THE RISK OF FALLING INTO THE ACCELERATION TRAP DURING A PRIVATIZATION PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF A EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANY

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Dissertation presented to Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo of Fundação Getulio Vargas, as a requirement to obtain the title of Master in International Management (MPGI).

Knowledge Field: Leadership

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Jaci Corrêa Leite

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Julien Montcel
Disclaimer

To ensure the confidentiality of the company on which the case study of the thesis is based on, the real name of the company has not been used. Any similarity or direct or indirect reference to any existing company or organization shall not be considered as a public statement or an opinion made either by the author of the thesis toward such company.
Abstract

The privatization of a company is a disruptive shift that generally coincides with the end of a monopoly position and the subsequent entry into the competitive game. The challenges that it raises are so arduous that they tend to lead the leadership to execute massive corporate changes. Yet, the literature shows that many of them fail. In fact, those plans envisage abrupt and severe changes that tend to push the privatized company into the acceleration trap: a type of organizational burnout where the exhaustion and the resignation of the workforce affect dramatically the performance of the company. The thesis has therefore focused on studying the link between a privatization process and the risk of falling into the acceleration trap.

An initial investigation into the corporate change literature has permitted to design a preliminary theoretical framework, which has suggested the existence of two moderators of the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap: a cultural clash and a weak transformational leadership climate.

Then, a single case study - based on a European telecommunication company and driven through a non-purely inductive approach – has confirmed but also deepened the understanding of the action of those two moderators.

Regarding the cultural clash moderator, the data analysis of the company’s case study shows the importance played by not only a corporate identity conflict but also by a management identity clash.

With regard to the weak transformational leadership climate moderator, the data analysis highlights the role of lack of trust in the new management but also of job sense, particularly through a loss of proudness.

Finally, it also derives from the data analysis that the non-acceptance of the new incentive system also significantly affects the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap by contributing to both a cultural clash and a weak transformational leadership climate.

Key-words

A privatização de uma empresa é uma mudança empresarial disruptiva que geralmente coincide com o fim de uma posição de monopólio e da subsequente entrada num ambiente competitivo. Os desafios que a privatização coloca são tão árduos que eles levam muitas vezes a liderança (leadership) para executar planos ambiciosos de mudança empresarial. No entanto, a literatura mostra que muitos deles falharam. Na verdade, esses planos preveem mudanças bruscas e importantes que tendem a empurrar a empresa privatizada na armadilha de aceleração (acceleration trap). Um tipo de “burnout organizacional” (organizational burnout) onde a exaustão e a resignação da força de trabalho afetam drasticamente o desempenho da empresa. A tese, portanto, focalizou em estudar a ligação entre um processo de privatização e o risco de cair na armadilha de aceleração.

Uma investigação preliminar sobre a literatura das mudanças empresariais permitiu a concepção de um quadro preliminar teórico que sugere a existência de dois moderadores (moderators) deste relacionamento entre um processo de privatização e a armadilha de aceleração: um “choque cultural” (cultural clash) e um “fraco clima de liderança transformacional” (weak transformational leadership).

Em seguida, um estudo de caso - baseado numa empresa de telecomunicações europeia e conduzido através de uma abordagem metodológico não puramente indutivo (non-purely inductive approach) - confirma, mas também aprofunda a compreensão da ação desses dois moderadores.

A respeito do moderador “choque cultural” (cultural clash moderator), a análise de dados do estudo de caso da empresa de telecomunicações europeia mostra a importância exercitado tanto por um “choque de identidade corporativa” (corporate identity conflict) como por um “conflito de identidade gerencial” (management identity conflict).

Quanto ao moderador “fraco liderança transformacional”, a análise dos dados destaca o papel da “falta de confiança na nova gerência” (lack of trust in the new management), mas também de “sentido do trabalho” (lack of job sense), principalmente através da perda de “orgulho no trabalho” (loss of proudness).

Finalmente, a análise dos dados salienta que a “não aceitação do novo sistema de incentivos” (non-acceptance of the new incentive system) afeta significativamente a relação entre a privatização e a armadilha de aceleração, contribuindo tanto para um “choque cultural” como para um “fraco clima de liderança transformacional”.

Palavras-chave

Mudança empresarial – Privatização – Armadilha de aceleração – Choque cultural – Liderança transformacional (transformational leadership) – Choque de identidade corporativa – Conflito de identidade gerencial - Falta de confiança na nova gerência – Falta de sentido no trabalho (lack of job sense) – Perda de orgulho no trabalho (loss of proudness)
Disclaimer

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Any similarity or direct or indirect reference to a real company is fortuitous and shall not be considered as a public statement or an opinion made by either the author of the thesis herein or the FGV-EAESP toward such company.
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1. **INTRODUCTION**

1.1. **THE RISK OF FALLING INTO THE ACCELERATION TRAP WHEN IMPLEMENTING A PRIVATIZATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL AND RESEARCH RELEVANCE**

The 4\textsuperscript{th} Railway Package announced in January 2013 by the European Commission predicts new series of privatizations within the European transportation market. Such phenomenon implies critical challenges in terms of corporate transformation. During the last two decades, the European competition law or other anti-trust regulations have triggered a profound restructuring among many state-owned companies. The opening to competition of their formerly protected markets has forced them to promptly enter into the competitive game. Ambitious change management plans have accordingly followed. However, many of them have led to an organizational burnout rapidly after having being implemented (Probst, 2005).

Although change management is a continuous process of renewing an organization’s direction, structure, and capabilities to address internal and external pressures (Moran & Brightman, 2001), change is often unpredictable, reactive, discontinuous, and triggered by an organizational crisis (Burnes, 2004). Hence, only 30% of corporate change programs reach their objectives according to a McKinsey & Company’s survey conducted among 1,546 business executives (Keller & Aiken, 2009). In fact, the pace, the range, and the toughness of a corporate change are likely to push the company into the acceleration trap (Zaugg, 2002). A common type of organizational failure where the exhaustion and the resignation of the workforce affect dramatically the performance, efficiency, employee productivity, and retention rate of the company (Bruch & Menges, 2010). The overloading, the multi-loading, or the perpetual-loading of the employees caused by uninterrupted over-accelerated efforts made when implementing a corporate change are the most common syndromes of such organizational disease (Bruch & Menges, 2010).

Hence, similar organizational issues are likely to be even stronger when executing a massive corporate change. In fact, after a period of excessive growth or accelerated change to execute a corporate reshuffle, the probability to burn out is high for the overall organization. The rush to change leads the management to lose focus in an ocean of initiatives that pressure the human capital of the company (Beer & Nohria, 2000).
Thus, it raises the interest of studying the link between change management and the risk of falling into the acceleration trap. In fact, despite of the vast literature about change management, few studies focus on analyzing this relationship. Most of academic papers consist of calling attention to the key initiatives to be taken to succeed when leading a change by enumerating a list of recommendations (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998). Those suggestions are generally sound and comprehensive. However, by being more prescriptive than explanatory, they do not address the specificities of certain types of change. Numerous corporate change issues do vary depending on the type of change to be undertaken. Therefore, while it is also important to focus on analyzing the profound and subtle factors leading to a corporate failure when implementing a change in a very specific environment, few studies have been able to catch such subtleties. For instance, the literature about corporate change issues emerging during a privatization process is very poor (Coram & Burnes, 2001). Most of the theoretical concepts about change management derive from studies based on private companies¹ (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998). Yet, it is critical for public sector organizations to rely on strategic approaches that have been designed to meet their specific needs and situations (Burnes & Salauroo, 1998). From an academic perspective, studying the link between a vast transformation plan such as a privatization and an organizational burnout is therefore particularly relevant. This explains why the present thesis will focus on studying the risk of falling into the acceleration trap during a privatization process.

1.2. THE RISK OF FALLING INTO THE ACCELERATION TRAP FOLLOWING A PRIVATIZATION AND THE ROLE OF A CULTURAL CLASH AND OF A WEAK TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP CLIMATE

Based on a preliminary theoretical framework built from a preliminary investigation into the corporate change literature, a single case study of a European telecommunication company (hereafter defined as “Telco”²) has permitted to highlight two moderators of the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap. In fact, both a cultural clash and a weak

¹ For sake of clarity, when used in the thesis, the term “private company” refers to a company in which a state/government does not hold more than 33.33% of the share capital while the term “public company” refers to a company in which a state/a government holds more than 33.33% of the share capital.

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transformational leadership climate seem to increase the risk of falling into the acceleration trap during a privatization process. Regarding the cultural clash moderator, the data analysis of the Telco’s case study displays the importance played by both a corporate and management identity conflict. With regard to the weak transformational leadership moderator, the data analysis illustrates the role played by a lack of trust in the new management but also by a loss of job sense among the employees, particularly through a loss of proudness. Finally, it also derives from the data analysis that the non-acceptance of the new incentive system also significantly affects the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap by contributing to both a cultural clash and a weak transformational leadership climate.

2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS ABOUT CORPORATE CHANGE

Change management is a continuous process of renewing an organization’s direction, structure, and capabilities to address internal and external pressures (Moran & Brightman, 2001). Therefore, many authors have proposed several theoretical models to describe the path of corporate change (2.1.1). However, change is often unpredictable, reactive, discontinuous, and triggered by an organizational crisis as well (Burnes, 2004). Hence, the literature distinguishes different types of changes according to their typical features (2.1.2). Among all those types of change, a privatization process appears to be one of the most sizeable forms of corporate change (2.1.3).

2.1.1. Presentation of the theoretical models studying the path of a corporate change

Many academic studies inspired from psychological articles have described thoroughly the path of a change management process and the initiatives to manage it successfully (Cameron & Green, 2012). From the Lewin’s three steps model of change, the Kübler-Ross’ 5 Stages Model (1969), the Kotter’s (1996) Eight-Stages Process for Successful Organizational Transformation, the Kanter’s (Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992) Ten Commandments for Change, to the Luecke’s (Luecke, 2003) Seven Steps to Change, they all have identified at which stage of a change the likelihood of failure is the highest. Others models have shown where exactly in organizational level, the probability of an organizational breakdown is the highest (Corley, 2004).
Among those theories, two early fundamental models of change process have really laid the foundations for numerous academic papers about the path of change.

2.1.1.1. Two early fundamental models

First, the Lewin’s model, which is a fundamental social psychology work that decomposes the change process into a three steps process: unfreezing, moving, and refreezing (Elrod & Tippett, 2002). Unfreezing supposes to break the current equilibrium that relies on complacency and self-righteousness so that the new behavior be successfully adopted (Burnes B., 2004). Schein (1996) goes further by enouncing that this step should itself be decomposed into a three stage process as well: the disconfirmation of the validity of the status quo, the induction of guilt or survival anxiety, and the creation of psychological safety. Moving, which is the second step of the Lewin’s model, means the learning approach that should create the motivation to change. As the direction and the duration of the moving phase are uncertain, a third step is essential: refreezing the new behavior in order to stabilize the group at the new quasi-stationary equilibrium (Burnes, 2004). Even though it explains its success, the simplicity of the Lewin’s model has also attracted criticisms. They are mainly directed at its approach of stability in organizations – the equilibrium to be unfreezed and then refreezed – that would not fit with the constant evolution of the environment in which companies evolve (Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992). Consequently, this conception of change would only match with an isolated or incremental type change as further described below (Price & Chahal, 2006). Other criticisms point out an ignorance of the power and politics’ issues and a top-down or management driven approach to change (Price & Chahal, 2006).

The second fundamental model of change is the Kübler-Ross’ 5 Stages Model (1969) (Kübler-Ross & Kessler, 2005) that describes the response cycle to death through the successive periods of “denial”, “anger”, “bargaining”, “depression”, and “acceptance”. Transposed to the organizational psychology academic field, it shows that the change can be as traumatic and stressful as a loss of a relative (Price & Chahal, 2006). Some employees may actually face a similar sequence of extreme emotions during a period of change by: first, denying that the change is actually happening – second, experiencing anger, frustration, and resentment – third, recognizing but negotiating for more time to delay the change – fourth, falling into a depressive state characterized by melancholy, somber, and discouragement – fifth, accepting the reality of change and finding a inner and outer peace (Zell, 2003).
2.1.1.2. Concrete approaches to corporate change

Many researchers have built on those two early fundamental models to propose their list of factors or steps to successfully implement a corporate change (Burnes, 2003). The works of Kanter (1992), Kotter (1996), and Luecke (2003) in particular have received a large coverage in the academic world (Todnem By, 2005) (Burnes, 2003).

Kanter (1992) recommends obeying to the following “Ten Commandments”: (1) Analyze the organization and its need for change; (2) Create a vision and a common Direction; (3) Separate from the past; (4) Create a sense of urgency; (5) Support a strong leader role; (6) Line up political sponsorship; (7) Craft an implementation plan; (8) Develop enabling structures; (9) Communicate, involve people and be honest; and (10) Reinforce and institutionalize change.

The Kotter’s (1996) eight-stages model preconizes to implement the following actions: (1) Establishing a sense of urgency; (2) Creating a guiding coalition; (3) Developing a vision and strategy; (4) Communicating the change vision; (5) Empowering broad-based action; (6) Generating short-term wins; (7) Consolidating gains and producing more change; and (8) Anchoring new approaches in the culture.

Finally, Luecke (2003) proposes to implement a change through a seven-steps plan: (1) Mobilize energy and commitment through joint identification of business problems and their solutions; (2) Develop a shared vision about how to organize and manage for competitiveness; (3) Identify the leadership; (4) Focus on results, not on activities; (5) Start change at the periphery, then let it spread to other units without pushing it from the top; (6) Institutionalize success through formal policies, systems, and structures; and (7) Monitor and adjust strategies in response to problems in the change process.

2.1.1.3. The role of culture during a corporate change

Those early approaches to change and even the more practice-oriented works about change management, such as the ones mentioned above, have been fundamental for building the foundations of the change management theory. However, those models do not specifically address the important aspect of the clash of values. Yet, it raises critical issues during a change process (Burnes, 2004). To fill this gap, Schein (2006) has proposed a model of
organizational culture change, which is also decomposed into a three-stages life-cycle model: (1) Founding and early growth; (2) Organizational midlife; and (3) Organizational maturity. For each stage, a specific type of culture is needed to support different functions (Price & Chahal, 2006) (Schein, 2006). Throughout those three stages, culture plays a different role for each and, as a result, generates different issues.

In the building stage, the culture may acts as a positive growth and, then, must be stimulated. In the intermediary stage – organizational midlife – as the culture gains in diversity to form many subcultures, the leadership needs to make strategic choices to decide which elements of the culture to be removed or stimulated.

In the maturity stage, as the shared assumptions are deeply enrooted into the organization, a strong culture is now formed. It is an advantage when the environment remains stable. Inversely, it becomes a liability when the environment is destabilized. The members of the organization will certainly resist to the cultural change since they tend to consider the organizational culture through their shared assumptions as the explanation for the past successes of the organization and constitutes the source of their pride and self-esteem (Schein, 2006). Therefore, because the “values, motivation, and behaviors of the organization’s member are critical determinants of corporate performance”, it is crucial to tackle the cultural issues when executing a change (Wilson, 1994, p. 18).

The role of culture during a corporate change has also been pointed out by Corley & Gioia (2004). Through an exhaustive analysis of corporate spin-off, they show that “some identity changes […] are so sweeping and discontinuous that they disrupt the order of the understood world” (Corley & Gioia, 2004, p. 173). Without expressly designating it, the authors even address the effect of cultural issues on the relationship between change management and acceleration trap. In fact, they show that a change overload can also result from cultural changes when the new processes do not fit with the existing corporate culture, and, consequently, generate identity tensions.

In this respect, despite of their similarities, it is also important to underline the slight difference existing between organizational culture and organizational identity. The organizational culture can be defined as “a set of norms and values that are widely shared and held throughout the organization” (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996, p. 166). While the concept of
organizational identity might be at the source of the corporate culture, it rather covers what the members of the organization perceived as being their norms and values (Balmer & Wilson, 1998). Therefore, contrary to the organizational culture, the concept of organizational identity leaves place for the presence of a mix of cultures (as least, what the members perceived as being a culture) within the organization (Balmer, 1995). This explains why in this thesis, the term of “corporate identity” or “management identity” is used to highlight corporate and management identity conflicts while the term “corporate culture” is rather employed to label the effect of such corporate and management identity conflicts on the overall corporate culture of the organization. In other words, the corporate culture is that which is one and unique as preexisting to a corporate change, and, therefore, which is at the source of a conflict of corporate and/or management identity.

2.1.1.4. The Resistance to Change
As mentioned earlier, the “unfreezing period” of the Lewin’s model of change highlights the need of removing old behaviors, structures, processes, and culture before successfully adopting new approaches (Todnem By, 2005; Bamford & Forrester, 2003). Adopting a more detailed approach about culture, Schein (2006) specifies that cultural change’s issues evolve according to the different stages of development of an organization. Hence, how the change occurs depends on the organization readiness to change and, particularly, on its flexibility and capacity to adapt (Price & Chahal, 2006; Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993; Cinite, Duxbury, & Higgins, 2009). In fact, as suggested by the aforementioned frameworks, the resistance to change is a key issue of the path of change that needs to be tackled by companies when implementing a corporate transformation.

Huczynski and Buchanan (2001, p. 887) have defined the resistance to change as “an inability or an unwillingness to discuss or to accept organizational changes that are perceived in some way damaging or threatening to the individual (or group)”. Then, they identify the following top ten barriers to change: (1) Competition for resources; (2) Functional boundaries; (3) Lack of change management skills; (4) Middle management; (5) Long information technology lead times; (6) Poor communication; (7) Employee opposition; (8) Human resource issues (e.g. training); (9) Initiative fatigue; and (10) Unrealistic timetables (Buchanan & Huczynski, 2001).
Williams (1993) has highlighted three factors that may affect the degree of resistance to change: non-recognition of the need to change, increase in the level of uncertainty relating to one’s future job (including its rewards, power and status), and failure to integrate the conditions in which people would learn and display the behaviors induced by the new organizational identity. Based on those factors, Price and Chahal (2006, p. 237) have concluded that the successful implementation of a change does not only rely on improving the efficiency of process but also on “the alignment of the organizational culture to support these new processes”. Otherwise, such processes are likely to spread anxiety and stress into the organization that will, then, result in resistance to change (Price & Chahal, 2006). Indeed, stressed employees are likely to be less committed and more reluctant to accept an organizational change (Vakola & Nikolaou, 2005). In this case and according to the literature, the leadership of the organization has a key role to play as well.

2.1.1.5. The role of the leadership during a corporate change

The literature insists on the importance of leadership to achieve a corporate change. An efficient leadership approach is crucial in nurturing and embedding the appropriate organizational culture to facilitate the implementation of a corporate change (Hennessey, 1998; Block, 2003).

Proficient leadership behaviors facilitate the execution of a change as it allows a smooth shift from the old culture to the new corporate identity by either developing a strong vision or relying on “consultation rather than diktat” (Price & Chahal, 2006, p. 242). Drawing on the knowledge and trust of the employees by promoting individual initiative is fundamental to foster a positive attitude towards the change and, then to gain their commitment and support to change (Burnes & James, 1995; Hoag, Ritschard, & Cooper, 2002).

Conversely, a massive corporate change disrupts so fiercely the “cultural status quo” that its poor management by the leadership of an organization may deeply impact its implementation (Burnes & James, 1995, p. 16).

A widespread example of the importance of leadership is often emphasized by the leader of the organization himself through the notion of charismatic leadership (Nadler & Tushman, 1990). Conger and Kanungo (1998) define charismatic leaders as having four key characteristics: possessing and articulating a vision, willing to take risks to achieve the vision,
exhibiting sensitivity to follower needs, and demonstrating the novel behavior. A charismatic leader may therefore facilitate the change by energizing, envisioning, and enabling the change (Nadler & Tushman, 1990). Energizing means demonstrating personal excitement, expressing personal confidence but also seeking, finding, and using success. Envisioning supposes to articulate a compelling vision, setting high expectations, and modeling consistent behaviors. Enabling requires to expressing personal support, empathizing, and expressing confidence in people (Nadler & Tushman, 1990). However, even Nadler and Tushman (1990) recognize that a charismatic leader is not sufficient in certain situations. Changing a corporate culture is an arduous challenge since it requires disrupting old and deep-rooted values and habits (Coram & Burnes, 2001). It then implies that a wider approach be adopted by the leadership of the organization.

The five primary mechanisms of Schein (2006) is the most comprehensive method available to leaders for embedding and reinforcing culture. It calls leaders to address the following managerial topics when fostering a cultural change: attention focusing, reaction to crises, role modeling, rewards allocation, and criteria for hiring and firing (Ke & Wei, 2008).

Another challenge stems from the fact that corporate changes vary a lot in terms of scale, speed, or degree of disruption. There is no “one best way to manage a change” (Coram & Burnes, 2001, p. 94). In this respect, the link between leadership and culture is particularly important by showing the impact of different styles of leadership on culture. For instance, Bass (2009) argues that transformational leaders are more able to promote a culture change than transactional leaders (Bass, 2009; Ke & Wei, 2008).

In fact, depending on the environment, either a transactional leadership or a transformational leadership climate is more appropriate to execute a change for instance (Burnes & James, 1995). Transactional leaders are generally described through the following four dimensions: contingent reward, active management by exception, passive management by exception, and laissez-faire (Judge, Fluegge Woolf, Hurst, & Livingston, 2006). They are “sensitive to the needs of others, who follow them in return for the satisfaction of these needs” (Ke & Wei, 2008, p. 210). Schematically, those leaders manage their employees through external incentives, that is, by promising them reward for good performance and sanctions for poor performance (Bass, 1991). They aims at setting patterns of desired behavior and keeping the followers on task throughout the process (Ke & Wei, 2008). Transactional leadership is
therefore more effective when it is implemented within an established organizational framework (Bass, 1989). Inversely, transformational leaders are those who inspire, energize, and intellectually stimulate their employees (Bass, 1991). Vision, inspirational communication, intellectual stimulation, supportive leadership, and personal recognition are the five dimensions that define a transformational leader. Based on those dimensions a transformational leader may “motivates and influences followers to work for collective goals by going beyond current norms and inspiring subordinates to transcend their self-interest for the sake of the organization” (Plowman et al., 2007, p. 344). Hence, contrary to a transactional leader, a transformational leader relies mainly on internal incentives and is therefore more able to promote an organizational change (Rafferty & Griffin, 2004).

Likewise, sensemaking leadership also facilitates the implementation of a change. Sensemakers leaders may lead an organization toward a change by making sense of the desired path within the existing organization (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Such leaders have the capacity to scan the environment and interpret related issues in such a way that they can drive the change (Plowman et al. 2007; Gioia & Thomas, 1996).

To sum up, the style of leadership that best fits with a corporate change is function of the characteristic of the organizational change being implemented. Knowing the various forms that an organizational change may take is therefore essential.

2.1.2. Types of corporate changes according to their typical features

While change is common to all organization, it does have different characteristics in terms of nature, scope, and intensity depending on both internal and external factors such as workforce capabilities, globalization, deregulation, pace of technological innovation, social and demographics trends (Nadler & Tushman, 1990; Todnem By, 2005). Consequently, as presented below, various different theories and approaches aim at categorizing a change according to its features (Todnem By, 2005).

2.1.2.1. Continuous versus discontinuous change

A first distinction is made between discontinuous and continuous change. It refers to the frequency of the change. A discontinuous change describes onetime events taking place through large and widely separated initiatives. It is then followed up by long periods of consolidation and stillness. Thus, such intermittent change creates a “single and abrupt shift
from the past” (Luecke, 2003, p. 102). Despite being still frequently executed (Duncan, Mouly, & Nilakant, 2001), this type of change is blamed for only generating short terms effects and promoting defensive behaviors and complacency. They would therefore inevitably lead to another unanticipated disruptive change, which is damaging for the performance of the organization (Luecke, 2003; Todnem By, 2005).

Nowadays, many authors favor the notion of continuous changes, those that occur through successive, limited, and negotiated shifts (Burnes, 2004). In this sense, the organization would rather evolve throughout those limited and constant changes to continually respond to the evolutions of the internal and external environment (Burnes, 2004). Hence, it is described as an ongoing process in order to “keep-up the fast-moving pace of change” (Todnem By, 2005, p. 372; Luecke, 2003).

2.1.2.2. Convergent and divergent change
A second approach classifies the change according to its scale through the distinction convergent versus divergent change (Todnem By, 2005).

A convergent change covers a state where the organization operates a change within a stable environment, the objectives of which are well established and accepted. The fit to the organization’s strategy, processes, people, and structure explains the steady evolution of such type of change (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998; Senior, 2002; Todnem By, 2005). In this context, Burnes & James (1995, p. 25) argue that a transactional leadership is the most appropriate style of management since transactional leaders may, in this situation, focus on optimizing “the performance of the organization through incremental changes within the confines of existing policy and arrangements – basically, they seek to work within and maintain the status quo”.

Inversely, a divergent change occurs when it is necessary to challenge the organization’s established goals, structures and ways of working (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998). It therefore disrupts the organization’s strategy, processes, people and structure. Consequently, according to the literature, a transformational style of leadership is necessary to tackle the issues generated by such disruption of the corporate objectives and process. Changing the “follower’s goals and beliefs and unite them behind a new vision of the organization’s future” is indeed essential in this situation (Burnes & James, 1995, p. 25).
2.1.2.3. Planned versus emergent change

A third classification opposes the concepts of planned change and emergent change. It is used to present the two main strategic approaches available to implement a change in function of its degree of predictability. The planned approach to change considers the organizational change “as a process that moves from one fixed state to another through a series of pre-planned steps” (Bamford & Forrester, 2003, p. 547). Thus, it directly relates to the Lewin’s three steps model of change as presented above (Bamford & Forrester, 2003).

Despite its profound influence on the change management theory, this approach is now under critics for not addressing the today’s instable environment or the issues related to an abrupt and radical change (Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992; Bamford & Forrester, 2003; Todnem By, 2005). As a result, the planned change approach is being superseded by the emergent change approach. This theory holds that, nowadays, change occurs too fast to be identified, planned, and implemented in advance by the top-management (Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992; Todnem By, 2005). As a result, the bottom-up method characterizing the emergent approach of change should replace the old top-down strategy in order to tackle the highly uncertain environment in which companies evolve today (Burnes, 1996; Bamford & Forrester, 2003). However, it requires to allow a higher degree of autonomy in the responsibility for the change and to turn the senior management from “a controller to a facilitator” (Bamford & Forrester, 2003, p. 548).

As described below, the issues highlighted by the three distinctions of type of change aforementioned are interestingly depicted by the example of a privatization. In fact, such example of massive corporate change generally combines simultaneously the characteristics of a discontinuous, divergent, and emergent change.

2.1.3. The privatization process as a sizeable form of corporate change

By symbolizing an extreme case of a corporate change process, privatization programs portray a breadth and deep vision of the obstacles that are likely to provoke the fall of an organization into the acceleration trap.

Indeed, a privatization usually leads to the abrupt entry of the company into the competitive environment. As a result, most of those state-owned firms are pressed to develop a new
business strategy to address the new challenges posed by the competitive game and compensate the potential losses caused by the end of their monopolistic rent. Thus, they tend to suddenly and massively engage in an extensive external growth policy, generally leading to a disparate portfolio of business in a short period of time. Yet, as mentioned above, a large part of the doctrine rather recommends implementing such massive change through successive, limited, and negotiated shifts, especially in the public service (Todnem By, 2005). Otherwise, the restructuration becomes highly complex to manage, increasing the risk of being caught into an uncontrolled change (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998).

Even more critical is the fact that this business diversification – combined with the entry into the competitive environment – imparts a new identity to the company, which genuinely differs with the habits and core-values of both the employees and the leadership of the organization. The consequences might be particularly significant during a privatization process. The shift from a long enrooted culture of public service to a highly competitive environment may deeply affect the daily work but also the vision employees have about their new tasks and their organization as well (Coram & Burnes, 2001). The top-management of the company may also react to the new competitive environment by forcing into the hierarchy a rigid model of transactional leadership, giving priority to external incentives. When linking with the literature about organizational change aforementioned, it would mean that the management tends to emphasize more on measures of the Theory E (characterized by a heavy used of external incentives) than on those of the Theory O (characterized by a heavy used of internal incentives) whereas the latter fits better than the former with a divergent change such as a privatization (Beer & Nohria, 2000; Salauroo & Burnes, 1998). In fact, a privatization is definitely a divergent change that requires a structural and cultural change (Coram & Burnes, 2001). Hence, a transformational leadership climate is more appropriate to tackle the issues related to such disruptive change (Burnes & James, 1995). Therefore, as pointed out by Beer and Nohria (Beer & Nohria, 2000), when implementing a vast corporate transformation, it is crucial to not only rely on a “hard” approach” (the Theory E) but also on a soft approach (the Theory O). Otherwise, the new corporate identity is applied without enough preparation and proper incentives. Hence, the probability for the new corporate identity to be well institutionalized (and, thus, forming the new corporate culture) by making employees mentally prepared to work for a private company is low, increasing the risk of making an organizational burnout (Goncalves, 2007).
2.2. Theoretical Concepts about the Acceleration Trap

2.2.1. Description of the acceleration trap phenomena

The literature about the acceleration trap is still modest since it is a recent academic concept developed by Bruch & Menges (2010). It describes a precise type of organizational failure in order to demonstrate that a burnout is not only an individual phenomenon but may also affect an entire organization. As for a casual employee, an organization is likely to fall into the acceleration trap when it has been pressured to produce constant accelerated efforts over a long period of time without any break to reenergize. Zaugg (2002) illustrates the phenomenon through the Olympian motto “faster – higher – stronger” that may push a company into the trap.

As a result of the fall into the acceleration trap, the exhaustion and the resignation of the workforce affect dramatically the performance, the efficiency, the employee productivity, and the retention rate of the company (Bruch & Menges, 2010). Overloading, multi-loading, or perpetual-loading of the employees are the typical patterns of this organizational breakdown (Bruch & Menges, 2010).

To avoid the fall into the trap, companies need to decelerate (Zaugg, 2002). Series of pit stops periods are required to pause the phase of high-energy – characterizing a major strategic shift – but also to leave time to regenerate the employees by letting them abandoning less important tasks (Bruch & Menges, 2010). The company itself should also limit its objective and require from its project managers to put “the kibosh on mediocre ideas” (Bruch & Menges, 2010, p. 83).

The acceleration trap is a relatively new concept and, therefore, is not yet widespread in literature. Yet, it can be linked to the notion organizational burnout developed by Probst (2005). Such type of generalized burnout has a comparable cause and lead to similar consequence: a period of excessive growth or accelerated change that leads to the emotional exhaustion of the workforce (Probst, 2005). Finally, it is not really different from an individual burnout, which presents comparable dimensions: emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and recognizably low self-efficacy (Maslach, 2001).
2.2.2. Identification of the organizational patterns found both during a large corporate change and in the acceleration trap

The implementation of a massive corporate change such as a privatization requires deep modifications of the activities and processes of the company. It also needs a certain amount of time to execute gradually the change as result of its size. Therefore, while it has been shown that a change has a low probability of success (Beer & Nohria, 2000), the likelihood for a massive corporate change to fail is certainly higher. The literature does not highlight a link between the implementation of a corporate transformation plan and the acceleration trap yet. However, Probst (2005) has showed that companies suffering from an organizational burnout meet at least three of the following characteristics: excessive growth, uncontrolled change, autocratic leadership, and excessive success culture. Although those features do not exactly match with the characteristics of the acceleration trap, they do have some links with the symptoms of this kind organizational breakdown: overloading, multiloading, and perpetual loading. In fact, an excessive growth or an uncontrolled change might explain why a company might be overloaded, multi-loaded or perpetually loaded.

However, this resemblance is only an analogy and, therefore, deserves to be analyzed deeper so that to increase the understanding of the relationship between a large corporate change, such as a privatization, and the acceleration trap, which is so far limited due to the lack of academic studies on the matter.

2.3. The Research Gap

2.3.1. Classification of the main studies about corporate change according to their purpose: prescriptive versus explanatory analysis

Corporate change is one of the most widespread topics in the literature about management. The key words “change management” occurring in the title of academic articles let appear about 27,300 results on Google Scholar® as at the 10th of November 2014. Some change management books have even encountered a massive commercial success. For instance, the John Kotter’s book named “Leading Change” about the eight-steps process for implementing a successful corporate transformation has been a best seller and is ranked as one of the 25 most influential books ever written on business management (Harvard Business Review, 2014). The rationale behind such commercial success is not only their ease of reading but
also their prescriptive nature. They propose practical recommendations that immediately attract the attention of the readers since they are almost ready to implement (Burnes, 2003).

However, despite their informative and valuable nature they are also like the “Highway Code”. They tell you about the general the rules but they cannot, by themselves, provide the manager with the skills, competencies, and aptitude to implement them” (Burnes, 2003, p. 631). They also tend to be too generalist to be applied to any particular situation (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998). Hence, other frameworks for understanding the deeps roots of a corporate change failure within a specific environment are needed. However, such studies are not widely available. Few focus on the specific factors that might explain why corporate changes fail in a particular environment. For instance, when “privatization” is added to key words “change management”, the results of the research into the titles of academic articles listed on Google Scholar® falls to only 8 articles as at the 10th of November 2014. As a consequence, there is a significant discrepancy in terms of number of academics studies between the generalist prescriptive articles – those focusing on listing recommendations to lead a change without consideration for the context in which occurs the change - and the focused explanatory articles – those which attempt to understand the process of change within a particular environment. The table below (see next page) illustrates the discrepancy by comparing the main “generalist prescriptive articles” versus the main “focused explanatory articles” among the relevant academic articles used for the purpose of this thesis.
2.3.2. The lack of explanatory studies focusing on analyzing the factors triggering the acceleration trap during a privatization process

As mentioned above, numerous studies or books have been published to recommend actions to be taken to lead a successful change. Those have undeniably improved the approaches to change management made by organizations. However, as mentioned above, few articles focus on explaining why a change may fail in some specific circumstances. Instead, they mainly establish a list of guidelines to undertake in order to correctly implement a change (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998). Salauroo & Burnes (1998) state that despite being useful, such lists of good practices have two weaknesses. Firstly, they do not ensure the success of a change since “even the managers in the less successful organizations were, in general terms, aware of the best practices in managing change” (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998, p. 461). Second,
those lists tend to be too specific to a certain type of organizations – and thus irrelevant for many other companies – or too generalist to be applied to a particular situation.

Likewise, the literature gap is even larger when looking at the academic works identifying the reasons of a change failure in a specific situation such as a privatization. In fact, while the topic of organizational change has considerably grown in importance since the work of Lewin in the 1940s, almost all studies still only focus on the private sector and most of the theories about organizational change derived from empirical studies of private companies (Coram & Burnes, 2001). Only few academic works analyze the issues that may emerge during a change in the public sector therefore (Cinite, Duxbury, & Higgins, 2009; Coram & Burnes, 2001; Fernandez, 2010). In addition, excepting the work of Coram & Burnes (2001), it is very hard to find any academic study in the management literature about a privatization process that does not focus on a specific company or case study.

The scarcity of the literature about the consequences of a change failure is also noteworthy. It is quite difficult to find articles looking at the consequences of an unsuccessful change. The concept of acceleration trap developed by Bruch and Menges (2010) is one of the few studies that describe thoroughly the negative effects of a perpetual change strategy for instance. However, being a recent theory, there is almost no study that has tried to link it with other concepts of the change management’s theory.

Therefore, the academic ground of the relationship between the acceleration trap and a large corporate change such as a privatization is relatively unexploited. By studying the risk of falling into the acceleration trap during a privatization process, the present thesis attempts to address such gap in literature.
3. PRELIMINARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – RESEARCH QUESTION – OBJECTIVES

3.1. PRESENTATION OF THE PRELIMINARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The literature review as summarized above highlights the critical function played by the corporate culture during the implementation of a vast corporate change such as privatization process. Indeed, when turning private, the organization enters into the competitive sector. Therefore, the shift from a long and enrooted culture of public service to a highly competitive environment does not only affect the daily work but also the vision employees have about their tasks and their organization. As a result, it is likely to destabilize their habits and core-values (Coram & Burnes, 2001).

They may then react by showing a high degree of resistance to change since they hold the former organizational culture as the unique responsible for the past success of the company overall but also for their own performance as employee (Cinite, Duxbury, & Higgins, 2009). The new values spread by the leadership within the organization – and which are characteristics of those of a privately owned company – hurt the pride and self-esteem of the employees, pushing them to a profound emotional state of resignation (Schein, 2006). As a result, it appears that the new corporate identity engendered by a privatization is likely to push the organization into the acceleration trap.

Two moderators of the relationship privatization and acceleration trap might be deduced from the analysis of the literature about change management. First, the cultural clash provoked by the shift from a public to a private company seems to prevent the employees from being emotionally prepared to the change whereas the “values, motivation, and behaviors of the organization’s member are critical determinants of corporate performance” (Wilson, 1994, p. 18). Second, a weak transformational style of leadership appears to also prevent the employees from being part of the corporate change and, thus, to turn them followers of the change. In fact, as mentioned in the literature review in Section 2.1.1.2, a low degree of transformational leadership particularly does not fit with a divergent change such as a privatization. A higher degree of transformational leadership would help the company to

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3 Provided, however, that the case where the public company was already evolving in a liberalized market is excluded.
overcome the challenge of disturbing the organization’s established goals, structures and ways of working (Salauroo & Burnes, 1998). Hence, as a privatization embodies the features of divergent change, a weak transformational leadership climate, combined with the cultural clash mentioned above, is likely to reinforce the destructive consequences of this massive corporate change and, as a consequence, to increase the risk of falling into the acceleration trap.

However, the role of those two moderators – cultural clash and weak transformational leadership – is only based on deductions from the literature review presented above. The literature is not enough explicit or, at least, not enough significant to be assertive on the role of the cultural and leadership issues. Furthermore, with few exceptions, the literature does not address the specificities of a case of a privatization. Hence, the foregoing analysis will only be the basis of a preliminary theoretical framework as schematized hereunder and attached hereto in Appendix 1. Then, this framework will serve to conduct and frame the case study presented in the next section so that to answer the research question of the thesis as presented below (see next page).
The cultural changes produced by a privatization are likely to trigger the acceleration trap when the change (i) is characterized by a cultural clash and (ii) weak transformational leadership climate.
3.2. **Research Question: Understanding and Demonstrating How a Privatization Process Affects the Risk of Falling into the Acceleration Trap**

As described above, the new corporate identity that emerges from the entry into a competitive environment (characterizing a privatization) exacerbates the relationship between a change management process and the risk of falling into the acceleration trap. As a result, this accentuation offers the opportunity to better understand what is behind this relationship and, therefore, allows highlighting the factors that may affect this link. Thus, the study will focus on understanding and demonstrating how a privatization process affects the risk of falling into the acceleration trap.

3.3. **Objectives**

As summarized in the preliminary theoretical framework, when the literature about change management is investigated under the perspective of how a privatization process may trigger the acceleration trap, it suggests an explanation about this relationship. In fact, it seems that an abrupt implementation of a new corporate identity, only supported by external incentives and without building a sense of identity may affect positively the risk of falling into the acceleration trap. The effect seems even more significant when there is a very low support for the change from the employees. Hence, the corporate culture clash and a poor transformational leadership climate could act as moderators of this relationship. However, the literature focusing on the link between a corporate change and the fall into the acceleration trap, whatever a privatization process is undertaken or not, remains too modest to understand or demonstrate precisely the effect of those two moderators.

Consequently, the objectives of the study consist of understanding and demonstrating how (i) a cultural clash and (ii) a weak transformational leadership climate affect positively the risk of falling into the acceleration trap during a privatization process.

4. **Methodology**

Given the lack of existing studies about the topics related to the concepts of privatization and acceleration trap, a qualitative research design has appeared to be the most appropriate choice
of research design to solve the research question and address the objectives of the thesis. Based on a single case study of a privatization, the research design has followed a non-purely inductive approach to combine the preliminary theoretical framework with the lack of explicit literature about the relationship privatization-acceleration trap. As further described below, a European telecommunication company (defined herein as Telco) has served as a case study and secondary data from the organizational crisis endured by the company in the last decade have been analyzed on the basis of the preliminary theoretical framework.

4.1. RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1.1. **Fitting of the case study methodology with the analysis of an extreme case of corporate change such as a privatization**

The study of the effect of a cultural shift on the relationship between change management and acceleration trap leaves place for very subtle and enrooted issues. Cultural issues are so deeply anchored into an organization that they do not emerge explicitly. Furthermore, they play a different role at certain levels of an organization and have dynamic aspects as well (Corley, 2004). Therefore, a comprehensive and thorough qualitative analysis is required to examine them. As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that the efficiency and the rigor of the qualitative approach is now well established since the key methodological works of Eisenhardt (1989) and Gioia (2004). With regard to this thesis, a qualitative analysis permits to capture rich data of a phenomenon evolving temporarily (Langley, 2011). It is therefore particularly relevant for the purpose of analyzing a corporate change through a longitudinal study (as further outlined below). In addition, by allowing “the development of testable hypotheses and theories which are generalizable across settings” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 546), the method is appropriate to analyze a phenomenon where the theoretical background is weak (Langley, 2011). Hence, it could be worthwhile when dealing with the privatization’s topic for which there is a lack of academic knowledge.

Furthermore, by allowing a rich understanding of an in-depth and holistic phenomenon, the case analysis also appears to be the most suitable research design to lead an insightful qualitative analysis (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011). Yin (2003) explains that the approach particularly fits with the situation where the boundaries are not clearly defined, as is the case when assessing the role of corporate culture, the components of which cannot be precisely defined. Consequently, the outcomes of case study’s evidences may give rise to
novel insights, thus forming the path toward a valuable inductive analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley 2011). It is then suitable for this study, which mostly relies on an inductive approach as outlined in Section 4.1.2 below.

Besides, the single case study methodology also matches with the analysis of an extreme case of corporate change embodied by a privatization. This deep corporate restructuration is so dependent of the economic and political environment in which it occurs that taking a sample of various privatizations cases are likely to produce numerous biases preventing the production of reliable results. Conversely, by representing an extreme case of corporate change, a privatization case also provides a rich material. Hence, the uniqueness and intensity of such corporate change justifies the use of a single case study to increase the probability to understand and demonstrate how a state-owned company is likely to become an accelerated company during its privatization process.

4.1.2. A non-purely inductive approach: inductive analysis followed by a deductive study based on a preliminary theoretical framework

The purpose of the study is to obtain deep insights about what is behind the relationship privatization-acceleration trap. Furthermore, both the literature focusing on privatization or acceleration trap issues and the set secondary data are not rich enough to lay the foundations for a potential existing theory to be tested. Consequently, to give sense to the data gathered but also to match them with the different patterns highlighted during the literature review that would form the outlines of a theoretical framework, working inductively is necessary.

However, the study will not follow a purely inductive approach. In fact, despite being rarely studied, the topics of privatization and acceleration trap are parts of the wider theme of change management, the literature of which is very wealth. In addition, the case of Telco has already received hard media coverage, pushing the company to mandate exhaustive reports about its organizational failure. Thus, even before being analyzed deeply, such combination of academic and corporate resources already hints at the existence of factors that may affect the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap. Thanks to such anticipated factors, the broad outlines of a preliminary theoretical framework can already be defined before being demonstrated throughout this research (see the preliminary framework in Appendix 1). Using the existing theory to formulate the research question but also to design
a preliminary framework is in this case of considerable help to organize and direct the data analysis (Yin, 2003).

For that reason, in a second step, the Telco’s case study also partly follows a deductive approach to demonstrate whether the expectations about the effects – as positive moderators – of a corporate culture clash and a weak transformational leadership climate on the relationship privatization and acceleration trap are confirmed or not. This explains why the purpose of the research question is not only to understand but also demonstrate the action of the presupposed dependent variables (cultural clash and weak transformational leadership) on an independent variable (the acceleration trap).

A key advantage of this combined approach – inductive analysis in the first phase, followed by a deductive study in the second one – is to facilitate the anchoring of the research into the existing body of knowledge (Saunders, 2011). In addition, it might be critical to confirm the hints about the moderators of the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap, while allowing the identification other competing factors, which is particularly important since this research is driven by a preliminary theoretical framework that relies on a rather low amount of literature, especially concerning the topics related to such relationship.

4.1.3. **A combined exploratory and explanatory study**

The combination of an inductive and deductive approach implies to conduct both an exploratory and explanatory study since the former seeks to explore profound insights into a phenomenon to clarify its understanding, while the latter focuses on studying a situation or a problem in order to explain existing relationships between variables (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011).

4.1.4. **A four years longitudinal study**

The study will be longitudinal in the sense that it aims at analyzing the corporate change of Telco that has accompanied its privatization. The timeframe will be limited from the adoption of the plan “Afterward” announced in 2005 and implemented as of 2006 until the publication in 2010 of the independent report on the organizational crisis of Telco mandated by the company itself.
4.2. CASE STUDY: THE TELCO COMPANY

4.2.1. Presentation of Telco

Telco is a Europe-based multinational telecommunication company. It mainly provides fixed-line, Internet, and mobile telecommunications services. Following its expansion phase initiated in early 2000s, the Telco group now operates in more than 30 countries, employs more than 165 thousand employees and holds more than 236 million clients worldwide (Telco, 2014).

The history of Telco has, for longtime, been intrinsically linked to the home-country’s government of Telco. The organization was a division of the ministry of posts and telecommunications until late 1980s when the company became autonomous, though remaining a state-run company. In the beginning of 1990s, a bill turned the company into an operator of public law with an independent board (meaning independent from the government though such government kept the power to appoint the majority of the board members of Telco). This process of privatization picked-up in the nineties in response to six European directives (90/388/CE, 94/46/CE, 95/51/CE, 96/2/CE, 96/19/CE and 1999/64/CE) enacted to open-up the European telecommunication market. Those directives were transposed into the home country of Telco through a law in mid-1990s. As a result of this bill, the telecommunication market of the home country of Telco became officially open to competition in late 1990s with the notable exception of the local telecommunication market where Telco kept its monopoly at that time. Subsequently, the company became officially privatized even though the government of the home country of Telco still indirectly owns nearly 25% of the shares of the company (Ulryck, 2012).

To overcome the threats from coming competitors in its newly privatized market, the company started a vast corporate transformation of the company as from the late 1990s to mid-2000s. After having floated a large part of its capital late 1990s, the company began a massive external growth strategy to develop new services and to expand internationally. In the beginning of 2000s, Telco acquired another major European mobile telecommunication network and was subsequently rebranded with the name of such company. Other big foreign telecommunications firms were also acquired in 2000 and 2001, particularly in Eastern Europe (Telco, 2007).
However, those acquisitions dramatically increased the debt of the company which nearly reached €50 million in 2002 (Telco, 2002). In addition, they were ill timed since realized just before the explosion of the dotcom bubble. As a result, between the beginning of 2000 and the end of 2002, the share price of the company plumped (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).

Year 2002 was a tough period for Telco indeed. In addition to its financial turmoil, the company was confronted by the arrival of competition in its last protected market. The local telecommunication market of the home country of Telco was indeed liberalized since the beginning of the year.

As a consequence, the need to address the issues of the liberalization of the telecommunication market while the company was financially weakened led the top management to decide a massive corporate change plan in mid-2000s (Financial Times, 2014; Ulryck, 2012).

4.2.2. Presentation of the corporate change plan adopted by Telco to accompany its privatization (the plan “Afterward”)

As a preliminary step to its corporate transformation, Telco firstly announced the plan “Ambition Telco 2005” in December 2002. It was aimed at reducing the colossal debt of the company by cutting 25,000 jobs over a 4 years period (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).

Three years later, Telco launched a vast restructuring plan called “Afterward”. The objective was to adapt the company to the growing competition, the technological evolution in the industry, and the changing consumer habits. In fact, the end of its monopoly forced the company to be as innovative and reactive as its new competitors (Telco, 2007).

The company presented the four pillars of the strategic plan as follows:

- Moving the corporate focus from providing access to telecommunication networks to selling telecommunication services;
- Innovating in terms of telecommunication services & customer services;
- Strengthening the integration of the group overall; and
- Implementing a massive competences development plan.
The first three pillars were mainly aimed at expanding the business of Telco into the growing market of Internet, developing new sources of revenues by proposing new services to its customers, and streamlining the interactions between the numerous foreign subsidiaries of the group.

The fourth pillar was critical for the successful implementation of the plan. The company was shifting its orientation from offering an access to telecommunication to selling telecommunication services. Therefore, adapting the competences of the employees to the new company orientation was absolutely necessary. To achieve this challenging objective, the company launched a sub-plan within the plan afterward called “ACTION”. Under this program, 22,000 jobs were cut, 6,000 employees were hired, and 14,000 were assigned to new functions by 2008 in order to align the competences of the workforce to the new orientation of the company as well as to its new organizational culture. In fact, more commercial positions had to be filled to match with the new business strategy of the company (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).

Besides, the goal was also to adapt the status and the managerial and working practices of workforce to those of a traditional private law company. In fact, the Telco’s employees recruited when the company was still state-owned have the specificity of benefiting from a well-protected status of public servant. They have been hired through a competitive exam and promoted either on the basis of another exam or on their years of service in the company. The bonuses were also allocated collectively according to formal criteria defined by decree enacted by the French government. This system was ensuring a certain level of equality and transparency. Hence, the degree of acceptance and trust that the employees had toward this system was very high (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).

Furthermore, the employees were proud of their status and of their company. They considered themselves – and were perceived – as acting for the public service. Their mission was to connect households to the public telephone network. As they had to intervene in remote areas, it was assumed that they were in charge – together with the employees of the national postal company – of maintaining the “social bond” among the society. The quality of the public service offered to the “user” was therefore their primary focus. The term “client” was indeed not often used yet (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).
However, following the end of its monopoly in the local telecommunication market and the implementation of the strategic plan Afterward, the deeply enrooted and particular corporate culture of Telco has faced three major shifts. Firstly, the new recruits are not anymore hired under the public servant regime. They are covered by a private law contract. Thus, a division among the workforce has appeared between the public servants and the newly recruited employees under private law contract. Second, the recruitment policy of the managers has started to favor candidates with a business academic or professional background. This has been the end of the tradition of recruiting managers in-house graduated in engineering. Third, promotions and bonuses became being allocated individually and based on the quantitative assessment of the performance of each employee have been introduced to stimulate the productivity and increase the competition between employees or shops (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).

To sum-up, in order to adapt the company to its newly private structure and competitive environment, the corporate transformation plan Afterward has brought significant changes at Telco. In a short period of time, the company has not only entered into new business and developed new services but also has considerably modified its managerial practices and the working conditions of its employees by affecting the way the latter are now recruited, managed, and promoted. Given the intensity of the change, it has not been without consequences on the organizational energy of Telco.

4.2.3. **Description of the organizational issues associated to the implementation of the Telco’s corporate change plan**

Rapidly after the execution of its corporate change plan Afterward, Telco has suffered a severe organizational failure for the past six years (Caldwell, 2009; Chrisaphis, 2012). The crisis was not really translated into a low financial performance but rather into a very poor organizational energy with a high level of emotional exhaustion. In fact, the company has faced an extraordinary high number of absenteeism (20 days a year in average). As from July 2009, it has also made the headlines of the news for the mediatized suicides of its employees, whose some left a note identifying their employer (Telco) as the only cause of their deaths (Caldwell, 2009). In this last case, one should nevertheless be careful to conclude to a direct relationship with the restructuring plan since, though the suicide rate at Telco is very high, it remains close to home country’s company national rate. Yet, a judicial inquiry over
workplace bullying has been opened against the company following those suicides (Chrisaphis, 2012).

A survey realized in 2009 among more than 80,000 employees of Telco has highlighted several criteria that tend to indicate that the company has fallen into the acceleration trap following its corporate transformation. First, according to the survey, the employees appear to present a significant degree of overloading. 61% of them declare to handle an excessive workload. Another 60% affirm to not getting the necessary time to properly handle their work. And they are 71% to assert that they are not able to correctly perform their task due to a situation of understaffing (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010). Second, the Telco’s staff seems to be emotionally exhausted due to a high level of stress, which is considered to be the source of such psychological state (Probst, 2005; Maslach, 2001). For instance, 40% of the employees declare to be or to have been stressed over the past 12 months preceding the survey. This figure even reaches 52% for the employees who have declared having an excessive workload (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).

Hence, it can be deduced from the characteristics and fierce of this organizational crisis that Telco has fallen into the acceleration trap. Probst (2005) has even coined the term “burn-out syndrome” to describe this type of crisis at Telco and in other companies with similar “syndromes”.

4.3. SECONDARY DATA: USE OF INTERVIEWS, QUESTIONNAIRES, AND INDEPENDENT REPORTS

4.3.1. The independent report commissioned by Telco and based on 80,000 questionnaires and 1,000 interviews of employees

The severity of the organizational failure of Telco has prompted the labor unions to react strongly to the malaise. The large media coverage of the emotional exhaustion of the employees has also provoked a fierce public outrage, forcing the company to announce actions to take the pressure off. Therefore, numerous data about this organization crisis are publicly available. Above all, pressured by the trade unions, the company has commissioned a consulting firm specialized in healthy leadership to carry out an independent audit of the situation. The result is a comprehensive report of nearly one thousand pages based on the outcomes of 1,000 employees-interviews and a survey sent to 120,000 employees, whom
80,000 of them have replied. Consequently, the report provides a deep and exhaustive analysis of the organizational failure of Telco.

What is even more interesting is that the report contains some extracts of the interviews which have been selected for their redundancy, that is, those which concern the most frequent issues that have been raised by the interviewees. Hence, those excerpts have provided meaningful secondary data that have been investigated in order to solve the research questions of the present thesis.

Besides, the results to the 270 questions asked during the survey and which have been classified according to very thin criteria, including the hierarchical level of the respondent, have been analyzed as well. Their use has therefore improved the reliability of secondary data set by offering objective insights about some specific issues at Telco.

To sum-up, the availability, completeness, and detail of such material have formed a set of rich secondary data to answer the research question. The fact that they have been retrieved by an independent organization is also an advantage to maintain the objectivity of the study. In addition, they overcome the challenge of relying on respondents that might be reluctant to speak openly and deeply about a topic that has been very sensitive until recently, within but also outside the organization.

4.4. DATA ANALYSIS BASED ON THE PRELIMINARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In Section 4.1.2, it is mentioned that the study follows a non-purely inductive approach, that is, an inductive analysis completed by a deductive study based on the preliminary theoretical framework. As a consequence, the design of the data analysis also relies on a non-purely inductive approach. Accordingly, while the preliminary theoretical framework has been used to structure the investigations into the set of secondary data in order to test the adequacy between the framework and the data, a degree of freedom has been allowed when proceeding to the coding of the data. That means that, even though they have been predetermined, the codes have also been amended or added during the coding process for the purpose of analyzing and deepening the preliminary framework rather than solely testing it (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011).
The main advantage of using a preliminary is to envisage a pattern of outcomes based on the literature that supports the framework (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011). For instance, concerning the Telco’s case study regarded under the perspective of the theoretical framework, it means that it has been assumed that the privatization process of the company (realized through the corporate change plan afterward) has caused the fall into the acceleration trap as result of a cultural clash and of a poor transformational leadership climate. Therefore, the set of secondary data has been investigated in the objective of analyzing this relationship throughout this theoretical framework.

More precisely, and in a first step, the two moderators of the preliminary theoretical framework (cultural clash and weak transformational leadership climate) have been used to structure the coding process. As those moderators were too conceptual to appear in the extracts of interviews composing the data set, they have been sub-categorized into more concrete issues, that is, those that can be not only perceived but also expressed by the staff of Telco.

Secondly, the secondary data have been investigated through the computer analysis qualitative data software (CAQDAS) Nvivo® to attach the relevant parts of the excerpts of interviews to the categories aforementioned. Simultaneously, when some recurrent topics were arising from the coding process but without fitting with any of those categories, new codes have been created to take them into consideration within the analysis.

Thirdly, those categories have been classified and ranked according to the number of bits of interviews they were composed by. Then, the categories for which few numbers of extracts of interviews could be attached to have been excluded. This is the case for instance for the categories “feeling of insecurity”, “lack of support from the management”, and “rhythm of change”. In addition, some categories have pointed out issues that were recurrent but not so much related to any issue of a privatization process and, therefore, not relevant for the analysis. For this reason, the categories “lack of competences” and “lack of autonomy” have been removed as well. In fact, the former covers a pre-existing problem that has not been triggered by the privatization and the latter underlines a fact that might occur in any large company, whether or not privatized.
Following this selection of the most relevant categories, the approach of Gioia (2013) has been used to analyze the results of the coding process. The categories for which bits of interviews of Telco’s employees have been attached have formed fifteen first-orders concepts, that is, those based on informant-centric terms and codes (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013).

Then, a second-order analysis has been run to highlight similarities and differences among those concepts in order to combine and categorize them into second-order themes (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Huettermann, S., & Boerner, 2014). Subsequently, the data set has been again investigated to verify whether they supported those theoretical concepts. Then, the designation of those second-order dimensions was refined to fit better with the data, clarify their meaning, and be linked more clearly to leadership’s academic concepts. Accordingly, the following five second-order themes have emerged: management identity conflict, corporate identity conflict, non-acceptance of new incentive system, lack of trust in the new management, and lack of job sense.

Afterward, those five dimensions have been analyzed again in order to classify them into two more theoretical aggregated dimensions: cultural clash and weak transformation leadership, confirming and completing, therefore, the preliminary theoretical framework as further described below. For sake of clarity, an overview of the data structure is provided in Appendix 3.

4.5. Generalization of the Telco Case’s Findings to Other Privatization Processes
Although the last major movement of privatizations in Western Europe dates from late-nineties, it remains a hot topic since a second wave is expected with the next opening up (to competition) of the postal service and rail transportation markets. Consequently, it might be expected that similar issues to those highlighted by the Telco case are likely to occur again, particularly with regard to the confrontation between the deeply anchored “public service culture” of those companies and the highly competitive culture inherent to privately-owned companies. The potential findings of this study might then be transposed to those future programs of privatizations.
However, as mentioned below, Telco is an extreme case of organizational failure. Thus, one may argue that the issues affecting Telco have only emerged as reason of a unique sample of persons acting within a unique context. Hence, the findings of the study would be too idiosyncratic and, thus, not generalizable (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Nevertheless, Gioia, Corley & Hamilton (2013, p. 24) argue that the findings of a case study might predict the outcomes of another case by exemplifying “a generable principle that can be taught as a transferable generality—namely, ‘principles that are portable’ from one setting to another”. Therefore, even though their generalization is limited, the findings of the thesis would permit to draw the outlines of a theoretical framework (and, thus, possibly confirming the preliminary framework presented above), the conclusions of which might be applied to other similar cases of privatization. Finally, it is also conceivable to even apply the results of the study to others massive corporate changes that do not follow a process a privatization but have similar characteristics. For instance, some large privately owned companies characterized by a high level of bureaucracy and benefiting from a monopolistic or oligopolistic position may be confronted to the same challenges than a privatized company: executing a large corporate change to improve their efficiency following an abrupt increase of the competition in their market.

4.6. DATA RELIABILITY

4.6.1. Potential flaw related to use of secondary data
As mentioned above, the extracts of interviews used as secondary data have been previously selected as reason of the redundancy of the topics they deal with by the authors of the Leadconsulting’s report in which they are transcribed. Thus, some biases in the results of the thesis may exist due to this pre-selection of the most redundant topics emerged throughout the 1,000 interviews run by the consulting firm Leadconsulting. Furthermore, the use of secondary data does not allow investigating precisely the organizational climate at Telco since the data are not based on questions that would have been designed especially for the sake of solving the research question.

However, the low degree of reliability of the use of such secondary data is counterbalanced by the size of the sample they are based on. Indeed, as they are the outcomes of 1,000 interviews supported by 80,000 questionnaires, they offer a comprehensive overview of the working environment at Telco following the implementation of the corporate change plan.
Afterward. Therefore, they, at least, allow the emergence of certain tendencies about the employees’ perceptions about the change.

4.6.2. Potential flaw related to the poor organizational energy at Telco

Furthermore, as only extracts of interviews have been used, it was impossible to take into consideration the context in which the interviews have occurred. Yet, in the specific case of Telco, the environment would have been very relevant to consider given the severe organizational crisis that was affecting the company during the survey period. The poor climate and energy that existed in the company while the interviews and survey have been realized have certainly affected the objectivity of the data. Then, although it has been previously said that the result of this case study might be generalized as it depicts a rather typical case of a privatization, the Telco case study also displays extreme characteristics due to the tremendously poor organizational energy that was existing inside the organization. Consequently, the results of the study should also be relativized due to the fierce of the organizational crisis to which the company has been confronted with.

4.6.3. Potential flaw related to the preliminary theoretical framework

Finally, the use of a preliminary theoretical framework offers the advantage of framing the research and the data analysis by acting as a guideline in conducting the thesis. However, by relying too much of such framework, there is a risk to “force the data into the framework” during the data analysis. Hence, such framework may produce self-fulfilling prophecies and/or neglect other possible better explanations, reducing, therefore, the reliability of the thesis’ results.

5. RESULTS

As anticipated on the basis of preliminary theoretical framework, two aggregate dimensions have emerged from the data analysis: cultural clash and weak transformational leadership climate. They will be analyzed in the present section through the second-orders concepts they cover: management identity conflict and corporate identity conflict for the former and non-acceptance of the new incentive system, lack of trust in the new management, and lack of job sense for the latter. Subsequently, each of those second-order concepts will be described through the first-order concepts they have been built from. In addition, it will be discuss
whether or not they can be attached to one of the academic concepts mentioned in the literature review presented in Section 2 of this thesis.

5.1. CULTURAL CLASH

The cultural clash aggregate dimension refers to the two second-order concepts of management identity conflict and corporate identity conflict.

5.1.1. Management identity conflict

The management identity conflict’s second-order concept describes the mismatch existing between the management and the employees about their profile. For instance, in the case of Telco, this gap emerges from the academic background of the new management of the company. Indeed, the privatization of the company has led to a profound change in the recruitment policy of the managers of the company. Until this major shift, almost all the managers, both those from the middle and from the top management, were promoted engineers. The top-management, for instance, was recruited almost exclusively among the graduates of a renowned school of telecommunication engineering. In fact, as the company was operating a service public and benefiting from a monopoly position, its unique objective was to provide the access to the national telephone network to every household of its home country. The quality of the network rather the profitability of the business was the priority.

Consequently, the employees, whatever they held a technological degree, were used to be managed by people who had a deep knowledge of the core-business of the company. However, following the privatization of the company and its loss of its monopoly and its mission of service public, the company decided to become a seller of telecommunication services and not only a provider of telecommunication. Providing access to the telephone was not sufficient anymore. Selling communication services was also necessary to resist to the new and growing competition.

Hence, to address its lack of talents having commercial skills, the company changed the focus of its recruitment policy and has started to hire managers from outside the organization, mostly with a business school degree. Therefore, the new managers do not have any specific

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4 As a reminder, the difference of terminology between cultural and identity issues is mentioned in Section 2.1.1.3.
knowledge in telecommunication engineering and have received different objectives. They have been recruited to sell but not to provide telecommunication services. In addition, they do not have the status of public servants contrary to those hired before the privatization of the company.

The employees reacted very negatively to this shift in the profile and objectives of managers. The new managers, they said, do not understand the corporate culture that has shaped an old state-owned company like Telco. They particularly pointed out the difference of mentality of the new management in the following terms (those that compose the first-orders concepts of the data structure as attached at the end of this Section and in Appendix 3):

- “Previously, the managers were promoted technicians. Now, they are fresh business school graduates unable to set the priorities.”
- “We have a public service mentality. I joined the company for this very reason. But now, it does not matter anymore. The managers only speak about financial figures.”
- “Today the corporate spirit does not exist for the leadership. The managers are employed with short-term contracts and don't understand the mind of public servants that shaped.”

This divergence of identity of the new management is not widespread in the literature about change management. Few authors have worked indeed on the topic of privatization where issues related to an incompatibility of identity are most likely to emerge.

However, it may echo to the need of relying on shared assumptions to implement a corporate change as studied by Schein (2006). The author explains that the shared assumptions or values of employees constitute the source of their pride and self-esteem. Hence, when they diverge as result of an identity’s difference with the new management, it is likely to negatively affect the employees’ reaction to the implementation of a large corporate change induced by a privatization process.

In addition, this strong divergence in the profile and objectives of the management may also deter the emergence of a shared vision and, subsequently, disturb the realization of the corporate change as argued by Kotter’s (1996) and Luecke (2003).
5.1.2. Corporate identity conflict

Contrary to the previous concept of management identity conflict, the notion of corporate identity conflict does not refer to a divergence of values and vision with the management but with the company in itself. Nevertheless, the source of this divergence is similar: the end of the monopoly and the privatization of Telco that respectively caused its shift from a pure telecommunication provider to a telecommunication service seller and the end of its state-owned company status.

To adapt to this massive change, the company had to profoundly alter its processes and objectives. Now, it must operate like a traditional private company and, therefore, maximize its profitability, whereas prior to its privatization, its main objective was to ensure the public service of providing access to the national telecommunication network. The employees, however, did not understand this shift since it has significantly altered the identity of the company. In fact, most of the employees were – and still are (for those hired prior to the privatization) – public servants with a very long experience in the company. Most of them have been recruited on the basis of an administrative exam at the end of their academic studies for instance (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010). Consequently, they considered the change from a state-owned company to a traditional private company as unrealizable by hurting not only the corporate culture but their values as well. They have strongly opposed to the new vision of being now part a profitable company, saying that they have joined the company – and they have been trained – with the aspiration of contributing to a public service.

In the interviews, they also express that they do not want to create a value for the shareholders but only for the user (of the public service), highlighting therefore their opposition to the new objectives and requirements of the company. In this respect, when they have been interviewed, many employees have used the term “user” rather than “customer” when speaking about their own tasks and aspirations of their day-to-day work. In addition, 70% of the employees surveyed by Leadconsulting declared that the work at Telco contradicts their own personal values (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).

The following quotes from the employees of Telco highlight their divergence of view toward the new corporate identity:
• “There is schizophrenia between a public administration and a regular company.”
• “The problem is being a public administration with the same ambition than a flexible American company. So tensions and incompatibilities are unavoidable.”
• “There is no moral value anymore. We try to behave as if the client were still important while we are well-aware that for the top-management, the customer is only an invoice to increase the wealth of shareholders.”

Since the corporate identity conflict has the same roots as the concept of management identity conflict, this second-order theme also encompasses the issues raised by Schein (2006), Kotter’s (1996), and Luecke (2003) about the absence of shared assumptions, values, and vision that prevents a change to be smoothly implemented.

The perception of the impossibility to realize the shift from a public to a private company may also suggest that Telco has reached the “maturity stage” described by Schein (2006). In this phase, the employees are likely to resist to the cultural change required by the destabilization of the corporate environment. Their shared assumptions about the identity of the company are such deeply enrooted into the organization that the corporate culture is now too strong to be altered so to fit to a massive change (Schein, 2006). Therefore, the probability is high for the employees – who have been recruited and trained to work for a company with a strong and specific public service’s culture – to resist to the significant cultural change induced by a privatization process.

5.2. Weak Transformational Leadership Climate
The aggregate dimension weak transformational leadership combines the second-order concepts of non-acceptance of the new incentive system, lack of trust in the new management, and lack of job sense.

5.2.1. Non acceptance of the new incentive system
The non-acceptance of the new incentive system reflects the negative reaction of employees to their submission to a new mechanism of promotion and bonuses that they were not used to deal with. At Telco, for decades, most of the promotions have relied on the administrative rank of the employees, determined either by the administrative exam they passed or by the
time they spent working for the company (e.g. years of service). Furthermore, the bonuses were allocated on a collective basis after negotiation with the labor unions. Thus, the incentive system was very transparent, objective, and, above all, not based on any kind of competition between the employees. Consequently, they were not incentivized by the perspective of increasing their pay or rank by being more efficient than their colleagues or by reaching individual key performance indicators. They were rather motivated through the proudness of being in charge of providing the access to the telephone to every French household. Thus, their motivation was mainly based on internal incentives.

Again, the end of monopoly and the privatization of the company that, respectively, caused the shift of the company from being a pure telecommunication provider to a telecommunication service seller and the end of its state-owned company status has provoked a major alteration of the incentive system. To adapt to this new competitive environment, Telco redesigned its promotion and bonuses policy by implementing a typical system of external incentives. Now, employees are asked to reach specific individual or, at least, team based, objectives to get promoted or to be awarded with a bonus. However, the employees have reacted negatively to the new incentive system as highlighted by the following quotes:

- “The biggest change is about the pay. Before, the salary was attached to the administrative rank defined by the exam passed by the employee. Now, it is based on the activity of the employee.”
- “The promoting system is relatively opaque and subjective. Even the promotions are blurred.”
- “Nowadays, we are under pressure to charge the client. We have objectives to reach.”

The new compensation model has deeply affected the reaction of the employees to the corporate change. The shift from an internal to an external incentive system was not only too abrupt and too strong but also not supported by the values and vision that the employees had about their work at Telco. The new incentive policy has made them pressured and has increased their level of stress. For instance, 40% of the employees have responded in the Leadconsulting survey that they have been stressed or very tired over the last twelve months (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010). Hence, it might refer to the idea developed by Price and
Chahal (2006) according to which the implementation of new processes not aligned with the corporate culture are likely to spread anxiety and stress throughout the organization. As highly stressed employees tend to be less committed and more reluctant to accept an organizational change, the probability of resistance to a massive corporate change has been inevitably high (Price & Chahal, 2006; Vakola & Nikolaou, 2005).

Furthermore, the non-acceptance of a new-incentive system prevents the leadership from running the organization through a captivating and intellectual vision, which is one of the main components of a transformational leadership strategy (Menges, Walter, Vogel, & Bruch, 2011; Bass, 1985; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Bommer, 1996).

In addition, as it will be further discussed in Section 6, the components and the literature that sustains such second-order concept also make it too belong to the cultural clash aggregate dimension and not only to weak transformational leadership one.

5.2.2. Lack of trust in the new management

The lack of trust in the new management is linked to the move of Telco toward a more business-oriented company as well. The shift from a provider to a seller of telecommunication services has led to the recruitment of managers with a business background as mentioned in Section 5.1.1. It has been a big change for the employees. For decades, engineers have been managing them. They were able to ask them advices and get precise answers about specific work-related technological issues. Therefore, the employees had a high level of trust in the management prior to the privatization.

When new managers with a business background arrived in the company to turn it more competitive, they did not understand why people without any knowledge of the telecommunication technology were now managing them. Therefore, they lost their trust in the management. The following quotes point-out such lack of trust in the management expressed by the employees of Telco:

- “The managers, they don't have any support and any clue about what we do.”
"I don't know whether they understand nothing or they don't get the information, but their management's decisions are unbelievable and don't fit with the reality of the fieldwork."

"The managers don’t have the right academic background to understand our job."

This loss of trust is far from being an unexpected phenomenon. The literature is unanimous to underline the importance of trust of the employees to promote a positive attitude towards the change by fostering their commitment and support (Burnes & James, 1995) (Hoag, Ritschard, & Cooper, 2002). Furthermore, this loss of trust may also be at the origin of the high level of anxiety and stress among the workforce. According to Schein and Kurt (1996), creating psychological safety is a crucial step in the unfreezing phase of the Lewin’s change process model. Thus, the anxiety and stress caused by the absence of trust in the new management may have strengthened the resistance to change observed at Telco.

5.2.3. Lack of job sense and proudness

The lack of job sense second-order concepts first highlights the feeling of frustration expressed by the employees about their work at Telco. This frustration comes from the impossibility to work properly because of harsh working conditions. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, 61% of the employees surveyed by Leadconsulting declared being overloaded and to not having the necessary time to properly handle their work. In addition, 71% of them said that they were not able to correctly perform their task due to a situation of understaffing (Telco's Independent Auditor, 2010).

More precisely, they expressed their feeling of frustration through the impossibility of providing a good customer service. They complained to not caring the client anymore. They argued that the length of the assistance to the client was reduced and is now over monitored. Thus, they said to have less time to find the appropriate solution for the customer. They also pointed-out that their new duty to sell by-products while assisting clients on technical problems reduces even more the time they would need to do their job properly.

A second important aspect of the lack of job sense concept stems from the loss of proudness of working for Telco expressed by the employees. The explanation can be found in the alteration of the notion of service public in their day-to-day work but also in the shift of Telco
from a technological to a business-oriented company. The employees were indeed very proud of providing not only a public service but also a technical expertise. This loss of proudness was such prevalent at Telco that it is the second-order concept to be supported with the highest number of first-order concepts, only behind the corporate and the management identity conflict concepts.

The loss of job sense and proudness experienced by the employees of Telco is illustrated by the following quotes:

- “Before we were public service oriented. We were caring the client. Now, it is a run. We don't have the time to make our job. It is frustrating since we have a passion for a job well done.”
- “We were proud of the public service we were providing and of the technical expertise of the company.”
- “The only thing is to meet the daily objectives. Whatever how and who.”

The lack of proudness is an underdeveloped topic in the change management literature. However, the literature may provide some hints about the way a lack of proudness may disrupt a corporate change. For instance, Kanter (1992), Nadler and Tushman (1990), and Burnes and James (1995) have all stressed on the importance of shaping a compelling vision to unite them behind a common goal, a unique vision. Hence, it is logical that the loss of proudness provoked by a change precludes the elaboration of such vision. Fostering a positive attitude about the vision and, therefore, about the change, as recommended by Hoag, Ritschard, and Cooper (2002), appears impossible when there is an absence of job sense or proudness. Otherwise, the employees are likely to oppose to the vision proposed by the leadership and, then, to resist to the change (Buchanan & Huczynski, 2001). Furthermore, the lack of job sense may also be linked to the absence of sensemaking leadership, which aims at making sense of the emerging change (Weick & Quinn, 1999).

Finally, the loss of job sense and proudness may also reinforces the opposition of values that nurtures the corporate identity conflict, creating a vicious circle between those two secondary-concepts and, thus, between the aggregate dimensions of the two moderators cultural clash and weak transformational leadership climate as explained below in Section 6.
(see next page for Figure 3)
Previously, the managers were promoted technicians. Now, they are fresh business school graduates unable to set the priorities.

We have a public service mentality. I joined the company for this very reason. But now, it does not matter anymore. The managers only speak about financial figures.

Today the corporate spirit does not exist for the leadership. The managers are employed with short-term contracts and don't understand the mind of public servants that shaped.

There is a schizophrenia between a public administration and a regular company.

The problem is being a public administration with the same ambition than a flexible American company. So tensions and incompatibilities are unavoidable.

There is no moral values anymore. We try to behave as if the client were still important while we are well-aware that for the top-management, the customer is only an invoice to increase the wealth of shareholders.

The biggest change is about the pay. Before, the salary was attached to the administrative rank defined by the exam passed by the employee. Now, it is based on the activity of the employee.

The promoting system is relatively opaque. Even the promotions are blurred.

Nowadays, we are under pressure to charge the client. We have objectives to reach.

The managers, they don't have any support and any clue about what we do.

I don't know whether they understand nothing or they don't get the information, but their management's decisions are unbelievable and don't fit with the reality of the fieldwork.

The managers don't have the academic the right academic background to understand our job.

Before we were public service oriented. Before, we were caring the client. Now, it is a run. We don't have the time to make our job. It is frustrating since we have a passion for a job well done.

We were proud of the public service we were providing and of the technical expertise of the company.

The only thing is to meet the daily objectives. Whatever how and who.

**Figure 3:** Data structure based on interviews retrieved from secondary data (the author)
6. **DISCUSSION**

The findings of the data analysis permit to confirm, complete, and explain more deeply the preliminary theoretical framework. Nevertheless, though it has the benefit of improving the understanding of the relationship between change management and acceleration trap, the framework is not free of flaws and, therefore, should not be considered as defining undisputable and definite conclusions.

6.1. **THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AS UPDATED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE THESIS**

![Diagram of the theoretical framework](see Appendix 4 for a bigger representation)

**Figure 4: Theoretical framework as updated with the results of the thesis (the author)**

The ambition of the thesis was to study the relationship between corporate change and acceleration trap through a privatization’s case study. More specifically, as suggested by the
existing literature and schematized in the preliminary theoretical framework presented in Section 3.1, the objectives of the data analysis were to demonstrate and understand better, through a privatization’s case study, the role of moderators played by a cultural clash and a weak transformational leadership climate on this relationship. The results of the data analysis tend to confirm the role of those two moderators and, therefore, validate the preliminary theoretical framework. In addition, they also deepen the understanding of their effect. In fact, as schematized here above, the cultural clash moderator appears to increase the risk of falling into the acceleration trap through a corporate identity conflict and a management identity conflict. With regards to the weak transformational leadership moderator, the results of the study indicates that they affect the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap through a lack of trust in the new management and lack of job sense, particularly via a loss of proudness. Lastly, the non-acceptance of the new incentive system seems to contribute to both the cultural clash and the weak transformational leadership climate moderators.

6.1.1. The cultural conflict moderator
The data analysis shows that a shift of culture provoked by a massive corporate change affects the risk of falling into the acceleration trap following a privatization process. In the case of Telco, the cultural clash is the result of the dual divergence expressed by employees with the corporate culture.

First, a corporate identity conflict that reflects the opposition of the employees towards the new corporate values and vision resulting from the company’ shift from a pure telecommunication provider to a telecommunication service seller and the end of its mission of public service. The former corporate culture was in fact so deeply enrooted – and for such longtime – into the mind of the employees that the company could not change it so abruptly and rapidly. Thus, as suggested by the concept of organizational readiness highlighted in literature (Price & Chahal, 2006; Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993; Cinite, Duxbury, & Higgins, 2009), the study illustrates the importance of culturally preparing the organization to the change that is to be implemented. Furthermore, the role of the corporate identity conflict moderator echoes with the work of Corley and Gioia (2004) on identity ambiguities about which the authors state that an excess of identity changes may contribute to a change overloading.
The second divergence expressed by the employees with the corporate culture is emphasized by the management identity conflict, which corresponds to the conflict of values and vision existing between the employees and the new management. This divergence is also induced by the shift toward a more “commercially-oriented” company and is particularly observable through the new academic background of the manager. This component of a cultural clash has not been explicitly identified in the corporate change literature so far. The impact of this finding is, however, limited. It can be argued that it is only a sub-category of the corporate identity conflict. In addition, it might only be applied to a case of privatization and not to every type of corporate change. In fact, the shift from a technological to a commercial academic background rather concerns a state-owned company that needs to change its recruitment policy of its managers to be more “commercially-oriented” because of the end of its monopoly position. It also refers to the concept of identity ambiguity of Corley and Gioia (2004) where there is an ambiguity about which identity is the most appropriate for the organization (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).

The study also shows that the implementation of a new incentive system contributes to the emergence of a cultural clash that, in turn, strengthens the relationship between change management and acceleration trap. In fact, in the case of Telco, such system has exacerbated the feeling of the employees that the company and the management were now only driven by objectives that deeply clash with their long enrooted values of public servants. Here again, while this finding has not been widely studied in corporate change literature, it should limited to a case of privatization during which the leadership needs to modify the incentive system to overcome the new challenges arising from the end of its monopoly and its entry into a competitive environment. However, the incentive system should not be underestimated as it may lead to a poor transformational leadership climate as well, which corresponds to the second variable that strengthens the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap.

Finally, it is important to note that the insights of the thesis are not so much about showing that there is a risk of cultural clash during a privatization. Such shock might reasonably be expected in any type of major change indeed. The achievements of the thesis are rather to highlight concrete illustrations of such cultural clash by showing, for instance, that a mismatch with the new managerial background may contribute to these cultural frictions.
6.1.2. The weak transformational leadership moderator

The study indicates that a poor transformational leadership climate stimulates the risk of falling into the acceleration trap following a privatization. Hence, it supports the extant literature affirming that a transformational leadership style is more appropriate to tackle the issues related to such disruptive and divergent change (Burnes & James, 1995). Likewise, the study also endorses the literature about the related topic of sensemaking leadership since sensemakers leaders are also able to influence strategic change in organizations by making sense of the desired path within the existing organization (Weick & Quinn, 1999).

Regarding the components of the transformational leadership moderator, the thesis provides evidences of how a poor transformational leadership climate may push a privatized company into the acceleration trap through the non-acceptance of the new incentive system, the lack of trust in the new management, and the loss of job sense and proudness.

Those three second-order concepts emerged from the data analysis were already known to be critical in the formation of a strong transformational leadership climate and to support a divergent change such as a privatization. The concept of “Theory E” and “Theory O” from Beer and Nohria (2000) that stresses the importance on not only relying on the former (focused on external incentives) but also on the latter (based on internal incentives) when executing this kind of disruptive change corroborates the findings of the thesis on this matter indeed.

Again, the interest of the study rather stems from the concrete illustrations covered by the concepts of lack of trust and lack of job sense. For instance, the data analysis has identified that a loss of trust can result from a shift in the educational background of the new managers provoked by the privatization of the company. Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of the lack of proudness as an important component of the loss of job sense. In the case of Telco, this feeling arises from the low importance apparently given by the company to the client since the privatization. The employees attribute such loss of proudness to their overloading and to the sales and profitability objectives inherent to a privately owned company. Such new working environment would prevent them from caring the customer as they did – and were proud of – prior to the privatization of the company.

To summarize, the analysis of the constituents of the cultural clash and of the poor
transformational leadership climate’s moderators demonstrates the contribution of such moderators to the relationship privatization and acceleration trap. Furthermore, the second order concepts may also suggest the formation of a vicious circle between those two moderators. Both would tend to reinforce each other. In fact, as further explained below, the features of the cultural clash also seem to contribute to a poor transformational leadership climate and *vice-versa*.

6.2. BENEFITS AND FLAWS OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AS RESULTING FROM THE DATA ANALYSIS

The main benefit of the theoretical framework resulting from the data analysis is to simultaneously confirm and deepen the extant literature about the management of large corporate changes throughout an intelligible and straightforward scheme. The importance of tackling cultural issues and fostering a transformational leadership climate has been already partly revealed by some academic studies. Yet, the literature on the topic was too modest to permit a deep understanding how a cultural clash and a poor transformational leadership climate affect the risk of falling into the acceleration trap during a privatization process. Therefore, the framework offers valuable insights about how those two moderators affect the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap. Indeed, those moderators are supported by second-order concepts that reflect concrete situations to which a company might face when executing a large corporate change.

The theoretical framework, however, does not integrate the suggestion that the two moderators might form a vicious circle. The interaction that may exist between them is, indeed, not directly observable throughout the data analysis. It is only the interpretation of the theoretical aspects on which relied the second-order concepts of the data analysis that hints at the existence of such vicious circle.

Furthermore, as the framework seems to reflect interlinked issues, its structuration, in particular the respective effects of its two moderators might be questionable. For instance, it might be argued that the poor transformational leadership climate variable acts as the sole moderator of the relationship privatization and acceleration trap. The cultural clash moderator would only be a component of the poor transformational leadership climate’s moderator. In this case, the second-order concepts corporate and management identity conflict that support
the cultural clash moderator would only prevent the formation of a transformational leadership climate by blocking the emergence of a common vision for instance. The fact that the non-acceptance of the new incentive system is a second-order concept of both the cultural conflict and the poor transformational leadership climate aggregate dimensions fortifies this interpretation. Consequently, it might be argued that the cultural clash would be a sort of “moderator of moderator” or, merely, another second-order concept of the poor transformational leadership climate.

7. CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCHES

7.1. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

The subject of the thesis was the analysis of the relationship that may exist between a corporate change and the fall into the acceleration trap within the context of a privatization. Following a review of the change management’s literature and an examination of a notorious case of privatization, it has been found of valuable of interest to answer the research question of how a privatization process affects the risk of falling into the acceleration trap.

An investigation into the corporate change literature has also permitted to draw the outlines of a preliminary theoretical framework. This framework suggests that two moderators affect the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap: a cultural clash and a weak transformational leadership climate.

Given the scarcity of the literature about privatization issues, the objectives of the study were to understand and demonstrate how those two moderators might increase the risk of falling into the acceleration trap during a privatization process. The shift of the telecommunication company Telco from a technology-oriented toward a business-oriented company caused by its privatization and its entry into a competitive environment has offered a sufficiently rich case study to meet the objectives of the study. While confirming the role played by those two moderators, the case of Telco has enhanced the knowledge of the action of such moderators on the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap.
In particular, the data analysis has firstly illustrated the importance of the concepts of corporate and management identity conflicts for the occurrence of a cultural clash that might push a privatized company into the acceleration trap. Secondly, the data analysis has also identified concrete illustrations of how a lack of trust in the new management but also of job sense contributes to establish a poor transformational leadership climate, which, then, reinforces the risk of falling into the acceleration trap. Furthermore, the data analysis shows that the non-acceptance of the new incentive system also significantly increases this risk by contributing to both a cultural clash and a weak transformational leadership climate.

Finally, the said dual contribution (of the non-acceptance of the new incentive system) to the risk of falling into the acceleration trap hints at the presence of an interlinked relationship existing between those two moderators (cultural clash and weak transformational leadership), hence, forming a vicious circle between them. It even raises the question of the sense of the relationship itself. In particular, whether the cultural clash would not rather be a “moderator of moderator” of the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap instead of being a “direct moderator”. In fact, it may be interpreted that the cultural clash concept does not act directly on this relationship, but solely indirectly through the weak transformational leadership moderator.

7.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE FUTURE PROCESSES OF PRIVATIZATION

The generalization of the findings of the study is relatively limited since those are based on a single case study of an extreme case of privatization. Likewise, the challenges provoked by a privatization that may trigger the acceleration trap – like a shift of corporate culture or change in the incentive system – seem to be inherent to any case of privatization, and therefore, are difficult to avoid.

However, as explained in Section 4.5, it is still possible to derive some managerial implications from the theoretical framework for next cases of privatization or, even, for others massive corporate changes in general.

Indeed, those findings might allow the leadership of a company, confronted with a privatization process, to, at least, take some actions to limit the challenges and difficulties
raised by such type of massive corporate change, in particular, with regards to the consequences provoked by the shift of corporate culture.

For instance, a first implication for the leadership is to stress on shaping a common vision and shared objectives. It would allow a higher degree of commitment from all the members of the organization – employees, management, and leadership – to fully support the change. Defining collectively such vision and objectives is, therefore, essential. Otherwise, the leadership should, at least, intensely communicate about the reasons that justify the shift of vision, and, thus, of corporate identity. Consequently, it would not only limit the effects of a cultural clash but also foster a transformational leadership climate (Bass, 1991).

A second implication stems from the importance of addressing the loss of pride suffered by the employees that they express when getting aware of working for a company that is not anymore in charge of public service mission and which the new vision is being a competitive and profitable company. Here again, communicating about the motives and the necessity of such changes appears to be critical to get the full support of the employees.

Lastly, the outcomes of the study also imply the need to counterbalance the introduction of external incentives by internal incentives. In fact, the alteration of the notion of job sense – in particular concerning the loss of pride – caused by the shift from a collectively toward an individually-based system of promotion and remuneration reduces dramatically the degree of acceptance of the change by the employees. It should, then, be combined with a softer way of motivating the employees; for instance, by relying on their capabilities and commitment in the execution of the change. Regarding this topic, the work of Beer & Nohria (2000) about the accurate mix of “Theory E” and “Theory O” as mentioned above is of valuable interest for the top-management of a company before starting a privatization process.

7.3. Implications of the Findings for the Change Management Literature

The study has followed an inductive and deductive approach by aiming at understanding and demonstrating how cultural and leadership issues may push a company into the acceleration trap following its privatization. In fact, by providing concrete examples of their action on this relationship, the thesis has not only confirmed the function played by a cultural clash and the style of leadership but also has deepened the comprehension of how those moderators may
affect the relationship between privatization and acceleration trap. The corporate and management identity clash, caused by the shift from a technological to a business-oriented company, has illustrated how a cultural conflict and transformational leadership may increase the risk of falling into the acceleration trap following a privatization process. It has also shown the effect of such massive corporate change on the trust in the management and on the acceptance of the new incentive system (which also involves cultural issues as mentioned above). Therefore, those illustrations can nurture the literature about the relationship between change management and acceleration trap, which is limited so far, especially that which focuses on cases of privatization.

Furthermore, the thesis has revealed a concept that has not been widely considered in the corporate change literature so far. In fact, the study highlights the significant role played by the lack of proudnness. It has been identified as strong explanation of the loss of job sense and, thus, of the low commitment and support to the change expressed by the employees. Yet, it is an underdeveloped concept in the change management literature. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate deeper its effect on the level of transformational leadership climate within an organization.

Finally, as explained in Section 6.2, the theoretical framework drawn up by the thesis present interlinked issues that rise the question about whether the concept of cultural clash is an independent moderator or only a component of the weak transformational leadership moderator. Hence, further studies would improve the knowledge about the relationship between change management and acceleration trap by clarifying this point.

7.4. LIMITATIONS

Aside from the flaw of the theoretical framework regarding the presence of interlinked issues as mentioned above, the thesis faces limitations, which mainly concern the data set of the study.

First, the use of secondary data has automatically limited the analysis of the organizational issues that may have pushed Telco into the acceleration trap. In fact, the employees have not been interviewed for the unique sake of solving the research question and the data analysis is only based on excerpts of the interviews that have been run by a consulting firm. As a result,
other factors that those highlighted by the thesis could have explained the fall of the telecommunication company into the acceleration during its privatization.

Second, the study only relies on the employees’ perspective since the members of the top-management of company have not been interviewed. Given the tense social climate that was affecting the company when the interviews have been made, the focus on the employees’ perspective may have over emphasized certain issues at the expense of more hidden factors. The point of view of the top-management could have counterbalanced the opinion of the employees of some issues therefore.

Finally, another limit stems from the extreme case of organizational crisis that has afflicted Telco after its privatization. In fact, the fierce of the crisis could have over exemplified some aspects that are not likely to be found in other cases of privatization or large corporate change.

Consequently, the generalization of the findings of the thesis remains limited as mentioned in Section 4.5. Nevertheless, as it is one of the few studies that focused on studying the relationship between change management and acceleration trap within the context of a privatization, the results of the thesis still offer valuable insights about how such massive and disruptive change may open this trap.

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8. BIBLIOGRAPHY


Burnes, B. (1996). "No such thing as … a “one best way” to manage organizational change". 34(10), 11-18.


Corley, K. G. (2004). Defined by our strategy or our culture? Hierarchical differences in perceptions of organizational identity and change. relations, 57(9), 1145-1177.


List of Appendix

1. Preliminary Theoretical Framework
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9. APPENDIX
9.1. Preliminary Theoretical Framework

Privatization → Cultural changes → Acceleration trap → Poor organizational energy

Moderator 1
Cultural clash

Moderator 2
Transformational leadership

(The author)
### 9.2. Table Comparing the Main “Generalist Prescriptive Articles” Versus the Main “Focused Explanatory Articles”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generalist prescriptive articles</th>
<th>Focused explanatory articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Beer &amp; Nohria, 2000)</td>
<td>(Salauroo &amp; Burnes, 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fernandez, 2010)</td>
<td>(Cinite, Duxbury, &amp; Higgins, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kanter, Stein, &amp; Jick, 1992)</td>
<td>(Burnes &amp; James, 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kotter, 1996) (Luecke, 2003)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Moran &amp; Brightman, 2001)</td>
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<td>(Nadler &amp; Tushman, 1990)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(Zaugg, 2002)</td>
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<td>(Cinite, Duxbury, &amp; Higgins, 2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Nadler D. A., 1995)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tushman &amp; O'Reilly, 2013)</td>
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<td>(Phillips &amp; Holton, 1997)</td>
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<td>(Englund, Graham, &amp; Dinsmore, 2003)</td>
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<td>(Anderson D. L., 2014)</td>
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<td>(Anderson &amp; Anderson, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Beckhard &amp; Pritchard, 1992)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Marshak, 2004)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The author)
9.3. **Data Structure**

*(see next page)*
Previously, the managers were promoted technicians. Now, they are fresh business school graduates unable to set the priorities.

We have a public service mentality. I joined the company for this very reason. But now, it does not matter anymore. The managers only speak about financial figures.

Today the corporate spirit does not exist for the leadership. The managers are employed with short-term contracts and don’t understand the mind of public servants that shaped.

There is a schizophrenia between a public administration and a regular company.

The problem is being a public administration with the same ambition than a flexible American company. So tensions and incompatibilities are unavoidable.

There is no moral values anymore. We try to behave as if the client were still important while we are well-aware that for the top-management, the customer is only an invoice to increase the wealth of shareholders.

The biggest change is about the pay. Before, the salary was attached to the administrative rank defined by the exam passed by the employee. Now, it is based on the activity of the employee.

The promoting system is relatively opaque. Even the promotions are blurred.

Nowadays, we are under pressure to charge the client. We have objectives to reach.

The managers, they don’t have any support and any clue about what we do.

I don’t know whether they understand nothing or they don’t get the information, but their management’s decisions are unbelievable and don’t fit with the reality of the fieldwork.

The managers don’t have the academic the right academic background to understand our job.

Before we were public service oriented. Before, we were caring the client. Now, it is a run. We don't have the time to make our job. It is frustrating since we have a passion for a job well done.

We were proud of the public service we were providing and of the technical expertise of the company.

The only thing is to meet the daily objectives. Whatever how and who.
9.4. Theoretical Framework as Updated with the Results of the Thesis

Non-acceptance of the new incentive system

Management identity conflict → Moderator 1
Cultural clash

Corporate identity conflict

Privatization → Cultural changes

Cultural changes → Acceleration trap

Non-acceptance of the new incentive system

Lack of trust in the new management → Lack of job sense

Lack of trust in the new management → Transformational leadership

(The author)
9.5. A List of the Internet Sources That Have Been Used

All the Internet sources that have been used are cited in Section 8 “Bibliography” above.
9.6. List of Meetings and Interviews with Informants

As mentioned in Section 4 “Methodology”, the thesis has exclusively relied on secondary data. The specimens of the excerpts of interviews run by the consulting firm mandated by Telco that have been used as secondary data are transcribed in Section 9.8 below.
9.7. **List of Support and Aids That Have Been Used**

- Software for dealing with qualitative data: NVivo 10 for MAC – Version 10.0.4 (1066)
9.8. Specimen of Interviews and Observation Documents that Have Been Used for the Thesis

Excerpts of interviews retrieved from the report issued by the consulting firm mandated by Telco on which is based the case study that supports the results of the thesis:

Internals \ Final Report – Technologia – § 195 coded references

Reference 1 -
"Managers at the beginning were promoted technicians rank, they understood the work. Today, managers do not understand our job. They left school with beautiful concepts in mind, while the work is much more artisanal”. The former managers understand the issues, the new ones are unable to set priorities"

Reference 2 -
“We were proud to be Telco and now we are ashamed. Some colleagues hide the company’s service cars to avoid being verbally abused by people who do not understand why it does not work as before. We are well aware that the cables are rotten and that people in some areas have never had the ADSL.”

Reference 3 -
“This is serious. How will restore the confidence of people? Some N + 1 were our colleagues and we would never have thought like that. Some managers are downgraded; there is no more desire for progress. We were proud of the public service and the technicality of the company. Now we no longer advise our family to go to Telco.”

Reference 4 -
"It will be very hard to restore confidence to the employees. Today we are almost ashamed to work for Telco. I have colleagues who say they work "in Telecommunications" but not for Telco"

Reference 5 -
"Before, I was proud to be Telco. But it's over. For "them", entrepreneurship does not exist. Before everyone contributed to it. The company is malfunctioning, it is totally unstructured. They put contractual workers as managers, but they do not understand the spirit of the officials who built Telco. Contractual workers, they spend three years after they go elsewhere. For them, it's all the same, but not for us.”

Reference 6 -
“We had a public service mind. This is different now. Today they are the policy of scorched earth.”

“I joined the company for this very reason. But now, it does not matter anymore. The managers only speak about financial figures.”

Reference 7 -
"I participate in a lot of technology forums on the Net, but I never say I am from Telco."

Reference 8 -

"Now when we arrive at customers, very often they question us on our health our morale. They say, "And you gonna not too bad?" Once a customer has said to my colleague: "And no mistake with you life, you must think about your family". It hurt us. We do not necessarily want to hear any of it every day. That's why we do not put company’s clothes, like that customers do not know from which company we are."

Reference 9 -

"I even told my family to stop because every time we announced a suicide, they called me to see how I was. It's heavy."

Reference 10 -

"There is a schizophrenia between a public administration and a normal company normal."

Reference 11 -

“There is a gap between rhetoric and reality, the "agile" and "performance" performance company... What a difference between the values displayed nearby, transparency, boldness, simplicity and reality!” “Values are wishful thinking, to simple to act like that.” "The problem of Telco, is having the ambition of a US company, flexibility, etc... while it is impossible. Tensions and incompatibilities occur inevitably.”

Reference 12 -

There were exaggerations (forced internal mobility, useless tasks...) and behaviors to condemn. But everyone was focused on results and sometimes at the expense of the human. Everyone has had its share of responsibility in this cycle and no one strongly condemned the excesses and bad practices. (...) The reduction of overhead was a leitmotif and transposition of the Anglo-Saxon methods. The "cost-killers" were at work but often without shade.”

Reference 13 -

"We have to go through our responsible and accountable our development, we we're at the end of France to Nice, it is far from Marseille, it is far from everything, that lack of dialogue with our leaders located in Marseille, they come not often our leaders, it is too far away.”

Reference 14 -

“I am responsible for a team and I feel responsible for anything, I should put up stuff from people who enact above me, I do not have more autonomy than my schedule, I have to get the signed off from my department head for everything.”

Reference 15 -

"I try to limit the centralization of power and decision and give more freedom to local entities, but today it is almost impossible, even the managers do not have any freedom. They lack autonomy, motivation and their decisions are slow as a consequence.”

Reference 17 -
"Managers do not have support they know nothing, hence decisions descend more by default than by real decision, taken more or less under the influence of "committees of stuff." Telco suffers from its size. It would take human sizes with clear responsibilities, and positive and negative sanctions.”

Reference 18 -

"I do not know if up there they do not understand or that they do not get the info, but the decisions they make are really crazy and do not correspond at all to the ground realities. They should come themself, see what they did exactly, to understand that the tools are not adequate, etc.”

Reference 19 -

"We can trace anything. It takes courage and few people have. The Directors of Business Units, they are slaughtered every week. The boss says: "we should not be the first, do not make big gains as the goals are going to be even harder."

Reference 20 -

"Anyway we can not change anything. So now I just do what they ask.”

Reference 21 -

"That's what they wanted us to not take any initiatives, we obey, that's all.”
"It's always a bit average for everyone, whether you are good or not, it is hard to distinguish and they do not give us the means to do this: bonus are given on the basis of an evaluation of the performances of the year, but we seek the average, one screws interviews and results and arrange for the majority of the team to that everyone get the average bonus.”

Reference 22-

"In the provinces, there has been so many restructurings, people are not well.”

Reference 23 -

"Local managers, executives fear, in a climate where there is little room for poor performance, if you lose your not sure of finding a job”.

Reference 24 -

"Operating rules appear increasingly contrary to the effectiveness of individual work and internal cooperation to customer service.”

Reference 25 -

"Today we particularly implement rationalization process of technical assistance and customer service centers that often tend to make them less effective because, framing too narrowly procedures, we often lose the benefit of experience and adaptability of men. In all these cases, the operational management should play between the conflicting demands of processes and operational efficiency: intellectual work is partially opaque to traditional management tools."

Reference 26 -

"The problem of the development process, it is the lack of ground listening. After that, it is difficult to implement in daily life.”
"The process and scripts are pushed to the extreme, it is far too rigid. They cease to be of aid to become shackles. It would give more freedom of action and judge the results."

Reference 27 -

"There is an increase in procedures and processes. We spend more time filling Excel spreadsheets to do its job. As technicians could not do the job, we created scripts and stored commands. The consequence is a loss of technical skill and competence. Now if there is a problem, nobody can intervene, hence loss of interest in work. We no longer feel responsible, we suffer."

Reference 28 -

"What bothers me are the “processes”, we do not understand what they mean. One has the impression that they lose time and we are wasting our time to do all that.”

Reference 29 -

"My job is very complex, there are many different cases. In the process, there is always something missing. The personal network is the basis of the trade.”
"The problem is the lack of autonomy. Everything is planned with pre-completed forms where there is good and nonsense. Before, we were organized with remote alarm, everything worked.

Reference 30 -

"The records fall into the apps. For ADSL, there were more than 7 apps. It's too much. We had formal training but it was worth nothing. The biggest problem is that the apps crash or are too heavy. Sometimes we take an appointment and it is not transmitted in the workload. The appointment is fixed depending on the windows that are arranged in the app but it was not so confident that we take back our phone and checked to the end of the chain.”
"You have to constantly connect to apps because one is managed by three lines of business. When driving change an appointment, it will not switch to other apps. She calls the other driving but we're not constantly informed so we'll see in every app each Activity Conduct. We must stop looking at the excessive productivity and all the tools that are there to control and not for efficiency.”

Reference 31 -

"Now OPTIM is a task by task, over water. We are over monitored, that gives me stress and it does not work well, our ability to organize ourselves is very important.”

Reference 32 -

"There is the example of a colleague who does the minimum and is well judged, it is because it is the simplest and cheapest projects. It's a lot.”

Reference 33 -

"Our N + 1 said:" The tables are made to be tampered with. "This is his assistant who spends his time feeding the application: "If the dates are wrong, you only have to put the correct dates.”

Reference 34 -
"Management is much too complicated, completely inadequate.

Reference 35 -

"The rule is equal derangement 1 hour. But we do not consider the travel time. It puts a lot of pressure."

Reference 36 -

"The apps are a real disaster. There are many, all developed by everyone because official apps have never worked so it's resourcefulness that worked but it leads to a possible magma streamline. It's like the rest, it is the actual company that operates the formal business."

"I work on a twenty apps. Without any training. The interrelations are very complex. Nothing is stabilized. The apps were made by people dispersed, there about ten years, and each has made his small developments in the corner so inevitably it cannot communicate."

Reference 37 -

"Many developments are made in India. Offshore developments require successive transcripts. They do what they asked. This is correct, but it is wrong."

Reference 40 -

"I saw a beautiful casting error for the position of head of the department, responsible for integrating the steering, it was said that for this position, there was no need to be a tech guy!"

Reference 41 -

"Project managers are less technical and more administrative. Consequently, everyone becomes bad."

Reference 42 -

"Permanent understaffed and absenteeism often force us to make the" Orchestra men."

"The working conditions in the department are difficult because it lacks the workforce. We are asked to working overtime and always work harder and faster."

Reference 43 -

"It is clearly understaffed ... With computers, we do the reporting, budgets, etc., We are underwater ... We could not believe when we were told there would be an additional person. All services are underwater as well. We lose contracts because they are understaffed…"

They say too that we have too many people in certain professions and not enough on others ... But the problem is they are trying to get rid of us."

Reference 44 -

"The downsizing has resulted in the disappearance of a 15-person team replaced by a new team of 7 people belonging to another company. In addition to the extra work, the void has disrupted important projects. In addition, the former team made quality services to several directions, in an important area of technology for the future. Training those guys also constitutes a significant additional workload."

Reference 45 -
"I, on my team, it gives me more customers with as many people... Compared to 20 years ago, it does the work of two teams. We try to do the best, but the pressure is stronger ... There was a time when we have worked at night, on weekends... "

Reference 46 -

"Making the figure, figure! There it still counts challenges... with a lollipop for the winner, for example."

"Always work very quickly! The figure, that's the key word! And recognition, it is told, "You have a job! Do not complain!" In two words: we must be silent and suffer.”

"No moral, it is like in bank every day. Especially in the sale derartment. Valorization is the God, is above everything. The point is that in the evening the figure is good, no matter how and where.”

Reference 47 –

For ten years I worked in the shop, the workload has increased significantly with the Internet and Mobile, required skills are becoming more sophisticated, but there is less and less training.

"Before we had long training, it was really good. Today I do not see how we could from a week in training our service…”

"It is true that before there was a real training, sometimes long, months, today is not at all the case, my business, it's a job that deserves a training, there is virtually no, or else have to ask, but I think we should give basic training to employees when they go into a new position.”

Reference 48 –

"For a small folder before we had a plan and a quote. This was going much faster. Now we must return 20 documents in apps before we can work. For a technical study that takes an hour, we go from half a day to go in all apps, and if it crashes, you never know who to contact.”

"It's OPUS (a software) that manages tasks. It's very heavy. The apps are not intuitive, they are heavy and now we cannot start any task until you have returned to the system. We lose a lot of time with that.”

"I'm working on 6 different apps, but they are not interfaced. When you have a problem is sometimes a month and a half waiting for intervention of an IT service. It has been outsourced. This is very annoying. Apps suppressed quick contacts we had between services. Basically while you have to go faster and faster, with all the apps it goes much slower."

Reference 49 -

"In our values, the word that makes me laugh is the simplicity, when we see gas plants that lay across our IS (information system). We want applications that are flexible, simple, but this is not the case.”

Reference 50 -
"We are four workers, we have tens of thousands of worksites. That's a lot of work, but even when it is done. All day at the computer, with the phone ringing constantly. It's very heavy. In addition.”

Reference 52 -

“People from above, they do not know what happens! They are disconnected.”

Reference 53 -

"The average age at the company is 46-60 years, while for designers of the apps is always simple but for us ... and then there are the bugs. Constantly working on 6 or 7 apps and must open all morning before starting.”

Reference 54 -

"Recently, it was pretty negative; we want to impose things very quickly, so that people are drowning in work, too many changes constantly, especially in the front office. People drop out, our role is to alert, it was nice to do it, try to slow it all, go back, but there is a timetable that must be taken.”

"Today the projects are deployed at full speed, with a ladle: Before we started increasing the skills of my job one month and a half before, here it should start in a week, 15 days, no balls, no objectives or training materials.”

Reference 55 -

"IT deployments are conducted without adequate resources and too quickly.”

Reference 56 -

"I run after the info, I call, I read, it is not always enough. When these are simple projects, cross with simple words, all right, but when we enter a more complicated job, or parts of the business that I do not know at all, that is another matter.”

Reference 57 -

"Constantly pressured, we can only work on priorities, it only deals with emergencies, which is less urgent is left hanging and then it becomes urgent ... it stresses me a little, it is, there is always something late, we cannot make "background tasks”. We only handles emergency ... We have no time to do construction ... Yesterday I took an hour to see my budget, my wallet, this is the first time in 3 years. There is no time to make more sales because it manages emergencies ... "

Reference 58 -

"There is no work ethic and moral values. We must follow the indicators that often describe the process and not the quality of work well done. We are dealing with customers and we try to ensure and demonstrate their professionalism and customer respect, while we know that in the eyes of management the customer is an invoice for enriching shareholders.”

"We all know the meaning of work is often flouted by the economic dominance. We do not work to meet a client, or to satisfy the common welfare, but to generate profit and satisfy shareholders. Thus it may be necessary to work on projects to optimize efficiency and thus
reduce the workforce while the provision of staff coupled with good organization, are guarantees of quality, well-being and common sense.”

"Too much load causes harm. The target of the figures also grows evil done; and this is not good for the customer (yet is at the center). The change of responsibility for the post makes no promotion or recognition. The meaning of work goes towards the shareholders, e.g. the understaffed provide customer dissatisfaction because the work cannot be done satisfactorily.”

Reference 59 -
For a year I have managed alone a team of 50 technicians, not happy to be there and I've done impossible schedules.”

Reference 60 -
"The reclassifications had to be on the right picture at the right time. Some were propelled like that group leader or even department head. They always had the same profile and little or no training. Some were not made to the manager. But if we were not in the picture, no chance for a promo.”

"Anyway, we are told nothing, we do not really know how it goes promotion and then everything classification. People who have not accepted the reclassification had a career blockage.”

"We have no recognition. We're fighting because he asks us to do more and more. It's been 13 or 14 years that I have the same index and never promoted.”

Reference 61 -
"The promotion system at Telco, it is relatively opaque. There opacity compared to that, it does not display promotions. Maintenance of progress I do not believe for a long time, I continue to do it but it's been six or seven years that I'll live to maintenance, but before I was preparing right now I do not care.”

Reference 62 -
"The talks progress, it's a big hoax, my boss is the one who does, he signs. But to the extent that there is no contest. Where we want, when we want, we have to get along with a senior.”

Reference 63 -
"Bonus are often given secretly and they say not to tell others. We are still 106,000? Well, there are 106,000 different treatments because local leaders have more power than in private company. In the private sector, the rules are clearer and stricter. Here if you ask nothing, you have nothing. Some recruits do not even know all the social rules. As HR have disappeared and the treatments are much more discriminating than before.”

"Department heads are real baronies. The rules are very different by region. Even the group leaders establish their own rules. This is the jungle.”

Reference 64 -
"For the promotion, everything is predetermined, we do believe that there will be two 2.3 spaces, but in fact it's a bit of the masquerade, it really is not encouraging. People they go
there, but everything is preordained and people are disgusted with the shot. In general we
know who, what, how, it's a bit biased. On the talks progress, there is one marked pleased
with you, you can manage a team and nothing happens, it's nothing at the end.”

"Yes, I am satisfied with my career, but the problem is that the rules are not clear,
promotions, all this is not very clear. I have already applied to a management position and it
was played, they had someone on the job. I applied once for group leader, it's five years on
my progress interview I say I want to be promoted.”

Reference 65 -
"People who invest are not recognized. I had my bonus by being aggressive, but some do not
dare. Well then I have an expertise so I have threatened to stop helping others to pressure
them”.

Reference 66 -
"I resented being sidelined. The company has accompanied it. The N + 2 was aware of the
situation but he left to do ... When he sees me (he's retired) on the occasion of an apero, it is
still uncomfortable. I have not done either waves. I have contacted person, I took such a blow
on the head…”

Reference 67 -
"You realize, I was manager and all I had to do was sort mail! I asked work to my colleagues
to unload them.”

"I am assigned to a site where there is none. I see no colleague. I have a phone call from my
head every three months is a good guy, I like him. At first, I worked a little, now I only go
even they are not for me.’’

Reference 68 -
"I'm afraid if I stop, I will not return.”

"If I stop, I would show them that they have won”.

"I have no desire to go to my personal interview, it'll be a test, they will still make me
understand that I have to go ... but I want to work.”

Reference 69 -
"Well it's going to 2 years I have no job, I'm on a mission as they say. So occasionally I go
back to the site to access the intranet and see the ads, I arrange with colleagues to lend me
their PC... I'm in severe depression for 9 months.”

Reference 70 -
"In 1998, just went, I lost my job, I divorced, and good I collapsed completely. Today I
cannot drive more than 100 km / h on the highway.”

Reference 71 -
"Heads must fall. I re-sleep at night when all these types, the CEO and his gang will be up
there in prison when they pay for what they did. There's been dead anyway shit! Just that, that
should be enough to condemn them.”
Reference 72 -
"I have touched on several trades. I thought it was a company's strength. I touched the area of billing, support shop international work in operator support, etc. Today I have been re-appointed here in IT"

Reference 73 -
"Anyway, all these reorganizations, it's not very consistent. Putting people on the move ... I say it's to make them leave."

Reference 74 -
"On mobility, we need to know, they are never posted in due time. Vacancies are treated secretly. The position that I left was not posted yet. It took 7 months to be published. I have not received any call for questions about the position.

"The positions are not posted immediately, everything is word of mouth treaty, I'm looking for a position for a year."

"I did not want to play the network, but I realized that when someone recommends someone, it makes more sense to take that than to go through the interviews process. I applied two positions online, no phone call."

Reference 75 -
"The human resource director is absent, they are not there, you never see the guys..."

Reference 76 -
"The HR department is no longer present. My local HR is located 200kms from my office"

Reference 77 -
"When we address the Human Resources Department, one has the feeling of facing a wall, or there is no answer or the answers are not clear."

Reference 78 -
"HR sometimes adopt bizarre behavior. I made a transfer request, I had an answer by SMS. I do not know who sent it. "The HR function has changed, it's more of reporting that communication. There has been a change in payroll, there has been a general email and you could go to the tutorial for more information. It could have been a quick presentation team meeting ... it's about ... not that of writing. Now whenever there is a change, it was an email or something like that... Everything is done like that ... HR, logistics."

Reference 79 -
Human relationships no longer exist."

"In terms of Human Resources, in large companies today, the word "Resources "you can keep it and the word" Human "you can steer it. This activity has been completely dehumanized."

"The what? We called the inhuman resources. Before we had the registries. It's possible to resolve situations, including opacity promotions. Me it's been 3 years since I asked to be
promoted and I have a vague answer, but nothing. The manager decides it no longer appeals. This is the human side that we lost.”

Reference 80 -
"The HR guys when we see them, it is to tell you that your position is deleted or moved.”
"HR practices are known, we know which way it is, it's not worth it.”

Reference 81 -
"If you put the finger in the development space, you're screwed! If you request information, you are labeled a volunteer for an external mobility and they do not let you anymore.”

Reference 82 -
"I did not understand, and I care less. As long as they do not ask me to fire someone, that's good”.

"Me, I was educated on the fact that I take responsibility, technical legitimacy which I have built gives me value ... but that's down. People are told that we need managers and non-technical managers. And who bears the technical responsibility now?”

Reference 83 -
"I met all my bosses, though, but they know nothing. The one before, he was okay, he understood when speaking about telecommunication. Technically, they know nothing.

Reference 84 -
"At the company, middle management decides less... when something need to be decided, it comes from the head.”

"My N + 1: he is two days there, three in Paris, he only applies what falls from above. ’
"The manager must obey their leader, and do everything that his boss told him. That's what many managers.”

Reference 85 -
"Since 2002, technical competence was no longer a criterion. Recruitment policies have become. Managers have sought to surround themself with yes-men, people who do not dare say no. The company has become a political business ... it ends to authoritarianism. There is no control of the situations by the skill or technique, we are all over monitored.”

Reference 86 -
"We do not talk with my manager when I ask him something, he replies that it does not depend on him.”

Reference 87 -
"People are afraid to indulge, to tell what they do, if one would take away their jobs, so even if they can not do their job, they say nothing, it is not in the interests of the company; Some of our activities are very technically complicated things, to understand the evolution of our business, we must work together... But, we are in ignorance of each other, people do not talk. "No one is trying to take responsibility, everyone has cold feet.”

Reference 88 -
"Between 2001 and 2004, I changed of manager every 6 months. One tried to understand but most of them were “blahblah” managers, those who speak for nothing to do things reluctantly."

Reference 89 -
"The golden rule of management in the company, it is especially not to make waves, saying nothing that can challenge something or someone."

Reference 90 -
"Managers look only to their careers, and how to move forward quickly... Managers have completely changed. They are less emotional. Those who are below them are transparent, interchangeable, they must produce what is expected of them, "You did not do your job ... I do not want to know the reason"

“They want to keep a certain distance to not establish ties."

"My N + 1 is an officer who is inserted in the circuits who only exists through its nuisance. It would defend that managers and their teams are a human minimum as many who only defend their positions.”

Reference 91 -
"I'm the only one of my service that has not been promoted since the reclassification of 1996. I am also the only one who says what he thinks. I am not sufficiently submissive. I must say amen."

"People were expected to say Amen to what the hierarchy says..."

"The former managers were protecting their teams. They are replaced by people subject to the hierarchy.”

Reference 92 -
It made me realize that it's been three years that I have this position, which is the limit for a manager. I need to move.”

Reference 93 -
"In two and a half years, I'm on my third and fourth N + 1 and N + 2 managers.”

Reference 94 -
"But managers are there for 27 months, executives can make the mess they want to go off after each draw down the drain.”

"Those who make promises leave.”

Reference 95 -
"More and more indicators are asked ... while explaining that we will be fewer.”

Reference 96 -
"We increase the objectives every year without reflection on the feasibility ... for example, we now are required to do 50 customer visits per month, that would be ... 2 days per week; it is not feasible... It affects our credibility, we lose motivation therefore."
"All goals ... they went too far, too far from the field..."

Reference 97 -

"We have an enormous gap between what is announced from above - as part of the overhaul, at the leadership level (...) - and what happens on the field. We have been told: "We should forgot two values: the sweetness and kindness, we must give them up". " Then we go down to our regions with regional bosses or other directions, and here the speech is: "If you do not do your figures and ratios, it will not be possible," so there is a double standard. I am well aware that we must do business to the customer, but I find awkward the way they presented things. A territorial director told the vendors: "Everything will change, more productivity pressure, we do not require you to move", this has been the talk of CEO who decline to go on the ground, then the sector boss who is very well but like us, he says: "The objectives of numbers is the same." The CEO has not dropped the company’s objectives, and it will continue to put pressure on sales guys."

Reference 98 -

"We did everything on our backs, we first level managers."

"And then, those who are on the front line of accusation, now that all the newspapers speak of poor employees of the company. We are the team leaders who are accused but to us we only did what have we been asked. And the pressure we put? And the lack of flexibility they give us?"

Reference 99 -

"I will not do certain things at the expense of human beings below me, implement the decisions taken in a hurry, when three months later we will see that it was impossible."

Reference 100 -

"I live with people who are ill every day."

Reference 101 -

"As a team leader, you had to find places for employees and resettle themselves. Sometimes we had to motivate them to work when it was known that the division would close ... I had 2 years of insomnia and 19 to 20 of tension. It hurts to see my colleagues under me suffering like that. Can you imagine? This is unacceptable!"

Reference 102 -

"Some managers spend their time tracking down the numbers. But they are suffering, and also completely disconnected from their teams. Near managers, they took their decision on the basis of instructions from the levels above. People saw them as inhuman levels related to +2, +3. The employees felt a union of n + X levels but in fact the local managers were only doing what they has been requested to do."

Reference 104 -

"No responsibility for me, it is the other that decided everything they said, they are coward leaders, who do not want problems."

"After all, if people die, it's not me who pushed the button!" That is their attitude."
Reference 105 -
"I was thrown into the bath. Our manager told us: "You should be 6, you are 3", it will be hard. But it helps us, sustains us. We receive recognition, promotions, congratulations. I'm having."

"Our service, these are simple people who know they are limited, but help each other. Our service is devalued, so we rallied and we get along well. The manager is close to retirement, he hosted and organized. It's a good atmosphere, with solidarity and conviviality. People have been taken under the wing of the manager. Everyone feels good. The manager still has his office open."

"I have a very good N + 1 and N + 2. They serve my models and I want to become like them. My N + 1 is near, and it helps me. Available, welcoming and good listening skills. There is no competition in the group, but a very good cooperation. "Some managers protect their teams. They reduce the orders they receive. They take their responsibilities and take risks."

Reference 106 -
"I'm lucky, my manager gets wet, it does so on the sly, unofficially, for this is not seen above, because it is not done in the box."

"He was angry with his leadership, I do not know if he will stay in office"

Reference 107 -
"My manager gave me an objective to achieve. I did not want to, there was no reason. He did not believe that I would take the risk of leaving. He thought I had no choice, I would never leave [...]. I left and I am glad not to have worked. I refuse working with such manager in these conditions. After I left, they continued and the guy ended up leaving."

Reference 108 -
"My colleague had an audit in another site of the company for three months. It was a useless mission and he knew it. We wanted to make him leave."

Reference 109 -
"It's a real psychological war. The leader is not interested in what we do. He only wants to make us leave, "You go when... You leave when?"

"I attended what undergone a colleague. The chef and the continued constantly asking her when she was leaving. Even on the subway platform."

"It's hard to swallow, since we have more than 50 years and that is official, we continuously receives mail asking us implicitly to leave. We are likely to have resented this way of wanting to get rid of people. When a person refuses to leave CFC, it removes him his job ... and it sends to the development space."

Reference 110 -
"We were not prepared to sneak attacks management. R & D has long been spared. They took care of us after as we were in charge the network."

Reference 111 -
The former head he left with a big promotion. We all broken by his acts but he had his promo. Normal he had done "the least".

Reference 112 -

"From a certain point, the cast of managers has been their ability to shake the tree and fired people. They selected raw, killers, people who terrorize everyone. Managers are selected to traumatize people."

"My head ... was commissioned to do the dirty work. He made a memorandum stating that our boss just dismissed and was appointed in a ministry. He was competent and respected. The objective is now an Excel sheet."

"Our leader ... has been replaced by a madman. He fired into the crowd, and managed to send off 30 staff. It was the star. He said it is necessary to do this for them to leave. 'We saw a paper in which he described his method. First suppression of people, second, pressures of all kinds. Many have cracked, there were in tears, some suffered from health problems. People left. He[the manager], he broke his goals, he was the hero. He was promoted elsewhere.'"

"What is valued is the level of turnover, and here in X, it is lower than Y. But they agree on the objective of achieving the same ratio."

Reference 113 -

"During my annul interview, despite I achieved my objectives, the overall assessment was: "Poor integration into the team..." When they can not criticize the work, they attack people. I have not been able to change that assessment."

"I was valued enough in my absence. "I have been evaluated before receiving my goals. "My manager told me, "You are a big no. What you do is useless.""

"In two weeks my assessment increased from "achieved its objectives" to "has not achieved its goals. " Several notes were lowered without justification. I never saw the manager who assessed me. For six months he had never come to see me. In the end, the assessment was that "there is no match between the position and the incumbent, X must initiate a process of mobility..."

Reference 114 -

"When my colleague came back from maternity leave, she had no more space, no more badge. She had to look for work."

Reference 115 -

"Then I got a new boss, she no longer saw the need for my job ... She invited me to do something else, I did not get any bonus, my service vehicle was not renewed. One wonders what happens ... we will see the development space. I became so-called bad. Luckily I had my family, I guess for those who are alone, it would have been horrible!"

"In 2005, I was promoted to manager of the team. One day my N + 2 told me that I am not able to manage. There is one year, I was forbidden to make changes in my teams, the job of my assistant was removed. In October, my N + 2 cancelled my managerial responsibilities, but my N + 1 leaves me to my position. It becomes completely incoherent, I'm no longer
respected, I have the right to not to say anything, it is not clear and the work suffers. They do all this for me to leave because in 2 years, I am 60 years old.”

Reference 116 -
"I was told you have problems with your colleagues. Everything is done to destroy the team spirit.”

"A member of the team has been put aside. He must look for work. It is on the brink of depression. It wanted to work, and we were forbidden to give him something. The only possibility was the mobility, or go to a job agency."

"Since we did not find me a job that suited me, I found myself alone for 3 months in this huge open space, without window”.

"During these two years, it's been hell. Chief ignored me, put aside like an old sock. I had to work the ball in the stomach, but I did not want to stop.”

Reference 117 -
"I have no qualms, I execute the directives. That sounds immoral, but I have a family."

Reference 118 -
"Obviously it is questioned by dint of being told one is zero, or when we have more work to do. We think what we have not done our job, why we deserve this.”

Reference 119 -
"My former manager, it was a great technician, appreciated and respected by all, now it changes the lighting tubes.”

Reference 120 -
"We stopped to say hello.”

"People end up closing the eyes, tagged by leaving the person alone.”

"But when people were dismissed and have not found work, people just marginal, they resist and become ghosts and wander the hallways, it's not easy. I'm the type of guy who feels guilty, so I decided to hide these people, but sometimes I think: "They are there, they see us working like bees," then we take a quarter of an hour to discuss but it is not enough to defend them, we should do better.”

Reference 121 -
"Some have emerged shocked by becoming aware of what they had done, but many others only talked about their goals.”

"For N + 1, they are subject to a contradictory discourse. They can break. They realize what they have done"

Reference 122 -
"How can they look in the mirror in the morning I do not understand!”
"Managers are no longer credible, change them! In the department, the manager stayed only 2 years. He did not know anyone or anything but it has to get its promotion because he "makes what he has been told to do".

Reference 123

"The change of direction, do I believe? You're kidding. Anyway, it's all for shareholders.”

Reference 124

"This is certainly important, but the past also counted. Between 1996 and 2000 I changed 7 or 8 times of branch, my bosses were 700 km away, reorganizations are chained and gradually I was diagnosed with chronic fatigue also called fibromyalgia incurable and highly debilitating disease. For the recent months, I invested much less and I know many colleagues who do the same…”

The corporate change plans changed all the time, it seemed that everything was disorganized. At one point everyone was wondering where he would be the next day, now it seems that it will calm down...

Reference 125

"For 20 years at Telco, the workload was greater from 1995 to 1998 where I received clients and had much to learn in customer products and services, software..."

Reference 126

"This is the biggest issue. The greatest differences between private law and the public law employees, is about the remuneration. The biggest change since the privatization is about the pay indeed. Before, the salary was attached to the administrative rank defined by the exam passed by the employee. Now, it is based on the activity of the employee.

Reference 127

"I am asked to perform multiple tasks in very different technical areas with partial mastery because it is impossible to know everything. We never saw a plumber to do the bodywork or paint on car and do a job in the rules of art, it is neither made, nor do"

Reference 128

"After all these incessant restructuring carried out at a rapid pace and often without explanation, (except to say" no one has the choice, it comes from above ") .... it can quickly become very difficult to live, if not impossible to resolve new issues ... .The line managers avoid discussions and prefer "recite" the lesson, e.g. the "official" speech. So they do not give "meaning" to changes and developments."

Reference 129

"Everyone tries to keep his place or to find the best possible point of fall depending on geographical or business..."

Reference 130

"The ongoing restructuring has broken human relationships and diluted skills. Cue loss in who does what in the company... What is the medium-term strategic plan for Telco?"
Reference 131 -

"Most of us have a very customer-oriented culture and see they are abused. The reorganization is almost harder to live due to sudden movements. ... People have lost confidence in their business and feel that their managers are powerless to explain to them, protect them."

Reference 132 -

"In 1995 I lost my job as technician telephony. Since I travel from services to services within the company for job training (1 day to 1 week). But as each division were closing few time after my arrival, it was necessary to find a new position after each relocation, and to adapt to new schedules, co-workers; readjust the pace of work. With such restructuring in the company, we left friendliness, recognition ".

Reference 133 -

"We are really in the cultural and managerial... It's very rare that money is the triggering element. This is what will make things to be made possible. The click is done on a project, the desire to have a new life, a frustration we feel at Telco. We are all traumatized by the changes. We get bonuses when a number of criteria are met. But money is not the first criterion for us. The work of the development areas that relate to HR, is to trigger the glimmer of hope.”

Reference 134 -

"It's a cultural problem: deciding to work over 45 years it is a trauma. It is the role of the development areas to which this support is as much psychological as financial. Many are telling us thank you and...why I did not do it sooner!”

Reference 135 -

"I was in contact with the Human Resources Development Department, I have had discussions but they offered me a call center.. It was like that almost 4-5 months to do only one thing. No assistance, unlivable situation. I was alone, all day and do nothing. My health took a hit: I too riddled for years, I am depressed, I take medication against the anxiety, it broke me.”

Reference 136 -

"We see HR crack and weep with us (....) but what!? Our managers can no longer speak of other things than figures. They live in offbeat, often uprooted from their origins and their families, they are lonely and isolated in small flats in the city away from it all and spend whole evenings and nights was mulling over their work (over family life, over benchmark on schedules, loss of awareness of the lives of others..) and plagued by depression and loneliness

Reference 137 -

"Our HR meetings, it was only Excel tables and starting numbers and bonus awards, we saw only this, the system had gone mad"

"I had to stop, it was unbearable, I have done a depression"

Reference 138 -
"I never want to return to the HR perimeter, the stories of suicide, I saw them up close, cries for help, malls, I have seen much, writing ... and the great leader replied 'j' am considered your email, I address to such who will take care to keep me informed ', that's all, it was in 2007; it was necessary that people leave.”

Reference 139 -
"The most important part of my job is my chair, I'm afraid of losing my chair, I do not want to take my vacation, I'm afraid of losing my chair"

Reference 140 -
"This atmosphere led to a depressed situation on all staff with a constant fear: that's when my turn? This situation, which pulled me thoroughly every day for a year had an impact on my health: hyper-tension, permanent headaches and I was taken to see a cardiologist. Anyway, I do not think being able to stay at Telco very long in this environment without endangering my health "

Reference 141 -
"Needless to say, when it was not, it had transpired on family life tremendously, now that it's better, it's getting better, but it has left scars in the family life.

"If I arrive late at home, I found my daughters in tears before the gate. They are afraid that something happens to me.”

Reference 142 -
"My daughter wants me to change of job" "With the pressure at work, I can not stand my children at night."

Reference 143 -
With my mobility in the south, my husband followed, he thought to find a job soon, he was unemployed for two or three years "

Reference 144 -
"I had an extraordinary career for a long time, making the game of geographic and functional mobility. My family followed: this has generated a lot of difficulties for children, my wife also working for. But for children it was a bit hard, they have a somewhat irregular schooling, suddenly they missed their studies, university. Just high school, so they work, but, with the minimum wage level. I have them changed every three, four years of school, high school. I am against the choices I have made. My kids say I do not know where I am, (...) they do not blame me for them. This is another life, they have traveled a lot, but I see the difference from other friends, sedentary, where children have a higher education.”

Reference 145 -
"First they send you to the development area, then they do not let you more, we receive mails, your manager asks you where you are and then if we find nothing after they put you on a mission, we know what does that mean, once, twice, three, then after nothing is left alone in an office..."
"They announce mobility are meetings to find. It is not known how they choose, my colleague cracked, she said she could not because of his family."

Reference 146 -
I was told I have to prove myself, but I gave it my all for my business but I know why all the doors are closed, my HR makes me shift my proposals or insulting ... HR thought 'ok we have a job for you in six months and you're doing to find a job,' it's a year. We propose you to support positions, one level below mine, I received a message last night, I said no to four or five proposals in the morning. I understand that people throw themselves from the third day of the crisis."

Reference 147 -
"Some colleagues are suffering, while they were on top of their profession, they have even been mounted without competition grade and today they are treated as less than nothing, they are told 'you're the worst, the most miserable of the unit... It was said, I was in a service where someone wanted to kill himself, I was on appeal, the colleague was arrested a month, she responds very well to customers, but on sell-side it does not work, the manager told her she was zero, they made him change service, it returns to disease, it is said that he changed to another team, he said he will commit suicide.

"We were betrayed. You are treated as less than nothing. We are the victims, we do not revolt. We are too well behaved. We must be able to keep our dignity. A leader should not accept anything. Why a leader immediately call us by “tu”? There is a mix of genres. Lack of respect for people. It affects the integrity. There was breaking a pact without notice. We invest everything in working life balance, now extra hours are not counted! No achievement as an individual. When you lose your job, you lose everything. The human being must be treated as a citizen, legally and equitably. As an adult you can hear. When they tell us we do not want to change, it is stupid. They believe we think after our retreat, it is wrong. We want to live, that's all. The man is not working for the money, the man is social. We must rebuild from a simple and coherent project.

Reference 148 -
"I was very surprised at the harshness with which he deals with people who can not / will not leave. It is also a problem. The choice of termination was not done but it is not fully assumed, or rather, we ask employees to find solutions and without helping them. There is a glaring absence of HR on these topics. Dismissal decision not taken at the highest level but then no management…"

Reference 149 -
"No moral, On-site... It is instead of the number of sales and even the number. Valorization is the God, the thing above everything. The point is that in the evening the figure is good, no matter how? Who? And where”

Reference 150 -
"I was working in a shop, I was known, and my parents who lived in the countryside, I was going to see them often, it was the time when the dial telephones were changed for keys posts and they came to my house to ask some help. It was not an empty word public service,
service to the people. I was glad that people left satisfied with the store, I was happy I was serving in something, I did not count my hours, it was for free".

Reference 151 -
I have a negative image of me whereas two years ago. I was proud to have had the courage. What a disappointment ... and now what?”

Reference 152 -
"The atmosphere is tensed, everyone is worried, though, and I'm tired of undergoing these changes, I am an actor in change ... "

Reference 153 -
"It's okay here, one does not complain, frankly, I often go to department’s meetings, I see my colleagues on the platforms, we live with the fear that it stops, it spreads fear, we are told restructuring are occurring in 2012. Do we have to sell our homes to be transferred elsewhere ...?"

Reference 154 -
"After thirty years in the business, I need to make a resume to be transferred, but this is ridiculous, as if they did not know what I did, like I should sell. This is the company task to help me find a job.”

Reference 155 -
"They were two, they looked down on me, they showed that they did not want me, I was quite happy driveway, I came away completely distraught"

"The first day my manager told me "I did not choose you."

Reference 156 -
"Cumbersome procedures to be followed, including reporting term (concept of brief since the introduction of lean management). So, management is very litigious. (Why not?) There are lists of corrective actions without any perspective with the daily work (sense of priorities ...) The quality (process) is no longer the objective of the Group's basic. It's sad, very time consuming and inefficient, not to mention the lack of recognition for background activity.”

Reference 157 -
"I sent an email to the HR there three months, I still have no answer, so I wait and I have nothing to do.”

Reference 158 -
"The disruption of services, the constant change of working methods, cumbersome procedures, poor working conditions are the main causes of deterioration. The lack of real leaders (we have lots of managers but few officials who know the meaning of the work. No real long-term policy for customer loyalty.”

Reference 159 -
"The new manager, arriving in the morning, I was cast: I was told that I was too
old for this team. I had always been praised, but I was increasing the average age of the team, I was alone in my corner. I postulated for fifteen positions, I was always too old, no skills, denied on all posts, I had two missions (each six months), I had, it seems, not the skills to continue: I was lucky to have this job but it ends soon, I had my interview yesterday. I was invited to change.

I'm 60 in three years, I do not know if we will put pressure on me or what. I will wish to go back to where I was, I would have a year to get back into the circuit, because everything has changed, a new market, it is impossible economically, I do not know what I'll do…”

Reference 160 -

"It will be three years that I have no job, I'm “on a mission” as they say. So from time to time, I return to the site to access the intranet and see the ads, I arrange with colleagues to lend me their PC... but I feel that it bothers them this situation. And you know, somewhere I understand.”

Reference 161 -

"I'm doing this under duress, I dreamed of having an accident for not coming to work, sometimes we had targets. When they put us sales targets, they separated the groups that got along well, reorganization in the unit happened. I was depressed during two years. It was a little better after, sometimes by period, it was more complicated, and I had a lot of family problems that did not help…”

Reference 162 -

"After all these incessant restructuring carried out at a rapid pace and often without explanation, (except to say" we do not have a choice, it comes from above "), people have become more individualistic, less supportive... So we often find ourselves more often alone with the various labor issues. If in addition, a person has few difficulties or personal concerns, it can quickly become very difficult to live, if not impossible to solve or more. The atmosphere between colleagues is not really bad, but a degree of mistrust (every man for himself...) and made of rivalries, often maintained by the hierarchy (you have to show that one is better, and especially essential...).”

Reference 163 -

"In the Paris region stress is linked to public transportation and is added to the many entities reorganizations, restructurings causing changes in business activities and do not leave time for employees to better know their new activity.”

Reference 164 -

"I was forced mobility, I lose my job, it goes wrong, no open communication, such things are kept secret until the last moment, I heard at the last moment, while I was responsible, I asked, I was told it is not safe, holding meeting to announce changes”.

Reference 165 -

"We warned at the last moment, there was little anticipation is unbearable for employees at all levels"
"What scares me is to see people around me who are ill."

"There are colleagues who crack it's hard; I take my PC and I will work elsewhere."

"I understand people who have committed suicide. I do not want to, because I'm a believer."

Reference 167 -

"I have a very heavy workload, I often comes very late, I work on weekends ... It was not discussed at the couple's life. It was hard for a few years now it goes. "Senior Manager.

"At one time, they went up the structure, I was working up to 60 hours per week. I gave up my family life, my children. So at a time when I have been asked to continue in that position, I said no, I made the choice to my personal life and my health, though, I miss my current position”.

Reference 168 -

"I separated from my wife and I go to work less now. My work had an impact in my private life, It was promoting through a carrot, I am involved and I was not realizing that I was spending 6 days a week from 8 am to 9 pm; it has played in the separation.”

Reference 169 -

"I have given everything to this company, I was doing some crazy trips, I had crazy hours, I was at the Board of my unit, and they put me aside ... I have proposed many ideas to reboost sales, to intervene in store, on the reorganization of stocks, I intervened to propose many ideas on management, some of them are being nationally implemented, it let me down.”

Reference 170 -

"It's terrible, I had lived reorganizations, I was conducted some of them. I was investing a lot, I even increased the turnover and two years later, I was told "we not need you.”

Reference 180 -

"It was a job that I chose, which I liked a lot, we were proud, very proud, I participated in the construction of the network for the whole country, the pinnacle of that, it was for the Olympics. My wife was hostess, I was working for the network, we were proud and we lost it, and now we feel like working... "

Reference 190 -

"They do what they want, it does not interest me, I divorced the company the day I was pissed off for a sick child...”

Reference 191 -

"In 2005, I struggled, I suffered a lot. It was a project to develop services: this was to be led by twelve people, but people were actually six, folders were piling ... You have to get them something which you are not convinced and you pass it knowing that it brings difficulties, stress...”

Reference 192 -

"Now I dropped, it is not worthwhile to make holes in the stomach, some would live that more or worse, I dropped two or three years ... I'm not violent, but I've ever had suicidal
ideas, but I sleep well, I have stomach problems and I had to be easy to live with me sometimes, but after a while we try to ignore it all.”

Reference 193 -

"I expect I retired in four more years ... and unit was threatened six months ago to optimize the productivity, when I came in 2005, I was told:" Do not imagine finishing your career here, "I know, I changed every four years”. I think I'll try to stay put unless they propose an interesting position but I do not think so, because it is the young who have good proposals, not me.”

Reference 194 -

"I stopped early in the year, I almost hit my head, I stopped two weeks. The manager even, he stopped three weeks.”

Reference 195 -

"I'm doing nothing… I will leave Telco for long illness.”