Effective and Responsible Protection from Atrocity Crimes: Toward Global Action

Findings and Policy Options From an International Research Project on “Global Norm Evolution and the Responsibility to Protect”

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As a team of academics and think tankers in Beijing, Berlin, Budapest, Delhi, Frankfurt, Oxford, Rio de Janeiro and São Paolo, we analyzed global debates about protection from atrocities over the past decade, with a focus on R2P. In more than 250 interviews with politicians, diplomats, academics and civil society actors in 20 countries, we asked how and why Brazil, China, Europe, India, Russia, South Africa and the United States engaged with these ideas in light of their history, culture and domestic politics.

We found that beyond the occasional rhetorical grandstanding, the core of the global political conflict over protection from atrocities has moved on. Most relevant actors around the globe accept the idea that the protection of populations from atrocity crimes is both a national and international responsibility. There is much greater and more widespread readiness to support what is seen as necessary to protect populations from atrocity crimes, and even to make active contributions when there is an overlap with other strategic interests. This readiness goes beyond individual groupings of states and far beyond “the West,” “liberal interventionists” or the members of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect. In analyzing the politics of protection, we found that none of the neat splits between “North” and “South,” “Western” and “non-Western,” “emerging” and “established,” “democratic” and “authoritarian” are helpful.

Of course, major conflicts over protection persist. They focus primarily on two interrelated challenges of putting protection in practice: how to protect responsibly (i.e., to prevent the abuse of humanitarian arguments by great powers) and how to protect effectively. Following the use of force in Libya in 2011, military intervention will only be found legitimate if undertaken in a way that prevents further abuses by the great powers. Effectiveness is no easier to ensure than responsibility. The record is marked more often by failure than by limited success. More effective protection is as much about developing policy instruments as it is about assessing risks and trying to identify the lesser of several evils in every particular situation.

Both responsible and effective protection require serious engagement with the many difficulties and dilemmas they pose, beyond the simplistic and misleading stereotypes that have long dominated the discussion about R2P. In addition, rather than avoiding the debate on the military component of R2P, stakeholders should have a more constructive and self-critical dialogue on global peace and security governance to enable effective and responsible protection in the future. That debate should be on the effectiveness of the use of force in protecting people from atrocity crimes, its chances of doing more good than harm, and its successes and failures in the past.

Executive Summary

A decade after the United Nations adopted the concept of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) people from atrocity crimes, the world’s record of protection remains grim. But those who point to a global deadlock between “Western” interventionists and “non-Western” stalwarts of sovereignty as a cause for this lack of progress misidentify the core of the political conflict, and fail to engage seriously with the practical challenges of protection from atrocity crimes.

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To help make progress in these debates, we outline policy options in five key areas:

**Reduce the vulnerability of information sources to accusations of bias.** One crucial challenge for protection from atrocity crimes has been the accusation of bias regarding the type and interpretation of information about atrocities that is provided by governments, by the media or by civil society groups. It is up to media corporations and philanthropists, particularly in emerging powers, to invest in independent and credible sources of information and analysis about conflicts and human rights. At the same time, member states, civil society and regional organizations should enhance the UN’s independent capacities for fact-finding and information-gathering.

**Deploy diplomatic and civilian tools early, fairly, strategically.** Despite widespread international agreement that atrocities should be prevented by the sustained and early use of a range of civilian tools, the international community has failed again and again in deploying these tools early and decisively. To make progress on effective protection, UN member states and particularly emerging powers need to match their rhetorical commitment with the required political will and investment into capacities and ideas. In their efforts on atrocity prevention, policymakers should hold all actors in a conflict to the same standards of behavior. Governments should prioritize the deterrence and prosecution of perpetrators of atrocity crimes within their jurisdictions and, just as civil society advocates for R2P, tread carefully when calling for UN Security Council consideration of an emerging crisis.

**Enable UN peacekeeping to provide credible protection.** Living up to even a moderate level of ambition for peacekeepers to protect populations from atrocity crimes requires additional investments in capacities, doctrine and training. It will also require a hard look at how to use peacekeeping more effectively together with political instruments. To maintain the fragile balance between troop contributors (mostly from Africa and Asia), funders (mostly from Europe and North America) and the permanent members of the UN Security Council issuing mandates, the system requires a boost in the quality of contributions to blue-helmet operations, including a fairer and more balanced division of labor.

**Work towards more inclusive decision-making on military action.** A council that is both able to mandate and mobilize effective protection and able to limit the fear over abuse of humanitarian arguments would need to draw on the voices of all major political players in today’s world, troop-contributing countries and major financial contributors. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council should therefore support a reform of the council’s working methods towards more inclusive and participatory decision-making. In addition, all member states should engage in further discussions on a monitoring and reporting system for states that implement UN-mandated missions, accommodating concerns raised during the Libya intervention and in the Responsibility while Protecting proposal.

**Build constant reflection and learning into every policy tool.** While there is a great deal of experience with grim failures and a few qualified successes, there is no reliable knowledge base on how to protect people from atrocity crimes. Given such great uncertainty, responsible policymaking requires governments, international organizations, civil society and academia to design policies that are more adaptable to evolving knowledge and risk assessments, based on in-built opportunities for continuous and collaborative reflection and learning.
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A decade after the United Nations adopted the principle of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) people from atrocity crimes, the world’s record of protection remains grim. In 1948 the world pledged that it would “never again” allow genocide, yet it has failed the victims of genocide and mass atrocities many times since – including in Bangladesh in 1971, Cambodia in 1978, Rwanda in 1994 as well as in Srebrenica in 1995, a catastrophe to be commemorated this year.

Meanwhile, thousands in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, South Sudan, Syria and elsewhere suffer from crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing: the very offenses covered by the pledge of the Responsibility to Protect. In March 2011 the imminent threat of mass killings of civilians in the Libyan city of Benghazi prompted a military intervention that probably saved many who would have otherwise been killed. The NATO-led coalition, however, opted to pursue a mission of regime change, and its local allies plunged the country into violent chaos that has spilled beyond its borders and cost many lives. This has increased concerns about the abuse of the R2P doctrine by great powers as well as the violent aftermath of military interventions. In Syria, hundreds of thousands of civilians have died and millions have suffered while the Security Council has remained in political deadlock. Even where the world agrees to act – in South Sudan, in the Central African Republic or in northern Iraq – governments and international organizations have often been too slow or acted ineffectively. This is all the more tragic since there is potential for action to prevent mass atrocity crimes. To use atrocities as a weapon of war or an instrument of politics requires systematic planning and organization, and with careful and determined action, these processes can be identified and disrupted. International action has a crucial role in contributing to this goal.1

If we believe the pundits, the future of protection from atrocities looks worse than the present. Many feel only despair regarding the rise of powers whose elites were socialized in opposition to the Western-led order from which the Responsibility to Protect emerged. Prominent predictions see the emerging powers standing opposed to R2P and expect that, in the words of Michael Ignatieff, “their resistance to intervention will become increasingly influential.”2

While the bleak image of failure is accurate, the underlying assessment of global deadlock between “Western” interventionists and “non-Western” stalwarts of sovereignty, with a shifting balance toward the latter, is misleading in two critical ways: It misidentifies the core of the political conflict, and it fails to engage seriously with the practical challenges of protection from atrocity crimes. These conclusions are based on two years of research into the historical, cultural and institutional origins of how Brazil, China, Europe, India, Russia, South Africa and the United States engaged with...
the debate about a Responsibility to Protect from 2005 to 2014, and how conflicts over its application in major crises have shaped the world’s expectations of protection from atrocities.

Leaving the old debates on sovereignty behind and focusing on the debates that matter today hold the potential for a more constructive debate that grapples with the difficulties and dilemmas of protection and seeks effective and responsible ways forward.

Our research has focused on the crimes covered by the 2005 World Summit definition of the Responsibility to Protect: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing (which we collectively refer to as atrocity crimes). Because of the sheer scale of human suffering worldwide, policymakers need to prioritize resources and attention, both among different crises and within each one. This is hard. But for the same reason, it is necessary to do so, and not every human rights violation should spark the dangerous debates about coercive and military means of protection that R2P is inseparably linked with.

We find it crucial to retain a profound sense of humility about the extent of protection from these crimes that international influence can achieve. Local actors hold by far the greatest power over these dynamics. Even when measures are carefully calibrated to the context, external influence will never be able to do more than tip the balance – and to do even that requires more than the efforts of governments and international organizations, but also those of civil society and the private sector, particularly the media. Our findings and suggested options on international actions to prevent atrocities should be read with these concerns in mind.

**Outline of the Paper**

In the following pages, we lay out our findings and their policy implications in two parts. In part one, we present our findings in detail. We argue that the most important discussions about the protection from atrocity crimes take place around two issues: the abuse of humanitarian arguments (responsible protection) and the how of international action on protection (effective protection). We argue that when discussing the latter question, the international community and R2P advocates should not shy away from the most disputed aspect of these two questions: When and how can force protect, if at all? In part two, we provide policy options to illustrate practical ways to protect more effectively and responsibly.
Global Norm Evolution and the Responsibility to Protect

As a team of academics and think tankers in Beijing, Berlin, Budapest, Delhi, Frankfurt, Oxford, Rio de Janeiro and São Paolo, we analyzed the global evolution of protection from atrocities around the Responsibility to Protect over the past decade. We asked how and why Brazil, China, Europe, India, Russia, South Africa and the United States engaged with these ideas in light of their history, culture and domestic politics. Our findings have been published in a freely accessible special issue of the journal Conflict, Security and Development (“Major Powers and the Contested Evolution of a Responsibility to Protect”).

We then examined how specific debates have shaped the world’s future expectations of protection from atrocities. Most of these debates focused on international reactions to atrocity crimes in particular places – Darfur, Kenya, Myanmar, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Libya and Cote d’Ivoire – while some covered the idea of R2P and its implementation in more-abstract ways. These findings will be published later in 2015; they will also be available for free download at www.globalnorms.net.

Overall, we conducted more than 250 interviews with politicians, diplomats, academics and civil society actors in 20 countries, and published 25 articles or studies so far, with more forthcoming.

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“Just as we have learnt that the world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violations of human rights are taking place, we have also learnt that, if it is to enjoy the sustained support of the world’s peoples, intervention must be based on legitimate and universal principles.”

Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty (1999)

Fairly or unfairly, political elites in most countries find the Responsibility to Protect to be inextricably linked with disregard by the powerful for international law and with a white savior complex. Opposition to the Responsibility to Protect, in turn, is often seen as the cynical insistence on sovereignty in the face of human suffering or misplaced South-South solidarity with repressive regimes.

These caricatures are legacies of the rhetorical battle lines of the 1990s. To link the challenge of protection from atrocities to the solution of intervention – as Kofi Annan did in his famous 1999 UN General Assembly opening speech – is to burden the former with the political baggage of the latter. Addressing this baggage head-on, Annan endorsed an attempt to redefine sovereignty in a way that deemphasized collective protection of the state from external domination in favor of individual protection from harm. But that move to “sovereignty as responsibility” backfired, not least because it allowed eager interventionists to selectively define actors who did or did not exercise “responsible” versus “irresponsible” sovereignty, and to cast intervention as the responsible choice. The interventionists’ claim to the moral high ground, however, became hypocritical when it was used by governments whose record of responsible international behavior was itself not spotless. As a result, this line of debate has poisoned a lot of discussion about protection from atrocity crimes in the years that followed the Kosovo crisis and the US-led invasion of Iraq.

In our research we find that this pernicious debate has gradually lost most of its political relevance over the last decade, amid controversies about including the Responsibility to Protect in the 2005 World Summit outcome document and the Security Council’s authorization of “all necessary means” to protect civilians in Libya. Beyond the occasional rhetorical grandstanding, we find that the core of the global political conflict over protection from atrocities has moved on. Faced with the worst atrocity crimes, the principled defense of non-intervention as resistance to Western hegemony has faded. However, the shadow of imperialism remains an issue. Western policymakers need to be more careful than in the past: A lot of skepticism about the efficacy of military force is genuine, even if it is voiced by those who could do more to make their visions of effective diplomacy a reality.
Of course, major conflicts over protection remain. They focus on two interrelated challenges of putting protection in practice: how to prevent the abuse of humanitarian arguments by great powers (“how to protect responsibly,” in the language promoted by Brazil) and how to protect effectively at all, particularly when the shadow of coercion and the use of force come into play. Both of these conflicts require serious engagement with the many difficulties and dilemmas they pose, beyond the simplistic and misleading stereotypes that have long dominated the debate about the Responsibility to Protect.

What is Undisputed: Protection From Atrocity Crimes Requires International Action

Most relevant actors around the globe accept the idea that the protection of populations from atrocity crimes is both a national and an international responsibility. This acceptance goes beyond the legal basis in international humanitarian law and the Genocide Convention, but it is not a product of the R2P movement. It began to emerge already in the 1990s, when for people and governments alike, “[t]olerance of mass atrocities no longer seemed acceptable – it seemed immoral.” Since then, the expectations of protection have grown exponentially. Moral demands on third parties – humanitarians, diplomats, human rights observers, even military forces – to act in a preventive manner and in a way that balances individual protection with state sovereignty have come to far exceed the capacities and realistic possibilities to do so.

There is much greater and more widespread readiness to support what is accepted as necessary to protect populations from atrocity crimes, and even to make active contributions when there is an overlap with other strategic interests. This readiness goes beyond individual groupings of states and far beyond “the West,” “liberal interventionists” or the members of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect. In fact, we found that in analyzing the politics of protection, none of the neat splits between “North” and “South,” “Western” and “non-Western,” “emerging” and “established,” “democratic” and “authoritarian” are helpful. It was the non-aligned movement that was ready to authorize the strengthening of the UN peace operation in Rwanda in 1994, whereas the United States actively opposed it. While Western powers led the interventions in Kosovo and Libya to protect civilians, tens of thousands of peacekeepers from South Asia and Africa have helped to protect civilians in dozens of UN missions in the last 20 years. Already during the World Summit negotiations, diverse perspectives transcending those stereotyped splits had actively contested and contributed to the final formulation of R2P in the outcome document.

Only a fringe group of governments is firmly opposed to an international role in protection from atrocity crimes regardless of circumstances. Some are themselves responsible for atrocity crimes. Others will interpret anything as part of an imperialist conspiracy among the great powers, specifically the United States. The concerns of these actors cannot and do not need to be met.
What Remains Disputed: How to Protect Responsibly and Effectively?

There is a large group of moderates, supporters of protection and skeptics of intervention whose concerns do need to be taken more seriously in light of repeated failures and abuses of power. They – governments in Brazil, India, South Africa, China or Germany as well as activists, pundits, academics and some policymakers in the United States, Britain and France – raise legitimate questions as to how the world can get better at protecting people from atrocity crimes in ways that are both effective and responsible.

In many ways, the emotional and political salience of the fight over non-intervention has long drowned out these crucial debates about the practicalities of protection. Most of the time, arguments regarding practical issues were either made in bad faith or understood by others as being made in bad faith. Libya is a case in point. Brazil, India and South Africa did not vehemently criticize the military intervention in 2011 because they were concerned about violating Libyan sovereignty or because they opposed an international role in protecting civilians in Benghazi from imminent atrocities. Rather, they complained about the abuse of a Security Council mandate for a political goal other than protection – in this case, regime change with the practical implications of likely state breakdown and resulting additional risks for the population. These critics have yet to live up to their rhetoric of demanding more or better protection by investing in ideas and capabilities accordingly. But that does not make their arguments any less valid.

There is a critical distinction between two kinds of atrocity situations depending on the type of perpetrators. International agreement to act against non-state perpetrators, even if linked to state forces, is much easier to reach than agreement to act against state perpetrators. Even if government consent to confront non-state groups is often unreliable and inconsistent, as in the DRC, there is little concern in any quarter for the sovereignty of these weak regimes. The key debate in these cases is about how to effectively protect people from atrocity crimes, not only with military but also, and much more frequently, with civilian tools. This is very challenging already. Even harder are the cases in which state forces are among the main perpetrators. In these situations, as in Libya in 2011 and Syria since, the critical global concern with coercive instruments (from sanctions to military intervention) is about the abuse of power for non-humanitarian purposes as well as the wisdom of attacking a state that is often a protector to some if not others, and whose demise could result in additional risk to people. The world’s record in state-building is not sufficiently encouraging to counter these concerns.

Protecting Responsibly: Guarding Against Great Power Abuse

Following Libya, military intervention will only be found legitimate if undertaken in a way that prevents further abuses by the great powers. In this special case of the use of force without consent, the shadow of imperialism continues to matter greatly. In most of the world, the memory of abuse by great powers, hypocritically couched in universal values, remains vivid. The use of humanitarian justifications by some British and US politicians for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 only heightened these concerns about
“humanitarian intervention,” as did the Russian deployment of similar arguments to justify its invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. This sense of hypocrisy has formed one of the central reasons for suspicions about R2P ever since the concept was conceived.

Legitimate intervention does not require the unrealistic standard of purely altruistic motives or consistency. Protection requires resources and risk-taking, and inconsistency is the norm rather than the exception in international politics. States that provide the capacities and take the risks to protect will in most cases be motivated by more than pure altruism, and their motivation – starting with the mobilization of their constituents – will vary from one situation to the next. Both the “mixed motives” and “selectivity” problems spark a high level of scrutiny on using military means, and rightly so, even if neither is limited to protection interventions but relates to any form of coercion in the current international system. While normatively relevant and rhetorically useful to oppose particular interventions, these arguments do not effectively keep most political actors from supporting an intervention that they accept as necessary and plausibly effective. As Libya illustrates, the line was crossed when incompatible motives – the removal of Gaddafi and his regime by force, without a convincing rationale linked to protection – are seen to trump the concern for protection.

Protecting Effectively: What Works in Practice?

Effective protection is no easier to ensure than responsible protection. While successes have been few and always limited, attempts at engagement, pressure and military interventions have often failed to protect or contributed to new threats to populations. Policymakers and academics across the world admit that we know little about effectively protecting people from atrocity crimes. To make progress toward this end is as much about developing policy instruments as it is about assessing risks and trying to identify the lesser of several evils in every particular situation. What is actually necessary and likely to succeed is open to debate and challenged in every case, not just when the use of force is involved.

A review of the cases we studied shows the uncertainties and ambiguities involved in decision-making on protection. Does it further the goal of protection when a head of state is indicted by the International Criminal Court, such as in the case of Sudan? Is protection furthered or hindered when a crisis is publicly labelled an “R2P situation,” such as in Kenya or Myanmar? If the state is a perpetrator of atrocity crimes, is there a case in which military force can be used against it without pursuing regime change or plunging the country into chaos, such as in Libya? When and how should UN peacekeepers take sides?

There are justifiable doubts about the available policy options and their risks. Compared to the considerable efforts made to promote R2P as a principle, too little is focused on finding and evaluating these difficult choices of putting protection from atrocity crimes into practice.
The Deeper Controversy: Can Force Protect?

While governments, civil society advocates and UN officials working on R2P have long tended to focus tactically on areas of consensus, the main international controversy concerns military intervention and the use of force for protection. More constructive and self-critical debate is essential to enable effective and responsible protection in the future; that debate should be on the effectiveness of the use of force in protecting people from atrocity crimes, its chances of doing more good than harm, and its successes and failures in the past. This debate is not only relevant to the rare cases of military intervention, since force and coercion are part of a wider range of protection strategies such as sanctions and peace operations. Even purely diplomatic or civilian tools are often seen as steps that may escalate toward the use of force.

Debates about the use of force, instead of focusing on the possible merits and risks of different choices, have been couched in terms of vague beliefs regarding the efficacy of military force to help achieve political goals. In the debates we examined, we found a striking contrast between the limited references to strategic studies on the utility of force in modern conflict and the conviction with which governments present their opinions about the very same subject.

In the “absence of military doctrine and analysis [for civilian protection],” as a former Pentagon official conceded even for the case of the United States, it appears as if policymakers tend to split along fundamental tenets of national strategic cultures: Some countries’ strategic communities are more optimistic that force can achieve good results such as civilian protection, and others’ are mostly pessimistic and more likely to believe that using military force would make matters worse.

Despite the inherent uncertainty of each crisis, actors on either side of this divide firmly present these beliefs, often in terms of truisms – “there can only be a political solution” or “there cannot be a future for Libya/Syria with Gaddaf i/Assad in power.” These are only two prominent positions that fail to acknowledge the complex reality of any crisis. They thereby invite mutual stereotyping rather than constructive discussion. The results have been predictable exchanges of reflexive anti-Western reactions in the South (“they just want to invade our countries”) and reflexive anti-Southern reactions in the West (“they always side with their fellow dictators”). Both sides try to use the language of responsibility to make a case. “Taking responsibility” long meant taking risky and costly military action, until Brazil challenged the interventionist monopoly on the term.

This contrast between knowledge and conviction is apparent in many muddled debates about peacekeeping, such as in the UN’s handling of the 2010-2011 crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, but it was most sharply brought out in the debate about the way the United States, France and the United Kingdom led the 2011 intervention in Libya. Senior Brazilian diplomats, for example, challenged the military case for regime change, a case that the US, the UK and France in fact never explicitly made. Why not stop the assault when the immediate threats to civilian population were eliminated and Gaddafi’s forces had been stopped in their advance, and force all sides to the negotiating table? What responsibility did the intervening coalition take for the actions of its de facto allies on the ground, the Libyan rebel forces? How did the intervening coalition balance the risks and rewards of different strategic choices, and why exactly was it “not possible to imagine a future with Gaddaf i in power,” as Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy claimed in
Similar questions have been asked with regard to suggestions of military intervention in Syria. The lack of convincing answers has likely played a very important role in shelving a series of unilateral intervention plans over the years.

The widespread discomfort in many parts of the world with what seems to be unfounded optimism that force can achieve complex political goals goes far beyond the specific goal of protection from atrocity crimes. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has loomed large in these discussions as an example of an irresponsible choice by a hegemonic power that tends to lecture others on responsible global leadership. It is also a stark reminder that even the world’s greatest military is evidently unable to forcibly build effective political order, with tragic consequences for many thousands of people in Iraq and beyond.

Still, during crises in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, Libya in 2011 and the Central African Republic in 2014, the Security Council was ready to legitimize military intervention “on a case-by-case basis,” as the World Summit had suggested. In each of these cases, large majorities emerged that ultimately prioritized the need for military action over the widespread concern with maintaining state sovereignty, whether by voting in favor in the Security Council, by enabling the passage of resolutions through abstention (such as Russia and China in the case of Libya), or by providing financial, military or political support in other forums.

There may be a window of opportunity emerging for a more thorough, critical policy debate on the efficacy of military force for protection from atrocity crimes. Such debates are taking place with regard to the different but related goals of fighting terrorist networks and insurgencies. In both of these cases, there is a nuanced discussion in professional military and law-enforcement circles as well as major news outlets on issues such as targeted killings of suspected terrorists or population-centric counterinsurgency tactics.

A similar, critical debate needs to take place about force and protection. It could build upon a recent trend toward further engagement with the practicalities of using military force for protection. Societies and strategic communities in the US, the UK and France have shown signs of becoming tired of interventions in general and unilateral interventions in particular. At the same time, some of the staunchest advocates of reflexive military restraint – like China, Brazil and Germany – have begun to consider, in particular cases, arguments for military action to protect civilians. Both advocates and skeptics of military protection stand to gain from pushing for greater nuance in these debates. For one side, the demand of specificity will guard against the abuse of humanitarian authority for other purposes. For the other, providing greater transparency will help defend against charges of abuse. This debate should draw on recent academic findings but will find more specific building blocks in policy concepts such as the UN’s doctrine for protection of civilians and attempts by the US military to develop conceptual guidance for “mass atrocity response operations.”
If the two main global controversies around the protection of people from atrocity crimes involve the fear of abuse of humanitarian arguments and how to effectively protect, what are options for better global solutions for protection? The starting point is to recognize protection from atrocity crimes as a complex political challenge, not a simple stop-gap to be employed while trying to resolve a larger political conflict. Any protection strategy must be primarily geared to influence the political and military calculations of perpetrators, and it must be mindful of the limits of external influence over events on the ground. Local actors hold by far the greatest sway over the dynamics of violence, and the knock-on effects of external action are hard to predict. Short-termism of the “rapid response, rapid withdrawal” variety is therefore irresponsible almost regardless of context; while rapid action is often necessary, policymakers as well as activists, journalists and academics need to pay more attention to the long haul and design policies to be adaptable to changing circumstances.

Based on our findings, we outline policy options for governments, the UN and regional organizations as well as the media and civil society to improve the credibility of existing tools by making them less likely to be abused and more effective at protecting people from atrocity crimes. We begin with the need to ensure credible information and analysis on atrocity situations. We then provide some options for strengthening the civilian toolkit for atrocity prevention and response, and for making UN peace operations better at protecting people from atrocity crimes. We proceed by highlighting important reform options for collective decision-making on military action and end by emphasizing the need for continuous and collaborative learning about the tools of atrocity prevention.

Reducing the Vulnerability of Information Sources to Accusations of Bias

To even begin considering ways to address looming or ongoing atrocities, the world needs to agree on what is going on in any given situation. In today’s world, the availability of information about specific crisis situations is no longer the main challenge for mobilizing action. Yet we find that one crucial challenge for protection from atrocity crimes has been the accusation of bias regarding the type and interpretation of information about atrocities provided by governments, by the media or by civil society groups. Trust in leading states and international institutions is running so low that even cases of well-documented atrocities such as those in Darfur have been dismissed as interventionist propaganda by some.29
This mistrust is most frequently directed at sources linked to “the West.” Oftentimes, Western-based, -funded or -staffed sources are by far the most accessible ones, not just for policy elites in faraway capitals but also for expert panels and inquiries of the United Nations in countries without an extensive UN field presence. When local government sources are obviously discredited, as in Syria, and access to violent areas is limited for journalists, sometimes all relevant remaining sources come from news or advocacy organizations headquartered in the West, from local civil society organizations that depend on Western or other foreign funding and that hold specific anti-government agendas, or from Western professionals working for the UN. The Chinese government, for example, often emphasizes that the international identification and assessment of human rights abuses abroad is too dependent on Western information and has called for more-impartial early warning systems. Indian experts say that it is not the availability of information that is a challenge today, but the “interpretation and the spin given to it.”

Advocacy groups and the media face incentives to simplify narratives, so a healthy skepticism regarding accusations of heinous atrocities is prudent. At the same time, to assume that the truth simply lies in the middle of all the positions presented would be to allow propaganda and misinformation to set the agenda. Credibly criticizing sources requires engaging with the information itself rather than insinuating political agendas based solely on geographical location, funding or education.

To provide for a better-informed debate on potential atrocity crimes, media corporations and philanthropists, particularly in emerging powers, should invest in independent and credible sources of information and analysis about conflicts and human rights.

The allegation of bias (whether pro- or anti-government or something else) flourishes when there is a paucity of sources. Those who criticize existing information sources know best whose money and influence might provide greater credibility, so it is upon them to invest accordingly. If governments and policy elites outside the West are suspicious of Western sources of information, they can help diversify the support base of existing globally active NGOs and media networks, or invest in platforms for alternative reporting and analysis based on the highest standards of journalistic integrity. For now, with few exceptions, investment in free media and access to information do not seem to enjoy the highest priority among emerging entrepreneurial elites, even in democratic emerging powers. State-run news agencies, in turn, often struggle to establish a reputation for journalistic integrity. Serious investments into reporting on humanitarian crises, such as the recent investment by the Hong Kong-based Jynwel Foundation in the now-independent news organization IRIN, are rare. Advocacy organizations can contribute to reducing the allegations of bias by not painting black-and-white pictures of conflict situations and by being transparent about who finances and supports them. If they provide an extensive record of footnotes and sources in their reports, as the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch regularly do, it is up to the critics to seriously engage with these on the basis of the facts.
Strengthening and diversifying information on the risks of mass atrocity crimes could also mean establishing regionally based civil society organizations dedicated to credible and reliable research on and advocacy for atrocity prevention. If truly rooted in local societies, such groups would provide greater access for regional and national civil society groups than global organizations based in New York or Geneva. Consequently, their information and advocacy would be more likely to command political credibility globally. In the short term, the necessary critical mass for such civil society centers is probably most likely to be achieved in Europe or Africa, but Latin America (with its unique government-to-government “Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention”) and Asia could well catch up quickly.

Member states, civil society and regional organizations should enhance the UN’s capacities for fact-finding and information-gathering about protection challenges by providing logistical assistance, short-term staff and local information sources.

While regional organizations are increasingly able to frame the global understanding of their parts of the world, their impartiality is often only as credible as that of the hegemonic power or powers driving their deliberations. The United Nations, however, cannot always meet the need for impartial, credible information on atrocity risks all by itself. Not only are UN mechanisms often forced to rely on government and private sources for reasons of time pressure and lack of their own, independent access to locations at risk. The UN has also been subject to self-censorship and been forced to cut political compromises in the past.34

All UN member states need to strengthen the role of UN fact-finding mechanisms, commissions of inquiry and related bodies. For example, whenever mass violence breaks out, as determined by the Secretary General, the UN should send a fact-finding mission to inform discussions at the Security Council. This could be based on a standing roster with relevant member-state experts, and should involve relevant UN agencies, in particular the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, and the Department of Political Affairs.35 Member states should contribute both funds and trained experts to these missions. Standard rules for the selection of fact-finders could help to make the selection process as transparent as possible and thereby improve the credibility and impartiality of UN fact-finding.36

Member states can also help the UN implement its “Human Rights Up Front” initiative, through which the secretariat is creating a streamlined information management system on all the information that the many parts of the UN system collect, combining existing data on humanitarian protection, human rights protection, protection of women in armed conflict, and child protection.37 Member states can support the UN by including more information from bilateral actors on the ground, provided the UN makes necessary investments into standards for treatment of sensitive data, witness protection and referral pathways.38
Deploy Diplomatic and Civilian Tools Early, Fairly, Strategically

Despite differences in rhetorical emphasis, there is universal agreement that atrocities should be prevented by the early and sustained use of a range of civilian tools available to the international community. They include diplomacy, mediation and political missions as well as sanctions, international criminal justice, humanitarian action and the tools of peacebuilding after a crisis, amongst them the rebuilding of state institutions and the rule of law.

Since the 1990s, the international community has learned important lessons regarding the use of these tools and made strides in further developing them. It has seen successes in preventive diplomacy, such as during the post-election crisis in Kenya in 2008, when a high-profile negotiator led talks with political support from regional bodies and all Security Council members, UN expertise and civil society engagement. Over the past 10 years, mediation capacities have been significantly expanded within the UN and regional organizations. Political missions such as in Timor-Leste or Guinea-Bissau may have prevented the renewed outbreak of violence. Targeted sanctions probably helped keep spoilers from disturbing the early peacebuilding processes in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. The International Criminal Court has prosecuted and convicted its first cases and supported important reforms of the criminal justice systems in many countries.

Yet, the international community has failed again and again to deploy the civilian tools at its disposal early, decisively and in a sustained manner. The consensus that appears to exist on deploying civilian tools early and as a matter of priority falls apart as soon as it requires real political tradeoffs and priority setting. Changing this is difficult. It requires moving beyond the common caricatures that blame only Western countries for investing too little or non-Western powers for blocking attempts to influence or pressure perpetrators and accomplices. Not only do competing priorities and interests exist on all sides, but the challenge is also a function of the deep uncertainty about how and when to deploy which tools, with which actors and in which forum. There is no blueprint or checklist for effective prevention, response or recovery.

We focused on shorter-term, targeted civilian measures in situations where atrocities are likely to occur or have already begun to occur. We found there are four areas that should be specifically addressed:

Those actors (particularly emerging powers) that call the loudest for diplomacy, civilian tools and early prevention need to match their rhetorical commitment with the required political will and investment into capacities and ideas.

Going beyond rhetoric on prevention requires the political will to make it a priority. Too often, the prevention of atrocity crimes collides with other political objectives in a particular crisis situation. At times, these interests or priorities are directly opposed to each other. In Sri Lanka in early 2009, for example, the government was able to leverage the overwhelming international concern with counterterrorism to deflect pressure about war crimes perpetrated in the fight against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In Darfur, international diplomatic action to stop atrocity crimes had to compete with...
the priority for a peace agreement in the long-standing North-South civil war in Sudan, and with counterterrorism collaboration with the Sudanese government.  

However, even in the absence of major competing interests, there is a gap between abstract support for the protection of populations from atrocity crimes and the political will to act, spend and take risks accordingly. A recent example in which investments should have been made earlier and more substantively is South Sudan – a crisis that also shows that “West” versus “rest” categories are not useful in analyzing country positions on protection. For different reasons, both the United States and China strongly supported Salva Kiir’s government, ignoring ample warning signs until it became one of the warring factions of South Sudan’s new civil war. In the Central African Republic, earlier investments into rule-of-law initiatives and security-sector reforms may have been able to prevent the country from plunging into violence of the current scale.

As these and other examples show, there is a great mismatch between the rhetoric of demanding more “political/diplomatic solutions” – as constantly emphasized by China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa (as well as Germany and the European Union) – and the political and material resources invested in pursuing such solutions. Making “political solutions” a reality requires at once the occasional statement and the establishment of institutional capacities for human rights monitoring; long-term election monitoring; rapidly deployable, senior-level mediation and mediation support; and institution building in the justice and security sectors and related areas, often wrapped into political missions by the UN and regional organizations. Similarly, the use of coercive tools like sanctions requires both hard-to-reach political agreements and the investment and initiative to creatively design and improve such tools in ways that are effectively targeted, fair and legally sound – which means minimizing the risk of targeting the wrong people in accordance with basic principles of the rule of law. The International Criminal Court needs the political commitment and ratification of the Rome Statute by some of the world’s most powerful nations; it also needs the resources to follow up on those cases that it is already pursuing. At the very least, both emerging and established powers need to step up their humanitarian assistance for those fleeing from violence. In 2014, for instance, UN member states provided less than 50 percent of the funds needed for the humanitarian response in Syria, leaving hundreds of thousands of people in need.

Governments should prioritize the deterrence and prosecution of perpetrators of atrocity crimes within their jurisdictions.

Beyond the difficult politics of dealing with perpetrators in power, as in Syria, or with perpetrators beyond the reach of weak states, as in the Central African Republic, all governments can do much more to sanction or prosecute those perpetrators of atrocity crimes that fall under their jurisdiction in one way or another. Preventing and responding to atrocity crimes mean addressing the motivations and capacities of individual perpetrators before a crime is committed. It also means holding them accountable after the fact. Those who keep money in a bank with international connections can be subject to asset freezes, whether the banks are in Europe or Asia. Those who travel are vulnerable to visa denials and travel bans, influencing their behavior before they
commit atrocities or while they are doing so. Existing laws, as in the United States, may allow immigrants to be deported if there is evidence linking them to genocide. Countries can actively pursue those sought by the International Criminal Court and change their laws or reassign law-enforcement capacity to prosecute the worst atrocity crimes independent of the place at which they were committed.

Too often, a lack of attention and political will enables perpetrators of atrocities to either live freely and comfortably after having committed atrocities or even organize, finance and support ongoing atrocities from abroad. This was the case with several leaders of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, a militia group operating in the Congo. They lived undisturbed in Germany for the better part of a decade before they were arrested and tried.\textsuperscript{50} The United States, despite its refusal to ratify the Rome Statute, has recently set a positive example by increasing efforts to search for suspected war crimes criminals who have lived in the United States and developing proposals that allow for the use of the immigration laws to hold perpetrators of atrocities accountable.\textsuperscript{51}

Policymakers should prioritize current behavior in assessing actors’ legitimacy and hold all actors in a conflict to the same standards.

Only because there is often one clearly identifiable group of perpetrators of known atrocities at some point in time does not mean that other groups have been and are going to remain innocent of such acts. Violence tends to beget violence, as threatened groups defend themselves and carry the fight to the enemy. Here, Libya is a good example. In spring 2011, correctly identifying Gaddafi’s regime as responsible for atrocity crimes was the right thing to do – but it did not stop the rebels from committing such abuses later, which some groups predictably did, and those supporting them militarily became complicit. Similarly, in 2014, supporting the Kurdish Peshmerga forces was the only way to prevent a massacre against Yezidis in Iraq – but their supporters should not be silent about later reprisal killings.

Picking specific groups as allies is easily seen as arbitrary when their present behavior does not justify international support. Amidst competing claims to political legitimacy, when external actors choose their local allies in inconsistent ways that have little to do with their behavior on the ground (sometimes favoring the incumbent regime, sometimes not), that choice is easily painted as hypocritical.\textsuperscript{52} Policymakers equally make themselves vulnerable to such accusations when they are selective about criticizing regional powers for arming or supporting rebel groups, as was the case with Western silence on Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Syria.

Government and civil society advocates for R2P and atrocity prevention need to tread carefully when calling for Security Council consideration of an emerging crisis.

With respect to careful preventive diplomacy, advocates for R2P and atrocity prevention, including governments and civil society, need to be careful about when and how to call for Security Council consideration of an emerging crisis. There will be situations
in which the council can make it more difficult to mediate by elevating the crisis to a highly visible political level. It can help mediators by giving them more leverage: sense of urgency, incentives and disincentives (eg, with targeted sanctions, travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargoes, investigations, establishment of a political mission). But in some situations, high-level international pressure, including a role for the Security Council, may be counterproductive. It may enforce a government’s urgency to finish a war at all costs, as in the case of Sri Lanka in early 2009, or complicate negotiations for humanitarian access, as in Myanmar in May 2008. Particularly when facing governments that already find themselves excluded from the international community, lower-profile forums and channels might be more effective at influencing behavior.

Enabling UN Peacekeeping to Provide Credible Protection

Peacekeeping is a system with great global legitimacy that already guards against abuse and has begun to focus on the protection of civilians (PoC) in many of its operations. The global composition of and strict control by the Security Council make peacekeeping operations far more acceptable to a wide range of stakeholders than any other instrument, notably the use of force by third parties under Security Council mandate. At the same time, peacekeeping is only able to address a limited set of protection challenges: The lack of rapid and effective deployment mechanisms makes it impossible for UN peacekeepers to respond to imminent threats of atrocity crimes, and the legal as well as practical requirement of collaboration with the host government limits effective action against perpetrators of atrocity crimes who are part of that government or enjoy its support. Even when peacekeepers were in place as atrocity crimes were being prepared, as they were in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 and in South Sudan in 2013, effective prevention was elusive. And where an immediate reaction did not succeed, the challenges of effective protection from ongoing crimes proved to quickly exceed the capabilities of blue helmets.

The many ways in which peacekeeping operations could better protect populations from atrocity crimes by building capacity, reducing vulnerability (“indirect protection”) and defending against perpetrators (“direct protection”) have been spelled out elsewhere. To live up to even a moderate level of ambition for peacekeepers to protect populations from atrocity crimes would require additional investments in capacities, doctrine and training. It would also require a hard look at how to use peacekeeping with political instruments more effectively.

The Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, mission leadership and contributing countries need to modestly and transparently communicate the limits of the UN’s capabilities to protect civilians on the ground.

The welcome and necessary commitment of the UN Security Council to deliver protection has led to excessive promises that have widened the gap between local expectations and a mission’s capacity to deliver. When thousands of peacekeepers are mandated with great fanfare but only a fraction arrive six months later, as in
South Sudan following the eruption of the latest civil war in December 2013, or when peacekeepers refuse to act while atrocity crimes are committed in the vicinity (whether due to inadequate support or leadership), as recently seen in the DRC or in Sudan, people who gather around the blue flag in the hope of protection can be put in greater danger than if they had fled elsewhere. Overall, threatened populations are still much better off with peacekeepers than without, but the credibility of the United Nations is nonetheless affected by such cases.58

Both effective protection and responsible protection require honest, transparent communication with the public and with the Security Council about every mission’s and every contingent’s capabilities and their willingness to take risks. When council diplomats create or reauthorize another ambitious mandate for civilian protection, they need to be told formally about the capacity and capability requirements that that would entail.

Protection by peacekeepers requires a boost in the quality of contributions to blue-helmet operations, and that requires the UNSC, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, troop, police and financial contributors to find a fairer and more balanced division of labor.

The fragile balance between troop contributors (mostly from Africa and Asia), funders (mostly from Europe and North America) and the permanent members of the UN Security Council issuing mandates is close to the breaking point. The unsustainable division of labor in peacekeeping is not a matter of the West against the rest. Many African countries, tired of years of failed attempts by external powers to bring peace to conflicts on the continent, increasingly demand and support the use of military force to protect civilians and buy time for peace negotiations. Large traditional troop contributors, in contrast, are increasingly wary of putting the lives of their soldiers at risk in faraway places – particularly those, like India, whose emerging role on the global stage has given rise to expectations of having influence over strategic choices that have thus far remained the exclusive domain of the permanent members. That, combined with the austerity-induced unwillingness of advanced militaries to step up their contributions of key assets, which could limit the risk to blue helmets, has made many developing countries increasingly impatient with a system that does not work for them any longer.

To make progress on the prevention of atrocity crimes, both wealthy and growing economies need to expand the resources they deploy for UN peacekeeping, but the main burden to alleviate the current imbalance is on countries with advanced capabilities. They need to make key military and police assets available to limit the risk for all blue helmets and increase the cost efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping. These include surveillance drones, mine-protected vehicles, military hospitals, airborne medical evacuation, combat air support, air lift, counter-IED equipment and other advanced technology.59

However, it is not just European and North American countries that deploy very few troops and provide far less to peacekeeping than they could. (Europeans, for example, account for less than 7 percent of UN peacekeeping troops and less than
4 percent of the UN's police forces. India has shown longstanding and extensive support for peacekeeping – a rare exception among countries with ambitions of regional or global leadership. Others should consider following the recent example of China and put greater numbers of qualified troops, police or civilians at the UN’s disposal. Brazil, for instance, despite its leadership role in Haiti, still deploys less personnel than tiny Togo and Burkina Faso.

All Security Council members and peacekeeping contributors should improve conceptual guidance, training and capacity building for protection of civilians from atrocity crimes.

Both the development of political strategies and the use of force for tactical protection of civilians sorely lack the solid conceptual foundation that any other type of military operation can rely on. The political, police and military challenges of protection from atrocity crimes do not receive adequate conceptual attention and training resources in almost any country. Not surprisingly, mission leaders and force commanders today operate on a trial-and-error basis without clear guidance or doctrine. Likewise, council members – particularly non-permanent ones – are forced to make hard decisions about the protection of civilians without having access to a body of political-military analysis on what particular tasks would entail on the ground. The lack of clear, commonly understood concepts about practical ways of protection (beyond no-fly zones) contributes to mutual stereotyping and suspicions of ulterior motives. The United States should continue to expand its Global Peace Operations Initiative and its African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, which bolster other countries’ capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping capacities. Both should focus more strongly on those militaries that frequently deploy in peacekeeping. In the future, training and exercises within the Global Peace Operations Initiative and beyond should specifically include different aspects of civilian protection. Similar to these US programs, the European Union, European governments and others with capable armed forces should provide state-of-the-art training and equipment to contributors to peace operations. They could create incentives for trained and equipped units to actually deploy with UN, African Union or sub-regional forces for civilian protection – in the EU’s case, by refocusing and expanding the Enable and Enhance Initiative.

Use the current review of UN peace operations to build consensus among all stakeholders (Security Council and secretariat as well as troop, police and financial contributors) on the use of force only to support – never to replace – a political strategy for protection from atrocity crimes, and to design mandates and operations accordingly.

As part of necessary dialogue on the utility of the use of force, the current review of UN peace operations provides an opportunity to rebuild a common language on peacekeeping, its basic principles and concepts, and the ambitions and challenges
for the protection tasks of UN missions, in particular regarding the use of force. The principles of consent, impartiality and neutrality, updated through the Brahimi Report to allow peacekeepers to act against violators of peace agreements and perpetrators of atrocities, are once again being bent or appear irrelevant in many operations. The majority of peacekeepers today are serving in active conflict situations, as in Mali or the Central African Republic. UN peacekeepers are conducting active combat operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In other places, the agreements on which a mission was founded many decades ago do not cover the parties now threatening or abducting peacekeepers, as in the Golan Heights.

While some ambiguity over principles is unavoidable, the active use of force to protect civilians can only support, but never replace, a political strategy. Where there is no realistic political strategy to make peace, there might at least be one to limit the risks to civilians – if necessary, one that includes the support of military force by UN troops, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These questions require honest discussions between all stakeholders in UN peace operations. Current fault lines in these discussions do not run between Western supporters of more force and non-Western naysayers. Currently, they run mostly between big traditional troop contributing countries like India and Pakistan, who worry about increased risks to their troops, and the more interventionist coalition of African and Western European countries.

**Decision-Making on Military Action**

Today’s collective security system with the UN Security Council at its core is not up to the task of providing effective and responsible protection. Not only is the council unable to act effectively when geopolitical interests collide, such as in Syria. It even fails in situations in which the abuse of humanitarian arguments is not at stake and the interests of key council members align – such as in the Central African Republic or South Sudan. A council that is both able to mandate and mobilize effective protection and to limit the fear of abuse of humanitarian arguments would need to draw on the voices of all major political players in today’s world, troop contributing countries and major financial contributors.

Both the composition and the working methods of the UN Security Council reflect the world order of the 1940s. To maintain the credibility of the collective security system, restoring the legitimacy of the Security Council is both urgent and in the interest of the five permanent members. However, while well-founded in terms of global justice and the long-term prospects for global governance, existing proposals for an expanded Council or a larger role of the General Assembly in security issues are unlikely to contribute to more effective protection from atrocity crimes.

With an eye to the UN’s 70th anniversary this year, our suggestions therefore focus on procedural rather than structural changes in the Security Council:
The five permanent members of the UN Security Council should support more inclusive decision-making within the council and open up informal channels of consultation on mandates, strategy and operations to all crucial stakeholders, particularly regional powers and major personnel contributors.

The working methods of the UN Security Council severely limit its sense of impartiality in the eyes of the world. For most crises in Africa, the so-called “penholder” – the country taking the lead in drafting council decisions – is either that country’s former colonial power or the United States. While useful in providing continuity over many years, this arrangement and the resulting internal relationships between permanent members effectively exclude non-permanent members from most of the informal negotiations where the key decisions are made.

For a less exclusionary way of decision-making, the council would need additional actors both within and outside the respective regions of concern to develop the analytical and political capacity to constructively co-manage council engagement and peace operations rather than just defending their own interests. Member states and civil society organizations should also continue the discussions on a code of conduct for a voluntary restraint of the veto right in situations of atrocity crimes, as proposed by the French government.

Beyond internal procedures, council members should continue to expand informal interactions with relevant stakeholders, including neighboring countries and major personnel contributors to peace operations. This does not need to be limited to formal diplomatic exchanges: To increase the quality and acceptance of peacekeeping mandates, mandate drafters could more regularly involve experts from major troop or police contributing countries in their personal capacity as former force commanders or police commissioners.

Actors with the credibility to bridge the polarized debate on military intervention should facilitate informal efforts to develop a more stringent monitoring and reporting system for states implementing UN-mandated missions.

The Responsibility while Protecting concept (RwP) is one of the most promising initiatives to address the global disagreements on abuse of the Responsibility to Protect. When it was put forward by Brazil in late 2011, it provided an opportunity to debate what effective protection could look like, and what role the use of force should or should not play in protecting, following the Libya intervention when these discussions were extremely polarized. After this experience, it is very unlikely that the UN Security Council will pass a resolution authorizing an outside force for protection with such broad language again in the future. Implementing some of the ideas in the RwP proposal is therefore in the interest of all states that believe that force should be a tool available to the international community as a measure of last resort. One issue that needs further discussion concerns the criteria and conditions under which the council should deploy force to protect populations. While the discussion on criteria for the use of force is as old as the discussion on humanitarian intervention, all member
states – as we noted above – would benefit from an honest debate on the successes and failures of using force in the past, and their implications for using force in the future. Another, more practical issue concerns how to increase the ability of the council to hold those who implement council decisions accountable. One concrete suggestion would be the adoption of elements of the peacekeeping system, such as regular reporting and briefings to situations of delegation of the use of force to third parties. These could include explicit “sunset clauses” in resolutions that would require an extension of the mandate by the Security Council and specific regular reporting requirements by those member states that implement council decisions to the council.70 Another suggestion would be the creation of an accountability and monitoring mechanism by establishing panels of experts when the council mandates the use of force modelled after the UN sanctions committees. Reports of independent committees like these can create a standard practice and contribute to improving over time the quality of decisions by the council both before and during military operations.71

Emerging and established powers can do their part in advancing the discussions on the issues that RwP raised. Both Brazil’s official initiative and the “Responsible Protection” idea floated by a leading Chinese pundit72 could provide starting points for more specific and operational discussions, both within the BRICS as well as among the permanent members of the Security Council.73 Instead of rejecting such concepts as attacks on the Responsibility to Protect, Western powers should welcome such initiatives as opportunities for constructive debate on how to protect populations from atrocity crimes.74

**Build Constant Reflection and Learning Into Every Policy Tool**

While there is a great deal of experience with grim failures and a few qualified successes, there is no reliable knowledge base on how to protect people from atrocity crimes. For the most part, governments and international organizations continue to treat every crisis as one of its kind, with too little attention devoted to continuous reflection, learning and policy adaptation as situations evolve. Academia has learned a great deal more about what did not work under certain conditions than about how it could be done better – partly because each political intervention takes place in its own context, and partly as a result of academic incentives and difficulties in accessing data.

Governments, international organizations, civil society and academia need to design policies that are more adaptable to evolving knowledge and risk assessments, based on in-built opportunities for continuous and collaborative reflection and learning.

While urgency continues to require action, acting responsibly in the face of such great uncertainty calls for being less confident in the ability to determine the best possible policy in any situation. Policymakers, activists and intellectuals should be honest with themselves and transparent with those who are most directly affected by their policies. There are no tried-and-tested solutions. All we can do is attempt to identify the most...
responsible way forward in every case, while being ready and able to quickly react to new developments and improve the policy toolkit. Such experimental policymaking needs to be constantly monitored and self-critically evaluated both internally and externally through open and honest exchange between practitioners, target societies and external experts at all levels, from the monitoring and evaluation of policy activities up to the broader public policy debates about the efficacy of military force and coercive diplomacy in preventing and responding to atrocity crimes.
Endnotes


18. Both the debates around the Brazilian proposal of a Responsibility while Protecting and the 2012 UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect on “Timely and Decisive Action” were attempts in which R2P advocates engaged in discussions on the use of force and R2P. For a collection of statements during the 2012 General Assembly debate see http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/278.


21. Pessimism on the efficacy of force, however, is not the same as promoting non-violence. Some of the biggest proponents of skepticism about military force for protection resort frequently to military or quasi-military force at home.


24. Tourinho, Stuenkel, and Brockmeier, “‘Responsibility While Protecting” and the Ethics of R2P Implementation.’


29. Harry Verhoeven documents the example of a senior Chinese diplomat, who “thought the West had invented the Janjaweed [pro-government militias in Darfur] as an excuse to intervene...But they were real and they killed people!” Harry Verhoeven, ‘Is Beijing's Non-Interference Policy History? How Africa Is Changing China,' *The Washington Quarterly* 37:2, 2014, 64.


32. Exchange with a number of Indian experts at a 21 January 2015 event at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.


43. For distinction between “systemic” and “targeted” activities see Reike, Sharma, and Welsh, ‘A Strategic Framework for Mass Atrocity Prevention.’


58. This was already described in 2009 in the “New Horizon” report by DPKO: “The mismatch between expectations and capacity to provide comprehensive protection creates a significant credibility challenge for UN peacekeeping.” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,’ (New York, 2009), 20.
67. Conversations with former military commanders, New Delhi, January 2015.
68. Tourinho, Stuenkel, and Brockmeier, “Responsibility While Protecting” and the Ethics of R2P Implementation.’
70. Compare also Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect. A Defense, 200.
71. Tourinho, Stuenkel, and Brockmeier, ‘“Responsibility While Protecting” and the Ethics of R2P Implementation.’
Selected Publications

Major Powers and the Contested Evolution of a Responsibility to Protect, by Philipp Rotmann, Thorsten Benner and Wolfgang Reinicke (editors) as a special issue of Conflict, Security and Development (volume 14, issue 4, 2014). The special issue contains the following articles, all available for free online:

- Introduction: Major Powers and the Contested Evolution of a Responsibility to Protect by Philipp Rotmann, Gerrit Kurtz, and Sarah Brockmeier
- Regulating Intervention: Brazil and the Responsibility to Protect by Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho
- Debates in China about the Responsibility to Protect as a Developing International Norm: A General Assessment by Liu Tiewa and Zhang Haibin
- Emerging Norm and Rhetorical Tool: Europe and a Responsibility to Protect by Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit Kurtz, and Julian Junk
- Singing the Tune of Sovereignty? India and the Responsibility to Protect by Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz
- Multipolarity as Resistance to Liberal Norms: Russia’s Position on Responsibility to Protect by Xymena Kurowska
- “Our Identity is Our Currency”: South Africa, the Responsibility to Protect and the Logic of African Intervention by Harry Verhoeven, C.S.R. Murthy, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira
- The Two-Level Politics of Support - US Foreign Policy and the Responsibility to Protect by Julian Junk

For our forthcoming special issue of Global Society, the following articles are currently under review:

- To Intervene in Darfur, or Not: Re-examining the R2P Debate and its Impacts by Harry Verhoeven and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira
- International Responsibility as Solidarity: the Impact of the World Summit Negotiations on R2P’s Trajectory by C.S.R. Murthy and Gerrit Kurtz
- Bringing the Non-Coercive Dimensions of R2P to the Fore: The Case of Kenya by Julian Junk
- Testing Boundaries – Myanmar, Nargis and the Scope of R2P by Julian Junk
- Parody as Norm Contestation: Normative Jujitsu around the 2008 Russian-Georgian War by Erna Burai
- Realizing Effective and Responsible Protection: Discussions and Development of the RtoP Concept in the 2009 UNGA Debate and thereafter by Zhang Haibin and Liu Tiewa
- The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection by Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel, and Marcos Tourinho
- African Visions of a Responsibility to Protect: Côte d’Ivoire as a Testing Ground by Erna Burai
- Responsibility While Protecting and the Ethics of R2P Implementation by Marcos Tourinho, Oliver Stuenkel, and Sarah Brockmeier

Other related publications:

- India’s Approach to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts by C.S.R. Murthy, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, November 2012.
- Contemporary World Order and Approaches to UN Peacekeeping: A South Asian Perspective by C.S.R. Murthy, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, December 2012.
- The BRICS and the Future of R2P: Was Syria or Libya the Exception? by Oliver Stuenkel, Global Responsibility to Protect 6:1, 2014, pp. 3-28.
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