SOCIAL MEDIA CRISES IN THE ORGANIZATION: EXPLORING MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES THROUGH CASES FROM FRANCE AND BRAZIL
CLÉMENCE VIGNAL LAMBRET

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Dissertation presented to Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo of Fundação Getulio Vargas, as a requirement to obtain the title of Master in International Management (MPGI).

Knowledge Field: Corporate Management

Adviser: Prof. Dr. Edgard Barki

SÃO PAULO
2016
Clémence Vignal Lambret.

Social Media Crises in the Organization: Exploring Management Strategies through Cases from France and Brazil / Clémence Vignal Lambret. - 2016

106 f.

Orientador: Edgard Elie Roger Barki
Dissertação (MPGI) - Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo.

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Approval Date:

18/02/2016

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“O caminho da sabedoria é não ter medo de errar”

Paulo Coelho

Engaging in the process of a Master thesis is an experience both exciting and challenging, for it brings closure to the first chapter of your life while propelling you into the next one at a phenomenal speed, or so it seems after at least 17 years spent in the school system. Hence, in no way has it been a lonely journey, and I would like to extend my deep gratitude to the different people who have travelled with me until now.

Firstly, I would like to sincerely thank my advisor, Prof. Dr. Edgard Barki, for his strong support since the beginning, his openness towards a topic whose dimensions are yet to be fully grasped, and for the inspiration he allowed me to express through this work: Merci! Second, I am grateful for all the professors I have had during my five (almost six) years of higher level study whether in France, the US or Brazil. Having the opportunity to read, study, learn and exchange with so many diverse people in such diverse environments has been an incredible experience, and the foundation on which I was able to start and finish my thesis project. In particular, I wish to thank Dr. Dong Liu, from the Georgia Institute of Technology, who was a very inspirational figure and taught me one valuable lesson: that much can be achieved with “knowledge and fun”.

Additionally, I would like to pay tribute to some of my precious friends who have directly and indirectly taken part in my project, may it be when patiently analyzing hundreds of comments, bearing to hear me think out loud over and over about what title to choose, or simply being wise and comforting travel partners. In particular, Florian, Juliana, Julie, Katie, Mascha and Quentin, you have been such inspiring friends. Thank you for your patience, your unfailing sense of humor, your radiant kindness and your words of wisdom. I would not have made it here without you.

Last, but not least, I would like to address a few words to those closest to my heart. Yann, my partner, you have been such a precious support, a rock of kindness and patience, a careful reviewer and a “force tranquille” with whom I shared much of this incredible learning experience. Merci, infiniment. Finally, I’d like to dedicate these last lines to my dear parents, and godfather Vincent, three careful pointsmen along my road, and to my little sister Mathilde, a monument of strength whom I admire a lot. Thank you for giving me both roots and wings, for making it possible for me to seize so many opportunities, for encouraging me to always dare and thus letting me make necessary mistakes. These pages are for you!
ABSTRACT

The aim of this Master’s thesis has been to shed light on the response strategies that organizations are implementing when facing a crisis created on or amplified by social media. Since the development of social media in the late 1990s, the interplay between the online and the offline spheres has become more complex, and characterized by dynamics of a new magnitude, as exemplified by the wave of “Twitter” Revolutions or the Wikileaks scandal in the mid 2000s, where online behaviors deeply affected an offline reality.

The corporate world does not escape to this worldwide phenomenon, and there are more and more examples of organizational reputations destroyed by social media “fireballs”. As such, this research aims to investigate, through the analysis of six recent cases of corporate crises (2013-2015) from France and Brazil, different strategies currently in use in order to identify examples of good and bad practices for companies to adopt or avoid when facing a social media crisis.

The first part of this research is dedicated to a review of the literature on crisis management and social media. From that review, we were able to design a matrix model, the Social Media Crisis Management Matrix, with which we analyzed the response strategies of the six companies we selected. This model allows the conceptualization of social media crises in a multidimensional matrix built to allow the choice, according to four parameters, of the most efficient (that is: which will limit the reputational damage) response strategy. Attribution of responsibility for the crisis to the company by stakeholders, the origin of the crisis (internal or external), the degree of reputational threat, and the emotions conveyed online by stakeholders help companies determining whether to adopt a defensive response, or an accommodative response.

The results of the analysis suggest that social media crises are rather manichean objects for they are, unlike their traditional offline counterparts, characterized by emotional involvement and irrationality, and cannot be dealt with traditionally. Thus analyzing the emotions of stakeholders proved to be, in these cases, an accurate thermometer of the seriousness of the crisis, and as such, a better rudder to follow when selecting a response strategy. Consequently, in the cases, companies minimized their reputational damage when responding to their stakeholders in an accommodative way, regardless of the “objective” situation, which might be a change of paradigm in crisis management.

KEY WORDS: CRISIS MANAGEMENT; SOCIAL MEDIA; CORPORATE REPUTATION; EMOTIONS; STRATEGY
RESUMO

O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é de esclarecer as estratégias que as organizações estão implementando quando enfrentam uma crise criada ou amplificada pelas mídias sociais. Desde o desenvolvimento das mídias sociais no final dos anos 1990, a interação entre as esferas off-line e on-line tornou-se mais complexa, e caracteriza-se por dinâmicas de uma nova magnitude, como exemplificado pela onda de revoluções "Twitter" ou o escândalo Wikileaks em meados da década de 2000, onde os comportamentos on-line afetaram profundamente a realidade off-line.

O mundo corporativo não escapa a este fenômeno mundial, e há cada vez mais exemplos de reputações corporativas destruídas por movimentos nas mídias sociais. Assim sendo, esta pesquisa tem como objetivo investigar, por meio da análise de seis casos recentes de crises corporativas (2013-2015) da França e do Brasil, diferentes estratégias atualmente em uso. Busca-se identificar exemplos de boas e más práticas para as empresas adotarem ou evitarem ao enfrentarem uma crise nas mídias sociais.

A primeira parte deste trabalho é dedicada a uma revisão da literatura sobre gestão de crises e mídias sociais. A partir dessa revisão, eu desenvolvi um modelo matricial, a Matriz de Gerenciamento de crise em Mídias Sociais, com o qual eu analisei as estratégias de resposta das seis empresas que selecionei. Este modelo permitiu a conceituação de crises nas mídias sociais em uma matriz multidimensional construída para permitir a escolha, de acordo com quatro parâmetros, da estratégia de resposta mais eficiente (isto é: o que irá limitar o dano à reputação). Atribuição de responsabilidade pela crise para a empresa pelos stakeholders, a origem da crise (interna ou externa), o grau de ameaça à reputação, e as emoções transmitidas on-line pelos interessados ajudam as empresas a determinar a adoção de uma resposta defensiva ou acomodativa.

Os resultados da análise sugerem que as crises de mídia social são, ao contrário de suas contrapartes off-line tradicionais, caracterizadas por envolvimento emocional e irracionalidade, e não podem ser tratadas tradicionalmente. Assim, analisar as emoções do stakeholders mostrou-se, nos casos analisados, um bom termômetro da gravidade da crise, e como tal, um melhor direcionador para selecionar uma estratégia de resposta. Por conseguinte, nos casos, as empresas minimizaram os danos à reputação ao responder aos seus stakeholders de forma acomodativa, independentemente da situação "objetiva", o que pode ser uma mudança de paradigma no gerenciamento de crise.

PALAVRAS CHAVES: ADMINISTRAÇÃO DE CRISE ; MIDIA SOCIAL; IMAGEM CORPORATIVA; EMOÇÕES ; ESTRATÉGIA
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“It takes 20 years to build a reputation, and 5 minutes to ruin it. If you think about this, you’ll do things differently.”
Warren Buffet

1 Introduction

On Friday, 18 of September 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency revealed that German car manufacturer Volkswagen had been superficially hiding the gas performance of its cars in order to circumvent gas emissions tests. 53,000 tweets about the revelation were posted that same day. It was followed by 1.3 million more tweets over the following week, averaging 8,000 tweets per hour, against 10,000 Volkswagen-related tweets on a usual day (Marketingtechnews.net). Within one week after the revelation, Volkswagen had lost its CEO, Martin Winterkorn, 35% of its market value, and its reputation. Early November 2015, a “Diesel emissions violation” subchapter was added to the “Environmental Record” chapter of the English-speaking Wikipedia page of Volkswagen, and a whole new page entitled “Volkswagen emissions scandal” was created. By the end of December, the new CEO of Volkswagen, Matthias Müller, threw on scrapheap their famous 2007-slogan “Das Auto” (“The Car”) to the profit of a more sober mention of “Volkswagen” (“the people’s car”), embodiment of a desire to focus on a more humble communication and to keep a low profile.

The infamous case of Volkswagen well illustrates Aula (2010) understanding of reputation risk: “the loss of reputation affects competitiveness, local positioning, the trust and loyalty of stakeholders, media relations, and the legitimacy of operations” (p.44).

The complex interplay of social media and organizations is, more than ever, a very newsworthy topic and seems to be the logical outcome of the trend identified in 2006 by the Time when it designated “You” (the internet user) as “Person of the year”, “for seizing the reins of the global media [and] for founding and framing the new digital democracy”.

Ever since, social media has been a research topic of interest. The wave of revolutions that sprung in Eastern Europe (Moldova and Iran in 2009-2010) and in Maghreb (Tunisia in 2010-2011 and Egypt, 2011) has been popularly labeled as “Twitter” or “Facebook Revolutions”. In particular, Lotan et al. (2011) analyzed the information flows on Twitter during Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, and concluded that “information is […] flowing among different actor types […] and […] revolutions were indeed tweeted”. A common thought, then, was that social media embodied a tool for democracy because it opened and widened the communication channels between governments and populations.
The ability to freely and instantly add one’s voice to the Internet conversation probably allowed, indeed, some salutary democratic impetuses. But it also proved the extensive power of influence held by social media users continuously reacting (as opposed to reasoning) to anything happening on and offline. In a socio-political context, social media has seemed to appear as the advent of a postmodern “government of the people, by the people, to the people” (Abraham Lincoln) where online communities can shake offline governments. What, then, can we expect the impact to be on companies?

The massive use of social media is a phenomenon that can be traced back to the late 1990s and early 2000s, when newspapers worldwide started developing their own online edition, hereby multiplying sources of immediate information: for instance, French newspaper Le Monde launched its first online version in 1995 followed in 1996 by The New York Times (US) and O Globo (Brazil), and in 1999 by The Times (UK). In the meantime, social networks such as MySpace, Facebook and YouTube, appeared almost simultaneously (2002, 2004 & 2005) and, within ten years, a multitude of other user-generated content platforms emerged, on themes as varied as professional networking (e.g LinkedIn, 2003), music sharing (e.g Spotify, 2006, Deezer, 2007), image sharing (e.g Instagram or Pinterest in 2010, Snapchat in 2011), instant messaging (e.g from Skype in 2003 to Whatsapp in 2010) or microblogging (Twitter in 2006, Tumblr in 2007).

The resulting very competitive market for “news” has been strengthening the dynamics of corporate crises, because crises are “an excellent opportunity of audience” (Libaert, 2015, p.28-32). Social media, because they are free from the time and space-constraint of traditional media, present new risks for the corporate environment as they help “disseminating information to as many people as possible” (Veil, Buechner and Palenchar, 2011, p.115). In addition, they allow an “afterglow effect” of any event relating to a company, as information remain available online and the company’s name can still be referenced long after the end of the crisis (Libaert, 2015). Consequently, “traces” of crises are “eternal” online, which makes the Internet inseparable from crisis management.

In 2013, Deloitte published a global survey entitled “Exploring Strategic Risk” where they found that strategic risks had become the focus of most companies today, reputation risk being cited as the most concerning sub-risk. The analysis, which confirms the intuition of several authors such as Aula (2010), revealed that new technologies were at the core of organizations’ fear, for they had “given way to a multidimensional information matrix where no single voice dominates” (Deloitte, 2013, p.4). Social media was deemed to be, in the report, the first technology threat, ahead of data mining and analytics. The instantaneity and
The universality of social media make it an extremely powerful tool: strategic risk “strikes more quickly” and social media embody a “rapid-fire […] technological innovation” (p.3). Indeed, the inherently public nature of online content will impact the reputation of organizations as other people’ voices add to the “organization’s voice to communicate” (Coombs & Holladay, 2014, p.42). The reputational risk faced by organizations is therefore permanent, and the challenge today is less about preventing this risk than to manage it when it “manifests” (Heath, 2006) and hereby becomes a crisis.

Therefore, some authors saw in social media new opportunities, such as Veil, Buehner and Palenchar (2011) who explored the potential of social media tools in risk and crisis management, and drew from their literature review a series of best practices to optimize the integration of social media into crisis communication.

Others focused on the interplay between social media and corporate reputation. Aula (2010), for example, argued that social media “expands the spectrum of reputation risks and boost risk dynamics” (p.45) because it is a space where users become active and influential stakeholders of the organizations. Organizations are scrutinized (everything they do is “profoundly public” (p. 45)) and they are bound to irreproachable behaviors - “looking good” is no longer enough. In the meantime, stakeholders massively sharing “unverified information, true or false” (p. 48) participate in shaping a somewhat artificial “collective truth” also binding organizations to respond to new expectations or beliefs about what they are or should be. Eventually, Aula (2010) developed the concept of “ambient publicity” to suggest that reputation is the aggregation of stakeholders’ shared interpretations of the organization (e.g anecdotes and other “discursive elements”) and should, as a result, be managed within this understanding and aimed at “participating in the social process of creating meaning” (p. 48).

Pfeffer, Zorbach and Carley (2014) focused on a side of the “collective truth” process mentioned by Aula (2010), which they refer to as online negative word-of-mouth. They argued that social media was an ideal conductor of users’ outrage. The authors coined the term “online firestorm” to designate the “instant waves of criticism” (p.118) allowed by social media and “that appear without warning” (p.118). The authors pointed out that these were “predominantly opinion, not fact, thus having a high affective nature” (p. 117) and as such, could “have a huge impact on a company’s or a brand’s reputation” (p.118). Approaching the topic as a marketing communication issue, they identified several drivers of firestorms from which they drew several axes of action for companies aiming to mitigate online firestorms: “retain their composure, and continue to communicate and interact”
(p.123) as well as “be[ing] proactive and create fan networks” (p. 125) were two of the authors’ recommendations.

The following year, Hövener (2015) attempted to create an integrated model, which he called The Social Media Matrix to suggest social media crisis communication strategies that companies could use to mitigate reputational exposure in a social media context. The model was derived from the analysis of several authors and based on two factors: internal capabilities, or the degree of available internal experience and know-how regarding crisis communication, and content attractiveness, the degree to which users will perceive sharing as interesting for a particular piece of information. Based on the respective level of both these factors, companies were advised four different strategies, namely “reactive”, “secure value”, “exploit content” and “proactive”.

It is possible to notice that overall, the researches mentioned above have accounted for the tight relationship between corporate reputation and social media, and in particular the risk as well as the opportunity that social media embodied for companies. However, crises generated and/or enhanced by social media are a recent phenomenon which calls for a deeper understanding of companies’ reactions face to online crises. In addition, the researches that are herein cited focus principally on the companies themselves and seem to leave out their stakeholders. Stakeholders are often portrayed as a cause of reputation crises and a static object: many researches deal with social media without ever really pondering over what lies behind “social”; people, who are dynamic agents.

Therefore, the objective of this research has been to shed light on how organizations react and attempt to mitigate these crises today by putting into perspective two different realities and contexts. I did not consider social media as an inert object but as a multifaceted platform where dynamic agents meet and communicate. In order to analyze these different reactions and strategies, I selected six cases from France and Brazil and designed a model resulting from the analysis of other frameworks from the literature.

There are numerous examples of social media corporate crises worldwide. However, as a French student pursuing a Masters degree both in France and in Brazil, the choice to analyze cases of Brazilian and French organizations appeared logical.
2 Context: Social Media Outlook

2.1 Social Media Use in Brazil and France

As preliminary notes to the analysis of the dynamics between social media and organizations, it appears necessary to look at the use of social media by the general population, which we can regard as potential stakeholders, and by the companies of each country.

In 2015, there were approximately 67 million inhabitants in France, against around 204 million in Brazil.

![Figure 1: Internet and Social Media profile of the French and Brazilian populations](image)

Source: We Are Social – Global Digital Statistics, January 2014 and January 2015\(^1\).

Although the internet penetration and the social media penetration in the general population are higher in France (respectively 84% and 68%) than in Brazil (respectively, 54% and 49%), Brazilians are on average more active users of social media: in January 2014, 72% of the people with a social media account had used it in the last month, against 55% for the French users. Furthermore, the 2015-report also shows that Brazilians spent an average of 3.8 hours per day on social media, against 2 hours for the French.

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\(^1\) The 2015 report by We Are Social did not include some of the figures which were present in the 2014 edition. As I deemed the figures from 2014 relevant, I chose to include them in the figure.
Figure 2: Percentage of the global population claiming activity in December 2014, per type of social media.

When looking at the types of social media used, Facebook (counted with Facebook Messenger) is the biggest platform used in both countries with a similar penetration rate (Figure 1: 45% in France and 47% in Brazil).

However, as illustrated by Figure 2, outside Facebook and Facebook Messenger, Brazilians seem to appreciate instant messaging applications as 24% of the population claimed activity on Whatsapp in December 2014 and 14% for Skype. These two social media are the most used platforms after Facebook (counted with Facebook Messenger). In France, 10% of the population claimed activity on Google+, and 9% on Twitter, which both come after Facebook. Whatsapp was only used by 6% of the population in December 2014. Consequently, although the most popular social media platform (Facebook) is the same in both France and Brazil (32% and 25% of the French and the Brazilians claimed activity in December 2014), Brazilians seem to prefer very interactive platforms more (Whatsapp, Skype) while the French are overall less active.

It is difficult to find reliable data on social media habits and behaviors. However, Brazil’s preference for overall more interactive platforms seem to indicate that Brazilians are on average more active users, who easily post and react to content, whereas the French, preferring less interactive platforms, are more passive, and mostly engaged as observers. Such intuition would actually be in line with the respective culture of each country, Brazil being seen as a naturally more social and open country. For example, according to Geert Hofstede, Brazil scores 38 on the individualism scale, making it a very collective country.
where the communication style is context-rich, whereas France scores 71, which makes it a highly individualistic society where the Cartesian culture usually excludes the display of strong emotions.

Such social media profile of the connected populations of both France and Brazil will help contextualize the dynamics that we will observe between companies in situations of crisis and their stakeholders. We may expect Brazilian companies to be particularly in touch with their stakeholders online while French companies may react to critical situations online in a way that is more uncorrelated to their stakeholders.

2.2 Social Media use by Companies

2.2.1 Brazil

In a study published in June 2015, Tracto Content Marketing investigated the use of social media by Brazilian companies. They found that in 2013, around 48% of Brazilian companies used social media in their brand content strategy, against 71% in 2015, Facebook being the most used platform: 97% companies using social media also used Facebook.

Brazilian companies also used more varied media: 80% used four or more different social media platforms and nearly half (47%) used six or more. In 2013, only 6% of the companies were present on six or more platforms. In other words, there are nearly eight times more companies using more than 6 different media in 2015 than there were in 2013, and twice as more using at least four different media (35% in 2013). Such pattern is coherent with the general population’s active use of social media in Brazil.

However, as illustrated by Figure 3, most social media are used for brand content strategy. Out of the nine social media cited, four are considered more important for corporate communication: corporate blogs (for 83% of the Brazilian companies), Linkedin (professional network, 74%) Whatsapp (an instant messaging app, 73%), and Pinterest (a photo sharing app, 38%). Actually, the difference between proportions of use for communication and use for brand content strategy is the widest for corporate blogs (10 points of difference), and Whatsapp (8 points of difference). For the two other platforms (Linkedin and Pinterest, the delta is only 2 points, which means that marketing remains the main reason for social media activity by companies.
Figure 3: Social media proportions of use by companies in Brazil and by type of medium

Source: Tracto Content Marketing, “Pesquisa sobre as redes sociais na empresas brasileiras”, 2015

More particularly, the research shows that lead generation and brand recognition have been adopted as two main indicators of performance on social media by respectively 83% and 88% of the companies (Tracto Content Marketing, 2015). Besides, five indicators out of the nine cited by companies deal with measuring quantitatively the « success » of the company online. The top four most adopted indicators are thus the quantity of « shares » (89.3% of the companies adopted it), the reach of Facebook posts (88.3%), the quantity of fans or followers (88.3%) and the quantity of comments (88.1%). The quantity of views comes 7th, with 85.1% of adoption.

The prominence of quantitative indicators can reveal two things. Firstly, Brazilian companies seem to correlate positively quantity and performance, hereby neglecting situations of viral phenomena where an organization’s post may be widely shared on social media without actually being supported (bad buzz phenomenon). By focusing on quantitative metrics, Brazilian companies look at the reach of a conversation yet overlook the reception of its content, which would be more representative of performance.

Second, the absence of qualitative metrics may well be the result of the companies’ inability to envision social media as anything else than an additional top-down marketing tool: in 2015, 49% of Brazilian companies monthly funded advertisements on social media (Tracto Content Marketing, 2015). More precisely, 74% allocated up to 1.000 BRL per month, and 18% allocated more than 10.000 BRL. (Tracto, 2015).
Yet, the increase of digital interaction is meant to have the biggest impact on organizations’ communication in the years to come (Aberje, 2015). In 2014, 69% of Brazilian companies claimed to have used social media to monitor online conversations about them (Aberje, 2014) and in 2015, companies claimed that reputation crises have influenced their communication actions the most in 42% of the cases (Aberje, 2015, pp.11-12).

In other words, Brazilian companies seem well aware of, and are already well operating the marketing possibilities offered by social media. They also have the intuition of the challenges social media comes with as they are giving evidence of the growing importance of digital communication. However, although the prominence of Facebook and YouTube may reveal a desire to engage in more interactive relationships with their stakeholders, their use remains centered on quantitative metrics and falls within a logic of marketing strategy.

### 2.2.2 France

French companies have rather similar behaviors towards social media, although the penetration rate is higher, reaching 93% in 2015 (Hootsuite, 2015).

Like in Brazil, brand recognition is the main objective pursued by French companies on social media (89%). Reputation management comes second with 65% of companies using social media in that perspective. However, the 24-percentage points difference between both uses highlights the importance granted to marketing. French companies tend to see and approach social media more as a megaphone to access stakeholders and send marketing messages on, than as a thermometer of stakeholders’ feelings towards their brand or product. The relationship is mostly one-sided, as illustrated by the low proportion of social media activities oriented toward customer relationship management (CRM) in Figure 4.
French companies however differ in the type of social media favored, as Linkedin (81%) and Twitter (79%) are the two most used ones, against Facebook (97%) and YouTube/Vimeo (85%) in Brazil (Figure 3). Once again, it highlights French companies’ preference for less «interactive» and somewhat more institutional behaviors. Indeed, Linkedin is a platform purely oriented towards professional networking, more built as a «showcase» of personal or organizational branding while Twitter is a microblogging site based on very short, informational messages. Facebook and YouTube come third and fourth, with respectively 60% and 58% of adoption by French companies.
The Hootsuite study also revealed that 52% of French companies have a team dedicated to the management of social media, showing that the phenomenon is acknowledged by the corporate world, but only 30% of companies have a social media “code of conduct” for the use of employees. In addition, that proportion is heterogeneous across different sectors and sizes. Indeed, 25% of companies in the sector of information, communication and media have such a code while only 8% of industrial companies claim to do. Likewise, 52% of companies that have a code of conduct on social media have more than 1,000 employees, which may imply that companies begin to value the social media question only once a certain size has been reached.

Generally speaking, French companies appear slightly shier and traditional in their use of social media. Although they seem to acknowledge that social media has become an inevitable variable of business, 55% of companies consider it a challenge to conceive a global social media strategy (Hootsuite, 2015).
2.2.3 Brazil and France

![Profile of social media use in both France and Brazil](image)

Figure 6: Profile of social media use in both France and Brazil
Source: Hootsuite and Tracto Content, 2015

Although the penetration is higher in France than in Brazil, both countries seem to use social media in rather similar ways. Both French and Brazilian companies acknowledge the importance of social media in business. French and Brazilian companies use Twitter in the same proportions, and concentrate mostly on marketing strategy, understood here as brand recognition and lead generation. They also focus on monitoring reputation fairly in the same proportions (65% in France and 69% in Brazil). Yet, France lags behind a little as it still favors a traditional push marketing approach and is slightly timorous with regard to direct interaction, whereas Brazil seems to have a better understanding of immediate social media challenges and already clearly engages on very interactive platforms such as Facebook and YouTube. Brazilian companies are hereby more active users than French companies, which is in line with the behavior of the Brazilian population.

Yet, overviewing the use of social media by companies in Brazil and France informs us on their still partial vision of the stakes attached to social media. Although the marketing opportunity has been well identified and is well used, the importance of the reputation component is a clearly secondary objective and both countries seem to be groping for the way to successfully tackle it. Although 65% and 69% of French and Brazilian companies claim to monitor their online reputation, it remains well behind marketing objectives. Understanding more precisely the way organizations deal with and react to social media once a crisis breaks out is therefore the main objective pursued in this thesis.
3 Literature Review

In order to reach my objective, relevant literature on corporate crises, crisis management, crisis communication and social media in a corporate environment has been analyzed and served as a basis for the design of my analytical model. The purpose of this literature review is to draw the main trends in the analysis of corporate crisis management with a particular focus on social media.

There is a variety of definitions of a crisis. In 1986, Steven Fink argued that the two defining features of a crisis were growing intensity and strong media attention. Weiner (2006) also emphasized public attention exposure, and added a reputational threat. Similarly, Coombs (2007, p. 164) argued that crises were “a sudden and unexpected event that (…) poses both a financial and a reputational threat” to the organization. Libaert (2015, p. 9) slightly differs as he acknowledged crises as “the last phase of a sequence of malfunctions” (as opposed to an isolated event), which nonetheless “endangers the reputation and the stability of a company”. Two common, seemingly intertwined traits of those different definitions are therefore the importance of media, and reputational exposure. Reputation is “an aggregate evaluation stakeholders make about how well an organization is meeting stakeholder expectations based on its past behavior” (Coombs, 2007, p. 164), a definition in line with Aula’s (2010) who talked about shared meaning, and it is rather straightforward to see how crises can damage reputations. Crises are visible signs of failures, which “give people a reason to think badly of the organization” (Coombs, 2007 p. 164).

Consequently, the crisis amplitude depends on the width of the public knowledge of its existence, and the resulting perceptions of the company. As such, what is being believed, perceived and said outside the corporate environment about the crisis has a performative effect on corporate reputation: the crisis is the impression of the crisis.

3.1 Typology of crises

Typologies of crises are understood here as categories of crises. The type, or category, of a crisis is defined by a set of different characteristics: typologies are transversal and hinge on various defining components such as nature (a crisis can be technical, political, accidental etc.), source/origin (internal or external crises) (Westphalen 1992, Lagadec 1993, Coombs,

These typologies well encompass the multidimensional character of crises. However, they do not fully factor in the newest component: social media.

The development of the Internet has made the risks faced by companies, as well as the type of crises they can undergo, more complex and threatening. Owyang (2011) defined a social media crisis as “an issue that arises in or is amplified by social media, and results in negative mainstream media coverage, a change in business process, or financial loss”.

Social media embody as many “public places” where a wide array of stakeholders can and will add their voice(s) to the organization’s voice, especially during crises (Coombs; Holladay, 2014, p. 42). As such, social media crisis can emerge online and they are not restricted to the denunciation of real life, concrete, corporate actions (e.g. a massive layoffs plan or technical accidents). Social media crises can arise from issues whose nature is much more subjective, uncertain or hazy (Bloch, 2012a) such as perceptions of corporate behaviors. Organizations no longer control the agenda of communication, and the crisis is an asymmetric conflict with varied stakeholders (Bloch, 2012b). Consequently, the very challenge of social media crises is their unpredictability, fueled by instantaneity and universal reach: “anyone can instantly have a megaphone and access to millions of people” (Wigley and Zhang, 2011, p. 3).

3.1.1 Social media: the new parameter of the interactive web

3.1.1.1 Defining the Web 2.0 and Social Media

As previously said, the millennial turn saw the emergence of the “interactive” web, or Web 2.0, which is considered as the cradle of social media. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010, p. 61) defined the terms Web 2.0 and social media as a “platform whereby content and applications […] are continuously modified by all users in a participatory and collaborative fashion”. Furthering their definition, they explained that social media could be described as “a group of Internet-based applications that […] allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content”.

Different categories of media (“applications”) exist within the social media group. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) have differentiated six categories: collaborative projects (e.g. Wikipedia), blogs (e.g. personal websites), content communities (e.g. YouTube), social
networking sites (e.g Facebook), virtual game worlds (e.g World of Warcraft) and virtual social worlds (e.g Second Life). The basic defining feature is the Internet user, at the core of social media dynamics.

3.1.1.2 The new powers of consumers

In 2015, the five main social media networks in terms of number of users (Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Instagram and Snapchat) together gathered around 2.4 billion users². This is nearly 33% of the world population and 80% of the connected world³. It suggests modified dynamics of dialogue between organizations and consumers, and well illustrates the new power now lying into the virtual hands of customers and potential customers.

Indeed, social media has made the chain of information among consumers/users more complex. Several authors have developed and detailed typologies of Internet users’ roles in the chain of information. User generated content is inherent to social media and can, in time of crises, set the tone for the communication management. Bloch (2012) differentiated the “suns” users who create and forward information, from “centers” users (“centroïdes”) who disseminate information to the mass, and from “leaf” users (“feuilles”) who passively receive information. In times of crises, and in the absence of information provided by the organizations themselves, users (external stakeholders) can thus become creators of information disseminated by followers and consumed by inactives (Brummette and Sisco, 2015; Booz Allen Hamilton Report, 2009). Bystanders can now provide context, “initial information” and shape the “public narrative” in the immediate aftermath of a crisis breakout (Whigley and Zhang 2011, p.3; Aggergaard 2015, p.11). It is what Jin, Liu and Austin (2012, p. 201) called “issue-fit opinion leadership”, which fulfills “followers’ […] informational and emotional needs related to the crisis”. They further added that social media embodied a “new informal communication channel” in the form of “online word-of-mouth communication” about products, services or organizations’ information for example (p.190).

Second, although the chain of information among users becomes denser, it also flows better between users and organizations.

Social media “allows dialogue with the public without the interference of public authorities” (Wendling, Radisch and Jacobzone, 2013, p.31). Stakeholders can challenge organizations in

³ http://www.blogdumoderateur.com/chiffres-internet/
a much more visible way (Brummette and Sisco, 2015). Indeed, Vanderbiest (2014) found that social media allows customers to efficiently voice either criticism (rational “calls to order” on possible corporate contradictions) or outrage (emotional reaction following a perceived attack on particular values) vis-à-vis a company. Vanderbiest further argued that in 2014, 64% of all corporate crises were online crises, 60% of which stemmed from criticism voiced about the company: social media offer a permanent complaints bureau, which organizations would be well advised to take into account.

In addition, some of Kaplan and Haenlein’s (2010) categories directly impact companies. Collaborative projects such as Wikipedia tend to become the “main source of information for many consumers” (p. 62). Users increasingly use social media to get both “immediate and in-depth crisis information” as well as emotional support and recovery (Austin et al, 2012 pp.189-191). Social media offers unfiltered communication and in certain conditions, users appear to trust the social media coverage of an event (e.g a crisis) more than traditional media coverage (Austin et al, 2014, p.76; Sweetser and Metzgar, 2007). The immensity of instantly available information dramatically amplifies the potential magnitude of crises.

Table 1 aims to summarize the different opportunities and threats of social media, both for the company and the connected stakeholder.
### Opportunities

**Prevent or reduce crises**
- Facilitates anticipation through easier monitoring of concerns online and of their evolution through different communication strategies
- Allows direct and fast responses: avoid the traditional media filter, use online word-of-mouth communication etc.
- Allows to tailor responses according to different publics and to target specific publics

**Positively engage stakeholders in the crisis response**
- Build trust about the organization
- Conquer new audiences by fostering collaboration with consumers
- Allows loyal customers and supporters to defend the company (quickly correct misinformation, champion for the brand etc.)

### Threats

**Can create crises of different types**
- Technical origin such as intrusion or piracy
- Communication origin due to information overload from stakeholders, snowball effect, user-generated content

**Can amplify crises**
- Risk of rumours and misinformation
- Difficult control of perceptions about the company – difficult management of reputation
- Online social media are gaining in credibility
- Hardened content and action management due to absence of territorial barriers
- Companies must be prepared to address the now direct demands from consumers

### Corporate side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities: Prevent or reduce crises</th>
<th>Stakeholder side: Direct Power of influence on the organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Facilitates anticipation through easier monitoring of concerns online and of their evolution through different communication strategies</td>
<td>• Can challenge the organization in an unrestricted and visible manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Allows direct and fast responses: avoid the traditional media filter, use online word-of-mouth communication etc.</td>
<td>• Can access multiple sources of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Allows to tailor responses according to different publics and to target specific publics</td>
<td><strong>Indirect power of influence via other stakeholders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positively engage stakeholders in the crisis response</strong></td>
<td>• Can champion for the company, acting as an informal crisis communication manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Build trust about the organization</td>
<td>• Creation of information in the absence of corporate communication aimed at other connected stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conquer new audiences by fostering collaboration with consumers</td>
<td>• As a result, ability to « set the tone » of the crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Allows loyal customers and supporters to defend the company (quickly correct misinformation, champion for the brand etc.)</td>
<td>• Provides emotional support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Information overload leading to confusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Can create crises of different types</strong></th>
<th><strong>Indirect power of influence via other stakeholders</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Technical origin such as intrusion or piracy</td>
<td>• Can champion for the company, acting as an informal crisis communication manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication origin due to information overload from stakeholders, snowball effect, user-generated content</td>
<td>• Creation of information in the absence of corporate communication aimed at other connected stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Opportunities and threats of social media for companies and their stakeholders
Source: Table by the author, derived from the work of multiple authors (see references)
3.2 Crisis management

The risk mapping of social media in a corporate context justifies the attention that has been given to the development of communication tactics in critical times. Literature on the topic either focuses on ways to anticipate crises, or on crisis communication strategies during and in the aftermath of the crisis.

3.2.1 Frameworks of management: prevention and analysis

Fink (1986) developed a 4-stage analysis of crisis cycles with the ambition of helping to “plan for the inevitable”. Fink’s approach advocated for proactivity in the detection of crisis: each phase of the crisis is defined by different demands in terms of information and reactions. As such, crisis management is about anticipating the predictable phases of development of a crisis, and the crisis communication plan should be tailored to each identified phase. Coombs (1999) has also written extensively on the topic and theorized a 4-part crisis management process in line with Fink’s model and organized around prevention, preparation, performance and learning; a framework that has become rather classical in crisis management studies.

More recently, Gonzales-Herrero and Smith (2008) updated their former 4-stage “biological” model for crisis management where they had assumed, like Fink (1986), that crises go through phases of birth, growth, maturity and death. Taking on a more active approach, they challenged the relevance of the classical “one-to-many” model of public relations. The new model is, in their opinion, “many-to-many”: the audience has been gradually fragmenting and has been given, online, the opportunity to voice multitudes of opinions because “information changes hands at record speed and local issues can become global in a matter of seconds” (p.144). Consequently, in the new digital environment, the Internet can both accelerate and trigger crises, either through “rumours, hacking, shadow or copy-cat web sites and cyber-terrorism” (Gonzales-Herrero and Smith, 2008, p.145) or because social media has become a soundbox by “breaking the boundaries of space and time characterizing traditional media” (Libaert 2015, p.32).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fink (1986)</td>
<td>Prodromal phase: early symptoms</td>
<td>Breakout of the crisis</td>
<td>Chronic phase</td>
<td>Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coombs (1999)</td>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vigilant monitoring “potentially</td>
<td>Consider the resources required for</td>
<td>Fast reaction online: two-way interactive</td>
<td>Follow blogs, online media post-crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conflicting issues” as the audience is</td>
<td>designing and implementing a crisis</td>
<td>communication, real-time monitoring, use</td>
<td>Thank people who helped the company during the crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“dynamic” and almost “proactive”</td>
<td>plan (money and human capital)</td>
<td>of Internet links and digital media (video, audio…)</td>
<td>Evaluate the crisis and assess consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain open and honest dialogue with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Draft new strategies to rebuild reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>involved parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As such, crisis management in a social media context cannot merely focus on predicting the development of the crisis, as social media crises are, by essence, unpredictable (Bloch, 2012). Crisis management in a digital context requires new tools adding to, and going beyond, classical prevention plans.

As crises often breakout unexpectedly and out of a restrictive preset scenario (Libaert, 2015, p.47) and because social media amplifies this phenomenon, crisis management becomes, beyond prevention, the enforcement of a flexible crisis communication plan, drafted much in advance.
3.2.2 Frameworks of communication

As “business planning horizons change from years into hour” (Weiner, 2006), a common businesses’ reaction to crises is a loss of perspective. The loss of perspective results in a loss of control, triggering a “siege mentality” which eventually translates into panic and silence (Weiner, 2006). Hence, to prevent panic, crisis communication should be part of a broader communication plan by the company (Libaert, 2015). Various authors have, across the years, analyzed the different responses given by companies during crises. The observed or recommended reactions vary along a spectrum that goes from denying the crisis and responsibility to acknowledging the crisis and responsibility. For instance, Lagadec (1986) argued that companies could choose between transparency, discretion or dissimulation. Piotet (1991) listed refusal (“front du refus”, equates to denial), silence (“abonné absent”), scapegoat (“bouc émissaire”, the company blames a third party), conflation (“amalgame”, the company claims to not be the only culprit) and acknowledgement (“acceptation”); a typology also adopted by Westphalen (1997) with a different lexicon (silence, attack, transfer, acknowledgement and discretion). Lastly, aggregating most of prior research, Libaert (2015) identified three main responses: acknowledgement, lateral project and refusal, each strategy responding to different objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgement</th>
<th>Lateral project</th>
<th>Refusal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Total acknowledgement of responsibility</em></td>
<td><em>Transfer of debate</em> to another theme outshining the crisis_</td>
<td><em>Denial: reject accusations</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Partial acknowledgement: responsible but not guilty</em></td>
<td><em>Pleading conspiracy</em></td>
<td><em>Silence: refusal to communicate</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Conflation: guilty with others</em></td>
<td><em>Blaming a third party: minimizing role, victimization, divert media attention by suggesting “it could have been worse”</em></td>
<td><em>Scapegoat: sacrifice a clearly identified individual to protect the corporate reputation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dissociation of the organization from the individual culprits</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Missing link: absence of information clears responsibility</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Main organizational responses to crisis situations
Source: Thierry Libaert (2015)

Eventually, the different models developed between the 80s and early 2000s incorporate two intertwined but equally important aspects of crisis management: preparation and tailored communication. Today’s connected environment, characterized by the immediacy of
information and reactions, has made these dimensions both absolutely necessary and much more complex to master.

Indeed, even outside any critical situation, corporate social media communication answers to new principles, which Westphalen and Libaert (2014, pp. 48-52) briefly listed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic principles of corporate social media presence</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fix objectives</td>
<td>The quantity of followers or fans does not assess success because social media is defined by dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be responsive</td>
<td>Social media conversations never stop, the organization should be on the watch, and available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be professional</td>
<td>The community manager should be able to grasp the relevance of criticisms and their importance for the organization before answering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt your internal organization</td>
<td>There is a reputational and commercial risk as employees communicate on social media both personally and in the organization’s name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act in a consistent and complementary way</td>
<td>Each social media platform has different advantages, downsides and codes. The organization should adapt the communication to the platform.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Basic principles of corporate social media presence
Source: Adapted from Libaert and Westphalen (2014)

Interestingly, the work of Libaert and Westphalen is pretty representative of the overall existing literature on social media communication: companies are advised to follow broad and general sets of guidelines and principles that are not attached to a particular context.

3.2.3 Social Media in crisis management literature

There is a widening literature on the relationships between social media and crisis management, as well as on the incorporation of social media into crisis management and communication. Several authors (Ott and Theunissen, 2014; Libaert, 2015; Brummette and Sisco, 2015) have implied that social media shall be built in crisis planning. Weiner (2006) called for the necessity of a “balanced communication strategy” which would both “protect corporate liability” and “satisfy the demands of today’s information and media dynamic”. Booz Allen Hamilton’s report (2009) concluded that the “new challenges” posed by social media required that they be “embedded in the corporate communication strategy” while Veil, Buehner and Palenchar (2011) gathered best practices to optimize social media integration into communication strategy.
Eriksson (2012) attempted, in a case study, to identify a new “descriptive” model approach for online strategic crisis communication. Eriksson posited that most models of communication are rigid because they are governed by the need to control and assign responsibility in organizations that are considered as a mechanical system and where internal and external environments are clearly separated. The new “action-net strategy”, however, envisions the organization as a more dynamic and flexible entity, and considers new technologies as informal fast channels of customer data and communication. It is built on the need to be pragmatic and focused on finding “what needs to be done and how […], in relation to the nature of the crisis”, through careful online monitoring of stakeholders’ discourse. (Eriksson, 2012, p.13).

Social media can therefore be instrumental in crisis communication, as showed by the findings of Eriksson (2012), Sweetser and Metzgar (2007) on blogs’ impact on crisis perception, and Schultz, Utz and Göritz (2011) on the prevalence of information channel (e.g. Twitter) over information content (e.g. apology, sympathy, information): according to them, the medium matters more than the message. As we will see, this distinction hardly holds in a social media ecosystem.

Research by Sweetser and Metzgar (2007), and Schultz et al. (2011) however began to suggest the relevance of a cognitive and emotional analysis of stakeholders’ online behaviors. Among the different models that have subsequently been developed as attempts to draft effective communication strategies, three were particularly relevant for my analysis:

a) Jin, Pang and Cameron (2007, 2009, 2012) have developed the Integrated Crisis Mapping model (ICM). It aimed at shaping “appropriate communication strategies” by analyzing and conceptualizing the emotions felt by stakeholders face to different crises. Across their different studies, authors singled out 3 dominant emotions - sadness, fright and anger - which they found were differing according to the 3-criteria origin of the crisis: 1) internal-external, 2) personal-public and 3) unnatural-natural. For the purpose of my research, I extracted below the findings directly instrumental in drafting a communication strategy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of crisis</th>
<th>Common interpretation of the situation</th>
<th>Stakeholder’s emotions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal public</strong> unnatural e.g Regulation, labor unrest, technology breakdown</td>
<td>The organization is responsible and not doing enough</td>
<td>Anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External public</strong> natural/unnatural e.g Natural disasters, accidents, economic situation</td>
<td>The organization is not responsible but the loss is irrevocable and little can be done.</td>
<td>Sadness/Fright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External personal</strong> unnatural e.g psychotic acts/terrorism</td>
<td>There are existential threats / high level of uncertainty</td>
<td>Fright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal personal</strong> unnatural e.g security issues, transport failure</td>
<td>The organization is responsible but not doing enough/little can be done about it. The loss is irrevocable</td>
<td>Anger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Summary of the emotion-based analysis of crisis communication in the ICM Model
Source: Adapted from Jin et al. (2007, 2009, 2012) work on the ICM model

As such, for example, when the organization and their stakeholders are impacted by a natural disaster (external-public-natural type of crisis), stakeholders’ first reaction (“primary level emotion”) is to feel sad or frightened because what has been lost in the crisis cannot be recovered (e.g. human casualties) and the organization cannot really do anything concrete to make up for it.

b) At the same time, Coombs (2007) developed the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). The model intends to help drafting the most appropriate response strategy by measuring the reputational threat faced by the company, according to the level of responsibility attributed to the company by stakeholders and the type of crisis being faced. Coombs’ approach fits into a wider objective of developing an evidence-based guidance for crisis communication, aimed at “maximizing the reputational protection” (p. 163). The main defining feature of a crisis is the obligation for the stakeholder to “assess crisis responsibility” (p. 166) which directly weighs on the organization’s reputation: Coombs (2007) found a positive correlation between the level of responsibility attributed to the company and the level of reputational threat.
Coombs’ research is further pondered by two other dimensions, crisis history (prior experience of a similar crisis) and prior relational reputation (how well an organization is perceived to have treated stakeholders in other contexts). Although both factors are relevant in assessing the global situation faced by the organization and should be kept in mind, they were not directly incorporated into my model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribution of responsibility</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Mild</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Severe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Victim Cluster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>e.g.</em> Natural disaster, rumor, workplace violence, product tampering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Accidental cluster</td>
<td></td>
<td>Preventable cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>e.g.</em> challenges by stakeholders, technical-error accidents or product harm</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>e.g.</em> human-error accidents or product harm, organizational misdeeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim cluster</td>
<td></td>
<td>“The organization is also a victim of the crisis”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental cluster</td>
<td></td>
<td>“The organizational actions leading to the crisis were unintentional”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventable cluster</td>
<td></td>
<td>“The organization knowingly placed people at risk, took inappropriate actions or violated a law/regulation”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Summary of Coombs (2007) work on the SCCT model

Source: Adapted from Coombs (2007)

The table 6 reads as follow: the weaker the responsibility attributed to the organization by stakeholders, the milder the reputational threat faced by the organization. Identifying the adequate cluster serve to design the adequate strategy.

Reputation and emotions are closely related through the attribution of responsibility (Coombs, 2007). Therefore, the stronger the attribution of responsibility, the stronger the anger of stakeholders, and the less likely are stakeholders to behave in a supportive way.

Victim crises are theoretically the least threatening for the reputation of an organization because the organization is also considered to be a victim of the crisis. As such it tends to bring about less harmful feelings (attribution-independent emotions) such as sadness and even sympathy for the organization. For instance, rumors and workplace violence create, in Coombs’ opinion, victim crises.

Accidental crises are halfway between Victim crises and Preventable crises on the reputational threat spectrum. In such crises, the organization did not purposefully commit any reprehensible or harmful deeds while however being likely to bear the legal responsibility of
Stakeholders usually do not fully blame the organization, as the crisis is deemed “unintentional”. Yet, such crises are usually shocking and often trigger feelings of sadness and fright that embody a risk for the organization’s reputation if no appropriate response is brought to stakeholders. For example, technical-error accidents or product harm are common situations of accidental crises. Interestingly enough, my analyses revealed that the crises we chose that would have been considered “accidental” in Coombs typology actually turned out to be “preventable” or treated as such.

Preventable crises are the most dangerous ones for organizations as the reputational risk is at its highest. Situations of organizational misdeed, human-error accidents or labor unrest are concrete examples of origins for preventable crises. In Coombs’ analysis, the origin is thus always internal: the organization is fully held responsible for the crisis as it intentionally did whatever sparked the crisis off. It brings on the most attribution-dependent emotions, anger and fright (Jin & Al., 2007-2012 and 2014), which are particularly dangerous for an organization reputation. The grid of analysis designed by Coombs allows drafting different responses strategies aimed at “framing” the crisis. By selecting the messages that will “shape how people define problems, causes of problems, attributions of responsibility and solutions to problems” (Coombs 2007, p.167), organizations can try to make stakeholders focus only on certain aspects of the crisis to influence their perception of the crisis.

The different strategies identified by Coombs (2007) are summed up in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim cluster</th>
<th>Accidental cluster</th>
<th>Preventable cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary response</strong></td>
<td><strong>Deny strategies (attack the accuser, denial, scapegoat) in particular case of rumors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Diminish strategies (Excuse, lack of intent, volition, justification)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diminish strategies (Excuse, justification)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rebuild strategies in particular case of challenges</strong></td>
<td><strong>Deny strategies in particular case of challenges</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary response</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bolstering strategies (victimage)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bolstering strategies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deny strategies</strong></td>
<td>Detach the organization from the crisis and inspire sympathy</td>
<td><strong>Diminish strategies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive approach</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rebuild strategies</strong></td>
<td>Generate or improve reputational assets by offering aid to stakeholders, whether material or symbolic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rebuild strategies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive approach</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bolstering strategies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Response strategies according to the crisis cluster

Source: Adapted from Coombs (2007) findings
Lastly, Jin, Liu and Austin (2010, 2014) developed the Social Mediated Crisis Communication Model (SMCC). The SMCC model aims to help crisis managers draft their response according to the crisis origin (internal or external), the crisis information form (social media, traditional media or word-of-mouth) and source (third party or organization). It posited that the multiple relationship dynamics between these factors affect how publics anticipate the organization’s responses as well as their emotions face to different crisis information. Jin et al.’s model furthers Coombs’ finding on the link between reactions and crisis types, and Jin et al. (2007, 2009, 2012) previous work on emotions. The originality resides in the importance given to the form and source of information, giving social media a leading role in crisis communication.

The main takeaways of Jin et al. (2010, 2014) analysis regarding crisis communication strategies are three-fold. Firstly, the crisis origin influences the emotions felt by stakeholders: internal crises foster stronger emotions in general, and mainly attribution dependent emotions (anger, contempt or disgust) because these crises are seen as more controllable, which makes stakeholders attribute a higher responsibility to the organization. On the other hand, external crises are seen as less predictable and less controllable. Less responsibility is attributed to the organization and stakeholders are likely to feel attribution independent emotions such as anxiety, apprehension and fear, and weaker negative emotions such as anger.

Secondly, the response strategy should be consistent with the crisis origin and the emotions it triggers. As internal crises cause stronger (negative) emotions, stakeholders tend to expect more accommodative responses from the organization. On the other hand, in the case of external crises, stakeholders tolerate defensive responses.

Lastly, the choice of the information form and source impacts either negatively or positively the emotions of stakeholders. The communication of information by the organization (source) either via social media or traditional media (form) is less likely to trigger stronger negative attribution-dependent emotions (such as anger) than information communicated by a third-party (source). To some extent, it confirms the importance attributed by Schultz et al. (2011) to the medium of information.
The table below summarizes the main findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of the crisis</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotions</td>
<td>Strong attribution-dependent emotions (e.g. anger)</td>
<td>Attribution-independent emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attribution-independent emotions (e.g. fear)</td>
<td>Milder attribution-dependent emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored response strategy</td>
<td>Accommodative</td>
<td>Defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored information source</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored information form</td>
<td>Social media or traditional media</td>
<td>Traditional media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravating factors</td>
<td>Information sent by third-party via social media</td>
<td>Information sent by third-party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Emotional analysis of stakeholders according to the origin of the crisis
Source: Adapted from Jin et al (2010; 2014)

All three models are as many tools to comprehend the stakes of corporate crises today. The ICM (Integrated Crisis Mapping) model (Jin, Pang & Cameron, 2007, 2009, 2012) showed that determining the origin of the crisis (external/internal and public/internal) allows determining and anticipating the emotions that stakeholders are likely to feel when facing the crisis. The SCCT (Situational Crisis Communication Theory) model (Coombs, 2007) analyzed that the degree of responsibility for the crisis attributed by stakeholders to the organization allows determining the type (“cluster”) of the crisis and is positively correlated to the width of reputational threat. Lastly, the SMCC (Social Mediated Crisis Communication) model (Jin, Liu and Austin, 2010 and 2014) concluded that the response strategy should be consistent with the crisis type and the emotions it triggers.

All in all, these models are conceptually intertwined and deepen one another: the ICM model and the SCCT model lay the ground for the SMCC model by identifying crisis origin and emotions as two foundational parameters of crisis management, while the SMCC model partly derives from the crisis origin the crisis type (or cluster), which is at the core of Coombs’ analysis of response strategies. In other words, a corporate crisis is defined by multiple, interconnected parameters among which the stakeholder has a place of choice.

The literature review covered here, although not exhaustive, allows conceptualizing and understanding the challenges that are posed today by companies continuously risking to fall into critical situations. Until the emergence of social media, most of the crisis communication theory advocated for a classical analysis: the company is considered a static entity that must control its environment in order to minimize or mitigate risk and, in fine, reputation risk. Authors such as Fink (1986) or Coombs (1999) realized early on the cyclical
nature of corporate crises. However, it was not until the 2000s that the necessity to move away from the static, non-interactive approach of crisis management was diagnosed to the profit of more flexible frameworks. The traditional paradigm had until then been based on an asymmetric relationship between the company and its stakeholders, and governed by prevention. The emergence of social media has restored, not to say reversed, balance and latest research has shown that anticipation was more appropriate to tackle corporate crises that had now become unpreventable. In addition, individuals that were consumers have turned into influential stakeholders. Companies can no longer afford to ignore discontent and must really incorporate the “social” part of social media into their strategies and approach to stakeholders.

Jin, Pang and Cameron (2007, 2009, 2012), Coombs (2007) and Jin, Liu and Austin (2010, 2014) have helped to map the multiple stakes and challenges posed by social media in a corporate environment. Their researches are key to understand modern corporate crises, but do not offer applicable tools to mitigate crises outside general guidelines. My intention has been to test their own research through the proposition of a new model, inspired by their work, and aimed at contextualizing social media crises.

In order to draw my model, the previously detailed models of ICM (Jin, Pang and Cameron, table 5), SCCT (Coombs, tables 6 and 7), and SMCC (Jin, Liu and Austin, table 8) were aggregated. My model intends to gather in a matrix the five parameters highlighted in these models, namely: attribution of responsibility by stakeholders, crisis origin, reputational threat, emotions and response strategies. The two defining axes of the matrix are, in abscissa, the attribution level of responsibility (from weak to strong), and in ordinate the crisis origin (up from external and down to internal).
Figure 7: The Social Media Crisis Management Matrix

The different crisis clusters (or types) exported from Coombs are placed on the matrix according to this spectrum and read as follow: the victim cluster’s origin is mostly external and sometimes internal, which leads to the weakest attribution of responsibility; the accidental cluster’s origin is mostly internal, which leads to a mild attribution of responsibility; lastly, the preventable cluster's origin is always internal and leads to the strongest attribution of responsibility.

The two axes are further enriched by 3 additional dimensions: above of the matrix, the reputational threat spectrum (from green, the mildest threat, to red, the strongest threat). Underneath this spectrum are the 3 emotions of stakeholders identified by Jin et al. (2012), and another positive emotion they cite: Sympathy, sadness, fright and anger. They are ordered according to their relation with the reputational threat spectrum: from the less negative emotions (sympathy and sadness) to the more negative emotions (fright and anger). Under the matrix are the two response strategies, Defensive or Accomodative, placed
according to the recommendations of the authors of the three overarching models. The matrix can therefore be read in several ways: Defensive strategies are best when the reputational threat is low, which means stakeholders’ feelings are less negative because lower levels of responsibility is attributed, which would imply that the crisis is likely to be in the victim or in the accidental cluster.

By placing the crises on this matrix, I believe that the type of the crisis and the most appropriate response strategy can be determined. Therefore, at the end of each case analysis, I will place the company on the matrix according to the type of crisis cluster it fell in. It will show, among other things, the strategy that would have been most adequate to adopt but won’t necessarily show the strategy that the company actually adopted, except if the strategy adopted was the appropriate one.

In addition, the matrix may allow to identify how existing crisis communication/management literature can be instrumental in drafting the best response strategy for social media crises.
4 Methodology

4.1 Case analysis through secondary data

The choice of methodology depends on the type of research question (Yin, 2006). In this study, we attempt to investigate more precisely the dynamics between social media and organizations once a corporate crisis breaks out. I am exploring responses from organizations in order to mitigate those crises.

Social media is a contemporary phenomenon where the “boundaries between context and phenomenon are unclear” (Yin, 2006 p. 13). It therefore would call for the use of an exploratory research, in which case studies appear as an appropriate method.

The case study method is subject to numerous criticisms such as lack of rigor, difficult justification for generalization, length and “massive unreadable results” (Yin, 2006). Yin (2006, p. 45) argues that a multiple-case study is preferable to a single case study because it leads to more compelling results. In addition to the necessity to report all evidence fairly, it must follow replication logic. Replication can be claimed when at least 2 cases support the proposition.

Although I believe that the multiple-case study approach is the most appropriate one, lack of means, time and access to the corporations and consumers compelled me to restrict myself to the analysis of cases using secondary data.

The objective of these cases is to understand how some social media crises have been managed, put in perspective with the existing literature on corporate reputation crises: indeed, the existing literature on crisis management and crisis communication was instrumental in building the matrix model of analysis that was used to fulfill the objectives of this analysis.

Following the replication rule, Yin estimates that 2 cases are a minimum for a multiple-case study. Although I have not conducted a multiple-case study, I however respected Yin’s rule in order to ensure a certain level of rigor in my research.

As we have seen previously, Coombs identify three types (which he calls “cluster”) of corporate reputation crises, ranging from “Victim” (with the lowest reputational risk) to “Preventable” (with the highest reputational risk). I used Coombs typology as a basis and, for each cluster, two cases were analyzed - one French and one Brazilian - which amounted to the analysis of six cases total.
4.2 Selecting cases

Gonzales-Herrero & Smith (2008), Owyang (2011) and Libaert (2015) stated that social media crises are crises that are either created on social media or that are amplified by them. In other words, social media are both a cradle and a soundbox of corporate crises. As such, the cases that were selected all have one or the other of this social media dimension. Secondly, social media is an inherently modern and ever-evolving phenomenon: social media usage then (at the birth of social media) is nothing like usage today. The cases that were chosen are no older than 3 years old to respect as much as possible time-sensitivity and to limit the weight that the change of social media habits since the birth of social media may have on stakeholders’ behaviors online.

Then, the study was restricted to French and Brazilian organizations, although there may have been more striking cases involving other organizations in other countries. Lastly, I have searched for cases that illustrated, in my opinion, different types of crises as characterized by Coombs’ clusters: “victim”, “accidental” and “preventable”. I linked each case to a cluster and the analysis has been the confrontation of my intuition, based on the understanding of Coombs’ typology, to the matrix I propose and which is an aggregate of three different models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Date of break out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATP – Les Prêtres</td>
<td>April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF – the Accident of Brétigny sur Orge</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirFrance – the “shirt affair”</td>
<td>October 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Summary of the cases according to their Coombs’ type of crisis
Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of Coombs (2007) work
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Date of break out</th>
<th>Coombs origin of crisis</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Date of break out</th>
<th>Coombs origin of crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RATP – Les Prêtres</td>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Skol – carnival ad campaign</td>
<td>February 2015</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF – the Accident of Brétigny sur Orge</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Samarco - BHP - The mining mudslide in Minas Gerais</td>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirFrance – the “shirt affair”</td>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Coca Cola Brasil – The rat scandal</td>
<td>September 2013</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Origin of the crises of the selected cases based on Coombs’ typology
Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of Coombs (2007) work

4.2.1 Preventable crises

**France: RATP – Les Prêtres’ ad campaign “to the benefit of the Orient Christians”**

Les Prêtres (or « The Priests ») is a popular French music band composed of three catholic priests. Their concert in May 2015 was taking place in a difficult international context for Christians: Christian minorities in Middle East were starting to be deported and massacred by ISIS. Les Prêtres released an ad campaign to promote their concert, where they added a banner mentioning the profits of the show will be « to the benefit of the Orient Christians » (« au bénéfice des Chrétiens d’Orient »). The Parisian public transportation company, the RATP, was violently attacked early April 2015 after the lead singer from Les Prêtres revealed on Twitter the RATP’s decision to not expose the mention « to the benefit of the Orient Christians » on the 250 underground posters dedicated to the upcoming concert of the band. The RATP claimed such a poster was against the necessary « neutrality of public service in a context of armed conflict abroad », which sparked off a week-long online firestorm until the RATP backed off.

**Brazil: Skol – The polemical Carnival ad campaign**

Manufactured by AB InBev, Skol is a famous and popular Brazilian beer brand, whose image is associated with fun and a party environment. Skol launched an advertisement campaign during the Carnival 2015 and was immediately called out on social media by two women, a blogger and a journalist. Indeed, the different promotional supports revolved around the theme of loss of control, with slogans such
as « say yes before you know the question » or « let « no » at home ». The two women claimed the campaign was irresponsible given the Carnival context as it seemed to be promoting rape through slogans that could be read as an incentive to lower vigilance. Their reaction on Facebook, spoofing Skol’s campaign to denounce it (they added a “and bring the never” to the “let no at home” poster) instantly went viral and forced the popular brand to react immediately and to take down the entire campaign.

4.2.2 Accidental crises

**France: SNCF – the train accident of Brétigny-sur-Orge.**

The SNCF is the French National railway service and manages most of the train traffic in France. The French train system is very used and benefits from a strong reputation of safety. However, in July 2013, the train joining Paris, the capital city, to Limoges, a smaller hinterland city, derailed at the entrance of the Brétigny-sur-Orge station. The derailment killed 7 passengers and injured more than 30. The accident was even more shocking by that it happened in the middle of summer (high traffic period) and two days before the National Day, Bastille Day (July, 14th). Investigations were immediately conducted to identify the cause of the accident and the SNCF was placed under formal investigation for involuntary homicide and injuries. However, although the SNCF contested the investigation incriminating them, their immediate response on social media, less than one hour after the accident, as well as constant communication during and after the crisis have become an example of successful crisis communication in France and allowed the SNCF to not suffer any reputational damage.

**Brazil: Samarco/BHP – the mining dam collapse in Minas Gerais**

On November 5, 2015, in Minas Gerais, a state in the south east of Brazil, a mining dam collapsed, resulting in an enormous mudslide, which engulfed an entire village (Bento Rodrigues, Mariana) downstream, killing at least 17 and wounding more than 50. The mining dam, Fundão, was retaining about 60 million cubic meters of toxic waste generated by the mine of Germano. The mudslide reached the Atlantic Ocean at the end of November, after a 650km journey through the river “Rio Doce”, killing thousands of animals, devastating protected rainforest areas and leaving nearly
280,000 people without water. Samarco, owned by anglo-australian BHP Biliton and Brazilian Vale, has since been entangled in an international crisis.

4.2.3 Victim crises

France: The AirFrance “shirt” scandal

AirFrance is the main French airline for passengers and airfreight and employs about 65,000 people. AirFrance has chronically been in deficit for the past 7 years and their latest plan, Perform 2020, presented in late 2014, is meant to lead to an operating result of 700 million euros by 2017. However, in late September 2015, negotiations about the plan perimeter and measures between the company and the unions came to an end as pilots refused the plan. As a result, AirFrance announced the launch of a plan B, based on the layoff of 2,900 employees. Following the announcement, unions called for a strike to take place on October 5, 2015. The crisis broke out when the strike degenerated in workplace violence as some employees physically attacked two of AirFrance executives. Images of the violence went viral worldwide thus unsettling the already weakened AirFrance. As a result, AirFrance engaged in an unsuccessful response strategy which worsened the image crisis of the company and led several officials to take a public stand on the affair. The AirFrance case was put in the victim cluster because workplace violence is, according to Coombs, a victim cluster component.

Brazil: The Coca Cola Brasil and “the rat”

In September 2013, R7Urgente, a YouTube channel of Brazilian online news and content provider R7, uploaded a video where they interviewed a man, Wilson Batista Rezende, who was claiming to have become heavily handicapped after drinking a glass of coke contaminated with rat. The video portrayed the man as a formerly very healthy man, vegetarian and sporty, whose life was ruined thirteen years before, after he ingested contaminated Coca Cola soda. Rezende claimed he had bought six bottles of said contaminated coke and retains a bottle, seemingly unopened, containing a rat head, clearly visible on the YouTube video. The video was seen more than 4 million times and cast heavy doubts on Coca Cola Brasil safety-checks processes. However, stakeholders online in their majority immediately sided with the brand and mocked Wilson Rezende’s claim which was deemed to be led by
greed only. The strong consumer loyalty helped Coca Cola diminish the reputational threat and even gave them an opportunity to bolster their reputation.

4.3 Sources of data:

The data used to conduct the analyses is secondary, and primarily extracted from the Internet. More precisely, I monitored social networks (such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube) to analyze both the companies and the stakeholders’ behaviors towards a given crisis. I also consulted the online press (major newspapers) to provide context, and corporate blogs to monitor more completely the companies’ strategy.

In order to analyze the emotions of stakeholders, which are an integral part of the matrix model, I randomly selected for each case a sample of comments from stakeholders. The comments had been posted on social media as reactions to the crisis affecting the company.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Source(s) of comments</th>
<th>Social medium of origin</th>
<th>Number of comments selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RATP</td>
<td>Di Falco’s first tweet that launched the crisis</td>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skol</td>
<td>Pri Ferrari’s post that launched the crisis</td>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF</td>
<td>SNCF’s post announcing the train accident</td>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarco</td>
<td>Samarco CEO’s post-collapse video</td>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirFrance</td>
<td>Video of the two executives fleeing the strike and AirFrance promotional video</td>
<td>Youtube and Facebook</td>
<td>20 and 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coca Cola</td>
<td>R7’s video about Rezende</td>
<td>Youtube</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Summary of selected samples
Source: the author

I translated into English all 161 comments (see Appendix 1) that were in another foreign language (usually French and Portuguese) and then asked 3 colleagues to analyze each comment and write down which emotion was, in their opinion and out of the 4 displayed in the model (sympathy, sadness, fright and anger), the main emotion conveyed in each comment. I then added my own analysis and aggregated the different results in order to determine the proportion of each emotion in each sample of comments, and single out the prevalent emotion conveyed by stakeholders for each crisis. Such proceeding was meant to limit the bias that using my own perception alone would have introduced.
5 Analysis

Each case was analyzed independently through the matrix model that was developed on the basis of the literature review. The analysis is divided into four parts that are meant to follow the cyclical development of each crisis: the origin of the crisis, the emotions of stakeholders, the response strategy and then the resolution. The two first parts are tightly linked.

5.1 The RATP crisis

This first crisis involves a popular music band and the Parisian public transportation company, the RATP. Les Prêtres is a music band created in 2010 by French bishop Jean Michel di Falco Leandri and originally intended as a fundraiser initiative to the benefit of two projects: the construction of a church in a local town and the construction of a school in Madagascar. Their first album was a huge hit, selling more than 750,000 copies and ranking as bestselling album in France in 2010. The popularity of the band led to the release of two subsequent albums. The band enjoys a high approval rating in France and has been donating money to various associations, in addition to realizing their initial projects.

Origin of the crisis: internal

In March 2015, Les Prêtres developed a project aimed to support Eastern Christians. This designation covers various Christian movements and gained wide media coverage in Europe within the context of the Islamic State’s expansion, an extremist islamic group, self-proclaimed as a caliphate and claiming authority over all Muslims worldwide. Eastern Christians have been a systematic target of ISIS, along with other religious minorities. Les Prêtres’ initiative consisted in dedicating their then upcoming June concert’s profits to an association called L’Oeuvre d’Orient, which locally supports eastern Christian communities.

The band promoted their initiative by adding a banner on 250 posters to be displayed in the Parisian, RATP-managed subway networks. The RATP however refused the addition of these banners on the posters and on March 30, Di Falco made the RATP’s decision public on Twitter. As the crisis was sparked off by RATP’s decision to censor the banners, the crisis origin would, in Coombs understanding, be internal.
Di Falco⁴ acted as a megaphone that dramatically amplified the situation. More than 6,000 people follow Di Falco on Twitter and his post was retweeted (that is, forwarded and re-posted on Twitter) 849 times (roughly 14% of his network), multiplying the message’s strike force.

**Primary emotion of stakeholders: Anger**

Following di Falco’s tweet, numerous personalities supported Les Prêtres and took a public stance on the matter, particularly on Twitter, such as Prime Minister Manuel Valls⁵ (283,000 followers) who posted a series of tweets near the end of the crisis: “stop to sterile debates! Support the Orient Christians who are victim of obscurantist terror. RATP must take responsibility” (image on the left).

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⁴ The screenshot of Di Falco’s tweet reads as follow: « The RATP refused the posters with: « FOR THE ORIENT CHRISTIANS, which announced the Le Prêtres’s concert at Olympia »

⁵ Manuel Valls’ tweet on the right reads as follow: « No hesitation. We must say our total support to the Orient Christians who are victim of barbarity. #OrientChristians »
Green party leader Jean Vincent Placé (47,500 followers) tweeted “staggering censorship of the poster supporting the Orient Christians we can’t believe it. The RATP must back off on this decision”.

Eventually, former Minister of Defense Michèle Alliot-Marie (21,7000 followers) tweeted “I’m with you. Persecutions of Orient Christians outrage the UN, the EU, in other words, all humans…but the RATP”.

The wide majority of reactions denounced the decision as “censorship” and intimated RATP to take its responsibilities. Many blamed the organization for authorizing other religion-related campaigns or more provocative campaigns, such as ones promoting extra-marital dating websites (Gleeden) or 2014-movie “May Allah bless France!”.

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6 Antoine Nantes’ tweet reads as follow: “Yet, the RATP did not hesitate for a second to massively display « May Allah Bless France»!”
For example, Henri Le Roy tweeted “The RATP supports the genocide of Orient Christians and adultery. That is clear” (in reference to the Gleeden ad campaign) and Antoine “Yet, the RATP did not hesitate for a second to massively display “May Allah bless France”.

RATP’s decision was assimilated to a denial of support to persecuted Christians and a negation of France’s Christian culture. User Chouquette, for instance, posted “I think it’s cowardice!” while Didier added “Very shocked. I’m outraged by this idiotic behavior. They are just supporting the massacres in Orient”. Overall, out of the 25 random comments (tweets) posted under Di Falco’s original tweet that I analyzed, 72% of them were considered to convey anger, followed by sadness (20%). Sympathy and fright were found in 4% of the comments. The prominence of anger as the main emotion expressed by stakeholders points out to the preventable cluster. According to the matrix, it consequently calls for the adoption of an accommodative response strategy.

**RATP’s response strategy: Defensive**

Following Di Falco’s tweet on March 30st, the RATP, on April 1st, released online a press release explaining and maintaining their decision. In this first press release, the RATP adopted a defensive position by using the law (“Public service ought to be neutral”) to justify the decision to remove the banner from the poster. In addition, the RATP claimed that adding the banner would be taking a stance in the conflict and could trigger contradictory positions. The vocabulary used by the RATP was detached and institutional, as illustrated by the expressions “strict rule”, “principle of neutrality of public service” or “general terms and conditions”. Their argument is two-fold. First off, the RATP refused to acknowledge responsibility because they only applied the law on public service neutrality, which the “advertisers perfectly know”. Second, the RATP can only acknowledge that the “dramatic situation of Eastern Christian” can trigger “emotion”. The RATP’s release is meant to be rational and established on the respect of the law. The first release was very poorly received. Di Falco was invited to talk in prominent media in France and abroad in Italy. On April 3, the Christian association CREDO announced its intent to pursue RATP in a court of law for arbitrary censorship. In response, the RATP published a series of three tweets announcing that they maintained their decision but “will take responsibility” if Justice decides in favor of CREDO.

However, on April 4, the RATP published another press release aimed to “calm things down” where they “decided to offer the possibility” to add a new banner mentioning “to the benefit of the association L’Oeuvre d’Orient, although the court will not settle the case until
next week”. Going back to a legal argument, they also mentioned that the “situation is an illustration of the growing difficulty to apply rules of neutrality and laïcité”7 The release was yet again very badly received and urged the Prime Minister to publicly support di Falco on Twitter.

**Resolution**

Two days later, on April 6th, the RATP released a last and very short press release, announcing the original banner would be reinstated, an information confirmed by Di Falco three days later on Twitter8, who also stated that the new campaign would be paid for by the RATP.

Overall, the RATP management of the crisis was a total failure, for several reasons. From the start on, they adopted a haughty position where they rejected responsibility and hid behind the law. They never factored in the emotions of the different stakeholders nor succeeded in contextualizing them, which led to their regress. By adopting a defensive response strategy until the very end, they considered themselves as a victim of the crisis. It however would have been fundamental to contextualize the stakeholders’ emotions to respond correctly.

First off, stakeholders are French and French culture and History are partly rooted in Christianity. As such, assimilating eastern Christians to one of “many communities in a situation of conflict” and refusing to take part in “any conflict” is both perceived as a negation of French culture and a tacit support to the Islamic State. Secondly, the RATP’s

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7 The « Laïcité » is often yet wrongly assimilated with State secularism. It however does not possess any official translation in English as the French acception of the term is inherited from the French Enlightenment and posits that in order for the State to respect all religions it must acknowledge none. Religiousness belongs to the private sphere and does not intervene in State Affairs, in the same way that the State does not act upon religion, let alone to guarantee the free exercise of cults (inscribed in the law). It is a very polemical and sensitive topic in France as the definition of the term is very debated.

8 Di Falco’s tweet reads as follow: “ #OrientChristians: Metrobus informed me that they would take charge of a new campaign in the metro, with the banners that we asked.”
vocabulary is clumsily euphemistic: the persecution of eastern Christians was denominated as an “armed conflict abroad” (implying there was symmetry of forces between Eastern Christians and ISIS) and a “dramatic situation” (whereas Eastern Christians are given the choice between forced conversion, religious fine or death). Lastly, the RATP’s regulation policy appears unclear. The RATP opposes this situation to Laïcité, a solely French concept whose definition has been at the core of political debates for the past two or three years. As a result, the “know-it-all” position of the RATP to that regard and their systematic mention of “the law” were poorly received because stakeholders remembered previous subway campaigns that were also religiously charged yet not “censored”. As such, the RATP’s reaction seemed to illustrate an unfair double standard.

The RATP’s response was totally misplaced for three reasons: it responded with a defensive posture opposing respect of the law and emotion; it used polemical words in a politically and socially tense context in France and it adopted a detached, rational tone in an emotionally charged context. In addition, their response took the form of multiple, rigid press releases - against the strong social media presence and reactivity of their stakeholders - where they successively denied their responsibility, attack their accusers, and maintained their position without ever offering apology.

The RATP’s crisis was however a prime example of an internal crisis with strong attribution of responsibility and high levels of attribution-dependent emotions such as anger. It was therefore a “preventable” crisis, which called for an accommodative response strategy, including but not limited to apology and withdrawal of their decision: even if they were to be right, the topic was too hot to stand their ground.
5.2 The Skol crisis

The Carnival is an intense period in Brazil. Lasting for a week, it is the most popular celebration in Brazil and one of the most touristic events. The stakes are therefore high for companies whose business relates to parties and celebrations. As such, Skol, one of the most popular Brazilian beer brands, launched a marketing campaign solely for the Carnival: “RedONdo”. The theme was the loss of control with slogans translating to “Let “no” at home” or “say yes before you know the question”, aiming to foster an environment of fun, openness and recklessness.

Origin of the crisis: internal
On February 11, two women, Pri Ferrari - a marketing professional and illustrator - and a journalist, Mila Alves, saw the ad at a bus stop in São Paulo. Outraged, they decided to spoof the campaign and denounced it online, on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Both women accused the company of irresponsibility, claiming Carnivals often saw a peak of rapes. To
that regard, Skol’s suggestion to “accept before you know the question” or “let no at home” resonated as an apology of rape and other irresponsible conducts.

At approximately 3:30pm on February 11, the marketing specialist, Pri Ferrari, uploaded the post. Ferrari was not particularly popular on social media with about 1,000 followers. Yet, her Facebook post got over 26,000 likes and was shared more than 8,500 times.

The origin of the crisis is internal and amplified by social media. The organization’s marketing campaign is denounced and vilified. Ferrari’s post was written in Portuguese in both a sarcastic and angry tone. Ferrari attacked “the “wonderful” Skol” and their “totally irresponsible campaign”. She called them out: “publicists friends”, you must have a better

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9 Pri Ferrari’s original full Facebook post reads as follow: « The « wonderful » Skol decided to launch a carnival campaign using sentences that imply loss of control. « Say yes before you know...»
notion of respect”. Although the organization intended to promote an atmosphere of fun and recklessness, it seems that they failed to comprehend the double reading attached to its promotional slogans, coming off as totally insensitive to women and the rape culture often associated with alcohol.

**Primary emotion of stakeholders: Anger**

A random sample of 27 comments that were published as responses under Pri Ferrari’s post on Facebook were analyzed. Ferrari’s initiative gained a lot of support. There were overall more female supporters than male, and they appeared to disagree on the potential sexism of Skol’s ad. For example, Mila claimed that “In reality, it does not matter what Skol wants to say, the fact is that is has a double meaning, and if it does, everyone can understand whatever they want. (...) it’s the Carnival period people…the world is sexist (...)”. João, however, replied that “today everything has a double meaning or is subject to interpretation…There will always be someone to take it to the extreme or interpret negatively. Today the world is boring”. The debate therefore went beyond the sole ad and revolved around themes of sexism in Brazil, with women massively supporting Pri’s initiative. Some men supported the initiative, such as Lucas: “What a shame. As a publicist, I swear to never do such a campaign during my career” or Fabricio: “Daniela, remember how we talked about sexism yesterday? Here is a trivial example of what not to do in advertising…”. Overall, I found that 69% of the sample comments conveyed anger, against 15% conveying sympathy and 16% conveying either sadness or fright.

As such, the internal origin together with the anger expressed in most of the message places the Skol scandal in the preventable cluster according to the matrix, calling for an accommodative response strategy.

**Skol’s response strategy: partially accommodative**

Skol was extremely fast to respond: at about 8p.m on the same day, Pri edited her Facebook post (published less than 5 hours earlier) to announce that the director of communication of Ambev (the mother-organization of Skol) had called her earlier in the day. The director said that “The only possible interpretation is not very clear to me. « forget the no at home » are some examples. It’s a totally irresponsible campaign, particularly during the carnival when we know the rate of rape increases exponentially. @sugarmila and I decided to make a small intervention. Publicist friends, you must be more careful and respect.#feminism, #respect #NOrape »
afternoon to “deny bad intentions” and to tell her that the campaign would be withdrawn at night. In the meantime, Skol also published a press release claiming the polemical wording would be replaced by “clearer and more positive messages”. The press release itself did not acknowledge full responsibility and justified the decision to change the polemical messages by the necessity to “respect the diversity of opinions”, while welcoming feedback and enforcing their commitment to “responsible consumption”.

Resolution

The new slogans were actually ready by February 13, two days after the crisis. Ambev also moved their director of Marketing to another position abroad. Although Ambev later claimed the decision to hire a new Marketing director had been taken long before the crisis broke out, its officialization at the very time of the crisis resolution remained very timely and somehow revealed an attempt to distance the brand from the scandal and to identify it with an individual. As such, Ambev/Skol’s response is overall accommodative but mixed together a deny strategy (as they subtly identified the director of Marketing as a scapegoat), a diminish strategy (they claimed lack of intent) and a rebuild strategy (they immediately withdrew the polemical posters).

Skol’s response was a success as they immediately perceived the virality of Pri’s post and dealt with it in a partially accommodative way, calling Pri personally. The crisis was therefore resolved in less than a day.

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10 The tweet of Sugarmila in the following page reads as follow: I and @cadeomeucafe (Pri) received the new posters of Skol’s campaign, where they got rid off the «no» and, hey, it’s way better »
5.3 The SNCF crisis

The SNCF is the French National railway service and manages most of the train traffic in France. However, in July 2013, the train joining Paris, the capital city to Limoges, a smaller hinterland city, derailed at the entrance of the Brétigny-sur-Orge station. The derailment killed 7 passengers and injured more than 30. The accident was even more shocking because it occurred in the middle of summer (high traffic period) and two days before the National Day, Bastille Day (July, 14).

Origin of the crisis: internal

A priori, the derailment was caused by the reversal of a splice bar in the railway, which would point to a technical accident. According to Coombs (2007), technical errors fall into the accidental cluster.
Primary emotion of stakeholders: sadness

According to the different authors that the matrix was built on, accidents are particularly shocking experiences where stakeholders tend to feel sadness and fright as primary emotions (Jin et al., 2007, 2009, 2012). In the case of SNCF, it indeed proved true. Comments that were posted under the SNCF’s Facebook announcement of the tragedy on July 14th, 2013 were randomly extracted. 54.2% of the comments that were analyzed were considered to convey sadness, followed by fright (19.4%). Thus, several users encouraged families to “be brave” such as Melody: “I take my train everyday from this station…be brave everyone”, AnneClaire; “Tribute and big thoughts to all the victims, the families and the emergency services!!!” and Cecilia “To families mourning and to the wounded: be brave…kisses for everyone…”. Other users expressed fright such as Daniel, who wondered if the “accident was premeditated” because, he writes, “a slice bar can’t unscrew like that; or it has never been screwed”. Similarly, other users wondered whether it was an “accident or a criminal act” such as Bres and Benoit.

Response strategy: Accommodative

However, the SNCF did not wait for stakeholders to express themselves to react on social media. Less than an hour after the accident and until 6 hours after, the SNCF posted a series of messages through their Public Relation Twitter account, SNCF Newsroom. The first one was published 59 minutes after the accident occurred11, and informed of the accident as well as identifying what was the train concerned.

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11 The SNCF Newsroom tweet reads as follow : “A train accident occurred at 5:14pm at #Bretignysur-Orge. The train is #Intercité #SNCF3657 from Paris Austerlitz to Limoges”
The second tweet\textsuperscript{12}, 45 minutes later expressed “SNCF’s emotion” and informed that the organization was getting together to help and inform travelers. Two minutes after that second tweet, another tweet \textsuperscript{13} revealed an investigation was currently taking place to determine the cause of the accident.

An hour later, the SNCF had put in operation a free information number and invited people to contact SNCF if needed. At nearly 10 p.m, the SNCF announced it had created a web page dedicated to the accident and lastly, about six hours after the accident, at around 11 p.m, a tweet announced a press conference was about to begin at their headquarters. The SNCF continued posting tweets summarizing the press conference throughout the night and even announced a first explanation for the accident a little before 3 a.m. The SNCF proactivity prevented stakeholders from expressing primary emotions and react in the heat of the moment. Rather, stakeholders could only respond to the SNCF.

It is interesting to notice how well prepared and methodical the communication plan was. The accidental nature of the crisis recommends, according to our matrix, a mix of accommodative and defensive responses to manage the reputational threat. However, the SNCF did much more than that as they treated the crisis as “preventable” and anticipated their stakeholders’ reactions. They immediately communicated on Twitter, the “buzz-media” by excellence and quickly labeled the situation as a “railway accident”, hereby externalizing the origin of the crisis. The content of the different messages evolved along an axis of both emotion and full, transparent information. By reacting less than an hour after the accident, SNCF ensured they were “owning” the crisis before it could even break out. It allowed them to frame the crisis as they wanted to because they appeared as taking responsibility. They

\textsuperscript{12} The second Tweet, whose screenshot is on the left of the page, reads as follow: “[Train Accident] #SNCF expresses their emotion about the accident and is pooling all necessary means to help the travelers #SNCF3657 #Bretigny”

\textsuperscript{13} The third tweet, on the right of the page, reads as follow: “[Train Accident] An investigation is being led to determine the causes of the derailment #SNCF3657 #Bretigny”
detailed the actions they were taking, such as requesting a security audit on the day of the accident while conveying their sympathy in a sincere way (it was their second tweet) and frequently posting pictures of rescue teams on the field.

The day after the event, they released an infographic to offer a visual explanation of what had happened to the train and, on July 14, they posted a message on Facebook summarizing their previous tweets. Between July 12 and July 24, they gave 4 press conferences.

Resolution

The SNCF posted a “back to normal” tweet\(^\text{14}\), on July 30, thus formally putting an end to the crisis. In addition to their commitment to transparency, SNCF also proceeded to offer numerous compensations to travelers: they reimbursed all cancelled trips as well as 50% to 100% of the travelers’ subscriptions.

On social media, the SNCF focused on a purely accommodative strategy, mixing both rebuild response and bolstering response, while maintaining frequent and transparent points of information throughout the crisis. The SNCF was also very present outside social media, with CEO Guillaume Pépy giving numerous interviews and publicly acknowledging the SNCF full responsibility. In other words, the SNCF had a prepared crisis management plan which helped them succeed in containing the crisis because they were not merely reacting to their stakeholders’ own reactions, but anticipating them. They occupied all fronts of the media scene, both online and offline, thus preempting any rumors or the spread of negative emotions, and keeping control over the crisis frame.

In addition to the security audit they commanded the day of the accident, two other external investigations were conducted and pointed faults in the maintenance network, which caused the splice bar to reverse and trigger the derailment. The SNCF, although eventually contesting culpability, was placed under formal investigation for involuntary homicide and

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\(^{14}\) The tweet reads as follow: “traffic is back to normal on #RERC_SNCF[…]”
injuries. Nonetheless, the SNCF suffered no reputational damage, much to the contrary: prior to the conclusion of external audits, they had already ordered the verification of 5,000 similar pieces on the network, anticipating the results of the different studies. As such they appeared as fully involved in the crisis resolution.

Figure 10: The SNCF crisis Management Matrix  

5.4 The Samarco mudslide crisis

On November 5, 2015, in Minas Gerais, a state in the south east of Brazil, a mining dam collapsed resulting in an enormous mudslide engulfing an entire village (Bento Rodrigues), killing at least 17 and wounding more than 50. The mudslide was described as red, thick and highly toxic. The mining dam, Fundão, operated by 25 people, retained very large quantities (50 million tons/ 60 million cubic meters) of the toxic waste (lead, arsenic and chromium) generated by the mine of Germano. The mudslide reached the Atlantic Ocean at the end of November, 650km away from its departure point and all the way through the
river “Rio Doce”. It killed thousands of animals, devastated protected rainforest areas and left 280,000 people without water.

Fundão, the dam, was operated by Brazilian company Samarco, held by Brazilian Vale (first exporter of iron-ore) and by BHP Billiton, an anglo-australian multinational specialized in mining, metals and petroleum.

**Origin of the crisis: external**

Reading about the collapse of a dam intuitively leads to labeling the incident as an accident, which is why we decided to analyze this case within the accidental cluster. However, and quite interestingly, a Federal decree in the Brazilian Law categorizes Dams’ collapsing as “natural disaster”¹⁵. In Jin et al. ICM model (2007, 2009, 2012), natural disasters are external crises were the organization is not responsible, although the loss is irrevocable (see Table 5). As a result, stakeholders tend to feel sadness or fright as primary, attribution-independent emotions. Consequently and according to these models, BHP- Vale - Samarco, faced a tragic event which is by law a natural disaster and therefore should use a mix of defensive and accommodative response strategy.

¹⁵ Federal Decree nº8572 according to which dams’collapses are natural disasters http://presrepublica.jusbrasil.com.br/legislacao/256176296/decreto-8572-15

“Parágrafo único. Para fins do disposto no inciso XVI do caput do art. 20 da Lei nº 8.036, de 11 de maio de 1990, considera-se também como natural o desastre decorrente do rompimento ou colapso de barragens que ocasionem movimento de massa, com danos a unidades residenciais.” (NR)
Primary emotion of stakeholders: anger

Many different stakeholders have reacted to the catastrophe. On November 27, about 20 days after the collapse, the Federal Government of Brazil announced it would sue Samarco, Vale and BHP Billiton with the objective of creating a fund, supplied by the three companies, to finance the repair of the damages caused by the dam’s collapse. Izabella Teixeira, Minister of the Environment thus declared, “It is the biggest environmental disaster that Brazil has lived so far. But it is not a natural disaster. It was provoked by economic activity. By men and as such, they bear a civil-criminal responsibility” (…). The government demanded 5.2 billion dollars to BHP Billiton and Vale – both mother companies – in order to finance the repair of the damages.

On the occasion of the Cop21 organized in France in early December 2015, President Dilma Roussef also condemned the accident as the result of “the irresponsible action of a company”, which provoked “the biggest environmental disaster in the history of Brazil”. She also promised that the people responsible would be “severely punished”.

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16 http://blog.planalto.gov.br/governo-cobrara-na-justica-que-mineradoras-criem-fundo-de-r-20-bilhoes/
17 http://blog.planalto.gov.br/governo-cobrara-na-justica-que-mineradoras-criem-fundo-de-r-20-bilhoes/
18 Roussef’s words were also forwarded by the twitter account of the Planalto Blog which reads as follow: « We are severely punishing the irresponsible action that caused the tragedy in the Rio Doce, says Dilma »
On social media, Facebook users worldwide used a non-official page of Samarco allowing to evaluate the company to give bad grades and post negative comments about Samarco. For example, Rime wrote, “just take responsibility and find a way. (...) Terrorists and people like you are the same”. Sophie, from France, later posted: “if zero star was possible that would be my grade for you (...). Irreversible damages for which Brazilian people and our earth will pay!!” or Reinald “You dirty as*holes; You think really that 60 million dollars is enough, for what you did in Brazil? Capital criminals like you, should be burned down to the ground”. Others posted pictures, such as DQ ProBeats who posted an image of himself flipping off a Samarco sign in the countryside and commenting, “I did not forget! #notanaccident”. The hashtag « #NãoFoiAcidente21 was actually launched and reprised on social media and allowed many people to post articles denouncing the ecological tragedy on Facebook and Twitter. Samarco’s “grade” on Facebook reached only 1.5 stars, out of 5.

The United Nations published on November 25th a press release22 on their website where they condemned “the defensive posturing” and the fact that “it ha(d) taken three weeks for information about the toxic risks of the mining disaster to surface”. The press release further mentioned that “this disaster serves as yet another tragic example of the failure of businesses to adequately conduct human rights due diligence to prevent human rights abuses”.

The almost unanimous condemnation of the tragedy and high attribution of responsibility to the Mining companies operating the dam by both public and private stakeholders show that the crisis cannot be categorized neither in the victim cluster nor in the

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20 The page can be reached at https://www.facebook.com/pages/Samarco/170753076437715?fref=ts
21 The Tweet from Maria Silva reads as follow : « #itwasnotanaccident » and the image reads as « Already forgot Mariana ? the law project 654/2015 could weaken even more the environemental rights of Brazil »
accidental cluster, as we may have intuitively done. Rather, the dam’s collapse led to a preventable crisis where anger crystallized against the mining companies, which were accused of endangering the planet and poor population to their own benefits.

**Response strategy: defensive**

The BHP-Samarco dam collapse is a prime example of a crisis, which, if badly categorized, can lead to totally inappropriate responses. Samarco, BHP and Vale all three responded to the crisis.

On December 1st, 2015, more than 77 press releases had been posted on Samarco’s website. The first one was published on the day of the collapse, November 5th and was titled “Samarco informs”. The press release labeled the situation as “an accident in the dam” and stated that “it (was) not possible, at the moment, to confirm the causes or the extent of the situation, nor the number of victims”. The following day, about a week after the UN statement, they posted simultaneously another press release on their website, and a video of Samarco’s CEO on their Facebook page.

The press release claimed, among other things, that the mudslide was “inert” and “composed mostly of silica (...) and not of any chemical product that could be dangerous for the health”. In parallel, in the video, the CEO apologized for the “accident” and assured that their objective was to “ensure the physical integrity of the people” although no figures of casualties could be given and no cause had been established. In addition, he committed to keep the necessary authorities “informed of the advancements”. The video was visualized over 64,000 times, received 500 comments and was shared nearly 1,300 times.

Comments on the Samarco video portraying their CEO were negative. I selected a random sample of 27 comments and 63% of them were considered to convey anger.

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23 The Samarco Mineração Facebook post reads as follow : “official communication from the president director of Samarco on the accident in the dam areas, located in the regions of Mariana and Ouro Preto (MG)”
followed by sadness (31%), which is consistent with the characteristic of an accidental crisis, and sympathy for Samarco (6%, or on average, 1.5 comments out of 27). Many Facebook comments blamed Samarco, such as Kátia: “Samarco is responsible for this tragedy and it is their responsibility to immediately deal with the suffering of these people”. Letiene denounced the “savage capitalism” and Elizete the “disaster [which] was not natural but caused by lack of skills”. Rodrigo went as far as calling Samarco a “group of murderers”. Many comments seemed to convey a sense of fatalism, as if the tragedy was expected: “Announced tragedy” (Amanda) or “we already knew the risk! Lives are lost for greed…revolting! “(Sabrina). Anecdotally, the 44th Samarco press release, published on November 18th, was entitled “responsibility and involvement” but only mentioned the number (600) of professionals of Samarco and other suppliers who were involved in the operations post-catastrophe.

Their 64th press release was a response to the UN’s release (November, 25th), where Samarco reconfirmed that “since the accident in our dam of Fundão (...) we have constantly informed the society, authorities and the press that the waste flooding from the dam did not present any danger for human health”. The release went on to describe the different analyses they had conducted to reach that conclusion. Samarco also published several notes of additional information (“nota de esclarecimento”) where they successively denied allegations of different newspapers, which claimed that Samarco had refused interviews24.

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24 One example of such press release can be found at http://www.samarco.com/2015/12/11/nota-de-esclarecimento-2/
In parallel, the two mother companies also took part in the response strategy. BHP Billiton started tweeting about the dam’s collapse on November 8th, three days after it happened. BHP’s tweets were exclusively focused on the Samarco incident from November 8th to December 13th. They were purely informational and focused on describing the different actions taken face to the tragedy such as “providing Samarco with all the assistance necessary”. On November 11th, BHP and Vale published the first of a series of joint press releases, signed by both CEOs. The release, posted under the “Investors and Media” category of BHP’s website again described what actions both companies had been taking after the tragedy, which was labeled as a “dam breach”. Both companies expressed their “profound sympathies to the families (…)” and acknowledged “the devastation in and around Bento Rodrigues”. They then announced to “pledge to support Samarco in creating an Emergency Fund for rebuilding (…) and to help affected families and communities”, an initiative they further described in another release published on November 27th. In parallel, BHP posted through its Youtube channel, on November 11, a video of their CEO, re-reading the joint statement. The video did not allow any comments.

Overall, all three companies attempted to label the crisis as accidental (as a matter of fact, every press release by Samarco mentions the “dam accident”) and responded as such. They used a lot of diminish strategies under the form of justification, describing very precisely all what they were doing in the aftermath of the collapse and insisting on they not understanding what went wrong. Samarco also religiously denied every newspapers’claims

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27 Video can be accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fYs49vA9rjc
that were negative and published a lot of press releases insisting on their positive local initiatives. Some titles of releases thus were “Students celebrate graduation with the support of Samarco” (22/12/15), “Samarco supports Santa Claus in Barra Longa” (19/12/15) or “Rescue of species in Rio Doce” (08/12/15).

The fund initiative to repair damages, demanded by the Brazilian government, was presented by BHP and Vale as their own initiative and all three companies continue denying the toxicity of the mudslide, which, according to the UN statement from November 2015, amounts to “20,000 Olympic pools of toxic mud waste”.

Yet, none of the companies ever took responsibility nor apologized for the catastrophe, but instead shared their “sympathy”. Paradoxically, all three CEOs were from the start personally involved in the crisis communication, which can seem contradictory with their desire to frame the crisis as accidental. Indeed, Libaert (2015) showed that when possible, companies should avoid involving the personality of the CEO who, as an embodiment of the company, would be a signal of the company’s responsibility and would be the first in line to pay for it which, ultimately, may further endanger the company.

Eventually, the response was mostly defensive, which would have made sense in cases of victim or accidental crises. Yet, the anger expressed by different stakeholders after the collapse prove that the crisis was in fact of a preventable nature.

Resolution

The Federal Government of Brazil already fined the two mother companies 5.2 billion dollars that should be used to repair the affected environment and somehow act as a first compensation. In addition, the announce, early January 2016, of incoming compensations for families who had suffered casualties or lost their home 28 goes in the sense of a realization from the incriminated companies of the necessity to shift their strategy towards a more accommodative response. Yet, BHP’s share lost 18% on the NYSE in twenty-five days, between November 5th and November 30th, concretely illustrating the impact of their crisis management on the company. What’s more, the fact that all three companies reacted individually to the crisis is a risky posture for the conglomerate, as they run the risk to contradict themselves or to adopt differing strategies. Samarco-BHP-Vale could have designated one corporate representative and adopt from the start accommodative strategies including, but not limited to, acknowledgment of responsibility, apology and compensation

28 The release announcing the compensation can be reached at http://www.samarco.com/2016/01/02/samarco-comecara-a-indenizar-familias-impactadas/
(Rebuild strategies). They also could have avoided flooding stakeholders with multiple press releases, which are not very interactive and too focused on the “good” they were doing without acknowledging their own responsibility. In addition, standing their ground on the alleged non-toxicity of the mud-waste, which devastated the local biodiversity, is not a good signal for transparency and does not invite trust.

Figure 11: The Samarco crisis Management Matrix
5.5 The Air France crisis

Founded in 1933, AirFrance is the main French airline for passengers and airfreight. It employs about 65,000 people. AirFrance has chronically been in deficit for the past 7 years. A first reorganization plan called Transform 2015 has led to 5,000 layoffs since 2012 and included a global salary freeze and an increase of working hours. The latest plan, Perform 2020, was presented in late 2014 and is meant to lead to an operating result of a 700 million euros by 2017. However, in late September 2015, negotiations about the plan perimeter and its measures between the company and the unions came to an end as pilots refused the plan. As a result, AirFrance announced the launch of a plan B, based on the layoff of 2,900 employees.

Origin of the crisis: internal

Following the announcement, unions called for a strike to take place on October 5, 2015. The crisis broke out when the strike degenerated in workplace violence. AirFrance’s head of Human Resources and labor relations, as well as AirFrance’s director at Orly Airport were jostled and their shirts ripped off by angry strikers. Videos of the unrest, including images of both AirFrance leaders fleeing the meeting and climbing a fence to escape assailants went viral worldwide.

Primary emotion of stakeholders: anger

Images of the two executives fleeing the strike with their shirt ripped off were broadcast and passed on by many, and on many media. On YouTube, typing “AirFrance shirt” sorts 28 videos depicting the flight scene on the first two pages.
I took a video posted on Youtube by BFMTV which was seen more than 96,000 times and analyzed 20 comments selected randomly. On average, 95% of them were considered to convey anger against AirFrance. Indeed, the majority of the commenters considered the shirt episode as a fair response to AirFrance layoff plan. Thus, MrZobiwan wrote “blue-collars do not deserve any other treatment, these bastards sit on their silver throne while real workers risk their job and their life for their company (...)”, followed by Damien: “Listening to some, we should keep on turning the other cheek (...). For years we’ve been asking employees more and more efforts (...) while big bosses leave their company after two years with compensation reaching 20 million euros (...) inequalities have never been so wide (...)” and Iskander added that “UNEMPLOYEMENT IS A SOCIAL VIOLENCE”.

Overall, it appeared that commentators established a causal relationship between the shirt symbol and the difficult economic context in which the accident took place. Some members of the government immediately reacted on Twitter such as the Minister of the Economy, Emmanuel Macron, who condemned the acts: “Total support to the people that were assaulted. Those who led this violence are irresponsible. Nothing replaces social dialogue”. He was followed by Myriam El Khomri, Minister of Labor: “The invasion of the AirFrance executive committee and the physical violence that followed are unacceptable (Tweet ½).

The day after the incident, President François Hollande also condemned the actions on Twitter: “We need an appeased social dialogue. If it is interrupted by unacceptable violences, it has consequences on the country’s attractivity”.
However, some public personalities actually sided with AirFrance’s employees, such as Jean Luc Mélenchon (711,000 followers), leader of the extreme left party in France, who published a series of Tweets strongly supporting AirFrance employees: “CEOs came and told 2,900 employees: sign here, you are dead! Is that social dialogue?” or “There is violence at AirFrance: 2,900 layoffs. There. This is violence” and even “You know what? I would go to jail in their place”.

What is interesting is that workplace violence is, according to Coombs, one the few examples where the organization is considered a victim of its crisis. Indeed, one can legitimately argue that the depiction of such internal violence negatively reflects on the entire company, which was pointed out by one commenter, rima1815: “We should show this video to all the foreign investors: 1) do not invest in this country (mostly?) made of idiots, 2) Let’s see how they manage without bosses and CEOs 3) Airdrop new shirts so that they can still have fun together”.

Although the comment has a very cynical tone it well shows the off-putting, dissuasive nature of the videos showing the internal violence and which were shared worldwide. Yet the overwhelming majority of the comments convey anger about the company, which shows that the labor unrest induced by the social crisis surpassed the workplace violence. It therefore places AirFrance in the preventable crisis cluster according to Coombs, who considers Labor Unrest to fall within that cluster.
AirFrance’s response: defensive

The Press Twitter account of AirFrance, @AirFranceNewsroom, posted 17 tweets, explaining the different dimensions of the new plan as well as condemning the violence perpetrated against the two members of AirFrance executive committee. The Twitter activity though decreased between the 6th (6 tweets) and 9th of October (1 tweet). AirFrance’s regular Twitter account, @AirFrance, however registered no activity between October 1st and October 9th.

On October 9th, four days after the incident and its worldwide knowledge, AirFrance sent out to all of his clients, via email, and posted on Youtube and his different social media, a video entitled “AirFrance is here for you!” The video opened up with AirFrance’s head of human resources and labor relations, Xavier Broseta, who was himself molested during the strike, claiming that what happened on October 5th was not “the real face of AirFrance”. The video then portrayed different employees of AirFrance worldwide. They successively claimed in different languages that “AirFrance is offering the best to its customers” and that they are “proud to work for AirFrance”. The 1-minute long video then went on depicting the different services offered by AirFrance with the repeated motto “That’s Airfrance, and it’s for you”. The video was seen more than 240,000 times and commented on more than 460 times on YouTube. On Facebook, it has received over 21,500 likes, was shared about 2,400 times and viewed 1.6 million times. Yet, the video was again poorly received. On YouTube, Marc thus posted “How much does it cost to make such a shallow video?” while D Mijoule added that “this video is a shame.” A foreign customer, Mats, even wrote “I am swedish and you send me an e-mail in English to tell me you can’t handle your emotions and attach a video in French that I cannot understand...?! You need a crash course in communication. For the record I stopped flying with AF when you had your strike last year.”. On Facebook, comments appeared as more supportive and positive as illustrated by George’s comment: « Always a pleasure to travel with you » or Vera’s: « The most trustworthy airline for me ! Vive la France ». The majority of positive comments may be explained by the fact that the video was posted on Airfrance’s fanpage, logically gathering supporters of the brand. Following Pfeffer et al (2011) recommendation, AirFrance could have activated its fan network to contain the negativity of other stakeholders.
Resolution

The crisis was labeled the “shirt affair” and mid-october 2015, six employees were placed under formal investigation. One month later, four of them were laid off and the trial of other five employees started on December, 2nd. As I write, the AirFrance crisis is not resolved yet, although it has cooled down, but AirFrance does not seem to have had any prepared crisis management strategy as its behavior proved in the past months. Arguably, AirFrance as a company is a victim of the workplace violence that took place on October 5th, even more so that the images of executive committee members climbing a fence with their shirt ripped off is a violent and negative signal for the image of the group which, in addition, is undergoing a social crisis. At the very least, AirFrance, as a victim, could have adopted a minimally defensive response focused on informing and adjusting information. It does seem like it is what AirFrance attempted to do with their video centered on showing “what the real AirFrance is”. However that video, adopting an almost candid promotional tone and sent out to their clients worldwide in French only, seemed to totally diminish the seriousness of the situation as well as coming off as hastily put up together. That impression is reinforced by the fact that the interlocutor opening the video is one of the two men who, four days earlier, was photographed escaping AirFrance by climbing a fence, his shirt completely ripped off. Besides, the very existence of a parallel deeper social crisis within the company called for more caution. Their video emphasizing the pride to be AirFrance employees only days after 2,900 layoffs were announced came off as cynical, irresponsible and seem to further embody a profound denial of the reality of the situation. Instead, AirFrance could have taken into account the responsibility attributed to them for the social crisis. A defensive reaction was not enough; let alone a clumsy, inappropriate diminish response strategy. Rather, AirFrance could have adopted a mixed strategy gathering transparency of information, acknowledgment and understanding of the context, and rebuild strategies showing good will: partial acknowledgement of responsibility and commitment to reopen dialogue with employees.
5.6 The Coca Cola “rat” crisis

Origin of the crisis: external

On September, 12 of 2013, R7Urgente, the YouTube channel of Brazilian online news and content provider of R7, uploaded a video portraying a man they had interviewed, Wilson Batista Rezende. Rezende was claiming to have become heavily handicapped after drinking a glass of coke contaminated with rat. The video portrayed the man as a formerly very healthy
man, vegetarian and sporty, whose life was ruined thirteen years ago after he had ingested contaminated Coca Cola soda. Rezende claimed that he had bought six bottles of said contaminated coke and that he retained a bottle, seemingly unopened, containing a rat head, clearly visible on the YouTube video. The video, suggesting very poor safety-check processes on the part of Coca Cola, was seen more than 4 million times and commented on almost 10,000 times. The origin is therefore external, because the crisis broke out following the claim of an external stakeholder.

**Primary emotion of stakeholders: sympathy**

In order to analyze the stakeholders’ emotions towards Coca Cola, I randomly selected 21 comments under the original YouTube video and dating from 2013, when the video was released. The main reaction was one of mockery against Rezende, whom many commenters suspected as greedy, such as Keyssin, who wrote “Hahaha, what a ridiculous video, my god, this Coca Cola is better than Formol! The rat is still in perfect state after thirteen years in the bottle (…) it’s the worst video I’ve ever seen but well, what would people not do for money…” The story was indeed considered very suspicious. For example, Alyson wrote “Only he drank coke and out of the millions that were produced, only his bottle was totally venenous…please…” or Daniêlo: “This story is bad! One sip only destroys the guy from the inside, but the rat head is in perfect state after thirteen years?!”. On average, 14% of the comments (that is, 3 comments) were considered to convey anger, such as Crioucris’ who wrote “It’s crazy! Coca Cola must take responsibility and this guy deserves full support” or Marcelo: “Brazil wake up! (…) how many more people are necessary for that mistake to be corrected! Wilson is right! Compensation is not to get rich but to help make this beverage better (…)”. 70% of the comments were however considered to convey sympathy for Coca Cola. Indeed many commentators either championed for the brand or pointed to the inconsistencies of the video, often in a humorous way (Ramon thus posted “I pause at 1:50, I’m gonna fetch myself a good glass of iced coke”). The overwhelming majority of comments were very critical of Rezende’s story and in fine, sympathetic to Coca Cola, which allows to place the crisis in the victim cluster.
Coca cola’s response: defensive

The indirect support of commentators is likely to have allowed Coca Cola to wait for September 17, or 5 days after the video was posted, to release a first press release, on Facebook, where they denied allegations. The press release is no longer directly available but has been posted on several online newspapers. Coca Cola then posted on 24/09/13 another more formal press release, on their website this time. The press release recounted Coca Cola’s strict production processes, which “makes it impossible to have rats in the bottles”. It also detailed the actions taken by Coca Cola to investigate the alleged victim’s claims while also revealing that the victim had refused to hand in the bottles he claimed were responsible for his disease, and had refused to comply with the medical appointments ordered by the Tribunal in charge of the affair. Lastly, Coca Cola expressed their sympathy for the man’s condition but denied responsibility.

Two days after their press release, Coca Cola uploaded a video on YouTube, the platform were the crisis was originally born, entitled “Conheça a verdade sobre Coca Cola” (Know the truth about Coca Cola). The video did not mention the ongoing crisis but clearly depicted and described the different safety-checks a bottle goes through before getting into the market. It clearly insisted on the fact that each bottle is analyzed independently. The video ended on an invitation to come visit one of the Brazilian factories by calling a specific number. The video today has more than 7 million views. Two days after, on September 28, another video was released: a visit of the Maceio factory had been organized for Brazilian influencers. One of them had recorded his visit in the quality and security department of the factory and was explicitly championing for the brand. Eventually, on November 14, the tribunal judged that the rat had never existed, hereby confirming Coca Cola’s victim status and putting a definitive end to the crisis.

Resolution

Eventually, Coca Cola’s response was very successful. They adopted a defensive strategy based on denial of responsibility after they realized they were not being blamed online. Rather, commentators firmly criticized Rezende. Coca Cola waited for 5 days before reacting, which is very long for a social media crisis, but seems to show that they took the time to analyze their stakeholders’ emotions. Not reacting immediately prevented them from appearing guilty and threatened. Focusing on press releases and videos that were both “educational” and championing for them, they did not heat up the crisis while indirectly discrediting the accuser. Although Coca Cola’s response was defensive, they went beyond
mere denial and seized the opportunity to enforce some bolstering strategies such as the organized visits of their factories to further establish their reputation.

Figure 13: The Coca Cola crisis management matrix
5.7 Concluding remarks on case-analysis

I analyzed six cases of social media crises. In each cluster that I used, Preventable, Accidental and Victim, there were a good and a bad example of crisis management.

In the preventable cluster, I studied the cases of the RATP and of Skol. In the RATP example, the primary emotion expressed in the sample comments that were analyzed was anger, clearly pointing to the preventable cluster and thus calling, according to the matrix, to an accommodative strategy. Yet, the RATP adopted a posture of victim, constantly reaffirming its rightful position (justification) and using a defensive strategy only to back off, one week later, after public stakeholders such as the Prime Minister openly positioned themselves against the RATP’s decision. On the other hand, on the case of Skol, the organization reacted immediately in an accommodative way, personally calling the two women who had earlier started off the crisis and taking down the entire campaign without any polemical debate.

In the accidental cluster, we saw the cases of the train derailment of the SNCF in France and the dam’s collapse of Samarco in Brazil. Putting both cases into perspective, it is interesting to notice that one could easily and intuitively label them as accidents, whether technical (SNCF) or natural (Samarco). Yet, only the SNCF succeeded in effectively framing the crisis as accidental through an immediate and very accommodative response strategy. In other words, the SNCF responded as if the crisis had been preventable while continuously labeling the situation as an accident. As the SNCF was occupying the entire media landscape while championing an accommodative strategy, the potential anger was contained and only sadness was particularly expressed. However, in the Samarco case, the three companies involved also attempted to frame the crisis as accidental (by, for example, constantly calling it the “dam accident” in their releases) but their response strategy was defensive, which fostered the anger of stakeholders and led to the companies being unanimously blamed by public and private stakeholders.

Lastly, in the victim cluster, we saw the case of AirFrance in France, and the case of Coca Cola in Brazil. The AirFrance case is an example of workplace violence and would, in the different typologies that we studied, be considered as a victim cluster type of crisis. Yet, the analysis of the sample comments I collected showed that the primary emotion felt by stakeholders was by far anger, pointing out to a preventable type of crisis. The response strategy of AirFrance was very unclear, clumsy and rather defensive as they tried to diminish and even deny the gravity of the violence and completely overlooked the impact it may have
on the corporate image, already stained by the social crisis (and resulting labor unrest) undergone by the company. They tried in vain to distance the company from the crisis and are, to this day, still embroiled in media turmoil.

However, in the Brazilian case, Coca Cola had a smart response strategy. Although it was clear that the company was considered a victim of a rumor as showed by the sympathy expressed by stakeholders on the incriminating video, Coca Cola adopted a mixed strategy that was both defensive (denying responsibility) and accommodative (showing good will) when they invited stakeholders to visit factories and released an educational video on their processes (bolstering strategy). As a result, the crisis was settled quickly and ended by a justice decision going in the sense of Coca Cola.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th></th>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Date of break out</td>
<td>Coombs type of crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATP – Les Prêtres</td>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Preventable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF – the Accident of Brétigny sur Orge</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>Accidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AirFrance – the “shirt affair”</td>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>Victim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Summary of the crises’ types after the research
Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of Coombs (2007) work
Figure 14: The Social Media Crisis Management Matrix applied to the six cases
6 Final Considerations

6.1 On social media crisis management

Such results lead me to think that the accidental cluster evidenced by Coombs and supported by the different models that were used to build the matrix may not be relevant in a social media context. Indeed, I sense that the social media environment is very Manichean and crises ought not to be analyzed on such a nuanced spectrum of clusters. Rather, the preventable and the victim clusters are the only ones truly applicable, with the preventable one being prominent. More precisely, in the cases, it was not the analysis of the origin (internal/external) of the crisis that really determined its cluster, but the analysis of the emotions of the stakeholders. Analyzing the origin is an objective and rational method, which is the one adopted by Coombs (2007) and Jin et al. (2007, 2009, 2012), and most researchers overall. Yet social media do not answer to a rational logic. They are governed by reactions, opinions, strong emotions (Pfeffer et al., 2011), that can be either positive or negative. These reactions can snowball worldwide instantly, in totally unexpected ways: social media is a formidable magnifying mirror. Eventually, studying corporate social media crises in a rational way might overlook the quintessence of social media and leads to false, partial analyses, and consequently to inappropriate response strategies. On the six cases of crisis that were analyzed, four turned out to be in the preventable cluster (RATP, Skol, Samarco and AirFrance), one was successfully framed as accidental (SNCF) but treated as preventable, and only one was a successful example of a victim cluster crisis (Coca Cola). In addition, and although only six cases were analyzed, it seems that treating any social media crisis as a preventable one remains a particularly safe response strategy. Indeed, it may not take a lot for a legitimately victim type crisis to turn into a preventable type crisis, as the emotional impact allowed by social media increases the instability of the crisis. It seems as though social media blur the boundaries between each cluster, which makes social media crises that harder to comprehend and manage.
Furthermore, the cases of AirFrance and of Samarco exemplified the necessity for companies, when facing a critical situation, to analyze it within the global corporate context, may it be a social crisis, or a crisis fueled by a world shared concern for underprivileged populations and endangered areas. It is consistent with Libaert (2015) claim that crises are not isolated events.

The advent of social media has transformed the economy by empowering stakeholders as opposed to shareholders. Consequently, financial stability is no longer the only component of a company’s reputation. In the early 2000s, journalist Chris Anderson envisioned that “brand is what Google says it is” and we may just extend today his visionary statement to the company as a whole. Although social media are the same between the public and the organizations, they are not and cannot be used in the same way within the corporate environment: social media and the digital ecosystem in general “accelerated” time and greatly empowered instant messages and reactions. The exposure allowed by social media comes with many exciting opportunities for businesses, as we have seen, but also comes with new risks: that of exposing constantly the organization’s reputation and image, and in fine, its
performance. Companies, if they intend to avoid suffering social media, must develop a digital culture in order to be able to anticipate movements of opinion, which is what the SNCF did and why their crisis management was a total success.

The argument developed in this thesis, eventually, is that social media have made corporate crises even more unpredictable because they are driven by irrationality. As such, they cannot be dealt with in the way that has prevailed so far and that relies on a neo-classical approach of an individual assumed to be rational (“homo economicus”). Rather, the “homo conectens” is defined by their emotional biases (behavioral approach).

The results of the analysis of the six cases suggest that stakeholders’ emotions are a more precise barometer of social media corporate crises’ types than defining the origin of the cause (external/internal analysis). Indeed, the companies that offered a response in accordance with their stakeholders’ emotions, which is usually an accommodative response, suffered less reputational damage than those which adopted a traditional, defensive strategy. Although emotions are by nature highly subjective, it however does not mean their analysis cannot be conducted in a systematic way. The matrix I proposed is an attempt to rationalize the choice of a response strategy in an irrational environment and proved consistent in all of the six cases.

6.2 Managerial implications

There is a wide literature showing the necessity for companies to embrace social media in order to better anticipate their movements. Yet, the unpredictability of social media crises fairly tames any hope to fully control a connected and highly irrational environment. In that regard, although anticipation and preparedness are integral parts of crisis management, companies that are able to swiftly navigate unstable situations and remain flexible are usually better off. When facing a social media crisis, companies, through their crisis management team, can transpose their crisis into the matrix I proposed and analyze the five factors that it is based on: attribution of responsibility (weak to strong), crisis origin (external or internal), reputational threat (low to high), emotions (sympathy, sadness, fright and anger) and response strategies (defensive or accommodative). These factors are interconnected: the emotions felt by stakeholders are correlated to the level of attribution of responsibility, which, added to the origin of the crisis, allows gauging the reputational threat. The matrix thus encourages the company to be self-critical and regard facts as they are in order to maximize the usefulness of the matrix.
In addition, as we have seen, the analysis of emotions seems to be, in theory, the most accurate thermometer of a social media crisis’ potential magnitude. Yet, pragmatically, it could not be the sole determining factor of the response strategies but rather, its rudder. Indeed, as social media dramatically increased the pace of time, a company cannot rationally wait for a full and representative analysis of their stakeholders’ emotions to decide of the response strategy. Rather, I would suggest that using one or another dimension of the matrix may quickly help determining the seriousness of the crisis and lead to an almost immediate first response (in order to acknowledge the situation) which companies then ought to tailor and adopt to the result of a more thorough analysis of their stakeholders’ emotions. It is exactly what SNCF did by reacting less than an hour after the accident and it clearly limited the negative potential of the crisis. Similarly, Skol reacted a few hours after Pri and her friend posted the critical message about their campaign. Although their post had already gone viral, they probably did not expect such a fast response from Skol, and by exchanging with them, it is likely that Skol could probe the emotional potential of the situation and react accordingly. Indeed, the first call Skol had with the two women was about understanding their concern, before responding publicly by the end of the day. In both cases, companies reacted immediately and adopted an accommodative strategy. However, when looking at the cases of the RATP or Samarco, although they reacted within a day after the breakout of the crisis, neither of them chose to respond accommodatingly by, for example, acknowledging the reality of the stakeholders’ concerns. Rather, both companies engaged in defensive posturing. In one case, the RATP hid behind the law to justify its position and was subsequently pointed out for former inconsistencies in the application of the law, which only reinforced the anger of the different stakeholders. On the other case, Samarco stubbornly claimed that the impressive mudslide was not toxic, even after a unanimous international condemnation and the release of a UN report stating the high toxicity of the waste. Samarco then engaged in numerous local humanitarian actions and pledged to pay, with its two mother-companies, the 5.2 billion dollars fine meant to restore the damaged area, hereby contradicting their original claim.

It may be hard to understand such stubbornness in both cases, for these companies may think they are well within their rights, and denial may, in their opinion, be the only way to contain the crisis and protect their image. Yet, it just shows once more than the one-to-many approach is outdated and that companies really must engage in active dialogues with their stakeholders, may these be right or wrong. To that extent, constantly gauging the “temperature” online may be a useful tool if not to prevent crises from happening, at least to react accordingly when it does in order to better contain it.
6.3 Limitations and future research

This research possesses several flaws that call for caution when analyzing the results. First of all, the multiple-case study would have been a more appropriate method to conduct this exploratory research but lack of means, time and access to corporations and consumers prevented me from engaging in it.

I instead chose to analyze six cases with secondary data, which may have led to incomplete results. In addition, as I chose to analyze both Brazilian and French cases, it would have been more rigorous to select, for each cluster, as least two cases of each country in order to make up for local and cultural factors that may have biased the results. However, I decided to focus on recent cases from two specific countries, which did limit the number of available and relevant cases when other countries may have had a more flourishing array of examples (e.g. The United States). Eventually, it is necessary to further test the matrix in a real case-study context and with a larger number of cases. In addition, the choice of very recent cases sometimes put me in a situation where the crisis was not fully resolved yet, which limits the analytical distance that we make take.

Then, as we have seen, social media crises can either be crises born on social media, or amplified by them. In this thesis, I attached myself to propose and analyze cases that were part of either category. However, it would be interesting to define and measure social media “amplification” in a more quantitative way, as my assumption on crises that I deemed “amplified” on social media was based on empirical observation.

Besides, to analyze the emotions of stakeholders, I randomly selected limited quantities of comments and submitted them to three colleagues. I then asked them to determine, for each comment, the emotion that was primarily conveyed in their opinion and according to the four emotions identified by Jin et al (2007, 2009, 2012) in the ICM model. Although the results were consistent, further research could systematize and extend the size of the samples by using code to retrieve and filter bigger quantities of data from social media, which would allow to dramatically sharpen the results. What’s more, the elaboration of such an algorithm could also benefit companies by helping them analyze in a more rigorous way the emotions of their stakeholders. In addition, I believe that there is a case for the use of predictive analytics in the field of reputation management, and online reputation management for the matter. Indeed, if companies monitored their online presence, and online conversations about them online, they could constitute a large database from which they could draw patterns, or trends. Thus, in a 2015-white paper, technology consulting firm Cognizant claimed that such
database could help companies identify particular “triggers for a particular type of consumer sentiment or online behavior during certain times of the year” or if there are “specific consumer groups that are more vocal about particular issues” (p.4). As such, future research could also focus on the opportunities offered by predictive analytics in the field of reputation management.

6.4 Concluding remarks

Eventually, the revolution brought about by social media is ongoing and far from consensual. Different schools of thoughts are already materializing in a new quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns. There are firm believers that social media is but a new tool added to the companies’ palette and which merely broadens classical business issues such as marketing, communication and risk management, and those striving to emancipate from established rules, seeing in social media a true driver of the reinvention of business models (exemplified by the “uberisation” trend) that companies must learn to navigate in order to last.

Without getting too carried away on which side may be proved right, putting corporate crises into a social media perspective seems to show that social media do change several paradigms. We went from control to agility, from hierarchy and “one-to-many” to dialoguing crowd of stakeholders and “many-to-many”, from months and days, to hours and minutes, from rational agents to emotional agents, and from shareholders and financial performance to stakeholders and reputation management.

In that regard, risks have become more diverse, more intense and more unpredictable while companies are only beginning to measure the phenomenon. The social media crisis management matrix that I suggest is yet another path for organizations towards better crisis management. I however believe this model has integrated a fundamental rule of social media, which we could describe by modernizing one of Antoine de Rivarol’s one-liner: the greatness of a company is like its reputation: it lives and breathes on the lips of others.

29 Antoine de Rivarol was a French Royalist writer and Lampoonist during the French Revolution (18th Century). His original quote reads as follow: “La grandeur d’un homme est comme sa reputation: elle vit et respire sur les lèvres d’autrui”, otherwise translated as “The greatness of a man is like his reputation: it lives and breathes on the lips of others”.
References


APPENDIX 1: Lists of the comments that were analyzed

Case 1: The RATP

Source: Twitter
Comments posted under Msg di Falco’s original Tweet

1. Michèle Alliot-Marie @MAlliotMarie 1 avr. 2015
With you @proteus2013 the persecutions of #OrientChristians outrage #UN, #EuropeanUnion, all humans...except the #RATP

2. MARY CHERBY FQSP© @MaryCherby 30 mars 2015
@proteus2013 In the name of a secularism which became no more than putting away everything related to our christian culture.

3. Poppy @Poppizzzz 30 mars 2015
@MaryCherby @proteus2013 In the name of a secularism which became no more than putting away everything related to our christian culture.

Promoting infidelity OK Benefit concert for Orient Christians NOK #ethics

5. Henri Le Roy @Henri_Le_Roy 30 mars 2015
@PFamilias @proteus2013 Anti-catholic racism

6. Jacques Centu † @JacquesCentue 31 mars 2015
@PFamilias @Henri_Le_Roy @proteus2013 this refusal of the #RATP is as if they supported the genocide of #OrientChristians

@JacquesCentue @PFamilias @proteus2013 The RATP supports the genocide of Orient Christians and adultery. This is obvious.

@proteus2013 @cmoua60 we should know that those who decide are part of the very leftist #Ratp unions...

9. MARY CHERBY FQSP© @MaryCherby 30 mars 2015
@EricChristianEP The same who are in favor of the islamic veil … @proteus2013 @cmoua60

10. Didier Houth @Houthdid77 30 mars 2015
Very shocked. I am outraged by this imbecile behavior. They show, in that way, their support to the massacres in the Orient… @proteus2013

11. france mima @francealmeria 1 avr. 2015
@proteus2013 @liberte46879517 Our country is going the wrong way. Let us wake up and rise up!

12. chouquette # NS2017 @JstLangevin 31 mars 2015
@proteus2013 They are cowards ! On the other hand there is no problem for rap music!

13. remont @SAMARIEN79 2 avr. 2015
@ericstloup @proteus2013 @GroupeRATP I don’t understand, or the time travelling machine exists and we came back to the 1940s.

14. Olivier Lecointe @OLecointe 4 avr. 2015
@proteus2013 @N_Kechichian We must understand them : they are cowards.

15. antoine nantes @antoine_nantes 30 mars 2015
@proteus2013 @PEREIRADAROCHAJ The #RATP however did not hesitate to massively display the movie « May Allah bless France” !
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. Anne-Sophie Désir @ASDesirFN78 2 avr. 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 The fundamentalist secularism of the RATP (financed by our taxes) can be very accommodating when it comes to the announcement of Rammhadan #scandal</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. Jacques CLOSTERMANN @jaclostermann 2 avr. 2015</th>
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<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 @leprincd /This country has become a real shame. What does Mr Juppé think of the RATP position?</td>
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<tr>
<th>18. Jean Louis Gerdes @Levercors 1 avr. 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 @nicdecham This RATP is unfortunately full of freemason anti-religious communists</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>19. Pascale @Neantilisme 31 mars 2015</th>
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<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 @PtdArcole Dirty RATP #DamnedLeftists</td>
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<tr>
<th>20. PADHAM AL GHAMM @rouloubac 30 mars 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 @GSevy they would have been ripped off anyway by #ChancesForFrance</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>21. I_Care @I_Care99 6 avr. 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 Christians must boycott RATP. This will leave more sits for others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>22. mum mum @mummmum55461004 4 avr. 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 SIMPLY SCANDALOUS!</td>
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<tr>
<th>23. Renaud Cfx @RenaudCfx 1 avr. 2015</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 @DominiqueReynie this is normal, we need room for @Gleeden... #idontwanttoliveonthisplanetanymore #ratp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>24. de La Bardonnie @yanndelab 31 mars 2015</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 on the other hand gleeden did not seem to cause them any worries!!!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>25. Jean Pierre Botella @jp_botella 30 mars 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@proteus2013 whatever the motivation behind it, this refusal is shocking or even vile. Charlie is already far away.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Case 2: Skol

Source: Facebook

Comments posted under Pri Ferrari’s original Facebook post

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Natalia Sousa - 11 de fevereiro às 15:41 · Curtir · 42</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO IS NO for f*ck’s sake! Destroyed!! &lt;3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Fernando Santin - 11 de fevereiro às 15:43 · Curtir · 41</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make it public so we can share it, PRI!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>3. Maria C Duflot - 11 de fevereiro às 15:43 · Curtir · 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You are soooo right!!!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>4. Mariana Rosalen - 11 de fevereiro às 16:29 · Curtir · 158</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know what’s worse...the publicist proposing this or the client approving it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Tatiana Benlo - 11 de fevereiro às 16:33 · Curtir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My God !!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>6. Andreza Alves - 11 de fevereiro às 16:36 · Curtir · 207</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>But does this ad mentions it is intended for women? At first when I saw it I thought it just meant “Do you want a beer?!“ and the person who always says no today responds ‘yes’. Please don’t judge me badly but I’m becoming way more selective regarding feminist protests. I have seen some extremism, and injustices as well.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 7. Carol Zilio - 11 de fevereiro às 16:37 · Curtir · 1 |
Someone knows from what agency it is?

8. Victoria Siqueira - 11 de fevereiro às 16:38 · Curtir · 222

Andrea the problem is that the message has a double interpretation, particularly during Carnaval as rape rates are way higher (and look it’s not just sex, many girls who pass out are being kissed without their consent) not to mention that people get drunk and blames the drink for their recklessness. This was wrong on many levels.

9. Halina Medina - 11 de fevereiro às 16:39 · Curtir · 118

Exactly, the intention does not matter, what matters it the margin for wrong interpretations!

10. Ana Maria Sena - 11 de fevereiro às 16:41 · Curtir · 124

Dude, you have already given your second idea and it’s wrong. You have to discuss the ads before putting them in the street, even more when you use “NO” (he insists on that), the same “no” that is used in anti rape campaign and even in campaigns promoting the use of condoms… this is a completely irresponsible. It’s not enough to say sorry and pretend there was no intention.

11. Fabrício Luz - 11 de fevereiro às 16:48 · Curtir · 8

Daniela, remember that we talked about machismo yesterday? Here is a trivial example of how not to do advertising.

12. Mila Alves - 11 de fevereiro às 16:49 · Curtir · 75

Actually, what Skol says is not really important. The issue is that it had a double meaning. And if it does, everyone can understand whatever they want. This is Carnival people… the world is sexist and if I were to walk in the street and a guy thought he could grab me or touch me, or anything else, and if I say no and the guy insists, am I wrong? No. I did not forget “No” at home. I brought the “never” and this is why this campaign is so wrong.

13. Stephanie Rolx - 11 de fevereiro às 16:49 · Curtir · 84

Including in this ad “accept the invite without knowing what will happen” clearly places women as an entertainment for men. Skol sucks and I think this campaign is clueless.

14. João Angelo Franco - 11 de fevereiro às 16:53 · Curtir · 35

Today, everything that has a double meaning or is open to interpretation gives this: there always will be people to see it extremely or interpret it negatively… today the world sucks Ps: I put #misandy in my post (which was later edited or removed)... I can’t even defend my own point of view...

15. Lucas Diniz Barroso - 11 de fevereiro às 16:54 · Curtir · 41

I only see yet another proof that you should read more about feminism. Extremism is pathetic too. Read more and pick fights less. Emoticon smile.

16. Ana Pinez - 11 de fevereiro às 17:01 · Curtir · 99

Can someone explain to me why there are men here who think their opinion has any value here?

17. Milena Castro - 11 de fevereiro às 17:02 · Curtir · 53

There is one of those next to my house. I’m going to vandalize it.

18. Felipe Araujo - 11 de fevereiro às 17:42 · Curtir · 5

As a publicist, I’m shocked to read this. You’ll realize the agency created this in a totally different context from what you think. What if “no” referred to cachça? Or “no” for the next round of beers. Remember: there is a tagline with the word « never ».

19. Victoria Siqueira - 11 de fevereiro às 17:50 · Editado · Curtir · 41

I don’t doubt that the campaign had another focus that was not the apology of rape (as a matter of fact, it would be a crime). However, it can infer many things and leave room for
double interpretation, particularly during a time of the year very tight to sex, promiscuity and flirting. In any case: it is wrong, and it is a fail.

20. André Kenji De Sousa - 11 de fevereiro às 17:49 · Curtir · 61
As political advisor for republicans in the US Frank Lutz said, communication is not about what you say. It’s about what people hear.

21. Elisangela Agostini - 11 de fevereiro às 18:14 · Curtir · 8
I loved your intervention. The concern is so real and esthetically, it was better than their original idea.

22. Juliana Lapp
I think it is funny to only see men defending the ad and the pane, trying to change the focus when the topic is so serious, either rape or sexual abuse and particularly for a brand promoting alcoholic beverage. This type of campaign is absurd, and the fact that there are people who don’t see why is only one of the reasons why. That’s it! Smart intervention in cautiousless ads should be common. I applaud you.

23. Julia Andrade - 11 de fevereiro às 18:32 · Curtir · 24
I’m laughing so much at some of the comments, jesuuus. There are many men who seem to know about feminism…much more than women, and who think they can have an opinion.

24. Karoline Pierre - 11 de fevereiro às 18:36 · Curtir · 28
Attitude more than adequate. I’m tired of these ads with double meaning, encouraging violence on anyone. Congrats, girls! I’m with you. ;)

25. Lucas Guarnieri - 11 de fevereiro às 18:37 · Curtir · 67
What a shame. As a publicist I swear to never do such a thing during my career.

26. Bela Della Corte - 11 de fevereiro às 18:50 · Curtir · 22
And here comes Skol f*cking up with women one more time.

27. Renata Persicheto - 11 de fevereiro às 18:53 · Curtir · 92
Men did not see apology of rape so there is no apology of rape. Come on! Seems like you don’t know that who makes the rules on women’s body are men ugh.

Source: Facebook
Comments posted under the SNCF Facebook post from July 14, 2013 announcing the accident

1. Melody Ksiazkiewicz - Like · Reply · 3 · July 14, 2013 at 10:43am
I take my train everyday from this station…be brave everyone.

2. Nicolas Chaubard - Like · Reply · 3 · July 17, 2013 at 11:02am
Hi. I’m just looking for a place where to congratulate the SNCF services for the replacement circuits they proposed for the RER C. I usually complain (after all, I’m French) but in this case, longer or not, I could reach my destination with many agents to help me through my trip. Good Job Guys!

3. Mina M’Liyan - Like · Reply · 3 · July 14, 2013 at 11:08am
Thoughts for the victims and their families.

4. Xela Iloisiv - Like · Reply · 5 · July 14, 2013 at 10:34am
I heard that a « slice bar » in the track points could have caused this tragedy…I’m perplexed…

5. Jean-pierre Campolini - Like · Reply · July 14, 2013 at 10:51am

Case 3 – The SNCF
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commenter</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xela Iloisiv</td>
<td>July 14, 2013 at 11:02am</td>
<td>I work at the rail signalling department...and I don’t really see how a slice bar could have caused the derailment...although I know the network is obsolete...but well... I hope we will have answers...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rémy LiLi</td>
<td>July 14, 2013 at 11:07am</td>
<td>Let the BEA-TT do their job, only they will get the real and definitive answer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xela Iloisiv</td>
<td>July 14, 2013 at 11:07am</td>
<td>I only hope we will find out what it’s all about.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bres Pierre</td>
<td>July 14, 2013 at 11:36am</td>
<td>Accident or criminal act?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benoit Occitan</td>
<td>July 14, 2013 at 11:37am</td>
<td>Criminal act or malevolence is almost impossible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurélien Gn</td>
<td></td>
<td>As a regular customer of the SNCF, particularly of the RER C line, I have personally faced many issues due to the poor maintenance of your infrastructures. Breakdowns of all kinds, late trains or simply suppressed during rush hour...as a result I’m often late at work which causes me problems. However, I have noticed an increase in the number of ticket inspectors so that you can make more money, to the detriment of services for customers, your counters are always closed, the ticket machines never work (Gare des Grésillons etc...) . so yeah my impression is that the SNCF does not do its work so way they should and think PROFIT before anything else. Trains are obsolete and yet, I pay 84 euros of Navigo subscription, so I consider that I’m not treated the way I deserve. Many other customers feel prejudiced like me. I’m absolutely not surprised to see such a catastrophe It’s not like you were not warned! An customer who has been unhappy for a long time! (no need to delete my post, I screenshot it). This is what we call a bad buzz! So just a piece of advice: take planese, cars, bikes...anything but the SNCF!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Tourret</td>
<td>July 21, 2013 at 7:28am</td>
<td>What if that accident was premeditated? A slice bar can’t unscrew like that; or it has never be screwed. What’s more in the middle of the point!! So what precision? And then we talk about pillaging? Would not that be a modern attack of a diligence? Even more so that bands of people are already pirating through the RERs without punishment. Lots of questions??? But I don’t believe in an accidental unscrewing of the slice bar. Salutations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrien Elba</td>
<td></td>
<td>As a train lover, my thoughts are to the victims of this accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruno Faure</td>
<td></td>
<td>TRAIN ACCIDENT AT BRETIGNY What was to happen happened...circulating on aging networks at the entrance of train stations with a speed of 137Km/h does not shock anyone? Networks suffer more of high speed than low speed. When, meanwhile, customers transported like cattle on trains circulating with incredible speed on suburb networks are fined to ensure their security by agents of the SUGE who mistreat you, hold you in custody and then bring you to the criminal court. As I say: what goes around comes around. It’s that Guillaume Pepy who should question himself and crying won’t bring back the dead. This is all comedy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecilia Coppier</td>
<td>July 14, 2013 at 12:25pm</td>
<td>To families mourning and to the wounded: be brave...kisses for everyone ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Mosesmax</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
I’m with the victims with all my heart and the people taking the train in that station, be brave!!

17. Jenny Jenn' - Like · Reply · 2 · July 17, 2013 at 12:00am

Quentin bontet, I have one thing to say: congrats! You’ve summed up the unease in our company, that no one outside can see…mutual help is being lost alas, such a beautiful speech!!!

18. Julien Chauvineau - Like · Reply · 3 · July 15, 2013 at 7:09pm

Instead of striking for anything, you better had checked the railways !!! Ah for striking there is a crowd but to check the railways (your Job) there is no one!!!

19. Henry Thodd - Like · Reply · 2 · July 14, 2013 at 11:34am

Let’s support them with our prayers.

20. Anne Marie - Like · Reply · 1 · July 16, 2013 at 2:32pm

I’d like to thank the train driver of Limoges for having switched on the alarm signal. He thus avoided that the train from Toulouse, and in which was my son, to crash into the train! The Toulouse train stopped at 10 m said my son.

21. Tristan Bachelard - Like · Reply · 1 · July 14, 2013 at 7:06pm

Tribute to the victims

22. Anne Claire

Tribute and big thought to all the victims, the families and the emergency services !!!

23. Frederic Cornilleau - Like · Reply · July 15, 2013 at 2:37am

If the networks are «tired» you don’t drive at 140km/h. Sincere condolences to the victims’families.

24. Laeticia Rimpault - Like · Reply · July 14, 2013 at 11:41am

Accident for me. Impossible malevolence act.

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**Case 4 – The Samarco crisis**

Source: Facebook
Comments posted under Samarco’s video of the CEO

1. Letiene Dos Santos Santos - Curtir · Responder · 3 · 6 de novembro de 2015 às 19:41

The environment is the victim of salvage capitalism.

2. Elizete Lima Renner Rotta - Curtir · Responder · 8 · 6 de novembro de 2015 às 20:13

It was not a natural disaster, but a lack of competence!

3. Joao Luis Chagas - Curtir · Responder · 5 · 6 de novembro de 2015 às 20:24

The gentlemen should pay more attention to the communities of this region. This mine has been operating for years causing a huge environmental impact, uncontrolled migration for those communities (along with other mines) and as usual, no resource is given back to these people. The offsets that you offer to the districts like Bento Rodrigues and Antonio Pereira (which is in the upper part of the dam) are ridiculous and indecent.

4. Robson Willian - Curtir · Responder · 2 · 6 de novembro de 2015 às 20:39

The government collects so much money, but turns a blind eye to what happens there.

5. Jose Antonio Rodrigues Jr - Curtir · Responder · 8 · 6 de novembro de 2015 às 22:46

Man! He earns a fortune to read a frivolous speech written by a communication advisor. If you want to give the guy a pat on the shoulder at least go public and say what you think !!! This "political correctness" is disgusting! He looks like a puppet ... ridiculous, artificial! And as you need to know: Every accident can be avoided !!!
6. Juliana L G Cruz - Curtir ·Responder ·4 ·6 de novembro de 2015 às 22:54
Well ... Only the poor are punished in this country, thousands of people will die, and the greed and unbridled ambition of some will cause further tragedies. The MP has recommended several adjustments; the government has turned a blind eye, and wants to give amnesty to the companies. I do not want to condemn the government of "now"; in Minas there have been breaches of dams and the other governments did nothing. Because they are shareholders. Because they enrich themselves along with these miners! MG can't take it anymore! The environment is destroyed. There will be nothing left! Hopefully a meteor will fall and lead to the end of the world, since here everything is wrong and no one does anything!

7. Higino Rossi- Curtir ·Responder ·5 ·6 de novembro de 2015 às 23:15
Small businesses came to rob the city of Mariana, and enslave our people, VALE of RIO DOCE, SAMARCO means the slavery of the people of Minas Gerais.... not only do they destroy nature but they also put our people at risk.... Take your gargabe and go away .... slavery is over!!!

8. Thiago Dutra E Silva - Curtir ·Responder ·7 ·6 de novembro de 2015 às 23:21
And when does Samarco plan to pay for every life lost? For every history erased and for each landscape destroyed?

9. Alexandre Santos - Curtir ·Responder ·5 ·7 de novembro de 2015 às 00:02
Very good Mr Chairman who wrote this speech, I would like to know: if the family of each of you were in this village, would you have done it the same way? I believe not, because your efforts are now useless. How many children will be left without their parents, the money of samarco will not bring back a life, and our government representatives allowed such an absurdity !!!! Where are these authorities now ?

10. Edson Aguiar- Curtir ·Responder ·9 ·7 de novembro de 2015 às 00:14
You guys have a 2013 report saying it would happen and did nothing, and worse, the public power has entered the club and stayed silent... nothing will happen now, as always, bullshit

11. Monica Santos Oliveira - Curtir ·Responder ·1 ·7 de novembro de 2015 às 00:36
Terrible...

12. Márcio Amaral - Curtir ·Responder ·5 ·7 de novembro de 2015 às 01:29
What will be left of Minas Gerais when there will be no iron mineral left?

13. Matheus Lima - Curtir ·Responder ·3 ·7 de novembro de 2015 às 01:54
The samarco company is giving the utmost attention to all, unfortunately the company cannot do the impossible, most of the people concerned are already provided with mobile homes etc

14. Carlos Machado - Curtir ·Responder ·5 ·7 de novembro de 2015 às 03:19
Disgusted to live in a state that is called MINAS Gerais ...It is a sad fate to sell cheap mineral that costs human lives and environmental degradation.

15. Alexson Mozer - Curtir ·Responder ·9 ·7 de novembro de 2015 às 08:37 ·Editado
Unfortunately tragedies happen either by human error or natural causes, criticizing the company that does so much for Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo is merely ignorance and lack of knowledge of what Samarco Mineração represents for so many other families who are mourning over the tragedy, let us think it over before talking nonsense. Before you call me names, as I say, I am not an employee of the company, I have hundreds of friends there and I cheer for each of them, I fight.

16. Rodrigo Silva- Curtir ·Responder ·2 ·7 de novembro de 2015 às 08:49
Group of murderers ...
### 17. Santa Luzia
Curtir · Responder · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 09:01

When it comes to the safety of people, employees or the neighborhood, companies should not limit their efforts to make stronger acts to prevent these tragedies. Although Samarco did not wish for this event to happen, its image suffers from it in the society.

### 18. Roberto Machado
- Curtir · Responder · 4 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 12:00

What is the use of “requirements of critical activities”, many procedures like using EPI to wash their hands and FISPQ as a bottle of neutral detergent, if in the end such catastrophes often happen?

### 19. Cristian Bichara
- Curtir · Responder · 4 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 12:28

Go away mining companies we don’t need you. They have been tearing our land and sending our wealth abroad for 350 years. Go away mining companies. Useless filthy business for the society.

### 20. Amanda Leandro Quinteiro Lopes
Curtir · Responder · 3 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 13:15

The tragedy was announced. Damage and more damage to the population and the environment.

### 21. Juliana Lima
- Curtir · Responder · 2 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 13:28

You just want to make more money but now the stakes are to know who and where the victims are

### 22. Julio Marques
- Curtir · Responder · 1 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 13:48

Containment of environmental damage? You already destroyed everything, and it's not news!

### 23. Mauro Filho
- Curtir · Responder · 5 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 14:05 · Editado

Besides the way he reads his text, his body language tells that he is not fully telling the truth. It's a shame that a company of this magnitude has not the necessary care to deal with something as dangerous as a tailings dam, but I'm sure the pockets of shareholders and of the board are full of money.

### 24. Kátia Mesquita
- Curtir · Responder · 10 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 17:37

Samarco is responsible for this tragedy and it is its duty to solve the suffering of this people immediately!

### 25. Ilas Sousa
- Curtir · Responder · 5 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 18:18

I disagree!! that Samarco is to blame, when all the responsible are guilty, incmuding our states, that give authorizations. I worked at the Samarco company from 1994-1996 and know that it is a great company, what are your critiques? Why is it that, after the tragedy, helicopters appear to be flying over Bento Rodrigues with many powerful people, why couldn’t they have inspected the dam along with Samarco? The people from Bento Rodrigues suffers and pays for that. Now if it were them I would have been too embarrassed to fly over it, because they came too late but God will give a lot of luck to the people of Bento Rodrigues.

### 26. Kirk Moabra
- Curtir · Responder · 8 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 18:29

THIS IS THE RESULT OF WHAT IS DONE HASTILY? THIS IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THERE ARE BIG PROJECTS OR CORRUPTION AND A LACK OF PLANNING !!!! THE CORRUPTED GOVERNMENT IS INVOLVED !!!!

### 27. Sabrina Martins
- Curtir · Responder · 4 · 7 de novembro de 2015 às 20:57

They already knew the risk! Lives were lost by greed ... unfortunate and revolting!
Case 5: AirFrance

Source: Youtube

Comments on the video depicting the two executives fleeing and climbing onto the fence

1. arl Afa il y a 2 mois
Real violence is misery, repression, layoffs and corporate harassment. It’s the corruption, scandal and expensive living! A ripped off shirt is nothing next to that. Class support with people from AirFrance and, actually, one day all these bastards who spit on us will pay the price for their criminal behavior.

2. Jack Simons il y a 2 mois
It just makes me want to do the same thing everywhere else.

3. MrZobiwan il y a 2 mois
This treatment is the only one the high ranking people deserve; these bastards sit on golden throne while real workers risk their job and life for their company. And if there is even the smallest problem, they still have their golden parachutes, or their full bank account filled up by years of bonuses and skullduggery.

4. Damien Houel il y a 2 mois
When listening to some, one should give the cheek to keep being slapped (I could use ruder words but I’m staying polite). For years we have been asking employees more and more efforts: work more for the same income, increasing length of contribution for retirement pensions beyond 42 installments (of which we won’t see anything), Sunday work, simplified labor laws to facilitate layoffs, challenged long term contracts…and then we also hear that big bosses are leaving their companies after two years with compensations reaching 20 million Euros (for example Alcatel). Inequalities have never been so wide but the rich do not yet feel the wind of revolt from high up in their ivory towers. The powder keg is dry, let’s just wait for the general spark.

5. Garcia jose il y a 1 mois
Such a political and media outcry! I find the unions very very nice towards this executive board of bastards. Brave employees, keep kowtowing… as long as fear will not have changed side, nothing will change!...

6. LUDOVIC.R il y a 1 mois
What beautiful propaganda against future unemployed people. I would be interesting to know the causes of these employees’ anger and what the behavior of the man who lost his shirt was to provoke such anger.

7. Hfeg Kgedegil y a 2 mois
Such a beautiful thing. They should hang him.

8. Alienkisse il y a 2 mois
Valls (French Prime Minister) who claims to be shocked by this violence ^^ but this is only the beginning dumb f*ck, you treat people like pig to give money to banks and shareholders, you extort from citizens as soon as they climb in their cars, there is no project for the future of our country but to obey to the US by launching bombs where we are told to. Once again we want to hit on the unemployed because they should be responsible for outsourcing, the rise of terrorism, global warming, everything is the citizens’fault who by the shitty product they are producing (polluting and made in China etc.). All of this is the people’s fault who are told to consume, get loans, kill themselves at work etc. It’s been a while that is country is governed by greedy and corrupted mafiosos and they are surprised by the results…You have not seen anything yet, blinded by your arrogance.

9. Brochet Vincent il y a 1 mois
Take off your shirt! Take off your shirt! Take off your shirt! A bit of Zebda, it’s nostalgic.

[Note from the author: Take off your shirt or “Tomber la chemise” is a famous song in France and Vincent is making a pun out of it]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. cosaque molov il y a 2 mois</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>haaa!! Here I see the soul of the French people again!! bravo!!</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. Iskander Mansour. il y a 2 mois</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNEMPLOYMENT IS A SOCIAL VIOLENCE!!!!</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. Sechet La Chaîne il y a 1 mois</th>
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<tr>
<td>The new video clip from the Human Resource Director of AirFrance on Youtube: « Take your shirt off – the new video clip from the HRD of AirFrance »</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. Pascal G il y a 1 mois</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I’m sick of corrupted media! We are talking about VIOLENCE. Can’t get sick leave in a tribunal because a ripped off shirt is nothing. For people thrown in the street, poverty, broken lives and probably dead people, isn’t that violence? AirFrance wants to make profits with low-cost…absurd because the added value is minimal. Strategic mistakes are not to bet on high end market, with private jets for some trips and passengers as societies like the Emirates do it with lots of subventions. Problems come from business management. The Executives are incapable of investing anywhere else than in the dividends of their shareholders. Beyond this, this video is the Medef’s tool to break the credibility of unions and destroy the labor laws. And by the way, how many jobs did it create with the billions from the CICE and fiscal gifts? Subsidize if you want to pay low!! GREAT!!</td>
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<th>14. rima1815 il y a 1 mois</th>
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<tr>
<td>We should show this video to all the foreign investors: 1) do not invest in this country (mostly?) made of idiots, 2) Let’s see how they manage without bosses and CEOs 3) Airdrop new shirts so that they can still have fun together</td>
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<th>15. Boybakar il y a 1 mois</th>
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<tr>
<td>They have what they deserve…they almost got lynched?!!!...we are playing with words when these people just ripped off the shirts of these crooked men. Take your shirt off!!! Hahaha</td>
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<tr>
<th>16. Patrice Buhours il y a 2 mois</th>
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<tr>
<td>I HAVE NEVER BEEN ON BOSSES‘SIDES AND OTHER HUSTLERS? MUCH TO THE CONTRARY BUT IF YOU KEEP PUSHING IT THEN IT BURSTS!!! EVEN MORE SO THAT THEY HAVE NOTHING TO COMPLAIN ABOUT!!! COMPARED TO WORKERS IN FACTORIES!!! YOU REAP WHAT YOU SOW!!!</td>
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<tr>
<th>17. Charles Dupont il y a 2 mois</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 YEARS OF JAIL FOR WANTING TO LAY OFF 3000 EMPLOYEES BECAUSE IN REALITY IT WILL AFFECT MORE THAN 8000 ALREADY IN POOR CONDITIONS SO JAIL THE BOSS OR HANG HIM FOR ENDANGERING THE LIFE OF OTHERS !! STOP PROGRAMMED POVERTY BY HOLLANDUSS SARKOPLUSS MERKULUSS STOP TO THE EUROPE OF MISERY POVERTY AND EXPENSIVE LIVING BECAUSE IT’S GONNA END BADLY FOR SURE!!! 20000 UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE IN SEPTEMBER IT’S ENOUGH, STOP AUSTERITY BAND OF BASTARDS!!</td>
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<th>18. Newik Enzo il y a 1 mois</th>
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<tr>
<td>SICK OF YOU AND YOUR GOVERNEMENT BE PREPARED, YES YOU!!! THE REVOLUTION IS SPREADING</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>19. Jean-Marie Ricci il y a 2 mois</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t let them hurt you! Fight!!! When we see the CEO of PSA Varin retires with 21 million euros for the next 25 years!! Put a limit to the salary of directors if you want to save money!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2,900 people are going to lose their job. France is a small city.

20. Steevenoo il y a 1 mois
If I were in the Head of HR shoes I’d defend my staff but most people are cowards!

Comments about the video AirFrance released during the crisis to reassure stakeholders

1. Hugo Capocci il y a 1 mois
When you mistaken a corporate movie to broadcast during a meeting and TV publicity spot for the public…xD

2. Quentin b il y a 1 mois
Omg even on North Korean official photos the smiles are less dark.

3. Marc Albano il y a 1 mois
How much does it cost to make such a shallow video?

4. Polak il y a 1 mois
What’s your editing software? movie maker?

5. Romain BENOIT il y a 1 mois
AirFrance is too expensive!!!

6. Grégory Delaunay il y a 1 mois
Look for the video: « CEO air France, favourable to child work » and you’ll see another face of Air France…

7. D Mijoule il y a 1 mois
This video is a shame. Is Airfrance afraid to lose customers for a ripped off shirt? What will make me avoid the company is the image of this employee who was trying to pass on a message to her directors who did not even cared to look at her (seen on the web, don’t look for it on our national channels). This attitude is unfortunately what characterizes our directors, who live in a world apart without connection to the reality.

8. Joëlle Blanquet il y a 1 mois
This communication video seems to be in another universe than that of internal dialogue at Air France !! Events of Monday made me wonder what the causes are of such a degraded dialogue : Head of RH undressed but not beaten. After looking into it, I found an important increase of the CEO’s salary, the difficult dialogue with pilots and their priviledges and eventually, the non dialogue with the 2,900 layoffs En cherchant, j’ai trouvé l’augmentation de salaire importante du PDG, le dialogue difficile mais réalisé avec les pilotes et leurs priviligés et finalement le non dialogue avec l'annonce de 2900 postes supprimés dont la plupart au sol. En cas de crise il faudrait éviter les indécences de salaires et de privilèges sinon cela devient rellement difficile pour le dialogue social.

9. Charles Ignace de FRONTIGNAC il y a 1 mois
At AirFrance, I smile to get my paycheck at the end of the month because I’m lucky enough not to be laid off…for now!

10. kimHsungBitch il y a 1 mois
As regular AirFrance customer on long haul flights, I wish you were not treating your staff this way ! More than 3,000 layoffs, for what? To comfort shareholders! I'm just gonna change my airline company for my next trips...AND THANKS FOR NO LONGER SENDING ME YOUR SHITTY PROPAGANDA EMAILS !!!!!!!!!!

11. Iikahouane il y a 1 mois
I can’t wait for a parody of this video, it could be fun.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>12. BIODUN AMUSAN il y a 1 mois</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air France is a heartless organization and out to cheat their numerous customers. I purchased a return ticket from Nigeria to London via Amsterdam on 4th August to return 21st August. My hand luggage was stolen in London with my passport and visa. I obtained an emergency travelling certificate from Nigerian High Commission office in London. Air France refused to board me because their flight is through Amsterdam. My ticket was not endorsed to another airline and no refund of my return ticket. I had to borrow money from a friend to purchase a direct flight ticket through Arik air. Nemesis will continue to haunt AIR FRANCE.</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>13. Mats Berglund il y a 1 mois</strong></th>
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<td>I am swedish and you send me an e-mail in english to tell me you can't handle your emotions and attach a video in french that I cannot understand...?! You need a crash course in communication. For the record I stopped flying with AF when you had your strike last year.</td>
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<th><strong>14. Laurent Mandement il y a 1 mois</strong></th>
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<td>Air France, it’s the company whose CEO pretends to fight « social rights for social rights », the company whose CEO, rather than bettering the structure to optimize the work time of every employee (which he apparently does not know how to do anyway), would rather use the simple and easy solution that consists in lowering salaries or increase working hours. What if employees disagree? Well r. de Juniac lay them off ! &quot;what you have seen on Monday is not the true face of AirFrance ». Much to the contrary, on Monday we saw 2,900 layoffs, on Monday we saw executives openly mocking employees in distress and displaying their indifference to an employee asking for explanations. On Monday the truth was revealed. What we saw on Monday, it’s a company ruled by people who deserve way more than a simple ripped off shirt. When you decide to DESTROY THE LIFE of 2,900 people for fallacious reasons, you deserve way worse than simple bedlam.</td>
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<th><strong>15. NicosOct il y a 1 mois</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*This video was offered to you by AirFrance and its partner Xanax® taken by all Airfrance employees  *Xanax® try it and you’ll adopt it! Thanks who? Thanks Xanax®</td>
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<th><strong>16. William il y a 1 mois</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>NO, AirFrance…it’s you..and YOU must fix this. However, this post-crisis communication…I really think we can suggest you another communication agency 😊 seriously AIR FRANCE, tell me this was not your sole idea to communicate?</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>17. Will Maurer il y a 1 mois</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Air France, it’s also 2,900 employees who won’t even be able to afford one of our Paris-Brest airplane ticket, it’s a media manipulation which makes us forget the heart of the problem.</td>
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**Case 6 – Coca Cola**

Source : Youtube
Comments posted under the R7 report on Youtube

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<tr>
<th><strong>1. Caê Roberto Silva il y a 2 ans</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>People, seriously: Record + Universal = manipulation. For God’s sake, from what I perceived, most of the comments are against the channel, the two dirtiest channels that are Rede Bobo (globo) and Universal (Record). This is all bullshit, one supports the government and the other stains our country, oh my god when is it gonna stop.</td>
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<th><strong>2. Pedro Marte il y a 2 ans</strong></th>
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<td>For those who did not understand the video or did not pay attention, he bought a pack of 6 bottles. He opened one, took a sip and got hurt because there was POISONED from a rat. Consequently, it’s the rat that hurt him. He kept unopened one of the bottles. One was handed</td>
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out to experts and the others were destroyed by Coca Cola who visited him. Record did not invent this, there has been a judicial process going on for 13 years.

### 3. Marcelo Mohring il y a 2 ans

@Isabel Pinto, he bought a pack of 6 bottles and as such all were infected. WAKE UP BRAZIL, COCA COLA IS THE MOST CONSUMED SODA IN THE WORLD. HOW MANY MORE PEOPLE ARE NECESSARY FOR THE MISTAKE TO BE CORRECTED. WILSON IS RIGHT, COMPENSATION IS NOT MEANT TO ENRICH YOU, IT ONLY SERVES TO MAKE THE SUBSTANCE BETTER AND FOR THESE MISTAKES NOT TO END WITH THE LIVES OF OTHER PEOPLE;

### 4. Valéria Viviani il y a 2 ans

Haha, what I like the most is he drank the rat’ poison but there still is the rat’s head in the bottle, do you have shit in your head? Coca sucks for various reasons but you are stupid to believe this…seriously.

### 5. Wander1011000 il y a 2 ans

I’m stupid but how can a rat enter a bottle this size, and why would Coke put a rat? It can be fake coke.

### 6. HARLLEY MELO il y a 2 ans en réponse à Eduardo Alves

But “for 13 years, walking has been difficult. WORKING? IMPOSSIBLE.” How come he walks past his school every day to go to work if he actually does not work? And then, a rat’s head would not remain intact for such a long time and even if it did, it would not have “thick hair”. This story is very obscure, and so is the explanation

### 7. Alyson GG il y a 2 ans

So he had coca cola…out of the millions that have been made, only his bottle was absolutely poisonous…come on, please…

### 8. Keyssin William il y a 2 ans

HAHAHAHAHAH, omg what a shame this video, my god this coke is better than formol, it kept the rat in full shape until now in the bottle, and after thirteen years, hahaha, you can say anything but who can believe it … this is the worst video I’ve ever seen, but oh well…what would not be done to get some money…

### 9. Daniélio Araujo il y a 2 ans

This story is bad! One sip only destroys the guy from the inside, but the rat head is in perfect state after thirteen years?! I say no.

### 10. Crioucris corintiano il y a 2 ans

This is crazy, coca cola must take responsibility this guy deserves full support.

### 11. Iuri de Melo Ferreira il y a 2 ans

Honestly, not to doubt the guy but I think this story is very strange… Record channel has a history of problems with various companies after which they burst a bomb. Everyone knows that Record attempted to get the rights for the World Cup of 2014 and that, even though they paid more they lost to Globo, and Coca Cola is sponsoring the world cup for the upcoming year. I’m not doubting the suffering but Record, unfortunately, is a bit biased.

### 12. Artur Guimaraes il y a 2 ans

Who here has died having Coca Cola?

### 13. Ramon Bolsoni il y a 2 ans

I pause at 1:50, I’m gonna fetch myself a glass of iced coke.

### 14. Daniélio Araujo il y a 2 ans
If a tooth remained immersed in a glass of coke it will be disintegrated within 3 days, how can a rat head remain in a bottle for 13 years?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>15. Vanessa kremer il y a 2 ans</th>
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<tr>
<td>But this guy must be dumb to buy a rotted coke and buy one with a rat head inside hahah are you serious people</td>
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<tr>
<th>16. Eliézer Torres il y a 2 ans</th>
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<td>Now i’m wondering how, 「HOW」 the head and only the rat 「head」 went inside the bottle? It’s hard to explain ' - '</td>
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<tr>
<th>17. ZzbootMasterBRzZ tenorio il y a 2 ans</th>
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<tr>
<td>Thank god we have the right of opinion, everyone think what they want. I don’t consume coca cola anymore, I prefer fruit juices…There are so many different flavors and colors that we can’t even describe.</td>
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<th>18. Dalto Santos il y a 2 ans</th>
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<td>This guy is ill, physically and mentally, and he has been used by some company and a band of bastard lawyers to tarnish the image of Coca Cola. I don’t drink coke, I prefer Guarana but honestly, this story is so poorly told…and the judicial process is not working because lawyers and the accuser did not attend the hearings. Look, if the guy is all obsessed with the possibility to get his hands on big money to get treatment, why would he not go to the hearings?</td>
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<th>19. Yanes Sandes il y a 2 ans</th>
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<td>I don’t get it, if coke was corrosive then the rat would not remain 13 years in the bottle…I’m thinking there is something fishy going on…</td>
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<th>20. JoãoPaulo il y a 2 ans</th>
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<td>Well, I just want to say… the coke he had burnt him inside, but the rat head did not burn even though it remained more than 10 years in a supposed acid liquid? Hahaha, people are so retarded that they would believe anything. On Youtube there have many videos teaching you how to change the content of a bottle without violating the seal. Of course the lawyer won’t abandon him: if he wins the lawsuit against the company, he will get a part of the compensations</td>
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<tr>
<th>21. Feliperox07 il y a 2 ans</th>
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<td>I think this is very poorly told. First off: coca cola is acid, this rat head should have already been dissolved since a long time. You guys have seen what happens to a bone that stays inside a coca cola bottle for a week? Second, the bottle neck is a little over an inch in diameter. This rat head is bigger. It could only have been pounded inside to enter. This story is sooo bad…</td>
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