*.

The design required at least one response for each category (pros and cons) and respected an open questionnaire requirement of leaving the number of elicitations free. Therefore, these questions were counterbalanced; that is, half of the time the con queries came before the pro queries and half of the time the opposite took place. It covered some possible "last response" influence on the next scenario manipulation.

6.1.3 Results

If each participant provided the three reasons expected per category I would obtain three hundred and seventy five (f = 375; 100%) answers, but if they answered just one per category, I would obtain one hundred and twenty five (f = 125; 30%) answers. Any quantity in the middle was possible since they needed to answer at least one and at most three.

Two hundred and ninety two pros (fpros = 292; 48%) and three hundred and twenty one cons (fcons = 321; 52%) answers were obtained; totalizing six hundred and thirteen (ft = 613; 82%) in a total of seven hundred and fifty (f = 750; 100%) possible reasons. Subjects in the consumer's conditions responded with one hundred and forty five pros (fc.pros = 145; 24%) and one hundred and sixty one cons (fc.cons = 161; 26%). On the other hand, participants in the provider's conditions responded with one hundred and forty seven pros (fp.pros = 147; 24%) and one hundred and sixty cons (fp.cons = 160; 26%). To better understand the results, I created groups that are the compilation of ranked factors; that is, groups were created based on factors that received more responses. These factors are the matching of two close concepts, for instance: on one side, consumers said that a pro for "sharing an apartment" is that they would pay less (financial advantage); on the other side, providers claimed that a pro for "sharing their apartment" is that they would gain extra money (income). Clearly the financial concern is a positive aspect

for both roles, thus, they were matched in one single factor. The same rationale was adopted for all close-conceptual responses, separated by pros and cons. See Appendix C for more a comprehensive explanation. The most frequent reasons elicited by both types of participants are presented in Figure 5. Five groups of reasons represent about 80% of all concerns for people to participate (or not) in an access-based market.

FIGURE 5

PARETO CHART – POSITIVE (PROS) AND NEGATIVE (CONS) REASONS FOR PEER-TO-PEER ACCESS-BASED MARKET (FOR CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS)



Note: Cons (f) – Numbers of "cons" citations; Pros (f) – Numbers of "pros" citations; Cum (%) – Cumulative percentage of citations. The detailed factors and citations of each group may be seen in appendix C.

∴ Group I (Factor A and T): f = 242; 40%.

Factor A (Pros) - Financial advantage/Income. The main positive reason to engage in an access-based market is the financial advantage. Consumers said that as long as it usually costs less, they would participate in this type of consumption (fc = 50; 34%). Providers (fp = 64; 44%), similarly, expected to earn money by 'opening' their assets (specifically, their apartments) to others. This reason alone represents 39% of all pros elicited by the respondents.

Factor T (Cons) – Autonomy and Flexibility. On the negative side, but as significant as the reason before, the lack of privacy and feeling of limited ownership represent the main barrier to

sharing, both for consumers (fc = 65; 40%) and providers (fp = 63, 40%). This allegation represents 40% of all cons answered.

∴ Group II (Factor B and U): f = 101; 16%.

Factor B (Pros): Network and social interactions. The social aspect of sharing has a great importance for consumers (fc = 24; 17%) and for providers (fp = 33, 22%). The fact that friendships and networks may be created through this type of consumption represents 20% of all positive reasons elicited.

Factor U (Cons): Confidence, Security and Damages. The risk and uncertainties associated with this category of economy was cited by 12% of consumers (fc = 19) and by 16% of providers (fp = 25). Jointly, this obstacle speaks for 14% of negative reasons to avoid sharing.

∴ Group III (Factor C and V): f = 57; 9%.

Factor C (Pros): Hosts' support/Support guest. The cooperation between hosts and/or guests represents a considerable predictor for entering an access-based market. Consumers (fc = 15, 10%) and providers (fp = 8, 5%) mentioned this advantage, totaling 8% of the pro reasons.

Factor V (Cons): Social incompatibility. The fear of sharing space with someone with different behaviors and customs led consumers (fc = 20, 12%) and providers (fp = 14, 9%) to avoid possible shared consumption. This factor represents 11% of negative predictors.

∴ Group IV (Factor D and X): f = 45; 7%.

Factor D (Pros): Infrastructure. Having an equipped kitchen, for instance, led possible consumers to accept sharing an apartment (fc = 14, 10%). This feature has an important impact on the final decision for them. It also has some role for providers (fp = 3, 2%). This category represents 6% of all pros.

Factor X (Cons): Organization and Hygiene. This issues of disorganization and lack of hygiene were also listed as cons. Consumers (fc = 12, 7%) and providers (fp = 16, 10%) care about this. Sharing the same asset carries this possibility. This factor reflects 9% of all cons externalized.

∴ Group V (Factor E and W): f = 38; 6%.

Factor E (Pros): Confidence, Security and Damages. The same reason that represents 14% of all cons for the subjects also represents 5% of all positive reasons, showing a bright side of the sharing arrangement. Consumers (fc = 5, 3%) and mainly, providers (fp = 11, 7%) see less risk in an access-based market.

Factor W (Cons): Presence of a stranger. Despite its link with the previous factor, this issue is conceptually different; the presence of someone unknown to consumers (fc = 13, 8%) and to providers (fp = 9, 6%) restrict their willingness to accessing an item with someone else. This last factor represents 7% of all cons raised.

6.1.4 Discussion

Five reasons represent about 80% of all concerns that the respondents had about joining a peer-to-peer access-based platform. The same number of explanations (and their representativeness also for 80% of cons) repeats for people who avoid it. This convergence of opinions provides a promising future for sharing practices. Academicians and experts in marketing must be attentive to this handful of explanations.

Pros

Financial advantage/Income. Unsurprisingly, a large number of consumers and providers' eyes brighten when *access* is a market option; it frequently costs less and adds extra money. Consumers and providers are constantly looking for financial advantages in their deals, searching for the best trade-offs and always struggling against any possible feeling of loss. As long as sharing an apartment is probably cheaper for one (compared to traditional markets based on ownership transference) and enlarges the income for the other (getting extra money from unusable or minimally usable assets), the access-based market has real potential indeed.

Network and social interactions. The possibilities of creating new contacts and new friends are certainly advantages of an access-based market. Consumers and providers negotiate directly, communicate with each other and share not only a space but experiences, creating a nexus. Consequently, they may keep in touch and support each other in any number of ways. Social interactions have this benefit and respondents recognize it. Moreover, having company during the

stay, a feature that the traditional hotel does not offer (compared to the shared apartment proposed in my experiments), is consistently viewed as pleasant.

Hosts' support/Guest support. To gain access to an apartment is not only beneficial because of money and/or social relationships but also because there can be a cooperation advantage between hosts and guests. Particularly, consumers expect great support from someone who knows the house, the city directions, and the interesting activities.

Infrastructure. Having a large bedroom or bathroom probably will not distinguish a private apartment from a typical hotel. But having an equipped kitchen, a pool, a backyard and a quiet village location will make a difference. Consumers desire it; providers have it in their hands.

Confidence, Security and Damages. Both consumers and providers see that the platforms that administer access-based markets manage risk well. Consumers do not want huge responsibilities during the stay; they want to feel as if they were in their homes, not having to be excessively careful about every object or structure damage, for example. On the other hand, providers do not want to lose any personal object, like having a cup broken, or be unprotected in any other instance. They want to be sure that nothing will happen, but in case something does happen, someone will repair it quickly and with the exact level of quality that they expect. Access-based markets address these issues well.

Cons

Autonomy and flexibility. Like money, which has a great positive influence for new participants in peer-to-peer access-based markets, the lack of autonomy and flexibility has the same impact in this market, but in the opposite way. It is common sense that consumers and providers feel that they are losing their flexibility when they share an apartment. As confirmed in experiment one and two, consumers see the act of sharing as a break in the product's benefits and providers try to solve it by being closer to their asset. Both have in common the threat of losing autonomy and limiting flexibility. Continue doing what they usually do under in their houses is necessary for their engagement.

Confidence, Security and Damages. More disadvantageous than advantageous (as explained before), consumers see that they will have to be very responsibility toward the space and its structure; providers see someone's presence as a potential break in the houses' *status quo* of integrity. Consumers and providers comprehend together that they do not know who will "live"

with them and how security will be managed. A private place seems more flexible for them as long as the risk depends only on each one.

Social incompatibility. There is a clear fear of incompatibility between parties. Consumers are afraid of staying in someone's house with different customs, habits and behaviors. The same is applied for providers that may receive someone strongly different (at least for them, owners) in their houses. It may generate, inconvenience, discomfort and stress.

Organization and Hygiene. Consumers expect a good level of organization and hygiene similar to that in traditional hotels. Providers want to keep their customized interior of their home constant and are afraid of having to deal with others' mess. Clearly, one wants the pattern observed in professional host services, while the other wants respect toward their normal regimen.

Presence of a stranger. People still do not think positively about the idea of staying with someone unfamiliar. This repulsiveness seems unrelated to the role performed by them; they just do not feel good about having to divide a space with someone that they have never seen before.

There are matched positive and negative antecedents regarding peer-to-peer access-based markets that may narrow future studies to a few lines of tests. Further explorations are required to check in fact which of these determinants have a significant impact on people's WTS. As long as the purpose of this last study was to elicit the main reasons behind consumers' and providers' decisions toward dividing an apartment, it accomplished its goal.

7 GENERAL DISCUSSION

The choice to share or not to share may depend on which role the person has. If in position of providing an item, people do not want to lose connection with their respective assets (a typical feeling from the owner's perspective); controlling products means maintenance of ownership. If in position of consuming an item, people do not carry any burden of personal ownership, preferring to be concerned about their expenditure (Ziv and Ariely 2000) and their possible losses (Tvesrky and Kahneman 1991), for example, their privacy. In this work, I show that the willingness to share a product depends on people's roles and the magnitude of sharing within these roles. Specifically, I found that consumers are more likely to share under low-intensity contexts of sharing (i.e. staying in someone's house for a week without the owner) and providers prefer the opposite. But the divergence between roles is fixed across intensity of sharing; that is,

changing from low to high-intensity sharing contexts will not increase the probability of an agreement between roles. My results suggest that the main drivers of these behaviors are the level of *psychological ownership* (consequently affecting the *extended-self*) attached to the role and also the *loss aversion* involved in the transactions. These behaviors are typically observed in ownership environments, and in my work was proved to be applicable also in access-based markets. These drivers made people respond with a restricted group of pros and cons that represent 80% of all possible advantages and disadvantages to engaging in a peer-to-peer access-based market. Briefly, Study 1 illustrates that consumers and providers tend to share differently (invert preferences) depending on the intensity of the sharing experience. Study 2 extends the same findings observed in Study 1 and further reveals that the same rationale of willingness to pay and willingness to accept observed in ownership literature is also observed here. Moreover, this study proves that money is not enough to bring consumers and providers together; they require something more. The complementary study checks these requirements. Recent studies have started to spread new findings about access-based consumption (Belk 2014; Catulli at al. 2013; Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012), but none of them consider the roles that people may perform and how this differentiates the way that they share. My work not only does this, but it also brings to the emergent stream of sharing research, the well explored concepts of *willingness to pay* and *willingness to accept* (Yang, Vosgerau and Loewenstein 2013; Plott and Zeiler 2005) and the literature of *loss aversion* and *endowment effect* (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991); all of these concepts are vastly applied in ownership perspective.

7.1 Why does willingness to share change across roles?

Experiment 1 and 2 clearly show that when sharing an apartment is an alternative to staying alone in it (or even staying in a hotel), providers prefer to share. This is a result of their *psychological ownership* (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2003) which is still present as they are exchanging ownership. This psychological state creates the necessity to control and exercise power over assets (beyond providing *identity* and the feeling of *home*); it has a great value for this particular role. This behavior is different for consumers: despite the absence of ownership transference in access-based markets, the burden of ownership is still present when considering what to get and to give. Because of this, consumers have a relative control over the leased asset in

a private place (apartment or a hotel), which would be more restricted in the case of a shared place.

Furthermore, Thaler (1980) claimed that the costs of loss are often higher than the benefits of gains. Considering this, it is comprehensible that as long as in high-intensity contexts providers keep their control over assets, moving them to low-intensity conditions would make them lose that control despite their gain in privacy. But losses weigh more than gains, which means that losing control is more painful than gaining privacy is pleasant. On the other hand, if consumers leave low-intensity contexts behind, they will lose both attributes, which explains their preference. Figure 6 demonstrates this rationale.

FIGURE 6

LOSSES AND GAINS ACROSS PEOPLES' ROLES AND INTENSITY OF SHARING



Note: P – Privacy; C – Control; C&P – Control and Privacy.

7.2 Are consumers and providers close to sharing?

Accordingly to experiment 2, there is about a one in five chance that an agreement takes place between providers and consumers in a peer-to-peer access-based accommodation market. The second study proves that money is not enough to make consumers and providers achieve an agreement; that is, the possibility that the willingness to accept by a provider will be overcome by the willingness to pay by a consumer is equally distributed between conditions of sharing intensity. Both consumers' and providers' prices for sharing an apartment are lower compared to their prices for not sharing, but the gaps in prices between the roles are the same comparing the

intensity of sharing. This gap in evaluations across roles is mainly explained by the *endowment effect* (Weaver and Frederick 2009; Reb and Connelly 2007; Brown 2005; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991), which understands the fact that people often demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it (Thaler 1980). This work demonstrates that the same behavior is observed in access based-markets, supporting my thesis that ownership feelings are present in access-based markets despite the absence of ownership transference.

When there is a reference price (an average rental price practiced in a determined place) both consumers and providers are prone to pay and accept, respectively, values above this price in most-preferred contexts. Contrarily, in least-preferred contexts, providers require values much above and consumers are prone to pay much below the reference price. This movement of roles' willingness to pay/accept is determined by some important antecedents which may make the lines observed in Figure 4 assume different slopes.

7.3 So, what would make people share?

The complementary study revealed the main conditions that determine consumers' and providers' willingness to share. The *psychological ownership*, the *extended self*, the *loss aversion* and the *endowment effect* create different evaluations toward sharing depending on their intrinsic decision, that is, if they are consuming or providing. Consequently, earning money, developing networks, getting/giving extra support, accessing complete infrastructure and increasing security, are essential factors that attract both roles. On the other hand, lack of autonomy, decrease in security, possible social incompatibility, lack of hygiene and strange presence prevent people from engaging in a peer-to-peer access-based market. Interestingly, these reasons represent 80% of all concerns about entering or not entering this market. It seems that consumers and providers have similar points of view regarding this category of consumption, converging their judgments to a few issues.

Despite complementary study shows that the financial advantage is the main reason why people would give or get access instead of give or get ownership, study 2 proved that money is equally important across roles, disregarding the intensity of sharing, giving an extra importance to the others variables claimed by subjects in the final study.

8 IMPLICATIONS

8.1 Theoretical

My findings expand the boundaries of the *access-based consumption* concept, suggesting that this type of consumption is not only a market mode "without the ownership transfer, … a result of a high level of market mediation and anonymity, limited temporality of a tangible accessed object, and low political consumerism" as suggested by Bardhi and Eckhardt (2012, p. 49), but also, in a peer-to-peer perspective, it is a market where there are feelings of ownership being exchanged by participants (despite the absence of ownership transfer). Moreover, my work goes against the conclusion of Bardhi and Eckhardt claiming that Belk (2010) has an altruistic definition about *sharing* and that is why access-based consumption does not fit well with this notion. Differently, this work comprehends access-based consumption as a product from *sharing* attitudes, more precisely, a product from *sharing out* actions, and not a separate instance as it was suggested by those authors. *Sharing out* (Ingold 1986) involves giving to others outside the boundaries separating self and other and is closer to *gift giving* and *commodity exchange*, a perfect generator of access' market.

Furthermore, Belk (1988) applied the concept of *extended-self* to "…external objects and personal possessions…also includes persons, places, and group possessions as well as such possessions as body parts and vital organs." The e*xtended-self* is, among other things, shaped by one's possessions, that is, by the *ownership*, and, as long as Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence that in access-based consumption people carry typical considerations of possessions, I may affirm that access is another construction of the self.

The *loss aversion* and *endowment effect* theories (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1991) have been applied to several studies (Yang, Vosgerau and Loewenstein 2013; Reb and Connolly 2007; Plott and Zeiler 2005; Zig and Ariely 2001) regarding losses and gains of property, but few dared to test these concepts in a *sharing* context, that is, to check if the overvaluation of 'losses rather than gains' and 'own items rather than third's items' are applicable to markets where access is preferable. Results of this work amplify the dimensions of these well-known theories concluding that givers (providers) evaluate their accessible items, requiring more to leave it temporarily with the getters (consumers), who in turn, are prone to pay less to have this access. This cognitive reaction takes place in access-based circumstances as long as people still carry, as stated before, ownership perceptions.

8.2 Managerial

My findings provide a rationale for encouraging new users to participate in the growing access-based market. It is common sense for the platforms to consider consumers and providers with similar cognitive judgments and consequently with similar propensity to share. But, as my research suggests, an intense sharing transaction is better received by providers than consumers; hence, companies that manage markets rooted in sharing must make an extra effort to atrract consumers rather than providers to this realm. In this process, managers should consider the *psychological ownership* attached to providers, emphasizing that, in a high-sharing access-based market, they may keep control/power over their assets, which increases their autonomy, security, social interactions and also diminishes third's lack of organization, for example. Consumers must be administered more carefully since in high-intensity contexts of sharing they are losing their relative control and privacy. To them, managers must show the losses of staying in low-intensity contexts rather than staying in high-intensity contexts: they will lose the opportunity to save money (which has a great weight for consumers according to Ziv and Ariely (2001)), lose the chance to make networks, lose extra support provided by the owner and lose infrastructure (in the case of a hotel). To sum up, the losses attached to low-intensity contexts should be explained to both roles (and complementary study provides a range of options), as long as it has a greater weight, but for providers the gain of control must also be highlighted because it is extremely important for this specific role.

The fact that the roles are equally distant from achieving an agreement brings new perspectives to access-based markets. It is not the money in itself that will make consumers and providers agree to share a product when the intensity for sharing changes, but other attributes. Managers must comprehend that the financial advantage has similar importance for both roles (which in fact is the most important reason), but they should optimize the advantages (see Table 8) and the gaps (see Table 9) that this type of consumption brings, making the gap observed in Figure 4 smaller.

Another suggestion from my findings is that in low-intensity sharing contexts consumers are prone to pay more than the reference price, thus, as long as companies accomplish their goals to make consumers' WTP higher than providers' WTA, companies may generate higher revenues managing the 'natural' behavior of consumers to pay more when staying with their relative control and privacy.

Finally, this work provided a limited range of antecedents which managers should focus on to develop the peer-to-peer access market based on sharing behaviors. They have to concentrate their attention on a few issues, as complementary study showed, to enlarge this contemporary practice.

9 LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

My research worked with a sample from Western cultures, where there is a higher attachment to feelings of ownership compared to Eastern cultures (Belk 1988, 2010). It is likely that the same design in China or Russia, for instance, would produce different behaviors because these nations are, historically, used to sharing more (as an economic policy and consequently as a consumer behavior) than long-term capitalist countries like the USA. Future studies should explore how the difference in people's roles is different across economies (*those that have communism in economic stream* vs. *those from a fixed capitalism*) and see in which of these two political realities the implementation of an access-based market performs better. This possibility of study could not only provide further understanding about the profiles of pro-access based consumers and providers, but also enhance the understanding about the propitious arenas to implement collaborative platforms.

People's roles were analyzed here using a scenario where participants were looking for (or had) an accommodation; this is just one possibility with which to approach consumers and providers through their marketable assets. Future research should explore the distinctions in consumers' and providers' cognitive effort in other markets like: car sharing, information sharing and clothes sharing. There are particular feelings regarding exclusively about sharing an apartment; it is a product of great value and high intimacy. These features may not be present in other categories of products and therefore make roles perform decisions differently from those found here. Moreover, considering the variation inside the products (not the market), further studies could manipulate the features of products in a broad way, for example, exploring the differences between hedonic and utilitarian products and how they are judged by different roles. My work balanced these two features well to not let them influence subjects' final judgments; other works might focus on these variations.

In addition, this exploration found that ownership feelings are present also in a peer-to-peer access-based market. This evidence was possible considering the presence of *loss aversion* and

endowment effect by the participants during the judgments of WTP and WTA. Despite this clue, future investigations should test how preferences vary across typical ownership markets and access-based markets, considering people's roles. This would provide a better understanding of what each role considers before buying/selling the ownership or the access.

Here, I estimate two types of *sharing intensity* (low-intensity vs. high intensity), creating a scenario with only two times' possibilities when staying (or renting) in a place. This is a limited *time* exploration. I appeal for the upcoming works to increase the number of time possibilities, that is, other authors should understand how far sharing behaviors take place as long as time increases (or decreases); a model might be suggested in these possible studies to predict how consumers and providers tend to behave as time of sharing (intensity of sharing) extends or shortens.

Here, a cross-section method was used to see how roles behave in a fixed moment. I suggest that not only roles keep being the central target of analyses, but I also encourage authors in consumers' stream to investigate further how these roles move over time, that is, to use a longitudinal study. This will provide more confident evidence about consumers' and providers' behaviors.

Finally, my work adds the experimental methodology to the sharing literature; surprisingly, it had not been adopted. Many of the methodologies used in previous works ignored the importance of 'manipulating condition' as an alternative to understanding behaviors. This study encourages future authors in the sharing literature to do the same.

10 CONCLUSION

In sum, the consumer behavior literature is starting to comprehend the importance of sharing products as the internet has restructured the way that sharing is practiced. Now, as a result of sharing behaviors, the access-based market emerges as a promising alternative to commercializing items. Consumers have the opportunity to enlarge their portfolio of choices, not having to acquire everything they need, as the same time that providers have a chance to earn extra revenue from their underused assets. More than this dynamic, consumers and providers are tied as they have never been before. In this atmosphere, some companies comprehend that serving products is not the ultimate instance of growth and profitability. Mediating the distance

between consumers and providers, a peer-to-peer relation is a perfect alternative for these organizations in a commerce based on deregulation and intense communication between people.

Currently, ownership assumptions give (partial) space to access assumptions and consumer literature has the responsibility of getting involved with it as long as consumption tendencies seem more driven from bottom-up (users) than top-down (companies) as it used to be. With an awareness of such new market perspectives, this work was built to pursue clarifications about some ‘machinery’ that encircles it and consequently contributes academically to the topic.

APPENDIX A

TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (experiment 1)

	Consumers / High-Intensity		Consumers / Low-Intensity		Providers / High-Intensity		Providers / Low-Intensity		Overall	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Platforms Use	2.64	1.42	3.00	1.75	2.73	1.66	2.96	1.95	2.83	1.70
Gender	1.48	0.50	1.50	0.50	1.47	0.50	1.48	0.50	1.48	0.50
Age	3.58	1.13	3.57	1.13	3.60	1.14	3.63	1.08	3.60	1.12
Education	2.49	0.88	2.58	0.94	2.63	0.99	2.50	0.79	2.55	0.90
Marital Status	3.27	1.87	3.13	1.94	3.05	1.92	3.29	1.90	3.19	1.91
Country	1.07	0.25	1.07	0.25	1.10	0.30	1.07	0.26	1.08	0.27
Children	1.56	0.50	1.58	0.50	1.60	0.49	1.57	0.50	1.58	0.50
Apt. Own	1.17	0.38	1.25	0.44	1.18	0.39	1.13	0.33	1.18	0.39
N	**59**		**60**		**60**		**56**		**235**	
%	**25.11%**		**25.53%**		**25.53%**		**23.83%**		**100%**	

Note: The meaning and values of each variable may be further comprehended through appendix C.

TABLE 4
CORRELATIONS (experiment 1)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1 - WTS	-												
2 - S.M.	0.15	-											
3 - Identity	0.03	0.09	-										
4 - Gain Feel	0.27	0.08	0.34	-									
5 - Lose Feel	-0.14	-0.06	0.17	0.08	-								
6 - Platforms Use	0.34	0.08	0.12	0.09	-0.12	-							
7 - Convenience	0.45	0.23	0.12	0.21	-0.13	0.39	-						
8 - Gender	-0.02	0.11	0.01	0.04	0.06	-0.05	0.02	-					
9 - Age	-0.23	-0.12	0.08	-0.06	-0.04	-0.12	-0.14	-0.01	-				
10 - Education	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.19	0.01	0.00	0.00	-			
11 - Marital Status	0.04	0.06	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.09	-0.33	-0.22	0.06	-		
12 - Country	0.11	0.07	0.08	-0.03	-0.03	0.29	0.08	-0.02	-0.08	0.30	0.23	-	
13 - Children	0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05	0.06	0.09	-0.20	-0.35	0.12	0.60	0.18	-
14 - Apt. Own	0.12	-0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.07	0.12	0.03	0.03	-0.22	0.08	0.11	0.19	0.14

Note: WTS - Willingness to share; S.M. - Sharing Magnitude (Manipulation Check). The meaning and values of each variable may be further comprehended through appendix C.

TABLE 5
CONVENIENCE PER CONDITION (experiment 1)

		C.LI	C.HI	P.LI	P.HI
	Means	3.40	2.68	2.95	2.75
C.LI	3.40	-			
C.HI	2.68	F = (1, 117) = 5.14| p<.05	-		
P.LI	2.95	F = (1, 114) = 1.84| p>.05	F = (1, 113) = 0.62| p>.05	-	
P.HI	2.75	F = (1, 118) = 4.83| p<.05	F = (1, 117) = 0.06| p>.05	F = (1, 114) = 0.38| p>.05	-

Note: C.LI - Consumer in Low-Intensity condition; C.HI - Consumer in High-Intensity condition; P.LI - Provider in Low-Intensity condition; P.HI - Provider in High-Intensity condition. Evaluation based on a 7-point scale from 1 (totally inconvenient) to 7 (totally convenient).

APPENDIX B

TABLE 6
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (experiment 2)

	Consumers / High-to-Low-Intensity		Consumers / Low-to-High Intensity		Providers / High-to-Low Intensity		Providers / Low-to-High Intensity		Overall	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Gender	1.65	0.09	1.74	0.08	1.50	0.09	1.52	0.09	1.60	0.09
Age	3.61	0.21	3.42	0.20	4.06	0.26	4.07	0.27	3.79	0.24
Education	2.61	0.15	2.13	0.16	2.35	0.15	2.52	0.15	2.40	0.15
Marital Status	3.29	0.33	2.32	0.31	3.09	0.31	2.55	0.34	2.81	0.32
City	3.45	0.29	3.35	0.28	3.47	0.29	3.52	0.30	3.45	0.29
Children	1.61	0.09	1.48	0.09	1.44	0.09	1.34	0.10	1.47	0.09
Apt. Own	1.29	0.08	1.16	0.07	1.18	0.07	1.17	0.07	1.20	0.07
N	**31**		**31**		**34**		**29**		**125**	
%	**24.80%**		**24.80%**		**27.20%**		**23.20%**		**100.00%**	

Note: The meaning and values of each variable may be further comprehended through appendix C.

TABLE 7
CORRELATIONS (experiment 2)

	1	**2**	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1 - WTS.HI	-												
2 - WTS.LI	0.71	-											
3 - S.M.	0.22	0.04	-										
4 - Platforms Use	0.16	0.13	0.20	-									
5 - Convenience I	0.20	0.03	0.50	0.20	-								
6 - Convenience II	-0.02	-0.13	0.19	0.20	0.33	-							
7 - Gender	0.11	0.06	-0.04	-0.11	-0.04	0.15	-						
8 - Age	0.03	0.08	-0.11	-0.13	-0.18	0.01	0.08	-					
9 - Education	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.10	-0.04	0.10	0.13	0.11	-				
10 - Marital Status	-0.09	-0.08	-0.04	0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.18	-0.18	-0.14	-			
11 - City	-0.15	-0.02	-0.25	-0.07	-0.39	-0.13	0.02	0.13	-0.04	-0.08	-		
12 - Children	-0.04	-0.12	0.07	0.09	-0.03	0.01	-0.14	-0.32	-0.05	0.39	-0.05	-	
13 - Apt. Own	-0.09	-0.11	0.03	-0.02	0.06	0.03	0.16	-0.18	0.05	0.14	0.09	0.09	-

Note: WTS.HI - Willingness to share in High-Intensity context; WTS.LI - Willingness to share in Low-Intensity context; S.M. - Sharing Magnitude (Manipulation Check). The meaning and values of each variable may be further comprehended through appendix C.

APPENDIX C

TABLE 8

POSITIVE FACTORS FOR PEER-TO-PEER ACCESS BASED MARKET – FREQUENCIES AND PERCENTAGES

Consumers	Providers	FACTOR	F.C	F.P	F.TT	%	Cumulative (%)
Financial advantage	Income	Factor A	50	64	114	39.04%	39.04%
Network & Social interaction	Network & Social interaction	Factor B	24	33	57	19.52%	58.56%
Hosts' Support	Support guest	Factor C	15	8	23	7.88%	66.44%
Infrastructure	Infrastructure	Factor D	14	3	17	5.82%	72.26%
Confidence, Security & Dama	Confidence, Security & Dama	Factor E	5	11	16	5.48%	77.74%
Convenience & Logistic	Convenience & Logistic	Factor F	7	4	11	3.77%	81.51%
Availability & Variety	-	Factor G	8	0	8	2.74%	84.25%
Fun & Novel Experience	Fun & Novel Experience	Factor H	3	5	8	2.74%	86.99%
Expenses shared	Expenses shared	Factor I	2	6	8	2.74%	89.73%
Housekeeping shared	-	Factor J	7	0	7	2.40%	92.12%
Home atmosphere	-	Factor K	6	0	6	2.05%	94.18%
-	Extra activities	Factor L	0	6	6	2.05%	96.23%
Liability (less)	-	Factor M	2	0	2	0.68%	96.92%
-	Asset optimization	Factor N	0	2	2	0.68%	97.60%
-	Referrals	Factor O	0	2	2	0.68%	98.29%
-	Test event	Factor P	0	2	2	0.68%	98.97%
Autonomy & Flexibility	-	Factor Q	1	0	1	0.34%	99.32%
Support the owner	-	Factor R	1	0	1	0.34%	99.66%
-	Learning	Factor S	0	1	1	0.34%	100.00%
TOTAL	-	-	145	147	292	100.00%	-

Note: F.C - Frequency of responses from consumers; F.P - Frequency of responses from providers; FTT and '%' - Frequency of responses from consumers and providers and its percentage representation of all responses; Cumulative (%) - The cumulative percentage, that is, the aggregate percentage summing factor by factor.

TABLE 9

NEGATIVE FACTORS AGAINST PEER-TO-PEER ACCESS BASED MARKET – FREQUENCIES AND PERCENTAGES

Consumers	Providers	FACTOR	F.C	F.P	F.TT	%	Cumulative (%)
Autonomy & Flexibility	Autonomy & Flexibility	Factor T	65	63	128	39.88%	39.88%
Confidence, Security & Dama	Confidence, Security & Dama	Factor U	19	25	44	13.71%	53.58%
Social incompatibility	Social incompatibility	Factor V	20	14	34	10.59%	64.17%
Organization & Hygiene	Organization & Hygiene	Factor X	12	16	28	8.72%	72.90%
Presence of a stranger	Presence of a stranger	Factor W	13	9	22	6.85%	79.75%
Liability (more)	Liability (more)	Factor Y	13	8	21	6.54%	86.29%
-	Convenience & Logistic	Factor Z	0	12	12	3.74%	90.03%
Unprofessional services	-	Factor AA	7	0	7	2.18%	92.21%
Infrastructure	Infrastructure	Factor AB	5	2	7	2.18%	94.39%
Awkward	-	Factor AC	4	0	4	1.25%	95.64%
-	Income	Factor AD	0	4	4	1.25%	96.88%
Availability & Variety	-	Factor AE	3	0	3	0.93%	97.82%
-	Payment	Factor AF	0	3	3	0.93%	98.75%
Mistaken as the owner	-	Factor AG	1	0	1	0.31%	99.07%
-	Diseases	Factor AH	0	1	1	0.31%	99.38%
-	Family/Peers presence	Factor AI	0	1	1	0.31%	99.69%
-	Neighborhood judgements	Factor AJ	0	1	1	0.31%	100.00%
TOTAL	-	-	162	159	321	100.00%	-

Note: F.C - Frequency of responses from consumers; F.P - Frequency of responses from providers; FTT and '%' - Frequency of responses from consumers and providers and its percentage representation of all responses; Cumulative (%) - The cumulative percentage, that is, the aggregate percentage summing factor by factor.

TABLE 10

FACTORS AND GROUPS

GROUP	FACTOR
Group I	Factor A + Factor T
Group II	Factor B + Factor U
Group III	Factor C + Factor V
Group IV	Factor D + Factor X
Group V	Factor E + Factor W

APPENDIX D

First study

Condition 1: Consumer

Imagine you are planning to attend a weeklong entertainment event in another city of your country.

Since you are planning to go, you searched for places to stay during that time. You found a one-bedroom apartment available at a mid-level hotel, but you also found in an online marketplace that the owner of a two-bedroom apartment decided to rent it for short-term living during the week of the event. The two-bedroom apartment is conveniently located close to the beach and it has a pleasant view**.** If you chose the two-bedroom apartment instead of the hotel, you will save some money.

Condition 1A – In high-intensity condition of sharing:

Notice that the owner of the apartment will stay into the unit during the period of the event, **sharing** the space with you the entire week (one bedroom for the owner and another for you).

Condition 1B – In low-intensity condition of sharing:

Notice that the owner of the apartment will stay with his/her relatives during the period of the event. You will have your own bedroom and **do not need to share** the space of the apartment with the owner the entire week.

Considering the situation above, please answer the following questions:

In a scale from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely), how likely would you rent the two-bedroom apartment specified above?

Condition 2: Provider

Imagine that the city in which you live will host a weeklong entertainment event and you want to attend it.

Since you live at the host city and there is a growing demand for accommodation during the

period, you may opt to maintain the way you live or try to lease your two-bedroom apartment in an online marketplace for short-term living during the week of the event. Your two-bedroom apartment is conveniently located close to the beach and it has a pleasant view. If you lease your two-bedroom apartment, you will earn some money.

Condition 1A – In high-intensity condition of sharing:
Notice that you will stay into the unit during the period of the event, **sharing** the space with your host the entire week (one bedroom for the him/her and another for you).

Condition 1B – In low-intensity condition of sharing:
Notice that if you rent your apartment you **will not share** the space with your renter, you will stay into your relatives' house during the period of the event.

Considering the situation above, please answer the following questions:

In a scale from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely), how likely would you offer the two-bedroom apartment specified above?

Manipulation checks and additional questions
A - In a scale from 1 (almost no sharing) to 7 (excessive sharing) how do you feel about the degree of sharing an apartment with the owner during one week?

B - An object that I share with other person is an object that says something about my identity.
In a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) please indicate how much you agree or disagree with this statement.

C1 - When I am sharing something that does not belong to me I feel that I am gaining it (or part of it).
In a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) please indicate how much you agree or disagree with this statement.

C2 - When I am sharing something that belongs to me I feel that I am losing it (or part of it).
In a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) please indicate how much you agree or disagree with this statement.

D - In a scale from 1 (never) to 7 (always), indicate how often do you share/borrow/lend things or use collaborative platforms (i.e. Uber, Airbnb, Couchsurfing, Craiglist, among others) in the internet to do this:

E - From 1 (totally inconvenient) to 7 (totally convenient) indicate how convenient/inconvenient is to you to share an apartment with a stranger for one week.

F – *Descriptive data*: Gender, age, level of education, marital status, country, presence of children in home, have own apartment.

Second study

(Standard presentation for all conditions)

Accordingly to the myapartmentmap.com, the monthly cost of renting a 2-bedroom apartment in Florida is, on average, about US$1600 (US$400 per week).

The complete report may be checked through the
website: http://www.myapartmentmap.com/apartments/fl/

Condition 1a: Consumer in low-to-high intensity of sharing contexts[8]

Imagine you are planning to attend a weeklong entertainment event in another city of Florida.

Since you are planning to go, you searched for places to stay during that time and you finally decided to stay in a 2-bedroom apartment conveniently located close to the beach with a pleasant view.

Notice that the owner of the apartment will stay with his/her relatives during the period of the event. You will have your own bedroom and **do not need to share** the space of the apartment with him/her the entire week.

Considering the situation above, please answer the following question:

[8] The condition 1b (high->low) inverted the order of presentation, that is, first a condition where a high intensity context appeared and after the subjects were required to answer how much they were WTP to change for a low context.

Indicate the rental price **(**highest price**),** in US$, you are willing to pay to stay in the described apartment the entire week:

Now imagine the following situation:

The owner of the apartment told you that he/she may change his/her plans and he/she may stay in the unit during the period of the event if you prefer to pay less. In such case he/she will **share** the space with you the entire week (one bedroom for the owner and another for you).

Considering this possibility, please answer the following question:

Since you were willing to pay ___ *(here the first answer appeared)* to stay in the apartment alone while the owner stay in his/her relative's house the entire week, now what is the rental price (highest price), in US$, you are willing to pay to share the apartment with the owner during the same period?

Condition 2a: Provider in low-to-high intensity of sharing contexts[9]

Imagine that the city in which you live will host a weeklong entertainment event and you want to attend it.

Since you live at the host city and there is a growing demand for accommodation during the period, you decided to lease your 2-bedroom apartment in an online marketplace for short-term living during the week of the event. Your 2-bedroom apartment is conveniently located close to the beach and it has a pleasant view.

Notice that you will stay in the unit during the period of the event, **sharing** the space with the guest the entire week (one bedroom for the him/her and another for you).

Considering the situation above, please answer the following question:

Indicate the rental price (lowest price)**,** in US$, you are willing to accept to lease your apartment the entire week:

[9] The condition 2b (high->low) inverted the order of presentation, that is, first a condition where a high intensity context appeared and after the subjects were required to answer how much they were WTA to change for a low context.

Now imagine the following situation:

If the renter pays more, you may stay in your relatives' house during the period of the event. In such case, you **will not share** the space with the guest.

Considering this possibility, please answer the following question:

Since you were willing to accept ___ *(here the first answer appeared)* to share the space with the guest the entire week, now what is the rental price (lowest price), in US$, you are willing to accept to stay in your relative's house and let the guest stay alone in your apartment during the same period?

Manipulation checks and additional questions

A - Bellow you may check your previous responses:

First price (not sharing the apartment): ___ *(here the first answer appeared)*

Second price (sharing the apartment): ___ *(here the second answer appeared)*

How much is the difference between your first and second prices ("First price" - "Second price")?

B - In a degree of sharing scale, from 1 (almost no sharing) to 7 (excessive sharing) how would you feel about sharing an apartment with other person during one week?

C - In a scale from 1 (never) to 7 (always), indicate how often do you share/borrow/lend things or use collaborative platforms (i.e. *Uber, Airbnb, Couchsurfing, Craiglist*, among others) in the internet to do this:

D1 - From 1 (totally inconvenient) to 7 (totally convenient) indicate how convenient/inconvenient is to you to share an apartment with a stranger for one week.

D2 - From 1 (totally inconvenient) to 7 (totally convenient) indicate how convenient/inconvenient for you is the experience of staying in your relative's house for one week.

E1 - A jacket costs US$50. Which of the following alternatives has the highest discount in price for this jacket. *(Five options appeared, just one was correct)*

E2 - A book costs US$15. Which of the following alternatives has the lowest addition in price for this book. *(Five options appeared, just one was correct)*

F – *Descriptive data*: Gender, age, level of education, marital status, city of Florida, presence of children in home, have own apartment.

G – In the introduction the following warning was shown to give more robustness to my experiment, as suggested by Olsen and Smith (2001) that alerted about hypothetical payments and absence of incentive compatibility: *The survey contains check questions to assess the involvement of each participant. These questions identify trivial responses that may result from inattention or lack of diligence. If a participant shows inattention or lack of diligence, the compensation for answering this survey will not be paid to said participant; (US$0.50).*

Third study

As a consumer (a person who needs a good or a service), there are many pros and cons of taking a shared apartment instead of a private place. Can you name three pros?
*At least one is required.

As a consumer (a person who needs a good or a service), there are many pros and cons of taking a shared apartment, preferring to stay in a private place. Can you name three cons?
*At least one is required.

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